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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 36**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 7, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was scheduled to work from (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) at BRA, and after reporting for duty, he was assigned to work a detail near (b) (7)(E) Texas. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed that on that date, he had a government-owned vehicle (GOV) available for his use throughout his working shift. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 12:00 p.m., Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, put out a message to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) unit working in (b) (7)(E) that everyone was to report to Uvalde regarding a school shooting, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed them to get in touch with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, for further instructions (timestamp 00:11:47).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall how the message regarding the school shooting was transmitted to him and his coworkers from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove alone utilizing the GOV's emergency lights and sirens the entire way from Brackettville to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was driving, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed a message advising which radio channel to utilize for the incident and instructed him to report directly to the Uvalde Civic Center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that all the responding law enforcement agency's radios were patched together, and he could hear the Texas Department of Public Safety, the Uvalde County Sheriff's Office, and BPAs putting out a lot of radio traffic.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon his arrival at the civic center, he saw other BPAs who indicated they needed assistance with the school buses that were on the way to the civic center with teachers and students. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while they were waiting on the buses to arrive, he and the other BPAs explained to parents who had gathered at the civic center that the children would need to first go inside the civic center before they could be released. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted with the arrival of two or three busloads of teachers and students. He noted he and his fellow BPAs created a lane by using their physical presence, thereby allowing them a clear pathway to walk from the bus into the civic center.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not specifically identify which USBP supervisor was issuing orders at the civic center; however, he believed it may have been someone from the Uvalde Station. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP had command and control of the area immediately outside of the civic center, as they were the only agency with enough personnel there to assist (timestamp 00:22:31).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied ever seeing or hearing anyone from USBP giving directives to agents or officers from other agencies, noting that later in the operation, he observed other agencies appeared to have positions on the perimeter (timestamp 00:23:13).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that other than telling the parents outside of the civic center that they needed to let the students go inside of the civic center after getting off the bus, he issued no direct orders to anyone (timestamp 00:23:42).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied having any conflicts with parents outside of the civic center, noting that they understood there was a process in place (timestamp 00:24:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled he worked with BRA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside of the Uvalde Civic Center, noting that all the other BPAs were from other stations, and he did not know them by name.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were people dropping off water bottles, which he helped hand out to the parents who were gathered outside the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied treating anyone medically while at the site (timestamp 00:29:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated response time was a factor in USBP responding to the incident at the school and indicated that because of the types of training they participate in, they can assist other agencies if needed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied hearing any shots fired on the date of the incident,



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being issued a body-worn camera, or maintaining any emails, texts, or reports discussing the incident (timestamp 00:30:16).

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that once all the children and parents departed the civic center, they repositioned and set up a perimeter where they fielded questions from the public, some of whom were attempting to access the civic center to vote. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that later in the afternoon, Watch Commander<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> BRA, was in charge of the USBP personnel that remained at the civic center. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that at approximately 5:45 p.m., he was relieved of his duties and instructed to return to his post of duty. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated another BPA he did not know replaced him. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he reported back to BRA and then proceeded to his residence. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> confirmed he has engaged in Active Shooter training (timestamp 00:37:35).

Prior to concluding the interview, BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> utilized printed maps to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
2	Maps reviewed by BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 7, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he began his shift at (b) (7)(E) attended the daily muster, and then departed CAR. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he received a call from the duty supervisor to return to CAR because he would be going to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he then retrieved a rifle and magazines and rode with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a USBP Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) (timestamp 00:09:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while enroute to Uvalde, they received text messages from Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who directed them to the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 00:10:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) raveled to Uvalde in a separate vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the civic center, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned them to a parking lot on the same side of the building as the Walgreens (timestamp 00:12:20).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they were advised by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to keep traffic in and out of the parking lot to a minimum. He said they remained at that same spot during the entire time in Uvalde (timestamp 00:12:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they received word from either a deputy or a Trooper that people were coming to the civic center to vote, or they were looking for their children who had been transported from the school. He said if a parent came looking for their child, the parent was then directed towards a door where other uniformed officers were (timestamp 00:13:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they were never directed to turn any parents away and never directed any parents away. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never witnessed any CBP personnel turn any parents away.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were other members of management at the civic center. He said Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, was providing information to them (timestamp 00:14:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never went into the civic center. He also said he never went to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:15:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not see any CBP employees restrict parents from seeing their children. He also said he did not see any actions by CBP employees that restricted anybody's right to vote at the civic center (timestamp 00:16:31).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that in reference to his authority, he viewed it more as an "all hands on deck" type of thing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was directed to respond to Uvalde (timestamp 00:17:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not witness any shooting. He did not wear a body camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he does not have any of the text messages he exchanged with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He said he does not have any emails regarding the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he has had Active Shooter training. He said he did not use any of his Active Shooter training, since he did not go to the school (timestamp 00:17:48).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he started his shift at (b) (7)(E). He estimated that from the time he left the station after muster, to when he was called back was 15 to 20 minutes tops. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he arrived at the civic center at approximately 3:30 p.m. (timestamp 00:18:26).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he does not know the time he left the civic center (timestamp 00:19:15).

He said he does recall the sun was going down on the drive back to CAR. He said upon his arrival at the station, he remained at the station and assisted with processing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the drive from Carrizo Springs to Uvalde takes about an hour (timestamp 00:21:15).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they drove (b) (7)(E) which is right near the civic center (timestamp 00:24:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew out his route on the provided maps (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after they left the civic center, they stopped and ate lunch (timestamp 00:25:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they did not run lights and siren while on the way to the civic center. He said they “10-3” that right away, about five minutes into the drive (timestamp 00:28:12).

[Agent’s Note: 10-3 is radio communication code meaning to stop transmitting or stop.]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he would feel comfortable with saying that he left the civic center between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:30:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not see BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) render any type of first aid to anyone while at the civic center. He stated they returned to the station together (timestamp 00:32:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said nobody expressed any sort of discontent with him while he was at the civic center (timestamp 00:34:42).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 7, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he worked the day shift at BRA. He recalled being assigned as the Field Training Officer (FTO) for three trainees identified as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he and his assigned trainees were tracking a group of individuals who illegally entered the U.S. (timestamp 11:18:38).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he heard about the incident at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde from the helicopter pilot who provided air support to assist him and his trainees with tracking the group of individuals who entered the U.S. He recalled the helicopter pilot reported over the radio he had to terminate his air support assistance to respond to a school shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who worked at the Uvalde School District, to ask what she knew of an alleged school shooting. He recalled his supervisor, Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, contacted him and informed him he and his trainees needed to respond to the civic center in Uvalde and to contact SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, upon their arrival. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to remember if SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted him via radio or cellular telephone (timestamp 11:21:36).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the drive to Uvalde took approximately 40 to 45 minutes, and they arrived around 12:00 p.m. He said his route of travel began south of (b) (7)(E) and continued to Uvalde. He was unable to recall any radio communication during the trip to Uvalde. He stated he had his emergency lights activated the entire trip, and the siren was activated when they approached traffic. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he attempted to contact SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the drive to Uvalde via his cellular telephone, but he was unable to make contact. He stated none of the trainees in his vehicle made any telephone calls or spoke with anyone on the drive to Uvalde (timestamp 11:26:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing other agents and local law enforcement officers (LEOs) when they arrived at the Uvalde Civic Center. He said they parked their vehicle and heard from an unknown individual that vans and buses were bringing children to the civic center, and they were to safeguard the children as they entered the building. They were also advised to tell any parents wanting to take their child that they needed to go inside to check their children out. He said they spread out and stood alongside the civic center sidewalk. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had no interaction with any of the parents who arrived at the civic center other than to greet people near him. He recalled remaining at the location where the children arrived for approximately one or two hours. While there, he remembered an unknown Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper provided information that there was a possibility that the shooter's girlfriend had made some threats on social media about wanting to "finish the job" or was mad. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his three trainees were asked to do perimeter security of the Uvalde Civic Center in case she arrived at their location. He said they continued to perform perimeter security at the Uvalde Civic Center until they left between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. (timestamp 11:29:48).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not report to anyone when he arrived at the Uvalde Civic Center. He stated he never contacted SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when he arrived at the civic center, but he did contact Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA. He was unable to recall what they spoke about. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall any USBP command and control at the Uvalde Civic Center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not recall any specific LEO acting in a command capacity or being in charge while they were at the Uvalde Civic Center. He reiterated he and his trainees arrived, and he was told by someone to help get the kids into the civic center so the parents could go inside to get their children. He said he never provided orders to anyone at the Uvalde Civic Center other than to the three trainees under his supervision (timestamp 11:35:17).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled talking to a man he believed worked at Robb Elementary School who was taking injured children off the bus and just being cordial to the people he encountered at the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to provide the names of the individuals he spoke with. He stated he never exercised any authority that impacted any individual's movement during his time at the Uvalde Civic Center. He said he never had to tell any parent arriving to claim their child not to take their child with them while he was at the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 11:38:44).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never provided any aid to any member of the public while at the Uvalde Civic Center. He stated he never saw anyone arrive injured. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was the city and the state's "show", and he was there as a support agency representative. He said that while he was at the Uvalde Civic Center, he never heard any shots fired or reported any gunfire. He stated he never made any telephone calls or updates to anyone back at his USBP station while he was at the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 11:42:12).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have gone to a local high school where parents were trying to get their children, or he may have gone to Robb Elementary School. He recalled hearing this while he was at the civic center, but he could not recall who he heard it from (timestamp 11:43:51).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 7, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, at approximately 11:45 a.m., he was having lunch with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in Carrizo Springs when she informed him of her discovery through social media that a shooting had occurred at Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that later, he reported for swing shift duty at CAR at the normal briefing time at (b) (7)(E). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the briefing, BPAs were notified by Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, that a shooting had occurred at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde (timestamp 14:05:50).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised CAR BPAs to respond to the Hillcrest Funeral Home to provide additional security around the perimeter of Robb Elementary School. At approximately (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) along with his partner BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, departed CAR in their USBP patrol vehicle dressed in their USBP uniforms (timestamp 14:09:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to Uvalde northbound via U.S. Highway 83. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while enroute, he received information from a USBP group chat via text message to respond to the civic center instead of the funeral home (timestamp 14:11:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who gave the specific command to respond to the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that since the incident had occurred several hours prior, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded in their USBP vehicle at a normal speed without using emergency lights and siren (timestamp 14:10:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they arrived at the civic center at approximately 4:00 p.m. (timestamp 14:10:05).

He and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were met by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and were instructed to position their patrol vehicle on the north side parking lot of the civic center for the purpose of blocking public access into the civic center (timestamp 14:14:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that other than receiving instructions from WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was unaware of an established incident command structure at the scene (timestamp 14:17:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while on the north side of the civic center, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he to redirect family members to the main entrance of the civic center, where they would be provided with further information regarding the incident. Both BPAs also directed members of the media to another section of the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never gave any aid, nor did he exercise his law enforcement authority with family members or members of the public.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maintained their position on the north side of the civic center until they were relieved by officers from the Dilley, Texas Police Department (DPD) at approximately 6:30 p.m. (timestamp 14:19:35).

After being relieved by DPD, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated W (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised him and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to return to CAR (timestamp 14:20:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's role in the incident was to respond to the scene of the incident and assist where needed (timestamp 14:22:13).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 40**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y





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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 7, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the BRA brush crew and was working at a remote location near (b) (7)(E) with limited radio and cell phone service, when he initially learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working in USBP uniform and driving a marked USBP vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working with BRA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as well as BRA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who were BPA trainees (timestamp 00:50:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he initially learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School from a helicopter pilot who was working with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs tracking a group of undocumented migrants. The helicopter pilot advised he was leaving to respond to a school shooting in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember at what time the pilot left. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he and the other BPAs continued tracking the group of undocumented migrants for approximately 30 to 45 minutes before being notified to respond to Uvalde (timestamp 00:16:15).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not remember how he was instructed to respond to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed a fellow BPA might have received instruction from Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, to respond to Uvalde and relayed the message to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the others tracking the group of undocumented migrants (timestamp 00:17:01).

BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed for Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any updates while enroute to Uvalde and said communications and updates were limited.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he, along with other BPAs and law enforcement agencies, traveled to Uvalde together in multiple vehicles. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to remember which specific law enforcement agencies traveled to Uvalde with him and the other BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not specifically remember but believed he activated his emergency lights while traveling to Uvalde but not his vehicle siren (timestamp 00:24:40).

While traveling to Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the other BPAs were advised to respond to the Uvalde Civic Center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being instructed by USBP to respond to the civic center but did not remember who provided the instruction or how it was received (timestamp 01:51:57).

Although BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to remember how this instruction was received or who provided the instruction, he recalled the instruction to report to the civic center was received from USBP.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he arrived at the civic center with BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:24:49).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall seeing SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the civic center (timestamp 00:26:12).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not believe he notified anyone with USBP that he had arrived at the civic center (timestamp 01:51:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that on May 24, 2022, when he arrived at the Uvalde Civic Center, other BPAs were already there and advised him that children were being brought to the civic center, and the school district wanted parents to sign out their children inside the civic center to account for the students. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when the children arrived, they were directed into the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember the name of the BPA he spoke to concerning the arrival of the children and the school district plan to have parents sign out their children before leaving the civic center.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that as the buses with children arrived and parents arrived, he and other BPAs directed the children inside and advised parents that they needed to sign out their children inside the civic center, so the school district could account for them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) repeatedly



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announced that parents needed to sign out their children inside the civic center, so the school district could account for all students (timestamp 00:24:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs provided security at the civic center by standing at locations near the civic center (timestamp 00:27:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs spoke with individuals wanting to enter the building and directed them to a school official. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said arriving parents were directed to the front door of the civic center to speak with a school official or administrator (timestamp 00:31:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that most parents entered the civic center, but there were a few grieving parents outside the civic center while BPAs provided security. The school district was responsible for the plan and procedure for parents to retrieve their children from the civic center, and he and other BPAs directed parents inside the civic center to sign out their children for accountability as required by the school district (timestamp 00:31:53).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there was a school administrator or principal at the civic center who seemed to be in charge (timestamp 00:33:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the name of the administrator or principal but described him as a Hispanic male, approximately 5'8", heavy build, wearing a suit with grey hair and a medium complexion. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated the administrator or principal was approximately 50 years of age.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while at the civic center, he consoled parents and might have placed his hand on a parent's shoulder (timestamp 00:35:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not use force to restrain anyone's movement while at the civic center (timestamp 00:36:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs repeatedly told parents they needed to sign out their children inside the civic center, so the school district could account for all students (timestamp 00:36:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the parents seemed to understand that the school district wanted to account for the children, and he did not believe it was a significant issue (timestamp 00:38:19).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide first aid to anyone while at the civic center (timestamp 00:54:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while at the civic center, he received information that a female made a comment on social media about finishing the job or a similar comment and that she might be driving a black car (timestamp 00:28:33).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received information concerning the social media post from another BPA (timestamp 01:53:05).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after receiving this information, he and other BPAs were alert, looking for the female and black vehicle. After receiving the information concerning the social media post, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs spoke with the occupants of approaching vehicles to determine their purpose for being there and directed them to school officials or to where the media was gathered, as appropriate.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after receiving the information concerning the female with the black vehicle, he and other BPAs attempted to obtain additional information to identify the female and vehicle (timestamp 01:01:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised members of the media where other media personnel were gathering. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew other law enforcement agencies were at the civic center, but he was unable to remember which agencies (timestamp 01:02:36).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that after he received information concerning the social media post, Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, arrived at the civic center. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not remember when WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived (timestamp 01:02:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that school district personnel developed and implemented the plan to release children to their parents, and he and other BPAs told parents that children needed to be signed out inside the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) overheard teachers discussing the arrival of students and how they would be taken into the civic center, so the school district could account for all students (timestamp 00:58:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while traveling from Brackettville to Uvalde, he did not receive any additional instruction or information (timestamp 00:55:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember receiving any additional information or hearing radio communications concerning the response to the school shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not told what they were responding to and did not understand the significance of the incident until he arrived at the civic center (timestamp 00:55:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of any USBP supervisor being in charge at the civic center (timestamp 01:01:39).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that after the female and black vehicle associated with the social media post were located, he and other BPAs were allowed to leave the civic center, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to remember what time he left the civic center (timestamp 00:54:30).

After leaving the Uvalde Civic Center, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to BRA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not go to Robb Elementary School in Uvalde on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 00:53:45).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he and other BPAs did a good job at the civic center and did what administrators wanted done (timestamp 01:04:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed BPAs, as law enforcement officers, had a duty to respond to a mass shooting (timestamp 01:05:32).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained USBP is a law enforcement organization, and he wished communication was better. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that with the available information, he and other BPAs did the best they could. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed that as a federal law enforcement officer employed by a law enforcement organization, he had a duty and responsibility to protect the lives of the public (timestamp 01:10:27).

CBP OPR investigators showed maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde, south of Uvalde, the city of Uvalde, Uvalde schools, and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:38:49) (Attachment B).

The maps were labeled one through five, respectively. On map one of north Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from (b) (7)(E) Texas, then onto U.S. Highway 90 into Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated map two of south Uvalde was not applicable. On the map three of Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again marked his route of travel to Uvalde on May 24, 2022. On map four of the Uvalde schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the Uvalde Civic Center where he responded on May 24, 2022, indicated where he parked his USBP vehicle, and indicated where USBP vehicles were parked at the civic center to control traffic after information was received concerning a threat of a possible second shooter (timestamp 01:12:23).

Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that he was diverted from Robb Elementary School to the Uvalde Civic Center to provide security. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated map five of Robb Elementary School was not applicable, since he did not respond to the school and was not at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he did not have a body-worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any text messages or emails concerning the CBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting and did not produce any reports concerning the incident (timestamp 01:10:50).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 41**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 8, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was scheduled to work from (b) (7)(E) until (b) (7)(E) at BRA, and after reporting for duty, he was assigned to work a detail near (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed that on that date, he was working with his Field Training Officer (FTO) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, as well as two other trainees identified as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned a government-owned vehicle (GOV) that accommodated himself and his fellow trainees.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 1:30 p.m., they were completing their work detail and heard a radio transmission from a helicopter advising there was a school shooting in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that a short time later, a radio transmission was communicated by Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, that all BRA working agents were being ordered to report to the civic center in Uvalde (timestamp 00:12:32).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and his team left immediately for Uvalde from the location where they were working and utilized the GOV's emergency lights and siren the entire way. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while enroute, they received no further instructions or information about what had happened; however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was relaying some information she had received that the shooting took place at Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon their arrival at the civic center, at approximately 2:00 p.m., he and his team were trying to identify what assistance was needed. A person that was possibly a school official told them they needed help clearing a path so that the students being transported to the civic center could get inside (timestamp 00:16:43).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at one point, a Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper told him and his team to continue to keep the area clear for the vehicles arriving at the civic center with students. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that as they were waiting for the buses to arrive, he and the other USBP agents spoke with the parents who were asking questions, noting that everyone at the scene was following directives. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that the students arriving on the buses were being ushered into the civic center to check them against the school roster, so they could then be properly released to their parents.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at some point, he received a directive to assist with creating a perimeter around the civic center due to a secondary threat that was being investigated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that outside of giving out a few bottles of water, he did not provide any type of aid to anyone on site.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated CBP has the authority to respond to emergency situations and noted that Uvalde has a lot of USBP agents that live or work in the area.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied ever hearing any gun shots, ever reporting to Robb Elementary School, ever having a body-worn camera activated during his shift, or ever generating any type of official report regarding his activities that day (timestamp 00:22:54).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 4:30 p.m. or 5:00 p.m., Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, told him and his team that another shift of agents would be relieving them of their duties, and they were to return to their post of duty. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that throughout the event, there were numerous law enforcement officials from a myriad of agencies that arrived and provided assistance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he reported back to BRA, arriving at approximately 6:00 p.m., and then he proceeded to his residence. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he has engaged in Active Shooter training (timestamp 00:25:14).

Prior to concluding the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized printed maps to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).





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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 8, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a certified Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) for USBP.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty and assigned to the USBP Checkpoint (b) (7)(E). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at approximately 11:45 a.m., he left the checkpoint to assist two other BPAs with a potential smuggling vehicle on U.S. Highway 57 (timestamp 00:11:51).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at approximately 12:20 p.m., he received a phone call from Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, stating he (BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) needed to respond to Uvalde due to an active shooter situation (timestamp 00:12:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he drove back to the checkpoint to grab his gear prior to driving to Uvalde. He said the drive back to the checkpoint was between 10 and 15 minutes (timestamp 00:13:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he left the checkpoint at approximately 12:35 p.m. He said SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided him with an address to the Command Post (CP) in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the CP was at the funeral home across the street from Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:14:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after he parked his vehicle, he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who advised the situation was under control, and they needed to go to the Uvalde Station (UVA) to muster. He said the muster was supposed to start at (b) (7)(E). He said he left for the station at about 1:45 p.m. (timestamp 00:15:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew his route of travel on the provided maps (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after he arrived at UVA, a message was received about a possible second shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he returned to Robb Elementary School. He said he was there about 10 to 15 minutes when he was approached by Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS. He said DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to ride with him to Flores Elementary School (timestamp 00:17:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when they arrived at Flores Elementary School, he assisted with directing traffic until the school was cleared out (timestamp 00:19:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he directed some parents to doors where the children were located (timestamp 00:20:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated nobody provided him any direction to do this, he just became aware of what was going on and directed people from there (timestamp 00:21:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) was on scene (timestamp 00:22:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he remained on scene for about two hours. He said he cleared from the school at approximately 5:30 p.m. (timestamp 00:23:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not see any CBP personnel restricting parents from accessing their children (timestamp 00:24:20).

He said that during the time he was directing traffic at Flores Elementary School, the people he dealt with were all very respectful (timestamp 00:25:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not have to render any type of first aid to anyone (timestamp 00:26:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after he and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cleared from Flores Elementary School, they returned to the CP at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:26:45).

He said that after arriving at the CP, it was determined they were no longer needed. He went to his vehicle and began to drive back to EGS. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated this occurred at about 6:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:27:00).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that he arrived at EGS to end his shift around 7:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was not ordered to write any type of memorandums. He said he was offered time off if needed to deal with the event (timestamp 00:27:38).

Regarding USBP's authority to assist with this type of event, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is an EMT and first responder, so it is his responsibility to assist when needed under the approval of his supervisor (timestamp 00:28:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never heard any shots while at the scene (timestamp 00:30:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not have a body-worn camera. He said he does not have any text messages or emails regarding the incident (timestamp 00:30:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did receive Active Shooter training while at the USBP academy. He said his post-academy training consisted of refresher training (timestamp 00:33:00).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 43**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 8, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty, wore his rough-duty uniform, worked the (b) (7)(E) shift, and his work assignment was to respond to sensor activations in the BRA area of responsibility (AOR).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he heard about the incident at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde on his service radio. He recalled performing sign cutting with his training unit when a call came out on his service radio for all agents to report to the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 09:15:30).

He said he did not know it was a school shooting and believed it was just a shooting around a school. He recalled working with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, Field Training Officer (FTO), and BRA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when the call came over their service radios. He was unable to provide the name of the individual who directed agents to respond to the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 09:16:55).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remembered getting the order to respond, hurrying to their vehicle, “going lights and sirens”, and getting there in approximately 35 to 40 minutes. He believed they arrived at the Uvalde Civic Center around 1:00 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. He said his coworker, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove them to Uvalde. He believed they began their drive to Uvalde at a ranch at (b) (7)(E) took Farm to Market Road 1572 up to U.S. Highway 90, and stayed on that road to Uvalde. He recalled another USBP vehicle followed them up to the Uvalde Civic Center, but he did not know who was in the other vehicle (timestamp 09:19:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated all he knew was his FTO told them they were to report to the civic center, and they were not going to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 09:25:16).

He said that when they arrived at the Uvalde Civic Center, there were a lot of vehicles and parents looking for their children. He said he received orders to funnel the children getting off from buses into the civic center, to not let parents take their kids, and to have the parents wait until the kids were accounted for. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled meeting up with a BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (first name unknown), BRA, when they arrived at the civic center. He could not recall who was providing instructions to everyone at the civic center when they arrived. He said the instructions he took came from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 09:28:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when he arrived at the civic center, he could not recall who was in charge. He recalled orders being provided to responding law enforcement officers (LEOs). The orders were to ensure kids arriving got into the building, to make sure no parents took their kids when they got off the bus, and to make sure the area was clear, so there was a clear path to the building as the kids were going in. He could not recall who gave those orders but thought it may have been a teacher from Robb Elementary School. He did not provide any orders or guidance to responding LEOs. He said he did not remember anyone from USBP being in charge when they arrived (timestamp 09:30:24).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained his actions upon his arrival at the Uvalde Civic Center. He recalled the instruction to keep the pathway clear from the buses to the front of the civic center doors for the kids to get into the building. He reiterated the instruction was given to make sure the parents did not get their kids right when they get off the bus and the parents had to follow the protocols in place to pick up their children. He said he and other BPAs formed a line along the pathway to allow the kids to get into the building. He believed they performed this task for approximately two hours.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he heard a threat was made to the civic center, which led to perimeter security around the civic center being set up. He stated he was on the backside corner of the civic center. He recalled hearing the threat made to the civic center was from the shooter’s girlfriend. He believed he performed perimeter security at the Uvalde Civic Center for approximately three hours. He was unable to recall who provided the information about the threat by the shooter’s girlfriend or who gave the order to perform the perimeter security (timestamp 09:37:22).





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said his interactions with the public consisted of answering questions presented to him by parents about their children and explaining to parents the process to get their children from the civic center. He said he never exercised any authority that impacted the movement of individuals during the event. He said the people he encountered followed their directions (timestamp 09:38:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not provide any type of aid to members of the public while he was at the Uvalde Civic Center. He said USBP's role in the incident was to provide security. He said USBP's authority/responsibility to respond to the incident was to provide security. He stated he never heard any shots fired during the time he was at the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 09:39:39).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled leaving the civic center around 5:00 p.m. He said he returned to BRA without making a stop, but he could not recall the time he arrived at the station.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 44**



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 8, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the USBP Eagle Pass South Side processing facility, working his normal shift from (b) (7)(E). At approximately 1:00 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a telephone call from Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT, informing him a shooting had occurred at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:33:05).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to EGT to retrieve a USBP vehicle and then to respond to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the time, he was not provided with any specific instructions to perform upon arrival in Uvalde, but later understood he was activated specifically because he was a Peer Support Member.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 2:00 p.m., he departed EGT in his USBP patrol vehicle dressed in his USBP uniform (timestamp 11:35:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was traveling alone in his patrol vehicle behind BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT, who was traveling in his patrol vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not hear any radio transmissions while enroute to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he received a phone call from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT, who advised him to respond to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) (timestamp 11:38:15).

Both BPAs traveled to Uvalde via U.S. Highway 57 with overhead vehicle lights activated (timestamp 11:36:15). They arrived at UVA at approximately 2:40 p.m. (timestamp 11:38:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at UVA, he was not given any specific instructions but helped by getting food and water and was available as a Peer Support Member. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never had any contact with the public in Uvalde and continued to help at UVA until approximately 5:30 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Eagle Pass South Station (EGS) Peer Support Coordinator arrived, he advised him to return to Eagle Pass (timestamp 11:42:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP’s role in the incident was to respond and help at the incident location.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**EXHIBIT 45**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 8, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty, in uniform, and assigned riverine patrol on the Rio Grande River. He said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who heard about the incident over a news radio station, told him (BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) about the incident at Robb Elementary School. He recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted the vessel commander to get their boat out of the water, so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could exit the vessel to respond with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to an active shooter incident in Uvalde. Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT, gave the order for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to travel together to respond to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed they received the call from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to Uvalde around 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. The trip took approximately one hour, and they got to Uvalde around 1:00 p.m. (timestamp 12:17:30).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled their ambulance already had all their gear inside, and they took the M-4 rifle from the riverine vessel with them. He said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove, and they drove up to Pryor, TX and then took U.S. Highway 83 to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall any updates over the service radio or via cellular telephone regarding Uvalde until they got close to the Uvalde area. As they got close, he recalled switching to the Uvalde channel on his service radio and hearing a lot of talking. He stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were talking to each other, planning what they would do when they got to Uvalde. He said the conversation dealt with EMT stuff and what they needed to do when they arrived. He said their EMT vehicle traveled to Uvalde with emergency lights activated, and they only used the sirens as traffic approached. He stated nobody caravanned with them on their drive to Uvalde (timestamp 12:22:04).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as they neared Uvalde, their plan was to go to Robb Elementary School. When they arrived, they parked as close to the school as they could, grabbed their EMT gear, and started heading towards the school. He recalled an unknown SBPA encountered them and advised they head towards the funeral home, as that was a rallying point and for them to look for Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first name or his USBP Station. He located WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and was told that everyone that needed treatment had been treated and for them to rally up at the Uvalde Station (UVA) for a debriefing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed they arrived at the funeral home in Uvalde around 1:00 p.m. (timestamp 12:23:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed they only spent approximately 15 minutes at the funeral home in Uvalde. He recalled that during his briefing by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was radio traffic indicating the girlfriend of the Robb Elementary School shooting suspect was potentially going to finish what he started, so they decided to perform security at another school. They got information that there were gunshots at a local high school, and they followed a local law enforcement officer (LEO) towards the high school where the shots were allegedly fired. Enroute, they heard on the service radio the report of shots fired at the high school was not true. They decided to go to a local elementary school close by to provide security for the school. They traveled to Dalton Elementary School, arrived at approximately 1:20 p.m., and spent the next five hours providing security at the school (timestamp 12:27:02).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he only contacted WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when he arrived in Uvalde. He said the suspect's vehicle was in the ditch when they arrived, and it appeared to be secured. He recalled many LEO vehicles everywhere. He said he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were worried about their assignments, what they would do, and did not really worry about anything else when they arrived. He believed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in charge of him when he arrived in Uvalde because he was the only person he spoke with at the funeral home. He did not observe any orders being provided to responding LEOs, and he said he never provided any orders or guidance to responding LEOs. He said that other than speaking with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it did not appear to him that anyone from USBP was in charge (timestamp 12:29:07).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that upon arrival at Dalton Elementary School, there was a large LEO presence. He recalled being told parents were attempting to get their kids out of the school prior



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to lockdown, and the principal informed the parents there had to be an orderly method to retrieve their children instead of everyone attempting to come into the school all at once. He said he, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA/EMT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (first name unknown but current Lead EMT out of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sector and formerly assigned to USBP Carrizo Springs Station, Texas), remained at the school to provide security to make sure the girlfriend of the Robb Elementary School shooting suspect did not show up.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said his only interactions with members of the public involved communicating with several parents who arrived at the school wanting to pick up their children. He advised them of the school’s procedures and requirements they needed to follow to retrieve their children from the school. He stated he never rendered aid to any member of the public while in Uvalde. He said he never exercised any authority that impacted any individual’s movement during the event while in Uvalde.

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what he believed the USBP’s role was in the shooting incident at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said his role was to provide security in case something was to spark up again (timestamp 12:35:40).

He clarified there was not much for him to do in Uvalde. He referenced jurisdiction and stated the school handled most of what was going on.

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what his understanding was regarding USBP’s authority/responsibility to respond to the incident. He stated, “I just assumed all law enforcement, if you’re the closest guy, you do what you have to do.” (timestamp 12:36:01).

He clarified it did not matter about federal, state or local. He said if he was the closest guy, he would do what he had to do. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall if he or BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to report they left Uvalde to return to EGT. He did not know what time they made it back to the station.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 46**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 8, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning her involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, she was assigned to BRA and was in the field training unit. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) commenced her shift at (b) (7)(E) and was in USBP uniform. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working with fellow BRA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was serving as their Field Training Officer. All of them were assigned to ride together in a marked USBP vehicle.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and her assigned partners were working in a remote location near (b) (7)(E) located approximately 10 miles south of Brackettville, when they heard about the incident over the USBP radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 12:00 p.m., they heard a request over the radio on the BRA channel for any available units to report to Uvalde. Following, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called an unknown manager at BRA, who advised BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there had been a shooting in Uvalde and directed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to report to the civic center in Uvalde along with BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:14:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated this was when she first learned that there had been a shooting (timestamp 00:44:38).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from (b) (7)(E) they traveled up Farm to Market Road (FM) 1572, then turned east on U.S. Highway 90 into Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were traveling using their emergency lights and sirens, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was driving (timestamp 00:26:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they arrived at the civic center in Uvalde at approximately 1:30 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival at the civic center, she and BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were directed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to stand on the civic center's sidewalk to facilitate crowd control. This was because the area was overcrowded with people and students arriving by bus who needed to go into the civic center to get checked in to be accounted for. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they performed these duties for approximately 45 minutes. At BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) direction, they then relocated to the civic center's perimeter area, where they provided security through the end of their shift after receiving information to be on the lookout for an unknown female (timestamp 00:14:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were multiple law enforcement agencies at the civic center, but she did not see any one agency in charge. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated their efforts at the civic center were to assist school administrators, and she believed that school administrators were in charge at the civic center (timestamp 00:29:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that prior to becoming a BPA, she was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she recalled seeing two Uvalde school administrators at the civic center, Director of Communications (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Assistant Superintendent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:30:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while she was providing crowd control, she informed people they needed to check in at the civic center to pick up arriving students. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the entire time she was at the civic center, she did not have any issues with anyone, she did not use any type of force with anyone, and she did not render aid to anyone (timestamp 00:23:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she did not have a body-worn camera on the date of the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she did not have any text messages relevant to the incident and had not generated any reports, memorandums, or emails pursuant to the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that aside from the Texas Rangers, she had not provided a statement to anyone else concerning the



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incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she had participated in Active Shooter training while at the USBP Academy (timestamp 00:32:53).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they departed back to BRA from the civic center after the end of their shift (b) (7)(E) and they did not go to Robb Elementary School or elsewhere in Uvalde (timestamp 00:40:18).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated her understanding of USBP's authority and responsibility to respond to this incident was based on USBP's role to provide assistance to other agencies wherever they were needed, to include crowd control and first aid (timestamp 00:45:11).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was presented with maps illustrating Uvalde and the surrounding area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated the route of travel taken from (b) (7)(E) to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also identified the location of the civic center in Uvalde where they responded to (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 47**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 8, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working the day shift from (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(C) but he worked approximately one additional hour. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in uniform and driving a marked USBP vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to the EGT Planning Team and was likely preparing a report on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he received a call from a USBP supervisor and was asked to retrieve uniforms from EGT and take them to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) (timestamp 00:14:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he was notified of the shooting at Robb Elementary School between approximately 12:45 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:41:20).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he is a member of the CBP Peer Support Program, and he was requested to take the USBP uniforms as part of the Peer Support Program. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember the name of the USBP supervisor who requested he take the uniforms to Uvalde, but it was a supervisor from EGT. The uniforms were needed for BPAs who had blood on their uniforms.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT, traveled together to Uvalde. While driving to Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated both the emergency lights and sirens on his USBP vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he arrived at UVA at approximately 2:20 PM. On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not go to Robb Elementary School, the Uvalde Civic Center, or any Uvalde school (timestamp 00:26:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that once he arrived at UVA, he went into the muster room and was asked to assist with organizing uniforms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also assisted with food preparation and subsequently with additional uniforms (timestamp 00:28:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at UVA for a while to assist with anything more that was needed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he notified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT, the Peer Support Coordinator, that he had arrived at UVA (timestamp 00:31:21).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he did not observe any orders being given to any responding law enforcement officers; he did not provide orders to any responding law enforcement officers; he did not have any interactions with the public; he did not exercise any authority impacting the movement of any member of the public; he did not use force against any member of the public; and he did not render aid to any member of the public (timestamp 00:33:52).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed that as a federal law enforcement officer, he had authority to assist in a response to the shooting at Robb Elementary School to the extent needed to ensure the safety of the public and fellow BPAs (timestamp 00:34:48).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that as a federal law enforcement officer, he was responsible for protecting lives (timestamp 00:35:41).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he was not wearing a body-worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he might have called or sent a text message to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his response to Uvalde (timestamp 00:36:24).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not prepare any reports or emails concerning the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 00:37:36).

After arriving at the UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) discussed the Robb Elementary School shooting with others at the station (timestamp 00:37:42).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he has not participated in Active Shooter training but was present during an Active Shooter training to take photos of the training. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not specifically remember taking online Active Shooter training.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**EXHIBIT 48**



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 8, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the DRT, Sector Intelligence Unit (SIU), from (b) (7)(E) SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a second-level supervisor, was at SIU when he first heard of the incident in Uvalde (timestamp 00:10:22).

Upon hearing of the incident, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked from the SIU office to the DRT Border Intelligence Center (BIC) office located by SIU at DRT Headquarters. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not remember what time he heard of the incident but recalled the situation was still ongoing. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was having a meeting with Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SIU (timestamp 00:11:24).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was wearing the black and tan uniform consisting of a black polo shirt with a USBP insignia, khaki pants, and tan boots (timestamp 00:12:22).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned of the incident when he received a text message from Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SIU, asking SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he had heard about the incident. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall the exact contents of the text message other than it was about a shooting at a school in Uvalde. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon receiving the message, he and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked from SIU to BIC. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once he was at BIC, he started hearing additional information over the radio (timestamp 00:14:52).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the drive from Del Rio to Uvalde is a little over an hour. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he initially remained at BIC and spent the majority of his time querying vehicle license plates received over the radio as well as calls to BIC. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he performed the queries to help assist in identifying the shooter and any possible associates (timestamp 00:20:27).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not direct Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) or any other CBP personnel to respond to Uvalde. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he subsequently fielded a call from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Eagle Pass South Station (EGS), Texas, the DRT Peer Support Coordinator, who requested SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) respond to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was a Peer Support Member and responded to UVA in a peer support role. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall what time he responded to UVA but stated it was soon after hearing reports that the subject was neutralized [killed] (timestamp 00:24:15).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he traveled alone from Del Rio to UVA, and it took him around an hour (timestamp 00:36:42).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not utilizing emergency lights or sirens. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall what time he arrived but said it was possibly around 3:00 p.m. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was driving an unmarked USBP vehicle and drove east on U.S. Highway 90, which was a direct route (timestamp 00:28:47).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove straight to UVA and never went to Robb Elementary School or any other location in Uvalde. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon his arrival, he did not recall notifying anyone in Del Rio that he had arrived. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he coordinated with other members of the Peer Support Team at UVA (timestamp 00:39:27).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained at UVA for several hours performing peer support duties. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall what time he departed but said it was around sundown.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any in-person contact with any members of the public during his response to Uvalde, he did not use his authority to impact anyone's movements, and he did not provide aid to anyone (timestamp 00:33:53).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated that while in Uvalde, he never directed any subordinates to perform any duties or take any actions with any members of the public (timestamp 01:03:47).



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SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in charge at UVA when he was there. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he spent the majority of his time conducting peer support duties (timestamp 00:41:10).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his understanding of USBP’s authority to respond to the incident was based on BPAs’ authority to make arrests for felonies committed in their presence, such as in this case of an active shooter. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in a hypothetical situation, if a BPA, while attempting to make an arrest within the scope of their duties, encountered a deadly force situation, then, if necessary, the use of deadly force would be authorized (timestamp 00:45:53).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP’s responsibility to respond to an incident such as the shooting was based on the general duty of law enforcement officers to act to protect lives. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP typically and routinely assisted other law enforcement agencies in a support role to perform their duties (timestamp 00:47:01).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have an assigned body-worn camera on the date of the incident. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he no longer had the work phone where he received the initial notification text message sent to him by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because he had turned it in and obtained a replacement. During the interview, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he would try and access his old phone to obtain a screenshot of the message (timestamp 00:48:11).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had not generated any reports, memorandums, or emails pursuant to the incident. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any discussions detailing his response to the incident. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that aside from the Texas Rangers, he did not provide a statement to anyone else concerning the incident. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had participated in Active Shooter training several times during his USBP career to include once while stationed in Deming, New Mexico, and other times while stationed in Del Rio (timestamp 00:51:09).

During the interview, OPR interviewers presented SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with maps illustrating Uvalde and the surrounding area. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated the route of travel he took from Del Rio to Uvalde. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also identified the approximate location of UVA where he had responded (Attachment 2).

Following his interview, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified OPR interviewers he had located his old phone, but no messages were available due to it being reset.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 49**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 9, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working an overtime shift that began at (b) (7)(E) and ended that evening at approximately 6:30 p.m. or 7:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recollected that on the morning of May 24, 2022, he was driving a fifteen-passenger marked transport van, government owned vehicle (GOV), assisting with a smuggling load that had been detained outside of Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that following the operation, he drove his GOV back into Uvalde. He was heading southbound on 4th Street near Dalton Elementary School when he heard a radio transmission from UVA indicating there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:12:12).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall the time the notification of the active shooter was communicated; however, he stated it would have been captured on the USBP, Del Rio Sector (DRT), dispatch radio (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly after the notification of the active shooter, his assigned radio frequency was patched together with other local law enforcement agencies.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he immediately activated his GOV's lights and sirens and drove from N. 4th Street to U.S. Highway 90, to U.S. Highway 83 south, to the south side of Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while enroute to Robb Elementary School, he communicated with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, because they were on the same route, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he would head to the west side of the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he was driving down Old Carrizo Road on the southeast side of the school, he noticed other law enforcement units already at the scene parking their vehicles. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked his GOV and asked a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper doing traffic control at the intersection what was happening, and the Trooper stated, "The chief is in the room with the guy." (timestamp 00:14:59).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based upon the Trooper's response, he believed the situation inside was a "standoff" (timestamp 00:15:11).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he began conducting traffic control at the intersection while noting that people were attempting to drive down the road or park, and people on foot were beginning to gather.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during this time, he heard over the radio that the subject had a long gun. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the Trooper that was initially there doing traffic control left their location on foot and took up another position, leaving BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alone in the intersection. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he directed vehicle traffic, he immediately recognized that the CBP helicopter (b) (7)(E) was flying above the school (timestamp 00:16:59).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also observed who he believed to be an off-duty law enforcement officer walking toward the school with bolt cutters to cut the locks on the pedestrian gates outside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, park his GOV and go towards the school cafeteria while asking BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to keep an eye on his K-9 inside the GOV (timestamp 00:17:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recollected a man climbing in the back of his truck to get an elevated position to video record, noting he told the man to get down because the suspect had a long gun. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, stopped in front of him in his GOV, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, "All I know is it's around the corner. It's that back building." SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded "10-4" and took off to the other side of the school (timestamp 00:18:19).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised he started seeing children being evacuated out of the south side of the school and heard a radio transmission that they were to be transported to the Uvalde Civic Center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he passed this information along to the parents that had gathered nearby. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted other law enforcement personnel in running the students and teachers to the mesquite trees behind the school to stage for transportation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that some of the children were crying. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he got a case of water out of his GOV and while doing so, decided to utilize his GOV to assist with transporting the students and teachers to the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he ran into the school superintendent and notified him the children would be transported to the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said two school buses came and were loaded with students and teachers, and he loaded his GOV with two teachers and those students who were under the control of those teachers (timestamp 00:21:31).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that as they were loading students into the buses and his GOV, an older male came up and grabbed one of the students stating the student was his grandchild. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he initially told the male he could not take the student but deferred to a teacher who approved the child going with the male (timestamp 00:23:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he followed the two school buses with his red and blue lights activated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they traveled to the civic center with the flow of traffic, where he made contact with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who was there with the UVA brush crew that included UVA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA First Name Unknown (FNU) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA FNU (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a large number of parents already gathered at the civic center; however, the children were unloaded and walked into the civic center without issue.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he departed the civic center in his GOV with the two school buses while noting he broke off from the buses because they were taking a different route back to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on his route back, he identified a large group of teachers and students gathered at a residence about two blocks east of Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he stopped his GOV and loaded more teachers and students as a school bus was approaching to load the remaining people. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he contacted SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via cell phone to advise he would be returning to the civic center with another load of students and teachers.

Prior to departing, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw an ambulance parked near the school, and he asked a female to take his Individual Patrol Officer Kit to the medical personnel, and they would know how to utilize the contents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove back to the civic center and dropped off the second load of students and teachers and assisted with making a path to get them inside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then returned the same way to the south side of Robb Elementary School; however, he heard there was a large number of students gathered at the funeral home on the north side of the school and decided to make his way to that location. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had to park his GOV and walk to the funeral home, where he spoke with a female he recognized and was informed there were school buses coming to the location to pick up students and teachers. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





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DRT, Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, outside of the funeral home attempting to keep a crowd of people back who were yelling and cursing in Spanish. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the people were angry because a BPA in full uniform, whom BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know or recognize, had retrieved their child, and the parents were asking why they had to go to the civic center to get their children, and the BPA did not (timestamp 00:35:07).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he departed the funeral home because he heard a transmission on his handheld radio indicating there were additional students that needed transported near Old Carrizo Road and the south side of Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he made his way in his GOV to where the students were gathered and immediately recognized Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, standing with the students across from the school (timestamp 00:35:56).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they loaded the students and teachers in the GOV and proceeded to travel to the civic center, where he dropped them off and assisted with getting them inside.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then returned to Robb Elementary School, parked his GOV, and met up with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), Erie Station (ERP), Pennsylvania, who was assigned to UVA at the time. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked to an impromptu muster that was taking place on the north side of the school in the schoolyard. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the muster was led by Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, who spoke to all the USBP personnel on site and directed all personnel to report to UVA for a muster with TXDPS. As he was driving to UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised there was a radio transmission regarding a secondary threat to the civic center, so he went directly to the civic center to assist with securing that facility. Upon arriving at the civic center, he spoke with Aviation Enforcement Agent (AEA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP, Air and Marine Operations, Uvalde, who indicated they were securing the site and taking all students and parents inside of the building (timestamp 00:43:11).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was another radio transmission indicating they needed personnel to secure the other Uvalde schools. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made the decision to drive to Flores Elementary School and park his GOV. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, also reported to the same location. They secured the school exits and ultimately formed a perimeter around the cafeteria, where all the students were gathered. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was making decisions as the situation evolved. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that eventually, parents began showing up, and the students were systematically released from Flores Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the last student was picked up from Flores Elementary School at approximately 6:30 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he departed the school and returned to UVA, where he briefly spoke with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then departed to his residence.



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BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> clarified that he self-deployed to Robb Elementary School upon hearing there was an active shooter at the school (timestamp 01:22:53).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he has never participated in any Active Shooter training (timestamp 01:23:24).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> clarified that upon initially responding to Robb Elementary School, he met face to face with BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> prior to BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> departing to the west side of the school where he encountered the shooting suspect's wrecked vehicle in the ditch. BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that upon first responding to the school and taking up a position conducting traffic and crowd control, he encountered members of the public that were attempting to cross the street. BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated some people were frustrated and were moving toward the school, prompting him to say, "Get the fuck back." (timestamp 01:28:25).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> denied physically touching or pushing any member of the public (timestamp 01:28:40).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that while standing in front of the school conducting traffic and crowd control, he was there for approximately ten or fifteen minutes prior to the students being evacuated from the school. Further, BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> clarified that BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> arrived at his location in an unmarked GOV prior to the first group of students being evacuated to the mesquite trees behind the school, and he said the CBP helicopter, <sup>(b) (7)(E)</sup> was flying overhead (timestamp 01:34:38).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that upon his first arrival at Robb Elementary School, he could not say if any particular agency was in command and control of the scene; however, from the radio transmissions, he knew the Uvalde Police Department (UPD) was involved and assisting (timestamp 01:38:13).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> denied issuing any orders or commands to fellow law enforcement officers while assisting at the site (timestamp 01:38:35).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he did not see anyone from USBP assume command and control of the situation at the school (timestamp 01:39:04).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> denied impacting any person's movement or restricting anyone in any way (timestamp 01:39:52).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated his purpose in raising his voice or swearing when communicating with the public that day was for the safety of the public due to the suspect involved in the school shooting having a long arm (timestamp 01:40:38).

BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> denied providing any medical aid to the public (timestamp 01:41:06).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at no point during the day did anyone issue him an order or directive to assist with transporting students and teachers to the civic center, and he made the decision on his own. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not estimate how long it took for him to complete three separate trips to the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall ever hearing anything on the radio that the situation inside of the school had been effectively resolved. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP's role on May 24, 2022, was to show up and assist. He added the authority to do so is from being a human being in law enforcement to show up and assist with whatever needed to be done. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied wearing a body-worn camera during his shift, denied having any pertinent text messages or emails that relate to the incident, and denied having to write a report detailing his activities on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 01:50:51).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that prior to the third time he picked up students and teachers and stopped at the funeral home, he noted there were helicopters and ambulances parked outside of the school. To him, this indicated the situation inside of the school had been resolved. Prior to concluding the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized printed maps to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 50**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 9, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his normal duty hours are from (b) (7)(E) and on May 24, 2022, he was an instructor for an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) class at USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). At approximately 12:30 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed by fellow EMT instructor, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas, to retrieve his medical kit because they were leaving to go to Uvalde (timestamp 12:47:20).

After he retrieved his kit, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRS, to obtain keys for an unmarked government vehicle. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that their medical support may be needed at Robb Elementary School. Other than to respond directly to Robb Elementary School, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not give any specific instructions for BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after they arrived in Uvalde (timestamp 12:50:13).

At approximately 12:40 p.m., BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who were both in uniform, departed the city of Del Rio together in an unmarked government vehicle and traveled on U.S. Highway

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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90 heading eastbound directly to Uvalde. Initially, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated the emergency overhead lights on his vehicle, but the lights stopped working before they left the city of Del Rio (timestamp 12:48:50).

At approximately 1:30 p.m., BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived in Uvalde (timestamp 12:50:56).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that upon arrival, he followed standard USBP protocol for a mass casualty incident, which was to report directly to the on-scene incident commander. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, who directed him to the incident command center located at Hillcrest Funeral Home (Hillcrest) (timestamp 12:51:30).

At approximately 1:35 p.m., BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Hillcrest and were directed to sign in on the log inside Hillcrest. Afterwards, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inquired about who was in charge for medical personnel at the incident and was directed to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (unknown name) from San Antonio, Texas Emergency Medical Services (EMS). While meeting with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was informed all medical personnel were being redirected to Uvalde Regional Medical Center (timestamp 12:53:30).

At approximately 1:45 p.m., BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed for Uvalde Regional Medical Center, but while enroute, USBP dispatch, call sign (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised via radio there was a suspected shooter at the Uvalde High School. At that point, they decided to redirect to the high school, arriving at approximately 1:50 p.m. (timestamp 12:57:00).

Upon arrival, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached a school resource officer and asked him where the incident command center was. The school resource officer then directed BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to an exterior door of a long hallway and told them they would be posted there. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed BPA-Programs (BPA-P) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Artesia, New Mexico, who was a BPA with DRT at that time, were also in the hallway and helped them to clear rooms inside the building. After they were done clearing the rooms, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the school building and met with an unknown USBP supervisor who advised them that additional perimeter security was needed at Morales Junior High School, which was a block away from Uvalde High School (timestamp 13:01:12).

BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed Uvalde High School at approximately 2:20 p.m. and arrived at Morales Junior High School at 2:23 p.m. Upon arrival, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) found an area along the perimeter of the school that was lacking law enforcement presence and decided to post there. They provided security there for approximately one hour before they were relieved by an officer from an unknown sheriff's department (timestamp 13:03:30).

After being relieved, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard from other officers on scene that additional security was needed at Flores Elementary School. BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed Morales Junior High School at approximately 3:23 p.m. and arrived at Flores Elementary School at 3:25 p.m. (timestamp 13:08:00).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at Flores Elementary School, he provided security and passed along information he received to parents. This included information that the school administrators were not releasing children unless the parents were in a vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not provide any aid to the public at any of the locations he was at, nor did he exercise any law enforcement authority to restrict anyone’s movements (timestamp 13:23:56).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after about an hour of providing security at Flores Elementary School, he spoke with other BPAs on scene who advised him they were not aware that his presence was needed at any other location in Uvalde. At approximately 4:25 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was serving as the Sector Medical Coordinator, DRT, at that time, and informed him he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were going to return to Del Rio (timestamp 13:09:40).

[Agent’s Note: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is now a Deportation Officer with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP’s role during the incident was that it was their duty as federal law enforcement officers to respond to incidents and provide protection where needed (timestamp 13:11:10).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y





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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 9, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he began his shift at (b) (7)(E) He said that after the daily muster at about 2:45 p.m., he received a call to return to the station's armory. He stated that CAR BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also received calls. He said the agents were assigned rifles and traveled to Uvalde. He said that initially, they were told to go to the funeral home near Robb Elementary School, but while on the way, they were rerouted to the civic center (timestamp 00:13:31).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said two of the BPAs were assigned to the west side of the civic center parking lot near the Walgreens and the other two were assigned to the lot on the opposite side. He said the four BPAs were all within view of each other (timestamp 00:15:10).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated the agents did not leave CAR until 3:00 p.m. or 3:30 p.m. (timestamp 00:16:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rode together. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, also traveled to Uvalde (timestamp 00:17:36).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when they left CAR, they took State Highway 85 to Farm to Market Road 1407 north to Crystal City, Texas then to La Pryor, Texas and into Uvalde on U.S. Highway 83 (timestamp 00:8:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he arrived at the civic center at about 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. He said he could not recall if there was any one particular law enforcement agency in command at the civic center (timestamp 00:20:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never witnessed any CBP personnel prohibit parents from reaching their kids (timestamp 00:22:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the four CAR BPAs remained on scene at the civic center until 6:30 p.m. or 7:30 p.m., until they were relieved by some local officers. He said the CAR agents went to eat and then went back to CAR (timestamp 00:23:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at some point after their arrival, there was a discussion about a potential second shooter, but he did not recall the time frame. He said that eventually, someone from Uvalde County advised the alleged second shooter, the girlfriend of the Robb Elementary School shooter, was located, and an all clear was given (timestamp 00:25:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not have to render aid to anyone (timestamp 00:26:26).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have a body-worn camera. He said he does not have any emails or messages regarding the situation and did not recall being instructed to provide a memorandum (timestamp 00:26:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he underwent Active Shooter training in 2017. In reference to USBP authority to respond, he said that in the Active Shooter training he received, as a reasonable adult in this job, you respond to it [the situation], and you need to go (timestamp 00:27:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the four BPAs that responded from CAR discussed on the way to Uvalde why things took so long [referring to the time it took to enter the classroom and confront the shooter]. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said regarding the Active Shooter training, you cannot stop to think; you just have to move (timestamp 00:28:36).



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 52**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 8, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty as a canine handler (K-9) patrolling the area of U.S. Highway 277 during the day shift in Carrizo Springs when a coworker told him the news about the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:47:45).

Shortly after hearing the news, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received a phone call from his Peer Support Coordinator, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Eagle Pass South Station (EGS), Texas, who advised him of the shooting and to respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:49:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall the time he received the phone call from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but understood from the conversation he was being activated as a Peer Support Member to provide assistance in a peer support role.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed Carrizo Springs alone in his assigned K-9 patrol vehicle wearing his USBP uniform but was unable to recall the time he departed or whether he activated the emergency overhead lights on his patrol vehicle (timestamp 11:51:25).

From Carrizo Springs, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled on U.S. Highway 277 east towards State Highway 191 and then took U.S. Highway 83 north to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he was approximately 15 miles from Uvalde, he received a phone call from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directing him to respond to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), and they would meet each other there. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall the time he received the phone call from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 11:52:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall the time he arrived at UVA, but after he arrived, he met with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who advised him other BPAs would soon be arriving at UVA from Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to assist the incoming BPAs with any needs they had (timestamp 11:54:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when the BPAs arrived, he was able to identify BPAs that looked distraught and offered to speak with them regarding their experience. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know the BPAs he spoke with by name (timestamp 11:55:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at UVA for approximately three hours until 6:00 p.m., when he was notified by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) his assistance was no longer needed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any contact with the public while in Uvalde (timestamp 11:56:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then called CAR to advise he would be going off duty and returning to his home in Uvalde.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he understood USBP's role was to provide assistance as law enforcement wherever needed.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 53**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 9, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to work in uniform in the CAR area of responsibility. He said he worked the (b) (7)(E) shift. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing about the incident at Robb Elementary School while driving to work from a coworker, who he believed was reading the news or got a text message about the shooting.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to CAR for his (b) (7)(E) shift and was briefed by station management on the shooting. He recalled being told the situation was handled, there was nothing left to do, and he would remain in Carrizo Springs, TX to work his shift. He remembered being called back to CAR after he had reported to his assigned area and was told he would pair up with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, were to pair up and go to Uvalde to relieve the BPAs working dayshift who were working security (Timestamp 13:37:27).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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He believed there were several BPAs from the dayshift in Uvalde, but the only one he could recall was BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR. He recalled leaving CAR and heading to Uvalde around 3:10 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he left CAR and took U.S. Highway 83 north to Uvalde. He rode with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the other two BPAs rode in a separate vehicle. He recalled they activated their emergency lights to begin the trip to Uvalde, but an unknown Watch Commander called and told them there was no need to have their emergency equipment activated, so they deactivated their lights and sirens near Crystal City, Texas. He said he and his two coworkers were the only two vehicles that traveled to Uvalde.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any communication from anyone on the drive to or as they neared Uvalde. He recalled utilizing his government phone to locate the dayshift agents needing relief. He was unable to recall the individual who told him the dayshift agents were at the Uvalde Civic Center, but he said that was where they were located. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the other three agents relieved the dayshift BPA agents from CAR and were asked to direct traffic at the Uvalde Civic Center (Timestamp 13:39:42).

He was unable to recall who asked him to direct traffic, and he believed they arrived at the Uvalde Civic Center at approximately 4:00 p.m. He believed he directed traffic for approximately two to three hours.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled a lot of traffic traveling past the Uvalde Civic Center when they arrived and said the traffic was on a main road that went through the city. He described the scene as chaotic. He was unsure of who was in charge at the Uvalde Civic Center because there were multiple agencies present. He said he did not observe any orders being provided to responding law enforcement officers (LEOs) except for the order he received to help direct traffic. He stated he did not provide any orders or guidance to any responding LEOs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it did not appear anyone from USBP was in charge (Timestamp 13:54:57).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he interacted with the public by providing information to civilians on where to go to vote, where to park, where to get their children, and telling them not to block the spaces where the children in the Uvalde Civic Center would enter and exit. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not exercise any authority which impacted any individual's movement during his time at the Uvalde Civic Center. He stated he did not render aid to any members of the public during his time at the civic center.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said USBP's role in the incident in Uvalde was to support local law enforcement. He explained Uvalde was a small city, and they needed all the help they could get. Regarding USBP's authority to respond, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "Well, we're just like I said, we're just there to support the local law enforcement. We, we, even in Carrizo, we always supporting law enforcement... We're here to help and exercise authority if needed, if need be. If somebody's trying to cause harm, we're there to protect the public as well," (Timestamp 13:57:47).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled he returned to the CAR at approximately 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 9, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working the day shift. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the day was hectic with involvement in a smuggling attempt and assistance being provided to another agency. On May 24, 2022, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in uniform and driving a marked USBP vehicle (timestamp 00:15:50).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to remember when he first learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School, but he believed it was near lunchtime (timestamp 00:16:01).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to remember specifically how he first learned of the shooting, but he said it was through a radio or phone communication. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember when he left Brackettville for Uvalde, but he recalled he traveled into Uvalde using U.S. Highway 90. While traveling from Brackettville to Uvalde, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP vehicle had a flat tire, and he did not have a spare tire. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) waited on the roadside while a spare tire was delivered to him, which delayed him approximately 45 minutes. While waiting for the spare tire, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned the shooter had been confronted and shot. After receiving this information, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to return to Brackettville. However, as he was changing the flat tire, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned through radio communications that a female made threats on social media, so he continued to Uvalde. While traveling to Uvalde, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated the vehicle's emergency lights and siren. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not travel with anyone into Uvalde (timestamp 00:22:26).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to remember specifically when he arrived in Uvalde, but he recalled it was after he had received information concerning the female making threats on social media and prior to her arrest (timestamp 00:18:39).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not directed to respond to Uvalde for the shooting (timestamp 00:17:44).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to Uvalde, since BRA Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) he supervised responded to Uvalde (timestamp 00:17:53).

While traveling to Uvalde, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard numerous radio communications concerning activity related to the shooting in Uvalde (timestamp 00:20:09).

These radio communications concerned activity at multiple locations in Uvalde. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that when he arrived at the civic center, he notified BRA on the radio of his arrival (timestamp 00:32:44).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the names of BRA BPAs who responded to Uvalde on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 00:33:40).

When asked to describe the situation he encountered at the civic center, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he pulled perimeter security and that it was an election day (timestamp 00:38:40).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the situation at the civic center as "controlled chaos" and one of the saddest things he had seen (timestamp 00:39:45).

When WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the civic center, he did not receive any instruction, and while at the civic center, he did not receive any instruction (timestamp 00:40:32).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never learned who had overarching command and control at the civic center (timestamp 00:41:44).



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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed law enforcement officers being given limited instruction at the civic center (timestamp 00:42:58).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that on May 24, 2022, he only spoke with fellow BPAs. On May 24, 2022, while at the civic center, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only provided instruction to BRA BPAs (timestamp 00:44:20).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Carizzo Springs Station (CAR), Texas, was the highest ranking USBP official he saw at the civic center (timestamp 00:47:48).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any interaction with school district officials concerning their plan to release students to parents.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he did not exercise any authority impacting the movements of any individual (timestamp 00:49:40).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he did not render aid to any member of the public. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed the Uvalde Civic Center at approximately 4:30 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:52:21).

When asked to explain his understanding of USBP authority to respond to the shooting at Robb Elementary School and the associated incidents, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it would be through the assistance request, a mutual aid agreement, and “Just pure being a human being.” (timestamp 00:50:17).

When asked to explain the USBP’s responsibility to respond to the shooting and associated incidents, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded, “Just being human beings... There’s people dying... You’ve got to react.” (timestamp 00:51:15).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that on May 24, 2022, he directed BRA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who are Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs), to respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:53:50).

During the interview, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:23:12) (Attachment 2).

These maps are labeled one through five, respectively. On map one of north Uvalde, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated his route of travel and where his vehicle had the flat tire. On map two of south Uvalde, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it was not applicable. On map three of Uvalde, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again indicated his travel route. On map four of the Uvalde schools, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he traveled to the Uvalde Civic Center, the approximate location where he parked his vehicle, and that he was not at any of the Uvalde schools. On map five of Robb Elementary School, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it was not applicable.



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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was not wearing a body-worn camera. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he sent text messages on May 24, 2022, relating to the incident. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he no longer had the government cell phone he used on May 24, 2022, since he was issued a new government cell phone. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the cell phone he used on May 24, 2022, was returned to Special Operations Supervisor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, who serves as the Local Property Officer. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the cell phone he used on May 24, 2022, is currently at USBP Del Rio Sector. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not send any emails concerning the response to the shooting at Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not prepare any reports concerning the USBP's response to the shooting at Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) participated in a phone interview with a Texas Ranger. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed the Texas Ranger that he was not at Robb Elementary School, and the interview ended shortly thereafter (timestamp 00:55:21).

Additionally, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received Active Shooter training within the last 10 years through USBP El Paso, Texas.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Additional Information Provided by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 29, 2023, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent Senior SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, text messages related to the CBP response to the school shooting (Attachment 1).

On March 31, 2023, and April 4, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning the text messages. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided additional information concerning the messages, including last names of those mentioned in the messages and an explanation of a messages referencing “Tim Hortons”, “B1” and “Hot Miking.”

Review of the messages and information provided on March 31, 2023, and April 4, 2023, by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the messages begin at 11:49 a.m., and were sent between WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA. In these messages, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, should be sent to Robb Elementary School since additional Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) might be needed. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to contact the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) to see if additional EMTs were needed.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently told WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he could not reach any UVA management, but the BPA who answered the phone said to send the EMTs to Uvalde, so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, responded. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then told WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was responding to Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then sent a message stating “Tim Hortons what is know when you go and seeing if you need anything else” and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded 10-4. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained to ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was using voice to text when he sent message, and he was unable to explain the meaning of this message and believed the voice to text might have not worked correctly.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were wearing body armor and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded that he had body armor, but he did not know about BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, instructed them to stage at the USBP Uvalde Checkpoint and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if they could proceed to a convenience store five blocks from the school. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded “From B1” and “They just took it off line. One UVA agent was Hot Miking.” WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when he referenced “B1” he was advising SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the instruction to stage at the Checkpoint was from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Additionally, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified his messages concerning the “Hot Miking” and taking it “off line” by explaining a BPA unknowingly had the transmission key pressed on his radio and others could not communicate on the radio channel so the BPA’s radio or that channel was taken off-line allowing others to communicate during the incident.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA phone number, which SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	Text messages between WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 55**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 9, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to DRT as the less-lethal coordinating officer. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was accompanied by Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Harpers Ferry, who were both assigned to CBP Law Enforcement Safety and Compliance (LESC) as use of force instructors. They were conducting observations of DRT's firearms and less-lethal training programs at the USBP Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas (timestamp 00:11:32).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said their uniforms (SBPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) consisted of a USBP polo shirt with Department of Homeland Security insignia, as well as tan pants and a gun belt. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were in an unmarked USBP vehicle driven by BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and were about to depart BRA when they crossed paths with an unknown BPA who advised them there had been an incident in Uvalde (timestamp 00:12:15).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the vehicle he was driving did not have a functioning USBP radio or emergency equipment. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that due to the circumstances, he proceeded to Uvalde as fast as he could whenever there was no traffic. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were passed up by many emergency vehicles with lights and sirens on while on their way to Uvalde. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were not directed to respond to Uvalde. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was a decision he made with SBPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:32:20).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know where Robb Elementary School was, so he called BRA to get more information. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the call, he was told by an unknown person at BRA that the incident at Robb Elementary School was the result of a bailed out smuggling load, and the load driver had absconded from a vehicle wreck and was shooting at law enforcement from the school. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not find out until much later what had actually occurred (timestamp 00:18:10).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove on U.S. Highway 90 from Brackettville to Uvalde (timestamp 00:19:07).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove to Robb Elementary School but had to park several hundred yards away on Geraldine Street due to a large volume of law enforcement vehicles that were parked and blocking the way to Robb Elementary School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival, they followed other arriving law enforcement officers and made their way to the area of the funeral home and Robb Elementary School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the scene as very chaotic but also without a sense of urgency. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no “stimulus” or “driving force” such as the sound of gunfire, calls for help, or someone on a bullhorn providing directions to law enforcement and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) staging areas. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based on Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) and Active Shooter trainings he had previously received, he knew to look or listen for stimulus. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he considered Geraldine Street a problem because law enforcement vehicles were completely occluding the ingress and egress of EMS vehicles. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he attempted to find the drivers of the law enforcement vehicles blocking the roadway; however, he was not successful (timestamp 00:22:07).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he subsequently made the independent decision set up a traffic control point on Geraldine Street and Evans Street along with a Uvalde Police Department (UPD) police officer or a Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD) police officer, whose last name was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to try to limit the scope of the vehicle congestion problem and facilitate access to EMS. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked law enforcement officers arriving at the location to park along the sides of Geraldine Street and Evans Street to keep the roadway accessible to EMS. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated this allowed for at least one or two EMS vehicles to travel through the area. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were also joined by off-duty Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA (timestamp 00:24:38).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed he had called Watch Commander (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Del Rio Station (DRS), to notify her he had responded to Uvalde. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could



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not identify a command-and-control structure at the scene when he arrived. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at the traffic control point, he heard the incident command center was at the funeral home located across the street from Robb Elementary School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon hearing this, he made his way there and asked a random officer who the incident commander was. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was pointed in the direction of an unknown UPD police officer or UCISDPD police officer who was sitting behind a desk in a very small room within the funeral home.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival, he observed the incident commander holding a small piece of paper in his hand with the name (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and possibly a date of birth or Social Security number. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed the incident commander yell at a female UPD police officer, telling her he needed to know everything about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yesterday. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he later learned from watching a news conference that the mayor of Uvalde was seated next to the unknown incident commander who BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described as a younger male, either white or Hispanic. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while inside the room, he made contact with an unknown officer who was next to the incident commander and who appeared to know what was going on. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he told the unknown officer that he and Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were screening traffic at the intersection of Geraldine and Evans. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked the officer if he wanted them to proceed carrying out this duty or if they were needed elsewhere. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the officer told him they were doing exactly what he needed them to do. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he provided his phone number to this officer and proceeded back to the traffic control point. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not observe orders being directed to anyone else while he was at the incident command center (timestamp 00:34:49).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that aside from directing arriving law enforcement officers where to park, he did not provide orders to any law enforcement officers (timestamp 00:41:01).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was manning the traffic control point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who are all also Firearms Instructors, along with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Harpers Ferry, LESC, arrived and proceeded farther towards Robb Elementary School and obtained more information. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him it had been a school shooting, and children had died. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BPAs must have arrived at least thirty 30 minutes after he did (timestamp 00:41:28).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was there, he did not receive any orders from anyone in USBP and did not observe anyone with USBP directing orders (timestamp 00:43:01).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his interactions with members of the public pertained to the time he manned the traffic control point. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that if a member of the public advised him they lived beyond the traffic control point, he would let them in, and if parents arrived looking for their children, he would direct them to the family reunification site at the civic center.



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BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that at one point, he heard there was a lookout for the shooter's aunt, but it was very basic information and only that she was wearing a tank-top shirt and had tattoos. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that soon after he heard about this lookout, he observed a female passenger who appeared to match the description leaving in a car on Geraldine Street. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he yelled to unknown officers standing ahead of him to direct the car to stop, which they did. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he then approached the car's passenger side and observed the female did not match the description, and he allowed the car to proceed. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated this interaction took about 15 to 20 seconds. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he did not recall the people in the car taking issue with his actions (timestamp 00:47:32).

BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that while he was manning the traffic control point, he did not allow non-EMS or law enforcement vehicles down Geraldine Street to keep it clear for EMS. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he did this because he felt it was the most appropriate thing for him to do with the information he had at that time. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> reiterated this allowed at least one or maybe two EMS ambulances to travel down the street as a result of his actions. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated it was his decision to establish that traffic control point, and he had requested Officer<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> assistance to do it (timestamp 00:53:00).

BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he never used force with any member of the public and did not provide aid to anyone (timestamp 00:54:45).

BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that on May 25, 2022, he emailed WC<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> a timeline outlining his response to Uvalde (Attachment 2).

BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> read his email and said he received initial notification of the incident at approximately 11:45 a.m. when he was in Brackettville (timestamp 00:56:18).

Upon reading his email, BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that from the traffic control point, he received information from SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> indicating assistance was needed with crowd control at the Uvalde Hospital where he proceeded to go with SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> (timestamp 01:02:42).

BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> estimated he arrived at the hospital between 1:00 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he only spent a short amount of time at the hospital because at approximately 1:30 p.m., BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> USBP, Eagle Pass South Station (EGS), Texas, who is the DRT Peer Support Coordinator, contacted him telephonically and requested he proceed to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) to provide Peer Support Member (PSM) services. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he departed the hospital at approximately 1:45 p.m. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that while he was at the hospital, he became aware of a female who was speaking with U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) Deputies. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated the female yelled obscenities at the USMS deputies, BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> and SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>. The female subsequently went inside the hospital, and a USMS Deputy informed BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> the female was a relative of the shooter. BPA-P<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he did not have any interactions with this female (timestamp 01:42:30).



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BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued reading his email and explained he arrived at UVA in time for the (b) (7)(E) muster. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained at UVA providing PSM services to affected agents until approximately 7:00 p.m. when he departed UVA with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who is the USBP Chaplain, to drive one of the affected agents to his residence in San Antonio, Texas. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then traveled back to Del Rio where he arrived at approximately 11:15 p.m. (timestamp 01:04:54).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who assisted in manning the traffic control point, had a child who was in Robb Elementary School at the time of the shooting.

Concerning his understanding of USBP's authority to respond to this incident, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPAs had the ability to use reasonable and necessary force to protect themselves or others based on case law from Graham versus Connor and Tennessee versus Garner. Concerning his understanding of USBP's responsibility to respond to this incident, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated any law enforcement agency has the obligation to protect life. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated CBP would not have an Active Shooter training program if they did not want to make a difference in such situations (timestamp 01:11:37).

During the interview, OPR interviewers presented BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with maps illustrating Uvalde and the surrounding area. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated the route of travel he took from Brackettville to Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also identified the location where he parked his USBP vehicle and where he established the traffic control point near Geraldine Street and Evans Street (Attachment 3).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he might have relevant text messages but would need time to verify, and if so, he would provide them post interview. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have an assigned body-worn camera on the date of the incident. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that following the incident, he generated the email he provided; however, he did not generate any other reports or memorandums about the incident. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that aside from the Texas Rangers, he did not have discussions detailing his response to this incident. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a CBP certified firearms and less lethal instructor, stated he had received ALERRT training in 2021 and Active Shooter training in 2018 (timestamp 01:38:06).

Prior to concluding the interview, OPR interviewers presented BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with a photograph to identify Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) however, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not identify the subject in the photograph (timestamp 02:23:10).

Following the interview, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a digital copy of the email he sent to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on May 25, 2022. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had no relevant text messages (Attachment 4).



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Timeline provided by BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4	Email provided by BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 9, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty, working in uniform, and driving a marked USBP vehicle. During this time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) typically worked from (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E). On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School while working on a USBP boat with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT. At approximately 1:00 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a phone call from their supervisor, Supervisory BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to the funeral home in Uvalde, since they are both Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) (timestamp 00:12:48).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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Later, while listening to news on the radio, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School and believed that was the reason he was directed to respond to Uvalde. While traveling into Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any updates concerning the response to the shooting. BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled from Eagle Pass to Uvalde together, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated the emergency lights and siren while driving the USBP vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to Uvalde on U.S. Highway 57, turned in La Pryor, Texas, and traveled into Uvalde (timestamp 00:15:48).

While traveling to Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received information from social media indicating the shooting was the result of a failed smuggling attempt, and the driver of the vehicle absconded into the school (timestamp 00:16:25).

At approximately 2:00 p.m., BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Uvalde. BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not travel with anyone to Uvalde.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when he arrived near the funeral home by Robb Elementary School, he parked the USBP vehicle several blocks away, since there were numerous law enforcement vehicles in the area. After parking the vehicle, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took their medical equipment with them to the funeral home. While at the funeral home BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas, and Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT (timestamp 00:31:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at the funeral home, he notified PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he arrived, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not speak with any state or local law enforcement officer nor school district officials (timestamp 00:38:35).

At the funeral home, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned they were not needed and were instructed to report to either the USBP Del Rio Station (DRS) or USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to remember which USBP Station he was instructed to report to by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). As BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were driving away from the area of the funeral home, they heard radio communications concerning a possible threat to other Uvalde schools. BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw another USBP vehicle with activated emergency equipment and decided to follow the vehicle to assist. BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went to Dalton Elementary School in Uvalde (timestamp 00:35:15).

When asked to describe the command-and-control structure at the funeral home and Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it was difficult to determine who was in charge (timestamp 00:39:32).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in charge at the funeral home and did not observe any instruction being provided to responding law enforcement officers. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide orders or guidance to any responding law enforcement officer (timestamp 00:40:10).



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While at the funeral home near Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not use force, take action to impede anyone's movement, or provide medical aid to anyone (timestamp 00:41:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Dalton Elementary School at approximately 2:30 p.m. At approximately 3:00 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved the marked USBP vehicle into the driveway at Dalton Elementary School to control traffic (timestamp 00:41:37).

While at Dalton Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw parents waiting to pick up children, but the school was locked down. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs provided security at the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told arriving parents the school was locked down and students would not be released until the lockdown was lifted (timestamp 00:46:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the names of BPAs he saw at Dalton Elementary School (timestamp 00:47:30).

After the lockdown was lifted at Dalton Elementary School, at the request of the principal, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs assisted Dalton Elementary School staff with releasing students to parents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he and other BPAs obtained driver licenses from parents and relayed parent information to school officials, who would then bring the student to the front of the school for release. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the process of releasing students was slow, and it took a few hours (timestamp 01:01:18).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in charge at Dalton Elementary School. While at Dalton Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe direction being given to responding law enforcement officers. Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide orders to any responding law enforcement officers (timestamp 00:50:50).

When asked if while at Dalton Elementary School he exercised authority impacting anyone's movement, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded that he guessed so since parents were not allowed to enter the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the school principal was out front, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained to arriving parents that since the school was in lockdown, the school was not releasing students (timestamp 00:54:10).

While at Dalton Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not use force against anyone or provide any medical treatment to anyone (timestamp 00:51:15).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:17:30).

These maps are labeled one through five, respectively (Attachment 2).

On map one of north Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it was not applicable. On map two of south Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the route he traveled from Eagle Pass to Uvalde and that he arrived in Uvalde at approximately 2:00 p.m. On map three of Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it



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was also not applicable. On map four of the Uvalde schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that once he arrived in Uvalde, he traveled to the funeral home near Robb Elementary School and subsequently to Dalton Elementary School. On this map, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also indicated locations where he parked the USBP vehicle near Dalton Elementary School. On map five of Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he arrived at the funeral home near Robb Elementary School at approximately 2:05 p.m. and approximately where he parked the USBP vehicle a few blocks from the funeral home (timestamp 00:18:50).

When asked to explain his understanding of USBP’s authority to respond to the shooting at Robb Elementary School and associated incidents, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he understood from his limited Active Shooter training that the first responding law enforcement officer was responsible until a more senior law enforcement officer responded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that he saw USBP in more of a support role unless USBP was first to respond to an incident. When asked to explain his understanding of USBP’s responsibility to respond to the shooting at Robb Elementary School and associated incidents in Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that USBP previously assisted in emergency responses. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again explained he viewed the incident as more of a local matter, and USBP was in a support role unless USBP was the first to arrive at the incident (timestamp 01:04:10).

Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that since he is an EMT, USBP previously had him assist with large public events, so he could provide medical treatment, if needed (timestamp 01:07:30).

On May 24, 2023, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not wearing a body-worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he sent a text message concerning his response to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that a few days after May 24, 2022, he provided a brief timeline of his activities in response to a USBP request. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not send any emails or write any reports concerning his response to the shooting at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed by a Texas Ranger concerning his response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 01:11:39).

When asked if he received any Active Shooter training, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he received some limited training concerning clearing rooms in conjunction with quarterly firearms training.

Following the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the two text messages he exchanged concerning his response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. The text messages provided by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) do not contain dates, but the messages were exchanged on May 27, 2022, at approximately 8:43 a.m. (Attachment 3).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Text messages provided by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 57**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to training in UVA and his tour of duty began at (b) (7)(E) (timestamp 00:14:20).

He said he wore his normal duty uniform, which consisted of a green shirt and green pants. He explained there was a break in training when the Uvalde Police Department requested assistance over the radio (timestamp 00:14:53).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who was also attending the training, had access to the armory. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he checked out a rifle from the armory (timestamp 00:15:10).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he paired up with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and they drove to Robb Elementary School together (timestamp 00:16:24).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not know where the school was located but figured it out (timestamp 00:17:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when they arrived at the school, they parked on the northeast side of the school on Geraldine Street, about 50 to 60 yards from the school (timestamp 00:18:04).

He said that after they parked, nobody appeared to know anything, and nothing had been confirmed. He said they continued to be on the lookout for the shooter (timestamp 00:18:48).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that from the time the call was received, to when they arrived on scene, it was about 20 minutes (timestamp 00:20:38).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when they arrived, they moved slowly towards the school. He said there was a lot of commotion and chaos. He said parents were making comments such as, "What are you guys doing?" (timestamp 00:20:50).

He said he did not see any law enforcement out and about. He said the first area he staged was on the north side of the school and moved to the west side and provided a perimeter around the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he used a vehicle in the parking lot as cover as he observed agents pulling kids out of the classroom (timestamp 00:21:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said his position was about 20 yards from the school. He said the funeral home would have been behind him to the left (timestamp 00:22:30).

He said the location of the shooter still had not been confirmed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he then moved to the entrance located at north end of the school. He said that area appeared to be covered by law enforcement (timestamp 00:24:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he then went to the southeast end wing of the school looking toward the inner part of the school (timestamp 00:24:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then used a map to provide a better overview of where he staged on the southeast side of the wing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he remained at that location to cover the perimeter for the rest of the time he was there (timestamp 00:27:11).

When asked if he heard any shooting, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded, "No I didn't hear anything from the beginning." He then stated, "I did hear the final, I mean, I guess, when the shooter ended up shooting again. I heard it; it was very, wasn't very clear, but I heard some shooting." (timestamp 00:27:20).





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BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that is when everyone said we need to get in there because we knew there was something going on inside (timestamp 00:27:40).

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> aid he thought it was the shooter shooting (timestamp 00:27:52).

When asked to confirm if he heard shots, he responded, "Shots correct." BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said the shots sounded like banging. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said the banging occurred after they had already pulled some children from the classrooms on that side of the building as well (timestamp 00:29:25).

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said he recalled the following personnel present on that side of the building with him: SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> UVA, and UVA BPAs <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>  
BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said he did remember other law enforcement personnel were present at the door on that side of the wing (timestamp 00:31:00).

He said he did not know any of the officers from the other agencies (timestamp 00:34:00).

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said he entered the school when the shooter was down (timestamp 00:34:31).

The union representative requested to take a break (timestamp 00:34:43).

[Agent's Note: There was a significant break in the interview. A second video had to be started when the interview resumed.]

On this same date, the interview resumed using a new StarWitness recording. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code <sup>(b) (7)(E)</sup> (1 hour and 14 minutes).

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said he did not notice any law enforcement agency in control of the scene. He said he just picked up based on what was going on that USBP was there to assist with security (timestamp 00:6:35).

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> confirmed two photos of himself taken from screen shots of body-worn camera video footage outside the school (Attachment 2) (timestamp 00:12:00).

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said he does recall guiding a teacher who had sustained an injury to a general area where the children were running (timestamp 00:16:47).

The NBPC representative requested a break (timestamp 00:17:34).

The interview resumed (timestamp 00:20:30).

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said he does not recall when he heard there would be a breach or that the shooter was down (timestamp 00:22:25).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the consensus of what might be going on was someone was shooting a gun (timestamp 00:27:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled saying there was a hot microphone on the radio (timestamp 00:31:54).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the helicopters being loud (timestamp 00:34:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not consider the scene to be an active shooter scenario because he did not hear anything (timestamp 00:37:00). [Agent's Note: BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had earlier stated he heard shooting.]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he is not an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) and did not render any aid to anyone (timestamp 00:37:45).

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested to take a break (timestamp 00:40:27).

The interview resumed (timestamp 00:57:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described his parking location on the north side of the school using the provided maps (Attachment 3) (timestamp 00:01:01).

[Agent's Note: At the conclusion of the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised he would need to be interviewed again at a later date.]

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Photos provided by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 23, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, Texas, concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed by CBP OPR on February 10, 2023. At the time of interview, CBP OPR was not aware that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the school and classrooms after the shooter was down. For this reason, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first interview was concluded when BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered the building. A follow up interview was rescheduled for March 23, 2023, to discuss BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) response from the moment he entered the building to the end of his shift.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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On May 24, 2022, prior to the breach into the classroom, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was providing security on the south exterior area of the building. He entered the building through the south entrance after hearing the shooter was down (timestamp 00:32:20). However, he does not recall how he heard the shooter was down, nor which classroom the shooter was in (timestamp 00:32:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered a classroom which he described as dark and with the lights off, inside he saw what appeared to him as deceased children laying on the floor (timestamp 00:34:01). Inside the classroom, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, with carrying a child victim whom he believed to be a girl to the medical triage area (timestamp 00:34:39). The medical triage area was set up by the T-intersection in front of the bathrooms (timestamp 00:30:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall specific details about his activities and movements after entering the building or what he did after assisting BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the child. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only recalled exiting the building through the west entrance (timestamp 00:37:04).

When he exited the building, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a group of USBP Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) working on another victim. He recalled seeing BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Tactical Unit, in this group (timestamp 00:38:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went to a tree, he did not know how he knew to go to the tree, but while there, Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, Del Rio Sector, addressed the BPAs present and advised them to report to UVA for a debrief. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove back to UVA and arrived during the (b) (7)(E) afternoon muster. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ended his shift and drove to his residence (timestamp 00:42:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he responded to a shooter in a school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know there were children in the classroom with the shooter until after he entered the classroom (timestamp 01:02:06). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what authority USBP had to respond to the incident at Robb Elementary School. He also did not know if he had Peace Officer status in the state of Texas. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide any medical aid, he did not exercise his authority to impact anyone's movement, he did not restrain or use force on anyone (timestamp 01:38:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked what he recalled from May 24, 2022, using the map labeled 8.e.- Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde TX (timestamp 01:31:54). All other maps were not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 58**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, his scheduled shift of duty began at (b) (7)(E) and was scheduled to end at (b) (7)(E). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he began his day at CAR; however, following muster, he drove his government-owned vehicle (GOV) to a scheduled meeting with several oil industry stakeholders. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that Deputy PAIC (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, also attended the recognition event for law enforcement that was scheduled to begin at approximately 10:30 a.m. or 11:00 a.m. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, may also have been at the meeting.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated someone in the group he was with received a telephone call or a text message advising of a possible active shooter in Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he called Executive Officer (XO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Del Rio Sector (DRT); however, he did not answer. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then contacted PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Del Rio Station (DRS), who was acting Division Chief at DRT at the time, and told him they were getting information about a possible active shooter in Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised they were hearing the same information (timestamp 00:15:28).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he told PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it looked like they were going to start moving, and he advised him to “hold on”, as they were currently working on setting up a DRT emergency operations center and patching the radios (timestamp 00:16:33).

Following the conversation with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed to the group that DRT had the same information and advised them to hold on and stand down because nobody knew what was going on yet. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated they continued with the meeting, and then someone in the group told him SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who is an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), was rounding up the other CAR EMTs, and they were going to start heading to Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to hold on (timestamp 00:17:07).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Deputy Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Dimmit County, Texas, Sheriff’s Office, who is a former BPA, announced to the entire stakeholder group that his agency was also getting information of an active shooter event in Uvalde, so the meeting was cut short. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were many pieces of information pouring in; however, he recollected one of the first things he heard being reported from the USBP group he was with was that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, was leaving his shift because one of his children attended a school in Uvalde (timestamp 00:19:28).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as far as he knows, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not discouraged by any supervisor from leaving his shift, noting that he had every right to take leave (timestamp 00:21:19).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saved a picture of a text message he received from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that stated there was no need to send anyone, so the reason nobody was going was because his boss was telling him nobody goes (timestamp 00:22:44).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remembers sending an email to all CAR supervisors while at the oil industry meeting advising they needed to stand down and await further information (timestamp 00:24:12).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown an email, dated May 24, 2022, originally sent to him at 12:25 p.m. as part of an Evolving Situation Report (ESR) notification that provided a timeline of events unfolding in Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the ESR was sent to all USBP station leadership, second-line supervisors and above, telling all station PAICs not to send anyone to the Uvalde incident unless directed by them. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he forwarded the ESR email at 12:31



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p.m. to all CAR supervisors, so they would be updated on what he was hearing and that the order was communicated to stand down unless otherwise directed (timestamp 00:30:22).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the original ESR appeared to be created by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Falfurrias Station (FLF), Texas, and was then sent to the USBP Del Rio Border Intelligence Center.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) referenced his personal cell phone to read the contents of a screenshot of a text string between he and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on May 24, 2023, noting that at 12:00 p.m., PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent a message stating there was “no need to send at this time”, to which PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded “thanks”. Further, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received another text message from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at 12:47 p.m. stating, “ICP is Hillcrest Funeral Home.”, to which PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded, “10-4.”, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then responded, “Have agents report there for assignment.” (timestamp 00:33:15).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that prior to getting the text from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he received a call from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicating CAR agents were already moving toward Uvalde, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded by telling him nobody from CAR is going because he previously told him not to send anyone. Following the telephone call and subsequent text messages received from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advising to send agents to Uvalde, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spoke with his group at the stakeholder meeting. He instructed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he would be his Incident Commander (IC) at the Hillcrest Funeral Home, which would be the Incident Command Center (ICC) and advised him to also direct all EMTs to report there and contact SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for more instructions (timestamp 00:34:45).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the stakeholder meeting he was attending was ultimately terminated, and after getting into his GOV to head back to CAR, he did not hear much traffic on the CAR radio channel, so he suspected that much of the communications amongst BPAs was being done via cell phone and text messaging (timestamp 00:50:27).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he left the stakeholder meeting enroute to CAR between 1:15 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. and made it back prior to the (b) (7)(E) muster. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that following the (b) (7)(E) muster, he received a phone call directing him to send a second wave of CAR relief agents to Uvalde. That group included himself, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and CAR BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:54:59).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon his arrival at the Uvalde Civic Center, it was very disorganized, and the first thing he heard about was that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was mad because Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, gave an order, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to do the opposite. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) argued with CPA Owens, prompting Deputy CPA (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to tell SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was being unprofessional (timestamp 00:56:07).





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PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on his drive from CAR to Uvalde, he drove with his emergency lights activated. Further, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at some point on the drive to Uvalde, he received a message that was put out indicating WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Uvalde Station (UVA), was designated as the point of contact for all USBP personnel, and he would tell those responding where to go. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first contacted WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the way and was told he did not know what was going on. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was said to be at the civic center; therefore, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to advise all those responding from CAR to report to the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 00:58:25).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based on what he was being told, there was nothing for them to do at the school where the shooting took place and that the students that survived were being taken to the civic center for reunification with family members. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated nobody at the Uvalde Civic Center had command or control, noting there were a lot of different agencies represented. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spoke with a male at the civic center who appeared to be in charge. He recollected the male was the Dilley, Texas, Chief of Police who denied being in command of the scene when asked (timestamp 01:03:56).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recollected arriving at the civic center between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., and he remained there for approximately one and a half hours. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he possibly saw WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, at the civic center, and he met with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas. They worked together to relieve USBP personnel with those that had just arrived from his station. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., he and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to UVA where they saw the following USBP personnel: CPA Owens, peer support personnel, USBP Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) members, the DRT PAIC of BORTAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who is now the PAIC of USBP Nogales Station, Arizona, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT (timestamp 01:15:05).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated she was collecting clean uniforms from other stations so personnel could change out of their bloody clothing prior to leaving UVA. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the civic center and noticed the entrances that were previously blocked by law enforcement were opened. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to find out if USBP was needed at that site any longer and ultimately determined they could relieve all personnel for the day. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he made it back to his residence between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied seeing anyone issuing orders to law enforcement personnel upon his arrival at the civic center (timestamp 01:21:05).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the only orders he issued were to USBP personnel (timestamp 01:21:55).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied providing any type of aid to members of the public or exercising any authority restricting the movement of the public (timestamp 01:24:53).



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PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP’s role in the incident that occurred was to support in any way possible (timestamp 01:25:21).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his understanding is USBP had no jurisdiction or authority at the incident, and their role was simply to provide support, noting that he had no authority, and there was nothing for him to enforce (timestamp 01:26:10).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have a body-worn camera on the date of the incident and has not taken Active Shooter training. He also denied ever being at Robb Elementary School or ever generating a report or memorandum describing his activities on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 01:30:53).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were at the Uvalde Hospital to provide peer support to a BORTAC agent who sustained a minor injury during the incident at Robb Elementary School. Additionally, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that the argument between SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and CPA Owens was over something related to the medical field; however, he is unsure of the specifics or where the argument occurred.

Prior to concluding the interview, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described his route of travel from CAR to Uvalde and utilized printed maps to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, Del Rio (HSI/Del Rio), as a Task Force Officer (TFO) and was working the (b) (7)(E) shift. On that day, SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the federal courthouse in Del Rio when he received a group text message notification from investigators from the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) at approximately 11:36 a.m. The notification was regarding a possible active shooter incident at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde (timestamp 10:02:25).

SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his partner, Special Agent (SA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HSI/Del Rio, both agreed that since Uvalde is approximately 70 miles away from Del Rio, the incident would probably be under control before they could arrive; therefore, it was not necessary for them to respond.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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At approximately 11:50 a.m., SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concluded their activities at the courthouse. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then told SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was scheduled to meet with the district attorney in Uvalde; therefore, he drove to Uvalde and responded to Robb Elementary School first to see if his assistance was needed. Shortly after speaking with SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received a call from his supervisor with HSI, Group Supervisor (GS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HSI/Del Rio. GS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to respond to the command center at the Hillcrest Funeral Home in Uvalde (timestamp 10:04:30).

SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then responded to HSI/Del Rio to pick up TFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Val Verde County, Texas Sheriff's Office. At approximately 12:13 p.m., SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and TFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left Del Rio wearing plainclothes and traveling together in an unmarked patrol vehicle. SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he activated the vehicle's overhead lights and siren and traveled eastbound on U.S. Highway 90 to Uvalde (timestamp 10:05:30).

SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and TFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the Hillcrest Funeral Home at approximately 1:02 p.m. (timestamp 10:07:50).

Upon arrival, SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and TFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were met by Lieutenant (Lt.) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS, who informed SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on the second entry team at Robb Elementary School. SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him and TFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the initial entry teams at Robb Elementary School would be arriving at Hillcrest Funeral Home and asked if they could look out for SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to ascertain if he needed any assistance. SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he had observed unknown members of the entry team at Robb Elementary School receiving medical attention for shrapnel wounds.

While at the Hillcrest Funeral Home, SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other HSI SAs were approached by an unknown officer from the Uvalde Police Department who said there was an alleged report that the girlfriend of the Robb Elementary School shooter threatened to go to Uvalde High School to finish the job. At approximately 1:30 p.m., SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and TFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the Hillcrest Funeral Home for Uvalde High School and rode in a vehicle driven by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HSI, Chattanooga, Tennessee, who was with HSI/Del Rio at the time (timestamp 10:09:45).

At approximately 1:35 pm., SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they arrived at Uvalde High School, where he immediately observed parents arguing with local law enforcement officers at the rear of the school. SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted the officers while they were trying to calm the parents. SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he did not give any verbal commands to any of the parents, and he did not restrict their movements or exercise any law enforcement authority (timestamp 10:12:25).

SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at Uvalde High School for approximately 30 minutes until he was notified by other HSI agents they received instructions from the command center to report to the Hillcrest Funeral Home (timestamp 10:14:20).



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After arriving at the Hillcrest Funeral Home, SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was met by GS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who told him and other HSI agents to return to Uvalde High School to assist the school faculty with the children who were going to be released to their parents. SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he provided protection for the school faculty and escorted children from the school lunchroom to their parent's cars in the school parking lot.

At approximately 6:30 p.m., SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed Uvalde High School after GS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified him and other HSI agents to respond to the fairgrounds for a debrief (timestamp 10:16:10).

SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the fairgrounds after the debrief at approximately 6:30 p.m. and arrived in Del Rio at approximately 8:30 p.m.

SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was aware there was a command-and-control structure at Hillcrest Funeral Home but did not enter the building to make any observations. SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated any information that was communicated from the command-and-control structure was first communicated to his supervisor, GS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who then communicated the information to other HSI agents at the scene (timestamp 10:17:30).

SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed USBP's role during the incident was to assist where needed.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 60**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he worked a (b) (7)(E) shift. His uniform that day was a black polo shirt displaying a Department of Homeland Security logo with “USBP” stitched underneath and tan cargo pants. He recalled his assignment that day was to work management inquiries and work with the transition of the USBP, Critical Incident Team (CIT) to CBP OPR. He said he, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Border Patrol Agent-Programs (BPA-P) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, traveled to Eagle Pass, Texas, to assist SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR/Del Rio, with conducting interviews for a critical incident involving a migrant death.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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During the trip to Eagle Pass, he recalled hearing spotty communication on his service radio about an incident taking place in Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his two coworkers got to Eagle Pass, and during a witness interview related to a migrant death, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a telephone call and informed everyone they all needed to respond to Uvalde to assist with a critical incident involving CBP employees and a shooting (timestamp 11:13:48).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove together to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated emergency equipment was activated at some points while they were enroute to Uvalde. He clarified the vehicle's lights and sirens were activated when they needed to overtake civilian vehicles. He recalled the route of travel taken from the USBP Eagle Pass South Station to Uvalde was an unknown loop to U.S. Highway 57, to Farm to Market Road 481, to U.S. Highway 90, to Evans Street, to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:17:55).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained their plan was to assist CBP OPR with whatever was needed after the incident and that CBP OPR was in the lead for them. He said they were going to meet up as close to Robb Elementary School as possible once they arrived. Upon arrival, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled parking approximately two blocks away from the school and walking towards the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was communicating with SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when they got to the front of Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:20:53).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered school buses taking kids from the school while they stood outside the front of the school. He clarified the incident at the school was already over by the time they arrived on foot at the front of the school. He said they never went inside the school and remained outside for approximately 10 minutes before they walked to the command center at the funeral home adjacent to the school (timestamp 11:26:15).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) signed into the command center and met with SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and acting Resident Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR/Del Rio, for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. He recalled an unknown Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper relaying information that a secondary threat possibly existed because the shooter's girlfriend was planning to "finish the job," (timestamp 11:26:58).

The unknown Trooper requested for people at the command center to go out and secure the other schools in the town. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered their assignment, given to them by ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was to secure Dalton Elementary School (timestamp 11:27:25).

He said, text communications relaying additional information occurred among acting RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he. The text messages exchanged involved where they were going.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after leaving the command center and prior to going to Dalton Elementary School, they traveled to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) to check out hard-plate body armor and M-4 rifles. He recalled SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, provided him and his coworkers with the M-4s and hard-plate body armor (timestamp 11:29:08).



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He was unable to recall what time they arrived at UVA. After they secured the body armor and M-4 rifles, they drove to Dalton Elementary School, where they provided perimeter security and helped direct traffic with other state and local law enforcement officers (LEOs) (timestamp 11:32:06).

He said he and his coworkers kept in contact with acting RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via text to inform them of their movements and whereabouts during their time in Uvalde. He said he also provided his supervisor, Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, with telephonic status updates during their time in Uvalde (timestamp 11:33:57).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said nobody at Dalton Elementary School gave them any orders, and they took it upon themselves to direct traffic. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the situation in Uvalde as very chaotic when they arrived. He noted many different law enforcement agencies present on scene, and it appeared to him the Troopers were in charge. He based his opinion on one unknown Trooper providing assignments to LEOs at the command center (timestamp 11:35:29).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe any orders being provided to responding LEOs. He described what he saw as people asking other LEOs to respond to different locations to help. He said he never provided any orders or guidance to any responding LEOs. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it did not appear that anyone from USBP was in charge (timestamp 11:36:47).

He said his interactions with the public consisted of answering questions and directing people to where they needed to go to retrieve their children.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he directed civilians' movement when he informed arriving parents, they needed to follow procedures in place for them to pick up their children. He said he never had to go "hands on" with anyone in Uvalde. He said he never rendered any aid to anyone while he was in Uvalde (timestamp 11:38:49).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when he arrived in Uvalde, the role of USBP was a support role (timestamp 11:39:23).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was a support role; a public safety aspect to help keep the public safe (timestamp 11:40:10).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 61**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty and in uniform during his normal shift from (b) (7)(E) when he received a text message from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, at approximately 12:00 p.m. regarding an active shooter threat at a school in Uvalde (timestamp 18:46:07).

After the text message, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed his supervisor, Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, of the active shooter incident. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then contacted Acting Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) JSBP, Del Rio Sector (DRT), and asked if there was a need for more Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) to respond to Uvalde. Acting Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there were enough personnel already enroute to Uvalde and told him to hold off on sending any additional USBP personnel (timestamp 14:48:15).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 1:30 p.m., Acting Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed USBP personnel to respond primarily with Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) first and then later with additional personnel for security at other buildings in Uvalde. At approximately 3:00 p.m., DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started heading to Uvalde from Carrizo Springs in his personally owned vehicle, following behind PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who were driving their individual patrol vehicles. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they traveled on U.S. Highway 83 directly to Uvalde. While enroute to Uvalde, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was coordinating via cell phone with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on where to respond in Uvalde.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived in Uvalde between 3:30 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. and drove directly to the civic center (timestamp 14:54:55).

When he arrived at the civic center, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed there were several other officers from the Uvalde Police Department, as well as BPAs already on scene who were providing perimeter security. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the Dilly, TX Police Department Police Chief appeared to be in charge of security at the time and was deciding who could go in and out of the civic center (timestamp 14:57:00).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also met with DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Uvalde Station (UVA), to ascertain what other assistance was needed. Afterwards, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with establishing additional perimeter security at the civic center and directed BPAs from the swing shift to relieve initial perimeter security personnel. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also told additional BPAs that responded to the civic center to report to the command center at Hillcrest Funeral Home for further instructions. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had very limited interaction with the public, mainly talking with parents he knew personally.

At approximately 5:00 p.m., DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who told him and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to UVA. After arriving at UVA, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked to the muster room along with other BPAs. In the muster room, Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, USBP, Del Rio Sector, addressed the BPAs and thanked them for their assistance. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he left UVA at approximately 6:30 p.m. and returned to his home in Uvalde.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's role was to assist to stop any threat and provide security and assistance.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 62**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the Professional Standards Branch (PSB), Management Inquiry Team (MIT), DRT. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on duty on this date and assigned to work from (b) (7)(E). BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was wearing a black USBP polo shirt and tan pants, which was the standard attire for PSB (timestamp 00:09:38).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on this date, he was accompanied by Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT MIT. He stated they had been dispatched by their supervisor, Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to respond the USBP Soft-Sided Facility (SSF) in Eagle Pass, Texas, to assist SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR/Del Rio, with conducting interviews related to an incident in Eagle Pass (timestamp 00:10:32).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was driving their assigned unmarked USBP vehicle (timestamp 00:15:05).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while conducting interviews at SSF, SBPAA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was contacted telephonically and advised for them to respond to Uvalde due to the shooting incident (timestamp 00:11:25).

He did not recall the time the phone call was received. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed it was SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who advised SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for them to respond. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the distance from Eagle Pass to Uvalde is approximately 63 to 64 miles (timestamp 00:13:08).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was uncertain when they received the orders to respond. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they responded using their lights and sirens. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it took them about an hour to travel from Eagle Pass to Uvalde. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were not part of a vehicle caravan when they were driving over there. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was uncertain what time they arrived. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also responded from Eagle Pass to Uvalde, but BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not see them when they departed (timestamp 00:17:05).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that earlier, when they were traveling south from Del Rio to Eagle Pass via U.S. Highway 277, near Quemado, Texas, they heard an unknown USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) BPA come over the USBP radio and say there had been a shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know what time it was. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were traveling near the river [Rio Grande] when they heard this and were far away from Uvalde (timestamp 00:13:45).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while traveling from Eagle Pass to Uvalde, they did not hear anything over their USBP radio (timestamp 00:19:33).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that it went silent. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated their route of travel was U.S. Highway 57, then Farm to Market Road 481, then U.S. Highway 90 into Uvalde. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they drove directly to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:21:55).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were so many law enforcement vehicles that they had to park approximately one-fourth to one-half of a mile away from the school. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after they parked, they began walking towards Robb Elementary School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were walking, they encountered SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), Texas, who is also an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), and he had his gear with him. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed them he had been in the classroom, the situation was over, and there were many deceased.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they remained outside of the school's fence for a short time and then walked over to the incident command center located at the funeral home (timestamp 00:24:11).





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BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at the incident command center, they heard the shooter's girlfriend had posted a threat online, something to the effect that she was going to finish the job (timestamp 00:24:45).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received instructions for them to go to Dalton Elementary School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who told them to go over there. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was in the area of Robb Elementary School, he did not provide aid to anyone and did not use his authority to prevent anyone from doing anything (timestamp 00:26:40).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the scene at Robb Elementary School as complete chaos and stated that it did not appear that anyone was in charge (timestamp 00:44:29).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only had their sidearms, so they first stopped at UVA to pick up body armor and long arms and then drove to Dalton Elementary School (timestamp 00:25:23).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he went to UVA, he did not have any contact with any members of the public. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know what time it was when they did this. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at Dalton Elementary School, he initially assisted school officials by helping reunite arriving parents with their children (timestamp 00:28:18).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated school officials were requesting parents provide identification before releasing any children to them. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on approximately four occasions, parents provided him with their identifications. He provided their identification information to school officials, who released the children, and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reunited the children with their parents. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated vehicle traffic from arriving parents was causing a lot of congestion at the entrance to the school, so he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with traffic control at the entrance to the school. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated their actions at Dalton Elementary School were at the request of the school principal. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the principal's name but described her as an Anglo female estimated to be in her mid-50s (timestamp 00:31:08).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the school principal was in charge at Dalton Elementary School (timestamp 00:44:20).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never provided instructions or orders to anyone else in law enforcement. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at Dalton Elementary School, he did not provide aid to anyone and did not use any type of force to prevent anyone from doing anything (timestamp 00:31:51).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated they left Dalton Elementary School at approximately 6:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:58:32).



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He went to UVA to drop off the body armor and long arms, and then he headed back to Del Rio with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and arrived there after dark (timestamp 01:21:26).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed from UVA to San Antonio, where he resided (timestamp 01:24:53).

Concerning his understanding of USBP’s authority to respond to this incident, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he understood it to be in a back-up role to assist local and state officials (timestamp 00:32:48).

Concerning his understanding of USBP’s responsibility to respond to this incident, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was in a back-up role. He continued to say if USBP was the first one there, then as first responders, the responsibility would be for the safety of the general public (timestamp 00:34:37).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have a body-worn camera on the date of the incident (timestamp 00:36:36).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any relevant text messages concerning the incident. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had not generated any emails, reports, or memorandums about the incident. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that aside from a brief telephonic interview with the Texas Rangers, he had not had discussions with anyone concerning his response to this incident (timestamp 00:38:44).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had been in law enforcement for 22 years and believed that he had participated in Active Shooter training but did not recall when (timestamp 00:40:12).

During the interview, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was presented with maps illustrating Uvalde and the surrounding area. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated the route of travel they took from Eagle Pass to Uvalde. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also identified the approximate location where they parked their USBP vehicle and the route they walked towards Robb Elementary School, the incident command center, and back to their vehicle. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated that they spent approximately 45 minutes at this location before departing to UVA and then to Dalton Elementary School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified Dalton Elementary School on the corresponding map. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he did not know what time they arrived at Dalton Elementary School but estimated they departed at approximately 6:00 p.m. (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 63**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was employed as a Border Patrol Agent (BPA) working on a Management Inquiry/Critical Incident Team out of USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) intended to meet up with SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR/Del Rio, at the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Eagle Pass South Station (EGS), Texas, to do interviews associated with an unrelated drowning incident that occurred in Eagle Pass. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove an unmarked Dodge Durango government-owned vehicle (GOV) with Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and Border Patrol Agent-Programs (BPA-P) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were together in a separate GOV. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wore a black polo shirt with U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) markings and tan cargo pants.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard over the GOV radio that someone entered Robb Elementary School with a long arm and shots were fired. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, on his cell phone and reported the information provided over the radio. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initially directed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to continue to EGS to handle the drowning investigation. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw several Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) units traveling toward Uvalde with their emergency equipment activated and called SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on his cell phone to discuss possibly diverting to Uvalde. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called his contacts and said that they needed to continue to Eagle Pass to handle the drowning. As SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the others continued toward Eagle Pass, the radio traffic was broken and eventually ceased (timestamp 00:10:26).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he parked at a soft-sided facility near EGS to wait for SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and heard broken radio traffic requesting all available units to respond to Uvalde. SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the station, and the group broke up into two interview teams to conduct the first of several required interviews pertaining to the drowning. In the middle of the second interview of each team, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call on his cell phone instructing SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to Uvalde. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left Eagle Pass in the Dodge Durango GOV, and SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left in SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Dodge Charger GOV. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said both GOVs activated their emergency equipment, and the trip from Eagle Pass to Uvalde took approximately 40 minutes (timestamp 00:13:05).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were a significant amount police and emergency vehicles and personnel around Robb Elementary School, so SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked approximately two blocks away on Geraldine Street near where the shooter crashed his vehicle in the ditch. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Robb Elementary School after the shooter had been stopped, and the injured were removed from the scene. As SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was walking toward the school, he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), Texas. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the situation in the school was bad, and at least 13 children had been killed. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard that the shooter's girlfriend was threatening to send someone else to finish the job. When SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reached the parking lot at Robb Elementary School, TXDPS had a controlled crime scene and was not letting anyone in the school (timestamp 00:14:38).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he called SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on his cell phone, and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was parked at the funeral home across the street from Robb Elementary School. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked to the parking lot of the funeral home to meet up with SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the incident command center at the funeral home and signed in. A TXDPS supervisor told SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the others there was an active threat to other local schools and instructed them to go to a local school. As they prepared to go to another school, Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, told SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, wanted to address everyone at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) (timestamp 00:18:09).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he left the incident command center at the funeral home and drove to UVA to get rifles and body armor. They were only at UVA for a few minutes and then left to go to Dalton Elementary School (timestamp 00:21:26).



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There were lots of parents and law enforcement in the parking lot at Dalton Elementary School. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR), DRT. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there was no command structure at Robb Elementary School or at Dalton Elementary School. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several senior TXDPS supervisors at the funeral home, but it was not clear who was in command (timestamp 00:22:50).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on the way to Dalton Elementary School, he heard over the GOV radio that shots were fired at Uvalde High School. Soon after hearing this, U.S. Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) personnel broadcast over the radio that no shots were fired, and they were on scene clearing the school. The parking lot was chaotic at Dalton Elementary School. Parents were in cars and walking around waiting to pick their children up from school. The principal of Dalton Elementary School took command and control of the scene by having parents pull up to the school in their vehicles to get their children. The resulting traffic slowed the process until TXDPS arrived and began traffic control (timestamp 00:26:05).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he instructed parents they needed to approach in their vehicle, provide identification, and then their child would be released from the school. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) helped the principal release the children for approximately 30 minutes. Several local officers began helping the principal get school children to their parents. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began assisting BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with traffic control when the area became too congested. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never had an argument or had to go hands on with anyone at Dalton Elementary School. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he was at Dalton Elementary School for approximately four hours (timestamp 00:26:52).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he thought it was his responsibility to assist the local police when the circumstances required. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the exact statutory authority that gives USBP the authority to assist the local police during a school shooting. At Dalton Elementary School, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed it was his duty to assist the principal with extracting the children from the school and getting them to their parents. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he was at Dalton Elementary School assisting the principal and controlling traffic until approximately 5:30 p.m. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called him on his cell phone and asked him to pick up some Gatorades and meet SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back at the funeral home. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left Dalton Elementary School and picked up some Gatorades at a gas station on the corner and then met SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR/Del Rio, who was the acting Resident Agent in Charge at OPR/Del Rio at that time, at the funeral home. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) talked to them for a minute and eventually told them they could go home. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the funeral home and returned their body armor and rifles to UVA. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went home after returning his gear to UVA (timestamp 00:32:20).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not hear any shots fired on the date of the incident and was not issued a body-worn camera (timestamp 00:35:47).



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SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said there was an OPR group text addressing the location, well-being, and information about the threat as it became known. SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> received the texts on his USBP-issued work cell phone. SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> turned in that cell phone when he accepted a position as an SA with CBP OPR (timestamp 00:36:01).

SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> was not aware of any specific email updates sent during the incident but believed USBP sent out Evolving Situation Reports (ESRs) after the incident. SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> did not complete any written reports about the incident and was briefly interviewed by TXDPS several weeks after the incident via phone asking about SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> involvement (timestamp 00:36:42).

SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said he received Active Shooter training while at CAR. The training included participants from TXDPS, the Dimmit County, Texas, Sheriff’s Office, school police, and Texas Game Wardens. SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said USBP hosted the weeklong Active Shooter training at a local middle school in Carrizo Springs in 2017 or 2018 using simulation rounds and focusing on clearing rooms and moving in on the active shooter (timestamp 00:38:05).

SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said he never rendered medical aid to anyone throughout the incident on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 00:39:48).

Prior to concluding the interview, SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> utilized printed maps to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
2	Maps reviewed by SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 64**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y





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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty and assigned to work at CAR. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was assigned to work from (b) (7)(E) wore the standard green USBP uniform, and had a marked USBP vehicle (timestamp 00:09:36).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned of the incident when he was contacted telephonically by one of his subordinates, Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there had been an incident at his child's school, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked at the same school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was uncertain what was going on but indicated there had been a chase, and a subject had gone into the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he could take leave to head over there. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he approved BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) leave. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded from the CAR Checkpoint, where he was assigned, to CAR to get his personal vehicle (timestamp 00:10:38).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were limited personnel at the CAR checkpoint where BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned, so he (SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) responded to the checkpoint to provide cover for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) while waiting for another BPA from the field to arrive (timestamp 00:12:33).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not to wait for him to arrive at the checkpoint and to head straight to the station to get his personal vehicle, which BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he arrived at the checkpoint, he and other BPAs there were monitoring the radio and heard someone yelling on the radio saying there were kids or something to that effect. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then began to realize there was more to the situation. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not sure at what time, but several CAR BPAs that were also Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) were sent from CAR to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, had directed the BPA/EMTs to respond (timestamp 00:15:58).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he began to monitor his USBP assigned ATAK (Android Team Awareness Kit) phone, which allowed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to view the locations of BPAs responding from CAR to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that through the ATAK phone, he could see the BPA/EMTs were responding, going up U.S. Highway 83 (timestamp 00:17:08).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was at the checkpoint, he received a call from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Eagle Pass South Station (EGS), Texas, who is also the USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) Peer Support Coordinator, requesting SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) respond to Uvalde to provide peer support services (timestamp 00:17:52).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was a Peer Support Member (PSM). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he in turn notified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, also a PSM, to report to Uvalde to provide peer support service as well. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) call, he departed the checkpoint (timestamp 00:23:23).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall the time he departed but believed it was after law enforcement officers had breached the room where the shooter was because he heard something to that effect over the radio before he departed. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that before he departed the checkpoint, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who is also an EMT, departed the checkpoint to Uvalde, following the initial orders for BPA/EMTs to respond (timestamp 00:19:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he departed the checkpoint alone in a marked USBP vehicle and had his emergency equipment activated (timestamp 00:21:25).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not part of a convoy of vehicles. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he drove up U.S. Highway 83, and then turned onto U.S. Highway 90 into Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that aside from directing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to Uvalde, he did not order or direct anyone else to respond (timestamp 00:22:22).



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he informed his upper management he had been activated to Uvalde to provide peer support services. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was driving to Uvalde, he heard over the radio for BPAs to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), so he drove directly there. Upon arrival, he went into the station and met with affected BPAs to provide them with peer support services (timestamp 00:24:51).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that one of the BPAs who stood out to him was BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who is also a Firearms Instructor (FI). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was wearing a red FI polo shirt, but SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tan pants were covered in blood (timestamp 00:30:52).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was at UVA, he heard BPAs talking about a threat that the shooter's girlfriend had reportedly made, something to the effect of finishing the job (timestamp 00:32:40).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon hearing this, he shifted from a peer support role to wanting to provide security and departed UVA, along with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from UVA to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vehicle, which was parked in the vicinity of Robb Elementary School, and then SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) headed to the Uvalde Hospital (timestamp 00:50:48).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at the hospital, he recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who were there to see an injured BPA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was off duty but was wearing his gear. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not being himself, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been one of the first BPAs at the school (timestamp 00:35:14).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon meeting with the BPAs, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she had just received a phone call and said they needed to report to the Uvalde Civic Center, where children were being reunited with parents, and people were also voting. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he only spent approximately five to ten minutes at the hospital before driving to the civic center (timestamp 00:34:25).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and the aforementioned BPAs and SBPAs responded to the civic center (timestamp 00:36:38).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the civic center as chaos. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were people everywhere, and news crews were arriving. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and the others provided security outside of the civic center, and he personally directed and also escorted arriving parents to the civic center's entrance (timestamp 00:39:05).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, being at the civic center when he was there (timestamp 00:44:10).



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any incidents with anyone and never used his authority to affect anyone’s movements or render aid to anyone (timestamp 00:41:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was at the civic center for several hours, until past 4:00 p.m., but he was uncertain what time it was. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he departed the civic center, he went back to UVA where he parked his USBP vehicle and made arrangements to be picked up and taken home because he lived in Uvalde (timestamp 00:52:53).

Concerning his understanding of USBP’s authority to respond to this incident, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as first responders, the priority was to send EMTs to assist then to ensure the safety of the EMTs due to possible threats. Concerning his understanding of USBP’s responsibility to respond to the incident, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was a matter of public safety (timestamp 00:46:18).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have a body-worn camera on the date of the incident (timestamp 00:54:40).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have text messages concerning the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not generate any emails, reports, or memorandums about the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that aside from an interview with a Texas Ranger, he did not have discussions with anyone concerning his response to the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had participated in a week-long Active Shooter training in Del Rio in approximately 2015 or 2016. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the day after the incident, he and others provided a verbal timeline of the incident to Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR (timestamp 00:55:45).

During the interview, OPR interviewers presented SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with maps illustrating Uvalde and the surrounding area. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated the route of travel he took from Carrizo Springs to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also identified the Uvalde Civic Center and annotated he was at the parking lot and provided crowd control (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 65**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 13, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning her involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is permanently assigned to the Del Rio POE. Since February 2022, CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has been detailed to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). On May 24, 2022, she was assigned to the ATF as an Analytical Targeting Officer (ATO).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, she worked from (b) (7)(E) Shortly after the events began, she received text messages on her ATF-issued phone that there was an active shooter but did not recall the time the messages were received (timestamp 00:19:15).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after she completed her shift, she went home (timestamp 00:20:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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She said there was talk that blood donations were needed. She said her ATF supervisor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio, asked who would be able to respond. She said she contacted the Del Rio POE for permission to respond and was told she could respond (timestamp 00:20:30).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she drove her personally-owned vehicle to Uvalde and arrived at the civic center at about 4:00 p.m. CBPO drew her route of travel on the provided maps (Attachment 2). CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wore her CBPO uniform (timestamp 00:21:40).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when she arrived, she met with members of her assigned ATF team (timestamp 00:22:00).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there did not appear to be any agency in charge of what was going on at the civic center (timestamp 00:25:10).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she remained at the civic center for about 40 minutes to an hour (timestamp 00:25:25).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after she left the civic center, she went to the Incident Command Post at the funeral home across from Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:25:40).

She called around to see if she could donate blood and was advised blood was not needed (timestamp 00:26:00).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked her ATF supervisor if she was still needed and, he told her no. CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she then departed for home and arrived back in Del Rio at about 7:00 p.m.

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not have any of the text messages related to this incident (timestamp 00:28:30).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she took Highway 90 from Del Rio to the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 00:29:50).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not initially recall who she talked to at the Del Rio POE, but later remembered she spoke with Port Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio, for permission to respond (timestamp 00:32:20).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she did not render aid to anyone (timestamp 00:33:30).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 13, 2023, Senior Special Agent (SSA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR SAC Detroit, and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR SAC Washington, conducted an interview of U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Sector Headquarters, Del Rio, TX (DRT) regarding her involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The entirety of the interview was audio/video recorded utilizing StarWitness equipment under Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, she reported to USBP Del Rio Station (DRS) in uniform for her shift of duty that began at (b) (7)(E) and was scheduled to end at (b) (7)(E) WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised her permanent position with USBP was Special Operations Supervisor (SOS); however, at that time she was serving in an acting capacity as the “A” chief of the Training and Traumatic Incident Management Branch (TTIMB).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she does not remember who she first spoke with regarding the active shooter in Uvalde, TX; however, noted that around noon she received multiple phone calls from multiple people regarding the situation. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that on that date she had the DRS firing range instructors doing range assessments with headquarters personnel at the USBP Brackettville Station (BRA). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recollected receiving a text message from Sector Programs Agent (SPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saying they were enroute to Uvalde, and at first believed they were going to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) firing range until she spoke with him on the telephone. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she received a call from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was in the car with DRT Deputy Chief Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regarding the incident. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was directed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get all available emergency medical technicians (EMTs) activated and ready to respond to Uvalde for an active shooter situation at Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directly notified BPA/EMT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA/EMT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the need for them to report immediately to Uvalde, noting they were at DRT conducting training; however, based on the request for assistance they were being activated to respond to Uvalde. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left immediately and, on their way to Uvalde, were going to BRA to pick up a trailer with gear that was already packed and ready to go. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also dispatched DRT peer support coordinator BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Uvalde (Timestamp 00:07:46).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she stayed at DRT in order to field incoming calls as the situation unfolded and to communicate activation messages as required. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised she received a telephone call from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asking that she attempt to gather as many articles of clothing as possible to be taken to UVA for those that responded to change into. That was followed by a call from Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens advising to get all available peer support members to UVA for an after brief. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to provide a timeline of when she fielded the referenced telephone calls, noting that she fielded a rolling barrage of calls without a break. She stated what she was hearing telephonically about the incident did not match what was being reported by the media, and she recognized the situation was very bad (Timestamp 00:15:23).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that in the summer of 2022, DRT was requested to develop a list of activations and roles related to the Uvalde school shooting and provide it to CBP OPR. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the list of activations was completed by DRT DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and included over one hundred names. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed that on May 24, 2022, she also activated Mission Support Specialist (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for peer support assistance. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would have also activated additional peer support personnel based upon her direction.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she did not hear any radio transmissions and received all information about the incident via telephone calls. She was unaware that an incident command post was established in the DRT radio room until after May 24, 2022. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied having any emails or text messages about the incident (Timestamp 00:22:54).



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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and provided him support following his return to DRT. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall what time she left DRS, but she continued working from home later that evening.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated her understanding is that USBP arrived to assist in a support capacity. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated nothing was reported to indicate who had command or control of the situation as it unfolded. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she believed the Uvalde Police Department (UPD) and Uvalde school officers were at Robb Elementary School, along with representatives from Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS), Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and several firearms instructors from Uvalde.. She stated these groups were taking their direction from UPD. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP's role that day was a support capacity to assist other agencies and that you take the orders and directives from the first on scene incident commander. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during an active shooter or barricaded subject, USBP would be acting in a support capacity to assist at the request of other law enforcement agencies (Timestamp 00:35:15).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described a situation involving BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wherein he rendered aid to the last child at the scene. When he attempted to move the child to a stretcher, he was supporting the child's back and neck (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she does not know any further details and cannot say for sure what exactly BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed because there were several children he was helping. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that other USBP personnel who were on scene at Robb Elementary School included BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Sector Programs Agent (SPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA first name unknown (FNU) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Timestamp 00:43:47).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied having any knowledge of any directions from Chief Owens or DRT leadership in which they advised EMTs not to assist with the care needed on site (Timestamp 00:50:55).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 13, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning her involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using Star Witness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on duty on the morning of May 24, 2022, worked in plain clothes, and was assigned to a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task force in Del Rio. She heard about the shooting at Robb Elementary School while working an operation in Eagle Pass, Texas. One of the other task force members notified the group of the shooting. She recalled hearing there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School (Timestamp 11:13:04)

The group supervisor for DEA informed her and the other task force members that they were going to respond to Uvalde and provide any support necessary (Timestamp 11:13:32).

She responded to Uvalde in her unmarked government vehicle, and followed other DEA agents all the way to Uvalde. She believed she departed Eagle Pass between 11:50 a.m. and 12:05 p.m. She recalled the drive to Uvalde took approximately 50 minutes. She believed she had her emergency lights activated during her entire drive to Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other DEA task force members arrived in Uvalde and drove until they reached a location approximately two blocks from Robb Elementary School. While enroute, she recalled hearing over her service radio, “The shooter was down,” (Timestamp 11:18:25).

Since she followed other DEA agents to Uvalde, she did not notify anyone upon their arrival at Robb Elementary School. She and other DEA agents stood outside the gate at the school to assist with crowd control and to keep order. She and the other DEA agents then walked to the command center located at the funeral home. At the command center, she did not witness anyone giving commands to other law enforcement officers.

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to describe the command-and-control structure at the funeral home because she never entered the conference room. She recalled a funeral home worker telling her the school shooter had shot at him before entering the school. After she departed from the funeral home, she recalled all DEA personnel were contacted by Acting Supervisor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DEA, Del Rio, to respond to the hospital to provide crowd control assistance. CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed she stayed at the command center at the funeral home for approximately 30 minutes (Timestamp 11:23:24).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she took her unmarked government vehicle to the hospital, parked, and was tasked with guarding the emergency room door alongside another DEA agent for approximately two to three hours. Her interaction with the parents consisted of civilians looking for their children. She recalled having no information to provide them. CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she did not put hands on any civilians during her time in Uvalde.

After providing security and crowd control at the hospital, she returned to a street near Robb Elementary School where she met up with the other DEA agents on her task force for a brief meeting. She recalled several DEA supervisors from San Antonio, Texas provided a briefing to the DEA personnel. She believed she was at the briefing for approximately 30 minutes before she was allowed to drive back to Del Rio. She believed she got home around 7:00 p.m. (Timestamp 11:27:24).

CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she never exercised any authority which impacted any individual’s movements during her time in Uvalde. She stated she never provided aid to any individual except to comfort one individual during her time in Uvalde. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what she believed U.S. Border Patrol’s (USBP’s) role was in the incident at Robb Elementary School. CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she had no direct knowledge. She said that from what she heard, USBP entered the building, but that was not first-hand information.

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what she believed USBP’s authority/responsibility to respond to the incident at Robb Elementary School was. CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained her belief that USBP are first responders.

During her time in Uvalde, she recalled seeing her supervisor, Supervisory CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio, who was assigned to a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security



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Investigations (HSI) task force. He was working outside the Robb Elementary School gate aiding individuals exiting the school after the incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of CBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 17, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was the Acting DCPA for DRT, his permanent position was Division Chief of Operations. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned about the incident at Robb Elementary School at approximately 11:00 a.m. when Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Comstock Station, and Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, reported there was an active shooter situation at an elementary school in Uvalde (timestamp 00:37:30). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked for additional details regarding the situation and was told there was nothing else to report and that Border Patrol agents (BPA) were en route.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that realizing the importance of the scenario, he interrupted Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, who was on a call, to inform him of the situation. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also informed CPA Owens he was going to deploy to the scene. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that because of the distance from DRT to Uvalde, he expected the incident to be over by the time he arrived and added he would likely assume an incident command role. However, to be safe, DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to bring M-4 rifles with them (timestamp 00:40:00). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Assistant CPA (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, at DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government vehicle with three M-4s. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were gearing up, and after obtaining the weapons and ammunition, departed DRT en route to Uvalde.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as he was driving to Uvalde, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with fielding telephone calls and taking notes. According to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CPA Owens departed shortly after him en route to Uvalde, while PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, stayed to set up a command post at DRT. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he would assist with handling decisions at the DRT level and any communications between DRT and Washington, D.C. (timestamp 00:44:00).

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after approximately 15 minutes, he received a call from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who informed him the situation might be legitimate. According to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there were reports of 911 calls which indicated there could be at least nine victims. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently activated the lights and sirens on his vehicle to get to the scene as fast as possible. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to order all emergency medical technicians (EMT) within driving distance to deploy to the vicinity of the school and be ready to respond when necessary. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed the local police department and the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) would have control of the situation and would provide instructions of where to respond. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also instructed the DRT Training and Traumatic Incident Management Branch to have peer support and chaplain resources on standby (timestamp 00:47:00).

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received more updates as they got closer to Uvalde and explained all the information received indicated the situation was real. According to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) even with “spotty” radio traffic and an open microphone, everything they heard pointed to the fact they were responding to an active shooter scenario. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at one point, he heard someone calling to and guiding children (timestamp 00:50:00). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added, however, he did not hear anyone announce the shooter had been shot or killed (timestamp 00:51:00).

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that moments later, he began hearing reports the shooter was a barricaded subject and recalled receiving this information from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:52:30). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there was a difference between the response to an active shooter and the response to a barricaded subject. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the response to an active shooter was immediate, whereas the response to a barricaded subject allowed more time to reassess the situation. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he believed they would arrive in time to participate in the unfolding situation that may have required negotiations to occur over hours and possibly days.



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DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled a call he received from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment (SOD), while en route to Uvalde (timestamp 01:07:00). According to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, was at the scene and informed him, “It’s all fucked up.” When DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested clarification, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not like the response and was getting the team together to go in. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he spoke with CPA Owens who had stated, “No hesitation. If we need to go in, go in.” DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was not surprised when he later learned the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) were involved in making entry and taking down the shooter.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during these types of incidents where USBP does not have jurisdiction, USBP responds in a support role. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP should have been taking direction from another agency such as TXDPS or the local police department, and the fact that USBP had to take charge of the situation was “abnormal.” However, DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that in circumstances where there was an emergent critical incident, such as the incident at Robb Elementary School, BORTAC and BORSTAR have latitude to react and respond as necessary (timestamp 03:13:30).

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as they neared the vicinity of the school, there were vehicles blocking the road and he had to park at the funeral home directly across from the school. According to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he heard a radio transmission stating they were going in and then another transmission indicating the subject was “down” and EMTs were needed (timestamp 00:56:10). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided the M-4s were no longer needed and instead grabbed his medical bag and they made their way towards the school. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that although he was not certified, he had previously received life-saving skills training and was ready to respond.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as they neared the west entrance, he saw an unknown SOD operator guiding BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. The SOD operator informed DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been shot but was okay. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then encountered SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD, who informed him, “It’s really bad. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed unknown BPAs in the immediate area conducting cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on a child on the sidewalk. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they needed to go inside.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when they entered the school, there were pools of blood everywhere and they were slipping as they walked (timestamp 01:00:30). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described seeing bodies on the floor covered with blankets with little hands sticking out from underneath. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he then stated he was an EMT and asked where they were needed. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there were a lot of people standing around and he questioned why they were not helping. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed the initial response to assist victims happened very quickly and only the deceased remained. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that when he asked someone in the hallway if there was a need for EMTs, he was told there was not and was warned to not go into the classrooms.



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DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not proceed down the hallway to the classrooms and explained ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confronted him and told him it was now time for DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to resume his duties as the deputy and figure out what needed to be done (timestamp 01:04:00). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he agreed with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and they walked out of the school. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described seeing children receiving CPR and BPAs with blank stares covered in blood. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to start gathering the BPAs. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he received information CPA Owens was approximately five minutes from arrival and directed BPAs not actively engaged in a task to gather under the tree in front of the school to meet CPA Owens.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that prior to CPA Owens' arrival, he addressed the group of BPAs and informed them that if anyone was looking for a family member at the school, they should go find them. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he also assessed the wellbeing of the BPAs and described that some BPAs still had body parts and brain matter on their uniform. When CPA Owens arrived, he quickly addressed the group and instructed them to meet at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for a briefing at (b) (7)(E) DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently instructed for clean uniforms to be gathered at UVA so BPAs could change clothes. As BPAs were departing the school, there was a report of another active shooter (timestamp 01:14:10). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the girlfriend of the shooter was identified as the possible threat. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPAs were sent to various schools in the area and to the hospital emergency room to protect BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the children who were receiving treatment.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that after CPA Owens addressed the group of BPAs at the tree, he walked the school grounds with CPA Owens to look for Regional Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS (timestamp 01:31:00). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not part of the conversation CPA Owens had with Regional Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) once they met. Following CPA Owens' meeting with Regional Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reunited with ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and walked back to their vehicle parked at the funeral home. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that an unknown officer approached them and requested their assistance with loading children from inside the funeral home onto a school bus (timestamp 01:15:00). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to assist, however, according to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the situation quickly turned "ugly." DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there was a group of parents that was agitated and upset because the parents were not yet allowed to see the kids. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added there was also a rumor circulating that the events of the day transpired due to a failure to yield related to a smuggling event and USBP was to blame. As the surrounding crowd of parents grew more agitated, DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he departed the area and headed to UVA. According to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) although the crowd was yelling and screaming, they were not assaultive, and he did not have any physical interaction with any of the parents (timestamp 03:30:00).

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival at UVA, he ensured the BPAs with soiled uniforms were able to change into clean uniforms and that the soiled uniforms were set aside and saved in case they were needed for evidence (timestamp 01:18:45). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that CPA Owens addressed the group of BPAs again and emphasized the need to take care of each other.



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DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated TXDPS Rangers arrived at UVA to interview BORTAC and BORSTAR members who were involved with the entry into the classroom and shooting of the subject (timestamp 01:22:10). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the Rangers with an office where they interviewed BPAs one at a time. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he later learned the Rangers conducted an ammunition count, obtained photographs, and asked a few questions instead of conducting full interviews.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that following the interviews by the Rangers, he and CPA Owens followed up with BPAs to assess their wellbeing. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that an unnamed watch commander was tasked with securing items that could be used as evidence such as uniforms and body worn cameras. DCPA stated that when the additional threat was identified to be a false report and support was provided to those who needed it, BPAs were sent home. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to DRT to handle reporting, notifications, and any other administrative matters related to the incident while CPA Owens stayed behind at UVA.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and CPA Owens assumed TXDPS may have been in charge of the incident at Robb Elementary School, however, DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never confirmed who was in charge (timestamp 01:32:45). According to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was able to walk around the scene without being stopped or questioned. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that every law enforcement agency was onsite, and it was very chaotic. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while en route to Uvalde, he was informed the funeral home was the incident command site, however, he never went inside the funeral home.

CBP OPR interviewers asked DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about USBP's authority to respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 4:01:30). According to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was a duty to act and an obligation to respond when there was a commission of a felony in their presence, especially if it involved loss of life.

DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not produce a memorandum related to the events for the day nor did he have any saved text messages, as all his communications on the date of the incident were conducted over the phone.

CBP OPR interviewers provided a map package to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which he utilized to mark his route of travel and significant areas where he was located throughout the day (Attachment 2):

- DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 1 – North of Uvalde, TX to indicate his route of travel from DRT to Uvalde.
- DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 5 – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the location where he parked at the funeral home and the route he took when they walked from the vehicle to the school.
- DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 5a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, to indicate the route taken to get to the funeral home.
- DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8f – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the areas he was in while at the school.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 69**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 13, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the PAIC of the USBP Del Rio Station (DRS), Texas. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at around 11:30 a.m. on May 24, 2022, he was having lunch at DRS when the first message came in reporting an active shooter in Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on his way to Eagle Pass, Texas when a call came in from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRS, who was Acting Division Chief, DRT, at that time, requesting help in Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) changed course in his unmarked Chevrolet Tahoe government-owned vehicle (GOV) towards Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in his rough duty USBP uniform armed with his issued Glock pistol. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted the USBP Eagle Pass Station (EGT) and requested all available Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) to respond to Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back to advise that EMTs were on their way. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to have an EMT supervisor accompany the EGT EMTs to Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him he would go to Uvalde and rendezvous with the EMTs (timestamp 00:10:40).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took Route 277 from Del Rio to Eagle Pass, then took a Farm to Market Road ending in 69 north toward Brackettville, Texas. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Troopers in front and behind him, and everyone had their emergency equipment on while heading to Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew his route of travel on the provided maps. (Attachment 2). A combination of cell phone calls and radio communication came in advising the funeral home was the incident command center and for all to stop there for assignment. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never made it to the funeral home and parked about a block and a half away from Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and some of the Troopers walked through the barricades and made their way to the outer perimeter at Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was located about 50 yards away from the school but never entered the school. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the school at about 1:30 p.m. At 1:45 p.m., PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a radio transmission instructing all USBP personnel to go to USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for a muster at 2:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:14:07).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated he never made it to the funeral home to rendezvous with the EMTs he was originally assigned to supervise. Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT, also an EMT, called PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and advised that he was at the funeral home. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had just received the information about the 2:00 p.m. muster at UVA, so PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to meet him at UVA at 2:00 p.m. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he had never met BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised none of the EMTs assigned to him when he deployed to Uvalde reported; they rendered care at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:22:04).

[Agent's Note: PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) name during his interview but later e-mailed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the name, which was added to this report.]

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any interactions with civilians on May 24, 2022, nor did he see any law enforcement personnel have any contentious interactions with civilians at Robb Elementary School or the funeral home (timestamp 00:23:16).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the funeral home in his GOV at approximately 1:50 p.m. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had never been to UVA, but it was chaos. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) followed agents to the muster room and waited in the muster room until the meeting began. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the UVA muster room was full. The only available space was standing room in the back. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was standing in the back of the muster room, and Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP, Del Rio Sector (DRT), was standing in the front. Right before the muster started, CPA Owens pointed at PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and invited him up to the front of the muster room. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CPA Owens, and Deputy CPA (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, stood in the front of the muster room. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said this was the first time he saw the BPAs that responded to Robb Elementary School and performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on shooting victims. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said seeing the BPAs soiled in blood and their faces struggling with what they were going through was shocking (timestamp 00:24:10).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the muster at UVA was emotional. CPA Owens started talking about what happened, and agents were sobbing. CPA Owens was emotional in his praise for all those who



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responded to assist. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were several peer support personnel in the back of the room. CPA Owens introduced PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and told the agents PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would ensure they receive the help they need. CPA Owens instructed everyone to take care of each other and offered resiliency, peer support, and chaplaincy. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had never seen a muster like that. It was CPA Owens talking to the agents and everyone crying and sobbing. There were no questions or back and forth with those in attendance. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the muster lasted approximately 25 minutes (timestamp 00:27:27).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Deputy PAIC (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), Texas, who was (A)PAIC at UVA at that time, had a child at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. CPA Owens appointed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the (A)PAIC of UVA, so DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could tend to his family. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) child was not injured and was retrieved at the civic center. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performed the (A)PAIC duties at UVA until May 31, 2022 (timestamp 00:29:40).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPAs on scene reported there was no real lead agency or command structure at Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said USBP will plant a flag and take over a situation, but it did not happen because of the chaos. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the incident command post at the funeral home was structured days after the incident. TXDPS and the Uvalde Police Department (UPD) were at the incident command post days later, and everyone knew their role. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said USBP did not have any representatives at the incident command post days after the incident (timestamp 00:33:49).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed at UVA until approximately midnight on May 24, 2022. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did the midnight muster at UVA at approximately (b) (7)(E) then stayed for a while after. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove home to Del Rio and arrived at approximately 1:30 a.m. (timestamp 00:38:44).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP was in a support role during the incident at Robb Elementary School. USBP has completed Active Shooter training with state and local law enforcement, and USBP always assumes a support role in those scenarios. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that TXDPS blocked off all the routes to Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not notice any altercations between law enforcement and parents at Robb Elementary School or the funeral home. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear shots fired at Robb Elementary School because he arrived at approximately 1:30 p.m. (timestamp 00:39:30).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not possess a body-worn camera. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent and received text messages on May 24, 2022, but he could not recall the extent of his text message communications. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe any law enforcement personnel have any confrontations with civilians. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any emails reporting significant information about the incident on May 24, 2022. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) produced an issue paper to senior DRT leadership about his response to Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had several discussions with USBP personnel about logistics and resiliency but did not discuss information about the incident at Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received Active Shooter training at USBP Weslaco Station (WSL), Texas, sometime between 2013 and



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2016. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed Active Shooter training for BPAs and for EMTs. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is not a trained EMT (timestamp 00:41:49).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated he never went inside Robb Elementary School, and at approximately 1:30 p.m., he received information to rendezvous at UVA at 2:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:52:03).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas was the USBP employee who lost (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 00:56:14).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being interviewed by a Trooper on June 3, 2022. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the interview was very brief because the Trooper only asked if PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went into Robb Elementary School. The interview ended after PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the Trooper he did not go into the school.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 70**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty as a Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) assigned to work at the USBP Eagle Pass South Station (EGS), Texas. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to work from (b) (7)(E) ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wore the standard green USBP uniform (timestamp 00:10:32).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not remember how he initially found out about the shooting incident in Uvalde but believed he heard it from another agent at his station. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall what time it was when he heard about it (timestamp 00:12:18).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon learning of the incident, Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, and Acting Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, advised ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get ready to respond to Uvalde. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that before they departed the station, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they needed to take USBP uniforms to Uvalde, and at PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) request ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed uniforms from the station and put them in the vehicle before they departed (timestamp 00:22:22).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he joined PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a passenger in PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) unmarked government vehicle while WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove behind them towards Uvalde (timestamp 13:20).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they had their lights and sirens activated while driving. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not remember what time it was when these events occurred. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the only information he recalled knowing, was that there was an active shooter (timestamp 00:15:20).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the distance was 60 to 70 miles from Eagle Pass to Uvalde. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated their route of travel was Farm to Market Road (FM) 480, then Highway 57, followed by FM 481 into Uvalde (timestamp 00:16:30).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while traveling to Uvalde, he telephonically contacted Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Station (UVA), who advised ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the situation was bad. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he (ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) might have initially found out about the incident from WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, who also responded along with an unknown USBP Emergency Medical Technician (EMT). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never ordered or directed any subordinate employees to respond to Uvalde (timestamp 00:20:15).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they drove directly to UVA, then went to the muster room and dropped off the uniforms. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know what time this occurred. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after dropping off the uniforms, he went outside where he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from UVA, they went to the Uvalde Middle School [Morales Junior High School] where they assisted school officials with escorting children exiting the school to parents who were arriving to pick them up (timestamp 00:27:37).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated school officials were in charge at this location, and they assisted with their requests to escort children to their parents (timestamp 00:36:40).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at this location, he never used force on anyone or observed anyone use force against anyone else (timestamp 00:37:44).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not provide aid to anyone while at this location. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not remember how much time they spent there. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he recalled seeing WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, at this location (timestamp 00:30:53).



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ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after being at the Uvalde Middle School for a good while and observing a large law enforcement presence from many different agencies, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were going to assist at the Uvalde High School. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall what time this was. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did recall seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, at the Uvalde Middle School during his time there (timestamp 00:34:08).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after arriving at the Uvalde High School, he observed some people talking to a high-school-aged Hispanic male who was in a vehicle stopped in the middle of the school's parking lot (timestamp 00:40:31).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he approached the vehicle and observed the driver did not look well and was slurring his speech. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the driver was experiencing some type of medical condition, possibly related to the heat or due to mental trauma as a result of hearing about the shooting incident. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted the subject moving to the car's passenger seat, then he (ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) proceeded to drive the vehicle a few feet to park it in a parking spot. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned to the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) in Del Rio, got the subject out of the car and placed him under a tree for additional care (timestamp 00:51:20).

At the request of the subject, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called the subject's mother using the subject's cellphone while BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) comforted and evaluated the subject. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled the subject's last name was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the subject's mother subsequently arrived, and they walked the subject over to his mother's vehicle. They helped him get in the car, and then she departed. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated this was the only aid he provided anyone while at the high school. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the request of an unknown school official, he assisted with escorting children to arriving parents and then provided traffic control. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was there, there were no issues with any parents or anyone else. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were there for several hours before departing. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall when they departed the high school. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, USBP, Del Rio Sector, at the high school. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never directed any subordinates to do anything while at the middle school or the high school (timestamp 00:56:09).

Concerning his understanding of USBP's authority and responsibility to respond to this incident, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was service to the public and to other law enforcement officers and to assist with whatever emergency there was. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP had taken an oath to respond to these situations (timestamp 00:57:34).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have a body-worn camera on the date of the incident. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have text messages concerning the incident. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had not generated any emails, reports, or memorandums about the incident. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that aside from an interview with a Texas Ranger, he had not had discussions with anyone concerning his response to this incident. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had participated in Active Shooter training in Eagle Pass in approximately 2016, and it was sponsored by USBP (timestamp 00:59:53).



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During the interview, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was presented with maps illustrating Uvalde and the surrounding area. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated the route of travel they took from Eagle Pass to Uvalde. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also indicated he responded to the Uvalde Middle School and Uvalde High School and made corresponding annotations (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 14, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he began his shift at (b) (7)(E) (timestamp 00:05:01).

He said he learned of the of the shooting from Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, who received a message from his spouse (timestamp 00:05:15).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified his supervisor, acting Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Del Rio Sector (DRT), who advised that no support was needed at that time (timestamp 00:05:51).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said DRT later requested he activate some Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) and Peer Support. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he activated WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Border Patrol Agent (BPA) EMT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS (timestamp 00:06:01).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he met up with local school security officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and patrolled an area near the Kennedy Elementary School in Eagle Pass (timestamp 00:07:12).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said DRT requested uniforms be brought to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). He then traveled to UVA with Special Operations Supervisor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS. He said acting Deputy PAIC (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, went to the Incident Command Center at the funeral home near Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he arrived at UVA between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:07:45).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was only at UVA about 15 minutes when a call was received that security was needed at a middle school to assist with parents picking up their children (timestamp 00:10:15).

He said he does not remember the name of the school. He said it was northwest of UVA in the middle of town. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the school. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he stayed at the middle school for about an hour and stated there were a lot of Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Troopers on scene. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who then sent them to the high school. He said he remained on scene there until about 7:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:12:00).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it appeared school officials were in control of the situation at both schools (timestamp 00:13:45).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied providing first aid to a student at the high school. He believed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have aided a student (timestamp 00:15:00).

When PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the high school, they traveled back to EGS. He believed they arrived about 7:30 p.m. (timestamp 00:17:00).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said their route of travel was State Highway 480 to U.S. Highway 57 to Farm to Market Road 481. They then took a right onto U.S. Highway 90 to UVA (timestamp 00:20:30). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew his route of travel on the provided map package (Attachment 2).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that since the incident, they had to switch government-issued phones. He does not have emails, text messages, or any other forms of electronic communication preserved (timestamp 00:21:50).

In reference to USBP's authority to respond, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said USBP is the largest law enforcement entity in the area. He said he has told external agencies they (USBP) would provide any support when needed (timestamp 00:25:45).



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 14, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he reported to the USBP Eagle Pass South Station (EGS) for his shift of duty that began at (b) (7)(E) and was scheduled to end at (b) (7)(E) noting that on that date, he was working as an acting supervisor alongside Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a telephone call at an unknown time regarding a shooting that had occurred in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervised intel BPAs assigned to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), and he was attempting to contact BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA [now with U.S. immigration Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations]; however, he would not answer.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recollected that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, for permission to travel to UVA and check on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the other UVA Sector Intelligence Unit (SIU) BPAs because they heard there were “officers down” (timestamp 00:13:29).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he rode with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Uvalde in an unmarked government-owned vehicle (GOV). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on the way, he was making telephone calls trying to reach BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) however, the attempts were unsuccessful. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he contacted the Eagle Pass school police to advise them of the situation unfolding in Uvalde, which they had learned involved a school shooting.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived in Uvalde, they drove as close as they could to Robb Elementary School; however, they had to park their GOV and walk approximately two blocks because there were so many law enforcement personnel on site, and vehicles were everywhere. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately went to the funeral home adjacent to the school where unknown law enforcement officers asked them to help form a perimeter to keep the parents back because they were yelling and kicking and trying to find their children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recognize anyone he knew from USBP at the funeral home.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that after assisting at the funeral home, he met with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and they walked toward the fence line near Robb Elementary School where they saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA SIU. While speaking with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisting Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) taking a patient on a stretcher to an ambulance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they briefly spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who appeared to be in shock. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) likely went into the school, noting he seemed sad and did not talk much. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the conversation with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lasted approximately five minutes (timestamp 00:25:38)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that prior to departing Robb Elementary School, he saw some USBP personnel meeting in the front of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then drove to UVA because a formal muster was scheduled to take place that afternoon. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised they attended the muster; however, after leaving, they heard a radio communication advising there was a threat of another shooting at one of the other Uvalde schools. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to a nearby school, possibly Flores Elementary School or Morales Junior High School, where they remained for approximately one hour, providing perimeter security.

Towards the end of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview, he clarified that while assisting at the funeral home near Robb Elementary School, parents assembled and were trying to find their children and had been waiting for a while without anyone being able to tell them anything (timestamp 00:42:36).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he learned from other law enforcement officers on site at the funeral home that students were being evacuated to the civic center; therefore, he relayed the information by directing parents to that location (timestamp 00:43:37).

While assisting with crowd control at the funeral home, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recollected one man who tried to run past the law enforcement personnel to the funeral home, and a couple of unknown



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law enforcement officers grabbed him and told him to calm down and wait with the other parents (timestamp 00:44:018).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied having any physical contact with any member of the public or providing aid to any member of the public (timestamp 00:46:36).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied hearing any gunshots during the incident (timestamp 00:47:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) had a large presence at the scene, and at the funeral home, he saw a high ranking TXDPS supervisor that appeared to be in control of that area (timestamp 00:48:53).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied issuing any orders or commands to any law enforcement personnel or seeing any other law enforcement officers issuing commands to anyone (timestamp 00:49:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he responded that day to provide support, noting that USBP was there to provide assistance to other agencies.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was not wearing a body-worn camera and maintained no text messages or emails from that date.

Prior to concluding the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized printed maps to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 73**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 14, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he worked the dayshift, in uniform, as the WC at EGS on May 24, 2022. He worked on his use of force training at EGS with Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS and acting Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS. At approximately 11:45 a.m., WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message from the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District indicating Robb Elementary School was in lockdown due to police activity in the area. At approximately 12:00 p.m., (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted him via telephone to ask if he knew what was going on at the school, and he said he did not know (timestamp 11:08:42).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled he started to receive initial reports, and at approximately 12:20 p.m., (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called to tell him she heard there was a barricaded subject at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:08:57).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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He remembered getting a request for help for Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) and anyone else available to respond. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, who is also an EMT, and sent him to Uvalde to respond. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he followed behind BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Uvalde after he grabbed his rifle and body armor from his office at EGS. He believed he left for Uvalde around 12:30 p.m. to 12:45 p.m. with his emergency lights and sirens activated the entire drive (timestamp 11:09:46).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled his travel to Uvalde from EGS involved exiting the south gate of EGS. He filled up his gas tank, turned onto Farm to Market Road (FM) 1021, turned onto Texas Loop 480, turned onto U.S. Highway 57, then turned onto FM 481. From FM 481, he traveled to U.S. Highway 90 and to Uvalde, where he went from Evans Street to Geraldine Street, where he parked his vehicle (timestamp 11:25:54).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived on Geraldine Street near Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:10 p.m. to 1:15 p.m. (timestamp 11:09:56).

He parked near BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and sent him to the funeral home to check them both in at the command center. As WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked to the command center, he encountered Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP, Del Rio Sector (DRT), and CPA Owens' Adjutant, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS. CPA Owens asked about DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), Texas, who (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attending school in Uvalde. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told CPA Owens he also had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who attended Robb Elementary School and told him he just witnessed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) getting into a bus outside the school.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled CPA Owens asked him to go to the hospital to check on the BPAs there and to provide him with an update. He left to go to the hospital at approximately 1:30 p.m. and arrived approximately five minutes later. Once he cleared security and gained entry to the hospital, he checked on injured BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. He confirmed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was okay, nobody else was injured, and the BPAs with the USBP, DRT, Special Operations Detachment (SOD) would remain with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide him with an escort when he left. Once WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was satisfied everything at the hospital was taken care of, he left the hospital, went outside, and called SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to report BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was alert, alive, and had two SOD escorts with him.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of a possible secondary threat at the Uvalde High School, supposedly by the Robb Elementary School shooter's girlfriend (timestamp 11:13:09).

He informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was responding to the high school, arrived at the high school at approximately 2:00 p.m., and met with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio Station (DRS), and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas, who is also an EMT. When they arrived at the school, there was a report of shots fired within the high school. They cleared the high school and confirmed there was no shooter, and no shots had been fired.



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After the high school was cleared, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the school and encountered a couple of SOD agents. He said he took control at that point since nobody in their group was from Uvalde. He sent BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) over to Flores Elementary School, and they took a couple of EMTs with them. He directed two additional EMTs over to Dalton Elementary School and tried to confirm over his service radio how far SOD had their perimeter set up (timestamp 11:15:31).

He learned of gaps in the perimeter security around both the middle and high schools and coordinated with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Tucson Sector, Arizona, who was assigned to DRT SOD at that time, to shift people around to cover any gaps in security. He recalled SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, had arrived at the high school at that point.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) coordinated with one of the SOD agents, confirmed they had things under control, and at approximately 2:45 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., he left for the Uvalde Civic Center to check on the status of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). When he arrived at the civic center, he discovered (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been picked up by a family friend. He saw DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) while there and let him know (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was all right (timestamp 11:16:55).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the command center at the funeral home and saw things appeared to be a chaotic mess. He stated he made the decision to return to Uvalde High School/Morales Junior High School to reunify children with their parents. While there, he requested assistance over his service radio for traffic control but was unable to contact anyone (timestamp 11:17:22).

He recalled the BPAs sent to Flores Elementary School finished clearing out the school and met up with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the high school/junior high school to assist with getting the children out to their parents. He believed it was approximately 3:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. when he got to the high school/junior high school. He said that after the junior high school was cleared out, he drove to Dalton Elementary School and helped with traffic control (timestamp 11:18:19).

He believed he arrived at the school around 6:00 p.m. to 6:15 p.m. He recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Station (UVA), at the school when he was there. Afterwards, he recalled leaving Dalton Elementary School to go home and check on his family. He believed it was approximately 7:00 p.m. when he checked on his family.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after checking on his family, he returned to EGS, arrived at approximately 8:10 p.m., downloaded his equipment, and informed supervisors he was going home. He drove home and arrived at approximately 9:15 p.m.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he heard the funeral home was going to be where the command center was going to be located. When he arrived in Uvalde, he recalled seeing many people walking away from the scene at Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "There didn't seem to be a whole lot in the way of command-and-control," (timestamp 11:53:56).



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He recalled seeing CPA Owens there, which he assumed would be his point of contact in Uvalde (timestamp 11:54:08).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained it was very difficult to get ahold of anyone using their service radios in Uvalde. He said a patch had been placed to get everyone on the same frequency, but every time he attempted to contact the command center, he would not get a response (timestamp 11:56:21).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled it did not seem like anyone was in control at the command center. He said that as he was traveling to the various locations in Uvalde, he kept in contact with Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, to let him know what he was doing.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never rendered any aid to any individual while he was in Uvalde. He said he did not exercise any authority that impacted any individual's movement during the event.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from a management perspective, they were in Uvalde to assist. He said it was mostly a USBP response to the potential secondary threat in Uvalde.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated as law enforcement, they have the authority and responsibility to respond to a school shooting. He said the response is conditional. For the Uvalde response, it should have been a situation where USBP was there in a support role to help (timestamp 12:03:31).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**EXHIBIT 74**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 14, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty and in uniform during his normal shift from (b) (7)(E). He also served as the Acting Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge of the USBP Eagle Pass South Station (EGS). In the afternoon, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was walking inside EGS with Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, who was acting PAIC at that time, and who received a phone call at approximately 12:00 p.m. regarding the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 14:46:10).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was an incident that happened in Uvalde but was unable to elaborate until he received further details. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, received a phone call from his spouse about the incident at Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to provide more details about the incident and explained to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also mentioned he had a child who attended Robb Elementary School. At that point, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to let WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) respond to Uvalde and assist, since he lived there and had a child who attended Robb Elementary School.

After the initial notification, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the situation at Robb Elementary School was going to be a prolonged incident. They decided to stay at EGS to avoid complicating the scene by sending too many USBP personnel to Uvalde. However, after they realized the situation in Uvalde was ongoing, both WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided that as members of the EGS command staff, they needed to respond to the command post in Uvalde and assist where needed. At approximately 2:30 p.m., WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left EGS and drove to Uvalde (timestamp 14:48:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left EGS for Uvalde approximately five minutes before he did. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled alone to Uvalde in an unmarked patrol vehicle and activated the vehicle's lights and siren all the way to Uvalde. From EGS, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled on U.S. Highway 57 and then on Farm to Market Road 481 directly to Uvalde (timestamp 14:49:13).

While enroute to Uvalde, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to find out what his status was, and he also spoke with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to discuss what location they would respond to in Uvalde. Ultimately, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to respond to the command post at Hillcrest Funeral Home. At approximately 3:15 p.m., WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the Hillcrest Funeral Home (timestamp 14:50:33).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [first name unknown] and asked if he was in charge. Trooper (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was helping to coordinate at the incident command post. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked Trooper (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) where he could assist, and Trooper (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him that his assistance was needed at Flores Elementary School to help assist the faculty with escorting the school children to their parents. While at Hillcrest Funeral Home, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGS, and advised him to ride in the vehicle with him on the way to Flores Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was at Hillcrest Funeral Home for approximately five minutes before departing to Flores Elementary School. At approximately 3:30 p.m., WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Flores Elementary School (timestamp 14:53:00).

Upon arrival, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed the children were being escorted out of the school to the rear parking lot area. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then approached several teachers and explained to them he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were there for security and to help assist where needed. Afterwards, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were tasked with approaching the parents in their vehicles, asking them for their child's name, and then relaying the name to the faculty who then brought





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the children out to their parents. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at no time did he render aid to the public or exercise his law enforcement authority to restrict any of their movements. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed at Flores Elementary School until all the children were escorted out of the school, and they left at approximately 5:30 p.m.

At approximately 5:40 p.m., WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived back at the incident command post at Hillcrest Funeral Home. At the command post, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it appeared to be chaotic, and it was difficult for him to determine who was in charge. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the time, he did not see any leadership from USBP. At some point, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was directed to go to a room where there were refreshments. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that since there was no further request for their assistance, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed Uvalde in separate vehicles at approximately 6:00 p.m. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived back in Eagle Pass at approximately 7:00 p.m. (timestamp 14:57:50)

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was uncertain of what USBP’s role was during the incident because he was not privy to the communications inside the command post. However, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP’s responsibility was to assist and support other law enforcement agencies on scene.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 14, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was employed as an SBPA working on the Sector Intelligence Unit, DRT. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) covered the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) and USBP Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), Texas, but worked out of the USBP Eagle Pass Station (EGT), Texas. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on duty in plain clothes at EGT from (b) (7)(E) on May 24, 2022. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got a phone call from Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, advising there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got off the phone with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and put out a group text message to the local supervisors and his supervisor, Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, reporting the active shooter situation at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also called the Border Intelligence Center (BIC) in Del Rio and asked a supervisor if they knew about the active shooter situation at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the BIC supervisor did not know what was occurring at Robb Elementary School, so SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised BIC to deploy the USBP Special Operations Detachment and Emergency Medical Services assets to the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed he received and relayed the information about the active shooter at Robb Elementary School before anyone at BIC or UVA was aware of what was going on (timestamp 00:13:52).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to do a safety check on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, because BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had approved leave to attend (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) award presentation at Robb Elementary School the morning of May 24, 2022. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tried to contact BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) numerous times on his cell phone, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never answered. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was worried about BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) so he contacted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) partner, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he heard what was going on at Robb Elementary School but could not get ahold of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and told him nobody was able to contact BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) so he was going to head to Uvalde to account for his guys and see if he could help (timestamp 00:16:55).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the particulars of what was happening at Robb Elementary School, so he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who was working as an acting SBPA at the Eagle Pass South Station (EGS), Texas, at that time, drove from EGS to Uvalde in an unmarked government -owned vehicle (GOV) utilizing emergency equipment to assist. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the drive from Eagle Pass to Uvalde took approximately 50 minutes. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had body armor with USBP markings. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a rifle, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had his service-issued pistol (timestamp 00:16:20).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was not sure where Robb Elementary School was, so when they got near the school, there were police and civilian vehicles everywhere, and a helicopter was flying above. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they had to park approximately five blocks away from Robb Elementary School because the streets near the school were blocked off. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked towards the school and arrived just outside a short fence outside the school. The only time SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) crossed the short fence outside Robb Elementary School was when Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, held a brief muster with all responding BPAs near a tree in front of the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that by the time he arrived at the school, a BPA advised the threat had been eliminated (timestamp 00:22:08).



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE



SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when he was on the street between the school and the funeral home, he saw a lot of parents at the funeral home with law enforcement preventing them from going toward the school because it was an active crime scene. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said a man went crazy and tried to bust through law enforcement to get to the school and was taken to the ground. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who stopped the man from advancing, but he believed it was a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not care who was in command of the incident scene. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was more concerned about taking care of the people on scene (timestamp 00:25:12).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was located near an ambulance and saw a female teacher victim being brought out of the school. As this occurred, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was covered in blood, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was inside the school and helped evacuate children out of the school through a window. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in plain clothes with a blue shirt on. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not remember if BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had on body armor or any kind of police markings. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported he was okay. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go home and get cleaned up and take care of himself. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) his child was fine, and he had left Robb Elementary School after the ceremony. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was not at the school when the incident started. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he had left Robb Elementary School and picked up his GOV from UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he saw police vehicles responding to an incident with their emergency equipment activated and decided to follow them. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was one of the first BPAs to arrive at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 00:28:37).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was located on the sidewalk in front of the school when CPA Owens told everyone to rendezvous at UVA to discuss the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never rendered care at Robb Elementary School or assisted parents with locating their children. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went into the funeral home briefly and spoke with a TXDPS lieutenant. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself and helped with evidence collection. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said TXDPS was running the show at the incident command center at the funeral home. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left Robb Elementary School and went to UVA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at UVA on time for the (b) (7)(E) muster. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the muster was packed and emotional. CPA Owens said he was proud of the USBP response to this horrific incident (timestamp 00:32:15).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never really questioned the command-and-control structure at the scene, as USBP had the authority to protect and serve. Jurisdiction was never an issue, as they were there to secure the scene. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when a law enforcement entity requests assistance, it is not to enforce their laws independently; it is to assist them and watch their back. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear any shots fired or see any USBP personnel go hands on with any civilians on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 00:38:50).



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the muster and went to get something to eat. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) finished eating at approximately 3:30 p.m., and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned there was a threat to Uvalde High School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to Uvalde High School at about 4:00 p.m. and parked approximately 150 yards away to monitor the scene because there was already a perimeter established by local law enforcement. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked at a field and stayed in their vehicle just monitoring the school (timestamp 00:42:05).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not possess a body-worn camera on May 24, 2022. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) texted during the incident but did not recall the extent of the texts or to whom they were sent. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall seeing or sending any emails. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall drafting any memoranda or reports about the shooting at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he had frequent telephone conversations with SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) throughout the incident. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initially told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) did not want them to get involved because they were in plain clothes. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) disregarded this instruction because SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the PAIC were not there and did not understand the situation. The day after the shooting, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the situation to SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who understood why SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed to Uvalde (timestamp 00:45:01).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left their original position at Uvalde High School and moved to another location a quarter mile down the road. While at the high school, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any interaction with civilians. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left Uvalde High School at approximately 6:00 p.m. and went back to Eagle Pass. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that when he was near the funeral home, a lady who said she was the shooter’s cousin approached him and said she could not believe what the shooter did to his grandmother and the children at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) passed the lady off to a TXDPS Trooper and advised him the lady may have more information about the shooter (timestamp 00:48:55).

Prior to concluding the interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized printed maps to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 76**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 14, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty and assigned to work at CAR from (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was wearing the standard green USBP uniform and had an unmarked USBP vehicle (timestamp 00:10:37).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned of the incident while attending a meeting in Carrizo Springs along with Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who informed him there was a possible shooting incident in Uvalde (timestamp 00:11:34).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the meeting was right before lunch, but he could not recall exactly what time. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he wanted him to go, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to standby for further guidance (timestamp 00:13:23).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Carrizo Springs is located approximately 45 to 50 miles away from Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after a few minutes, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to Uvalde (timestamp 00:14:07).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he responded to Uvalde by himself in his unmarked USBP vehicle. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not part of a vehicle convoy and was not utilizing his vehicle's emergency equipment. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at this point, other Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) that are also Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) had already been directed to respond, to include SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who is also a Peer Support Member. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed these BPA/EMTs had been directed to respond by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:15:08).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he traveled north on U.S. Highway 83 from Carrizo Springs directly to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that approximately 20 miles before arriving at Uvalde, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted him and advised him to proceed directly to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) where all other agents were being directed. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at UVA a few minutes before the (b) (7)(E) muster and attended the muster. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon his arrival at UVA, he notified PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:16:44)

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the muster, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was a wounded BPA at the Uvalde Hospital. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if they could go check on the BPA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) accompanied him to the Uvalde Hospital, where they arrived at approximately 2:30 p.m. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were a lot of people and BPAs at the hospital. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they went towards the emergency room area but were unable to visit with the wounded BPA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they spent approximately one to one and a half hours at the hospital (timestamp 00:19:54).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from the hospital, he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed to the Uvalde Civic Center, where they arrived at approximately 4:00 p.m. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a lot of law enforcement at the civic center. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while there, he stood outside along with other BPAs, Texas Department of Public Safety Troopers, and other local law enforcement officers. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not tell which law enforcement agency was in charge at the civic center. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were not directed by anyone to go to the civic center. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they went to see if they could help. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at the civic center, he observed parents arriving to pick up children. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during this time, he only provided security and was not directly involved in this process. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated school officials oversaw this process. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained at the civic center until approximately 6:30 p.m. or 7:00 p.m. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from the civic center, he drove directly back to the CAR. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had obtained a ride with someone else (timestamp 00:21:59).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked if during his times at UVA, the hospital, or the civic center, he had any encounters with any civilians where he had to use his authority or any type of force against them. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated he did not provide any aid to anyone at



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any time. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not provide any orders to any BPAs or any other officials while at any of these locations (timestamp 00:25:37).

Concerning his understanding of USBP’s authority to respond to this incident, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was more of a support and security role for whatever was needed out there. Concerning his understanding of USBP’s responsibility to respond to this incident, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was to account for the initial BPAs/EMTs who were dispatched to assist (timestamp 00:27:58).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have a body-worn camera on the date of the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have text messages concerning the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not generate any emails, reports, or memorandums about the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had not been interviewed and did not have discussions with anyone concerning his response to this incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had participated in Active Shooter training at CAR in approximately 2016. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was hosted by USBP and included other local agencies (timestamp 00:29:26).

During the interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was presented with maps illustrating Uvalde and the surrounding area. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated the route of travel he took from Carrizo Springs to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also identified the Uvalde Civic Center and annotated the approximate timeframe he was there (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 77**



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 15, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he was on detail from the CBP Advanced Training Center in Harpers Ferry conducting use of force training assessments at USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) for the CBP Law Enforcement Safety and Compliance Directorate. He traveled with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Harpers Ferry, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Harpers Ferry. They had gone to the USBP Brackettville Station, Texas, along with Border Patrol Agent-Programs (BPA-P) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to observe use of force training. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at about lunchtime, they heard there was an active shooter in Uvalde and decided they would respond (timestamp 00:11:10).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that once they found out the shooting was at Robb Elementary School, they used a global positioning system to obtain directions (timestamp 00:11:35).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when they arrived at Rob Elementary School, they noticed stretchers were being carried into the building. He said that based on what he noticed, he determined the shooting had ended (timestamp 00:12:15).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he were asked to direct traffic (timestamp 00:14:10).

He said he noticed plenty of law enforcement officers present. He noticed officers from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Alcohol Tobacco Firearms, and Explosives, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Texas Department of Public Safety (timestamp 00:14:40).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was directing traffic at the street beside the funeral home. He said he remained at that spot for about 45 minutes to an hour. He said he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were asked to provide security at the hospital (timestamp 00:15:20).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and some USBP Del Rio Station (DRS) firearms personnel went to a middle school to clear it (timestamp 00:17:45).

[Agent's Note: SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide any names for the DRS firearms personnel.]

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that from the hospital, he went to the high school. He remained at the high school until just about all the children went home (timestamp 00:22:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after they left the high school, they went to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) (timestamp 24:20).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not provide any first aid to any victims. He said SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did assist with first aid to victims (timestamp 00:26:11).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not invoke any law enforcement authority to restrict anyone's movement (timestamp 27:40).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not witness any CBP employees use force on anyone (timestamp 00:28:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that since he is not a UVA agent, he is unaware of their authority as it pertains to the response in this incident (timestamp 00:32:18).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was unsure of his routes of travel. He said he used google maps because he was unfamiliar with the area (timestamp 00:37:30).



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Maps of Uvalde were sent to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for review. He documented his positions on the maps to the best of his ability. He returned the maps to SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via email on February 16, 2023 (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 78**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 15, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not respond to the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 00:03:30). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he heard about the incident over a radio channel that scans the local police channels (timestamp 00:08:10).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he immediately contacted Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to stand by and to keep him posted on any updates. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he called DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back a few minutes later, who again told him to stand down and not send any personnel (timestamp 00:11:06).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he then received a call back to deploy personnel (timestamp 00:12:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he deployed CAR Supervisory Border Patrol Agents (SBPAs) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:12:20).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not deploy any additional personnel. He said because Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were on the way to Uvalde, he stayed back so there would be proper leadership at the station (timestamp 00:13:10).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he became aware of a disagreement between SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who is also a paramedic, and Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, USBP, Del Rio Sector. The disagreement had to do with triage processing for the wounded (timestamp 00:15:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he directed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, to contact the USBP Uvalde Station to update the Evolving Situation Report (timestamp 00:23:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that as far as Active Shooting training and USBP's authority to respond is concerned; he was aware that when you respond, you must take the shooter out (timestamp 00:24:20).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 15, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was on duty, in uniform, and worked the (b) (7)(E) shift on May 24, 2022, as a canine (K-9) handler at BRA. He heard about the incident at Robb Elementary School while performing sign-cutting duties in the BRA area of responsibility. He recalled a CBP helicopter was assisting with sign cutting, and they overheard radio traffic of a possible bail out, possible armed subject in Uvalde near a school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued with his sign-cutting (b) (7)(E) for approximately one hour until he heard over his service radio that all available agents in the field needed to respond to Uvalde. He believed the call was broadcast over the service radio at approximately 12:45 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he also received a personal message via cellular telephone from Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, requesting they respond to the Uvalde Civic Center to assist with evacuations.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and the other BPAs he worked with cancelled their sign-cutting activities and hiked out of the brush towards their vehicles to make the 35-to-40-mile drive to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was working with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, an unknown trainee, and another group of unknown trainees. He recalled arriving in Uvalde at approximately 1:20 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he drove his K-9 vehicle and utilized the vehicle's emergency lights and sirens the entire drive to Uvalde. He recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his trainee followed them to Uvalde. The only communication he remembered receiving on the drive to Uvalde was a message to contact SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, when they got to the civic center. He recalled his route of travel to Uvalde was taking Farm to Market Road 1572 to U.S. Highway 90 into Uvalde and to the civic center. When he arrived at the civic center, he learned SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at Robb Elementary School, and he was unable to make contact to let him know they arrived at the civic center.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing many BPAs from the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) at the civic center but was unable to provide any names. School staff at the civic center coordinated with the BPAs and asked them to create a security funnel/human wall, which created a pathway for arriving children on buses to walk between as they went into the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled all of the parents were cooperative (timestamp 09:25:59).

He recalled he performed these duties for three buses that arrived with children for approximately 30 minutes. He remembered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, were also at the civic center. After the third bus dropped children off at the civic center, he recalled a second threat was put out over the service radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the threat involved somebody that was, "Going to finish the job." (timestamp 09:25:09)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when the secondary threat was announced, he and the other BPAs at the civic center set up a security perimeter around the civic center, along with other law enforcement officers (LEOs) from multiple agencies and departments. He continued to provide perimeter security for the remainder of his time in Uvalde. He believed he performed perimeter security until approximately 5:00 p.m. when he received the instruction to return to BRA from WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled returning to BRA at approximately 5:45 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the command-and-control structure in Uvalde as "confusion." (timestamp 09:32:47).

He stated he based his actions on what was needed and where he needed to be (timestamp 09:33:02).

He said that at the civic center, there were other SBPAs, and he felt they were trying to take charge, but he took his guidance from WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not witness any orders being provided to responding LEOs, and he said he never provided any orders to anyone



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in Uvalde, but he made a recommendation to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the trainees on where to stand to provide security around the civic center.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled his interactions with members of the public at the civic center involved informing them the voting was cancelled due to the lockdown. He said he never had to restrain any civilian during his time at the civic center. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he ever exercised any authority impacting any individual’s movement during the event, to which BPA (b) (7)(C) replied, “No.” (timestamp 09:36:58).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP’s role in the incident was “backup and assistance.” (timestamp 09:37:17).

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) his understanding of USBP’s authority/responsibility to respond to the incident. BPA (b) (7)(C) said the role was “backup and assistance.” (timestamp 09:37:50).

He explained he was not responding to a school shooting at the time; he was responding as backup (timestamp 09:38:01).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was at USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) with other USBP instructors conducting a field review of the use of force training for the CBP Law Enforcement Safety and Compliance Directorate. However, the use of force training was canceled, which prompted instructor Border Patrol Agent-Programs (BPA-P) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to call the USBP Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas, and he found out the use of force training was being conducted there. SPBAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Harpers Ferry, along with BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to BRA together in an unmarked patrol vehicle arriving at approximately 10:00 a.m. SBPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were dressed in black polos and tan khakis, and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dressed in full uniform.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at approximately 12:45 p.m., SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he finished their observation of the use of force training at BRA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the training, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he walked outside, and approximately five minutes later, they observed an unknown BPA drive into the parking lot. The BPA informed them there was an active shooter in Uvalde shooting at cops and BPAs (timestamp 11:13:02).

At that point, SPBAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to respond to Uvalde and left BRA together in an unmarked patrol vehicle. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the vehicle's emergency lights and siren were activated while enroute to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember the exact route they took to travel to Uvalde but believed that at some point, they traveled on a Farm to Market Road or highway. While enroute to Uvalde, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear any transmissions over the radio. However, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in contact via cellphone with instructor SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Harpers Ferry, who advised him he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Gulfport Station (GPS), Mississippi, who was assigned to the USBP Del Rio Station (DRS) at that time, would be responding to Uvalde from Del Rio.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he arrived in Uvalde approximately 30 to 40 minutes after leaving Brackettville (timestamp 11:21:48).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that since BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was familiar with the Uvalde area, he made the decision for them to drive directly to Robb Elementary School where he parked the vehicle alongside the road a couple blocks away from the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed there were several emergency vehicles parked along the road blocking the entrance to the school. After parking, SPBAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the vehicle and walked towards the school where they encountered an Uvalde Police Department (UPD) officer who told them there was a barricaded subject inside the school. The UPD officer asked if they could clear out some of the vehicles that were blocking other Emergency Medical Services vehicles from entering the school. However, they were unable to do so, since the vehicles were locked. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also noticed it was not clear there was anyone in command at the school or who was directing law enforcement officers on the scene. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at Robb Elementary School, he did not render any aid to the public and did not use his law enforcement authority to restrain or restrict their movements.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that later, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he were approached by a Deputy U.S. Marshal who told them help was needed at the Uvalde Hospital because there were several upset family members there. At approximately 2:00 p.m., SPBAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked back to their vehicle and drove to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) to drop off BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) since he was a Peer Support Member. After dropping off BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to the Uvalde Hospital to see if they could assist there. After arriving at the Uvalde Hospital, SBPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were told by a UPD officer they could help by directing traffic and advising family members where the entrance to the hospital was.





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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were at the Uvalde Hospital for a couple of hours before traffic subsided. After traffic subsided at the hospital, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was at Flores Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there were police officers there who were being deployed as security guards. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then decided to drive to Flores Elementary School to assist with traffic control and security while children were being released to their parents. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he arrived at Flores Elementary School at approximately 4:00 p.m. (timestamp 11:35:25).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after an hour at Flores Elementary School, he received word from other officers there that help may be needed at Morales Junior High School. At that point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to respond to Morales Junior High School to provide assistance there. While at Morales Junior High School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stood guard for approximately 45 minutes to ensure the safety of the school. After traffic cleared at Morales Junior High School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to return to UVA to ascertain if any help was needed there. They arrived at UVA at approximately 5:20 p.m. and stayed until 6:00 p.m., when their assistance was no longer needed. Afterwards, they traveled back to Del Rio.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's role during the incident at Robb Elementary School was to assist and provide security. Furthermore, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP had no particular statutory authority to respond to the incident other than acting in a law enforcement capacity in the interest of public safety.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 15, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled working the (b) (7)(E) shift in uniform on May 24, 2022, at CAR. He recalled attending a meeting with a local oil field company, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Carrizo Springs, with Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message, and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a telephone call about the incident in Uvalde during the meeting with the oil field company. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being told there was an ongoing active shooter situation in Uvalde. He remembered asking PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he wanted him to respond to Uvalde and was told, “not right now, we’re ok.” (timestamp 14:04:49).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received texts messages from USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) during the remainder of the meeting with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which lasted

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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approximately 30 minutes. He believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left early and was told to be on standby, ready to respond. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they all returned to CAR, and he monitored his service radio.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was more in an administrative role at his station, and other operational units on the CAR dayshift were coordinating with their Watch Commanders (WCs) with their responses to Uvalde. He recalled he and his supervisors remained on standby at CAR in case those who responded needed additional help, and they kept checking with the CAR duty supervisors to see if any additional help would be needed in Uvalde. He said no additional information about what occurred operationally in Uvalde was relayed to him at CAR. He stated he remained at CAR until his shift ended at 6:00 p.m., and agents from the swing shift took over.

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what he believed USBP's role was in the incident. He opined that by the time CAR agents arrived in Uvalde, they provided a back-up role due to the time it took them to respond. He was unable to identify anyone at CAR who directed any of the BPAs to respond to Uvalde. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what his understanding was of USBP's authority or responsibility to respond to an incident, and he stated, "It's to protect the public in my opinion." (timestamp 14:17:57).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 82**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 15, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was the SOS over the Professional Standards Branch (PSB), Management Inquiry Team (MIT) at DRT. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in tan cargo pants with a black polo shirt with USBP markings. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had three MIT Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) that conducted administrative inquiries assigned to him on May 24, 2022. The team was assigned to CBP OPR for the day to assist with unrelated interviews. The team was on their way to Eagle Pass, Texas from Del Rio, and Special Agent (SA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, Del Rio, who was a BPA with DRT at that time, called SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked what SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew about an active shooter at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the office of Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Comstock Station (COM), Texas, who was working as Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA), DRT, at the time, and advised that SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard there was a possible active shooter at Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the DRT Border Intelligence Center (BIC) to get information about the chatter on the radio, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to find rifles to take to Uvalde (timestamp 00:09:10).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) originally contacted him about the active shooter situation at Robb Elementary School, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised that the CBP OPR SAs with him were not instructed to go to Uvalde. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed MIT, consisting of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and Border Patrol Agent-Programs (BPA-P) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to continue to Eagle Pass with the CBP OPR SAs. A little while later, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and advised that the CBP OPR SAs and MIT were headed to Uvalde. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to his chain of command that SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were discontinuing the interviews in Eagle Pass to assist in the active shooter situation in Uvalde. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated his conversation with SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about going to Uvalde occurred sometime between 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:12:11).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed the information SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided about the active shooter situation in Uvalde was the first time USBP heard about the incident. When SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported the information to his chain of command, all hell broke loose, and everyone was making calls trying to find out what was going on. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he got a rifle for Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who was Division Chief of Operations, DRT, at that time, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, had his own rifle, and DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left DRT and went to Uvalde. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was instructed to stay at DRT to run PSB and perform safety checks on his team (timestamp 00:13:13).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he called SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approximately every hour for a safety check and to receive any available updates about the situation at Robb Elementary School. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did a good job with communications and would notify SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when MIT was relocated. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised MIT relocated to another school because of a threat involving the girlfriend of the shooter. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he left DRT and went home at about 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. after SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported they were heading back to the station. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were heading home, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could go home. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) to get body armor and rifles and at some point, attended a debriefing there (timestamp 00:17:42).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he does not know what authority USBP had regarding responding to a school shooting, but USBP is always called upon to assist local law enforcement because USBP has more assets and better trained personnel. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained USBP has a duty to respond to an active shooter. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he has not attended any specific Active Shooter course, but during quarterly firearms training, the firearms instructors brief on how to stack up and neutralize an active shooter. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there is currently a stand-down order in place for all scenario-based training because of an incident that occurred in Florida. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not have a body-worn camera but did assist CBP OPR in obtaining the body-worn cameras worn by members of the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) team that responded to Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any texts, and the only emails he received about the incident were the Evolving Situation Reports (ESRs) that were distributed by BIC. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not generate a written report about his or MIT's response to Robb Elementary



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School on May 24, 2022. SOS <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> did not get interviewed by the Texas Department of Public Safety (timestamp 00:19:46).

SOS <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> reiterated that his actions involving the active shooter at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022, were isolated to DRT where he monitored the safety and whereabouts of SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> SBPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> and BPA-P <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SOS <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>



O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 83**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 15, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). At the time, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a Border Patrol Agent (BPA) and Firearms Instructor (FI) assigned to work at the DRT firearms range located near Del Rio. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned hours were from (b) (7)(E) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was wearing a red FI shirt and khaki pants (timestamp 00:08:52).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned of the incident at approximately 11:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. while at the firearms range. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated visiting FI, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, notified SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of a possible active shooter at a school in Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) along with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who are all also FIs, equipped themselves with rifles and body armor and departed the range to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the time, there were ongoing CBP firearms qualifications at the range, so he stayed behind to manage the range (timestamp 00:09:44).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was never deployed to Uvalde, and he never directed anyone to respond to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked if he knew BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Del Rio Station (DRS), and knew of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activity on that date. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did know BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but did not know of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activities on that date. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not remember if BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the firearms range on that date. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was told CBP OPR had received information indicating he (SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) had responded to Uvalde with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on May 24, 2022. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that was incorrect information. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never responded to Uvalde (timestamp 00:14:45).

CBP OPR investigators did not present any maps of Uvalde to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 84**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 16, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on May 24, 2022, he reported to UVA in uniform for his shift of duty which began at (b) (7)(E) and was scheduled to end at (b) (7)(E). He and his brush crew drove to a ranch which was approximately 45 to 60 minutes outside of Uvalde, where they were searching for undocumented persons. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said his crew typically consists of the following UVA Border Patrol Agents (BPAs): (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not confirm if BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were present; however, he noted that if they were on duty and not in training, they would have been with the brush crew that day.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while they were working their shift, his team communicated on radio channel (b) (7)(E) however, as the supervisor, he also scans other channels. At an unknown time, he heard a transmission over radio channel (b) (7)(E) advising to be on the lookout for a guy carrying a gun; however, some of the traffic was not clear because of poor radio reception. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it sounded to him like the Uvalde Police Department (UPD) was involved with the situation and possibly looking for a vehicle. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that several minutes later, a report was communicated advising someone went to a school with a gun.

Upon hearing the communication, he directed all brush crew team members to make their way back to their vehicles. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they loaded into three or four vehicles and headed to the highway, where they observed Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) vehicles “running code” [lights and sirens on] back towards Uvalde, and they in turn fell in behind them running code. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while they were driving, they received an update via text identifying which school was involved. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he and his team arrived near Robb Elementary School; however, because there were so many law enforcement personnel and vehicles blocking the street, they were unable to get close and never got out of their vehicles.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recollected that shortly after their arrival, he somehow heard that the shooter was no longer a threat, and he felt there was a sufficient law enforcement presence at the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also heard over the radio they were evacuating students to the civic center and needed security. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made the command decision to deploy his team to the civic center and communicated this over the radio (timestamp 00:11:49).

Upon arrival at the civic center, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated his team was the first law enforcement presence on site, and there were already members of the public gathering who did not know what to do. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he directed his team to utilize their government-owned vehicles (GOVs) to block the driveway entrances to the civic center and establish perimeter security. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were some school officials present who were coordinating with the school buses that soon began transporting the students to the civic center. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his team kept the road clear for the buses and helped escort the students into the civic center to keep everyone safe.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised he and his team were communicating with the public about the process which was occurring inside of the civic center to account for the children and noted that people were cooperative. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated some parents could not find their children and did not know what to do. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he told parents they could check with the incident command post, and at one point, the school officials began bringing some of the parents inside of the civic center to speak with them privately. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), Texas, who was temporarily assigned as the acting Patrol Agent in Charge for UVA, was at the civic center looking for his child. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he knew DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and therefore, allowed him to take his child with him when his child arrived on one of the buses. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated other law enforcement agencies later responded to the civic center to assist.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied being in command at the scene and said he did not issue directives to anyone other than his team. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his goal was simply to get the students off the buses and safely into the civic center (timestamp 00:15:19).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and his team were relieved of their duties after BPAs from CAR and USBP Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas, arrived at the civic center that afternoon. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he saw Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, at the civic center prior to his departure.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that in addition to the school buses, a CBP transport vehicle was also used by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, to drive students to the civic center. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after leaving the civic center at approximately 3:30 p.m., he and his team stopped at UVA where he checked on his team prior to releasing them for the day.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not observe any direct commands or orders being given to anyone from a law enforcement agency; however, he said everyone was in communication with one another. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied providing first aid or medical treatment to anyone. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did impact the movement of the public on that date through utilization of law enforcement presence when he and his team prevented people from entering the civic center due to the process established by the school officials at the site. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied having any negative verbal or physical interactions with the public (timestamp 00:22:21).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied wearing a body-worn camera, maintaining texts or emails from that date, or generating any official reports documenting his actions. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that while at the civic center, he was able to make telephone calls; however, text messages would not transmit. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP's role that day was to keep the public safe and assist UPD, but when it escalated to an active shooter, the role became to stop the killing. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated USBP has the authority to act when there is an active shooter incident.

Prior to concluding the interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described his route of travel to Uvalde and utilized printed maps to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 85**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y





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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 16, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was in Puerto Rico for USBP oral hiring boards, having arrived there on May 23, 2022. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first heard about what was happening in Uvalde from a text he received from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who worked at a private school in Uvalde. After receiving the text from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he proceeded to text or telephonically contact Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who was on scene at Robb Elementary School with DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Carrizo Springs Station, Texas, who was acting PAIC for UVA at that time. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was an active shooter that was determined to be a barricaded subject. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted he did not speak with DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because he knew DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a child that attended the school. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he next telephonically contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was attending Uvalde High School, and attempted to calm her down. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he later spoke with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who indicated the shooter had been neutralized [killed]. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied issuing any order or directives regarding the incident (timestamp 00:09:32).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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Approved by:		Date:	

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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 86**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 16, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty as acting Division Chief of Operations at USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was at lunch at an unknown time, when he received two or three telephone calls indicating something was going on in Uvalde related to an active shooter. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately returned to DRT, where he met with Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who was already aware of the reports involving Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he also spoke telephonically with Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received information that the situation in Uvalde involved an active shooter and potential victims. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Comstock Station (COM), Texas, who was working as Assistant CPA (ACPA), DRT, at that time, and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, notified him they were departing to Uvalde and left within approximately five minutes of his return to DRT.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained at DRT with Executive Officer (XO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and they ultimately worked to establish a makeshift emergency operations center (EOC) between the radio room and the Border Intelligence Center, which acted as a conduit for incoming information. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) COM, who was a supervisor with the Special Operations Detachment (SOD), DRT, at the time, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Sector Intelligence Unit (SIU), DRT, Deputy PAIC (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SIU, DRT, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Operational Programs, DRT, as well as approximately fifteen other people worked out of the makeshift EOC. They worked to facilitate information flow, notifications, and resource management from outside of DRT, as well as the communication with USBP Headquarters (HQ) in Washington, D.C. to keep the information flowing.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained in direct communication with CPA Owens, DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and also DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), Texas, who was acting PAIC for the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) at that time. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) child attended Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, and CPA Owens ended up replacing DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Laredo South Station (LRS), Texas, who was PAIC of DRS at that time, in order for DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to attend to his personal situation.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and the team at DRT assisted in relaying the request for vital resources to USBP Big Bend Sector and USBP Laredo Sector, noting this included manpower and resiliency teams. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that early in the situation, there was a radio patch that was completed so the responding agencies could communicate on one channel; however, he could not advise who requested it or which agency completed the radio patch. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and his team attempted to complete rolling timelines based on the radio traffic they heard, complete a written tally of what resources were on site in Uvalde, and specified that XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked on a significant incident report. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated agents from UVA and possibly the USBP Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas, automatically responded to assist with the incident without a specific directive being issued by DRT. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at an unknown time, he was instructed by someone at the scene, possibly CPA Owens, to put out the directive for all Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) to activate, which amounted to him telling someone to get in touch with supervisors and notify them of the request because he was fielding so many incoming notifications and requests (timestamp 00:28:02).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, was one of the people that called him when he was walking out of the restaurant to return to DRT. He told PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he heard about something happening in Uvalde and asked if personnel or EMTs were needed. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he responded to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was unsure exactly what was happening or what was needed and told PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to hold on until he knew what was needed (timestamp 00:29:11).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was read a text message that was sent by him to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at 12:00 p.m. on May 24, 2022, stating, "No need to send at this time." PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the timeline matched in that he would have responded to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initial telephone call with that indication. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arriving back at DRT, he recollected speaking with DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and



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the other two ACPAs before they left for Uvalde to standby for additional information to determine what exactly was going on prior to sending resources. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told a second text message sent by him to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at 12:47 p.m. on May 24, 2022, indicated the incident command post was the Hillcrest Funeral Home and to have agents respond to that location for additional instructions. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recollected the text to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and noted that it was after DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was enroute to Uvalde, and there was confirmation that there were victims at the scene in Uvalde. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spoke with CPA Owens about the situation, and CPA Owens then left DRT soon after (timestamp 00:35:12).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that following the incident in Uvalde, a short after-action report was developed by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the main conduit for USBP HQ, noting that he would have been communicating with the Associate Chief or Assistant Chief via evolving emails, and those emails would have been saved (timestamp 00:42:25).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP operational control would have been dictated by CPA Owens (timestamp 00:46:10).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that regarding authority, generally the agency with jurisdiction would have oversight or control of those responding to the scene, and USBP would be a responding entity (timestamp 00:48:02).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not say for sure if any one person gave authority for USBP personnel to “go in” (timestamp 00:48:17).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on the tactical response level, the only communication he has heard about after the fact was between the USBP Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Nogales Station, Arizona, who was PAIC of SOD at that time, and he was talking to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directly on a tactical level (timestamp 00:48:34).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated USBP would have primarily been in a support role to assist, noting that USBP receives many calls for assistance from other law enforcement agencies in the surrounding area for many purposes (timestamp 00:49:13).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied hearing anything related to arguments that arose from the USBP EMTs regarding the treatment of victims at Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP engaged as much as possible to provide support for the situation at Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted USBP assets provided security at other locations to include Uvalde local schools, the hospital, and the civic center (timestamp 00:59:43).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified DRT was responsible for information flow and did not direct manpower to the scene, activate manpower, or dictate tactical command at the scene in Uvalde (timestamp 01:14:05).



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 17, 2023, Special Agent (SA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, and Senior Special Agent (SSA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, interviewed Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde, Texas concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. Union Representative (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio, Texas was present during the interview. The interview was audio recorded with StarWitness equipment and is uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working in uniform with a USBP brush crew unit on a ranch on the outskirts of Uvalde during his shift from (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E). While working in the bush, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a transmission over the radio advising that a shooting had occurred at Robb Elementary but does not recall the time of the radio transmission. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisor, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also at the ranch and advised him and the other USBP (b) (7)(E) BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that there were other (b) (7)(E) members but couldn't remember their names.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> and <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> rode together in a marked patrol vehicle and the other BPAs followed behind in their marked patrol vehicles. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> did not remember what time they responded to Uvalde. Once they left the ranch, they traveled on Highway 481 and then on Highway 90 eastbound to Uvalde. Once on 481, they activated their lights and sirens all the way to Uvalde. While in enroute to Uvalde, BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that there was a radio transmission advising BPAs to respond to the civic center in Uvalde for crowd control at the perimeter of the civic center. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> then advised the brush crew to respond directly to the civic center. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> further stated that it was an approximately **(b) (7)(E)** drive to the civic center. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> drew his route of travel on the maps provided (Attachment 2).

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> did not recall what time the BPAs arrived at the civic center, but after arriving he noticed alot of parents and teachers standing around. The BPAs then asked the teachers about how they could help. The teachers informed them that children would soon be bused into the civic center and advised the BPAs that they needed help clearing a pathway so that the buses could drive into the civic center parking lot. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> then waited at the curve for the buses to come in and drop off the children. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> advised the other the brush crew members to set up a perimeter around the civic center. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that at no time did he render any aid or exercise his law enforcement authority to restrict or control the public.

BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that he was at the civic center until approximately 5:30 p.m., until he was relieved by members of the USBP swing shift. Afterwards, he drove back to the USBP Station in Uvalde where he turned in the keys to his vehicle and then left the station. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that he wasn't quite sure what USBPs role was during the incident but believed it was primarily as support and to help at the scene.

After questioning, BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that he did wish to view the recording of the interview. At that point, SA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stopped the recording and allowed BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> to review the video. After BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> finished viewing the recording, SA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> activated the video recorder (audio recorded with StarWitness equipment and is uniquely identified by Authentication Code **(b) (7)(E)** **(b) (7)(E)** Attachment 3). BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> was advised that his previous rights, advisements, and warnings were still in effect. BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> attested that he was satisfied with the recording and that it was a true and exact copy of the previous recording. There were no further clarifications, questions, or additional statements.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
2	Maps reviewed by BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
3	StarWitness interview of BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> continued).

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 16, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he worked in uniform as the duty supervisor at BRA on May 24, 2022, and he was assigned the (b) (7)(E) shift. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard about the incident at Robb Elementary School while listening to radio communications on his service-issued radio between Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) and a CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) pilot flying a helicopter in the BRA Area of Responsibility (AOR). He recalled hearing the AMO pilot report he would be leaving the BRA AOR to respond to a shooting in Uvalde (timestamp 10:59:59).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), spoke with an unknown individual, and learned of a school shooting. He asked if UVA needed anything and decided to dispatch BRA Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) and BPAs who worked brush crew to Uvalde to help. The EMTs dispatched were BRA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was a Field Training Officer. He recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and another unknown BRA BPA, who were trainees, rode with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also sent BRA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who is also a Canine (K-9) Handler, to respond to Uvalde for the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:02:35).

He said he did not direct any of the responding EMTs or BPAs to activate their emergency equipment in their vehicles enroute to Uvalde (timestamp 11:05:44).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled his decision to send EMT's and BPAs to Uvalde was based on the telephone conversation he initially had with the unknown individual at UVA. He described his role in the incident as being the point of contact (POC) at BRA for BPAs to contact to figure out what to do or where to go (timestamp 11:03:15).

He recalled getting updates as the POC from Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, who responded to the command center in Uvalde.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BRA received a lot of calls and information about the Uvalde shooting and would relay the information to the EMTs and BPAs he dispatched to Uvalde. He recalled a specific update he received that Robb Elementary School was going to begin moving kids out of the school to the civic center, so he redirected some of the BPAs he dispatched to Uvalde to respond to the civic center. Another update he recalled asked for help at the USBP Checkpoint near Uvalde, so he redirected BPAs to assist with checkpoint duties. He stated WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would also provide updates, which led to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) redirecting BPAs to where WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed them. He said the rest of his calls and status checks were to the BPAs and EMTs to make sure they were all right.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had no information to provide about who from USBP may have been in command in Uvalde. He stated a call for help was requested, and they responded the best that they could. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understanding of USBP's authority /responsibility to respond to the incident would be to respond to the command center to determine what needed to be done and then complete the task. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what authority WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had when he gave the order to send agents to various locations in Uvalde. He said the command-and-control pathway and decision-making information they had went through WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unaware if any aid was rendered to any member of the public by anyone he asked to respond to Uvalde. He said he was unaware of anyone he sent to Uvalde interacting with the public, which became physical where someone had to be restrained.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, all entered Robb Elementary School to assist with the children inside. He reiterated that the (b) (7)(E) from BRA were all assigned to the civic center.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered somebody came to BRA to pick up some old uniforms to take to agents arriving at UVA for an after-action report who may have needed a different uniform. He was unable to recall the name of the individual who picked up the uniforms. He could not recall the exact time he left BRA at the end of the day but remembered he remained at the station until all the agents returned from Uvalde.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 89**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 17, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to brush duty and was working in uniform on a ranch located south of Uvalde off (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shift that day was (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working in the brush unit with Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and UVA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first name unknown). While working in the brush, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a phone call regarding the shooting at Robb Elementary School and informed him and the other BPAs working on the ranch about the incident (timestamp 14:48:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall what time SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him and the other BPAs about the shooting at Robb Elementary School. After the phone call, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed the BPAs working in the brush unit to respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 14:50:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he left the ranch and rode together in an unmarked vehicle while the other brush unit BPAs rode in their own vehicles. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they traveled on

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Farm to Market Road 481 and then on U.S. Highway 90 eastbound to Uvalde with their vehicle's emergency lights and siren activated (timestamp 14:51:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall what time the BPAs left the ranch to go to Uvalde. While enroute to Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard garbled radio traffic and was not able to understand much of it. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did hear over the radio a request for assistance at the civic center, and they were directed to respond to the civic center to help unload the children from the buses and provide security (timestamp 14:54:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when they arrived in Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he parked two blocks away from the civic center. As they walked towards the civic center, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed law enforcement officers from other agencies were also on scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the lead and asked people at the civic center how the BPAs could help. The BPAs were told help was needed clearing a pathway for buses to enter the civic center, so the children could be unloaded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he and the other BPAs from the brush crew stood at the curve and waited for children to get off the bus, and afterwards, they made sure the children had a clear path to the entrance of the civic center (timestamp 14:55:39).

Other than providing water to parents, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not provide aid to anyone at the civic center or use his law enforcement authority to restrict anyone's movement (timestamp 14:57:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were so many law enforcement personnel at the civic center, he was unable to see whether there was anyone in charge at the scene.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at approximately 6:30 p.m., he and the other brush crew BPAs were relieved by the BPAs from the swing shift. Afterwards, they returned to UVA and turned in the keys to their vehicles.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood USBP's responsibility to respond to the incident was to provide whatever assistance was necessary.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 90**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 16, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was at UVA where he was assigned as the juvenile processing coordinator. As the juvenile processing coordinator BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) processed juvenile migrants, and rarely left the station. On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dressed in tan cargo pants and a black polo shirt with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) markings while he was processing juveniles. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went home to pick up lunch at approximately 11:30 a.m. and was heading back to UVA when he saw USBP vehicles with their emergency equipment activated leaving the station. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he went into UVA and started listening to radio traffic, but nothing was being reported. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the units may have been responding to a potential bailout because there was no information being broadcast on the radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he lives approximately (b) (7)(E) miles from UVA (timestamp 00:11:05).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was curious as to what was going on in Uvalde. The agents in the office originally thought there was a bailout by Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got a call from an agent at a checkpoint in Eagle Pass, Texas, asking what was going on because they saw Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Troopers going through the checkpoint. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), Texas, who was the acting Patrol Agent in Charge at UVA at the time, called him and instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to load up a couple cases of water and head out to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) loaded up a marked USBP Tahoe with water and headed to the school with BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA (timestamp 00:14:49).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they arrived at the south side of the school sometime between 12:00 p.m. or 12:30 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when they arrived at Robb Elementary School, the scene was still active, and children were being evacuated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not know what was going on, and TXDPS asked them where the command center was. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dropped off several cases of water at a stop sign at the intersection of Old Carrizo Road and W. Cargile Street and then began helping evacuate kids into buses from the south side of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said approximately 20 children came down Old Carrizo Road from the back of Robb Elementary School, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) escorted the children to an empty lot where a bus was waiting (timestamp 00:17:13).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, called either BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and advised they were on the wrong side of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got back into their marked USBP Tahoe and tried to drive to the funeral home, but most of the roads were blocked off. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they made their way around the secure perimeter and parked by the funeral home near the intersection of Perez Street and Geraldine Street. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a cousin that was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School that was killed on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 00:24:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never heard any shots fired at Robb Elementary School and did not know if the shooter had been killed after they parked at the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that shortly after they arrived at the funeral home, he saw some of the wounded being taken out of Robb Elementary School by first responders. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were no supervisors or command structure instructing arriving law enforcement on what was needed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said a lot of the public had gathered behind the funeral home and advanced toward Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) joined BPAs and local law enforcement that were trying to prevent the public from advancing towards Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed the advancing public to stay back for their own safety, and they obeyed and were never hostile towards him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) monitored the public and handed out water to law enforcement leaving the school for approximately 30 minutes (timestamp 00:29:18).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while he was addressing the public at the funeral home, ambulances made their way to the school to transport the injured. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not render aid or have any interaction with the wounded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see the children evacuated from Robb Elementary School to the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed this occurred when he was on the



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south side of the school or in transit to the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did escort children from the funeral home to buses that were taking the children to the civic center to be picked up by their parents (timestamp 00:35:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and another BPA from UVA that went by the nickname (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to keep an eye on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because he was crying and distraught. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and talked to him for a little bit. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) eventually walked away, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resumed helping with crowd control and handing out water to first responders. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) discovered later that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been inside Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was ever inside Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:39:41).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after he was finished escorting the children from the funeral home to the buses, all USBP personnel began to meet under a tree near Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP, Del Rio Sector (DRT), under the tree. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw CPA Owens over by the parking lot in front of Robb Elementary School. CPA Owens instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to tell WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there would be a muster at UVA at (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed the instructions of CPA Owens to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed all USBP personnel under the tree at Robb Elementary School that there was going to be a muster at UVA at (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left Robb Elementary School and made it in time for the muster at UVA (timestamp 00:42:51).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reconsidered the immediate events leading up to the (b) (7)(E) muster at UVA and stated he believed he arrived at the funeral home on May 24, 2022, at approximately 1:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also described the role of the BPAs involved in escorting the children from the funeral home to the buses. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the BPAs created a path to the buses and were essentially shielding the children from the view of others. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said teachers were leading the children from the funeral home to the buses and entering the buses with the children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it seemed like they were shielding the children to the buses for a long time (timestamp 00:46:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the role of USBP in an active shooter situation is primarily to support local law enforcement. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the local police were in control of the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said most of the law enforcement personnel in or near Robb Elementary School were local police officers. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said his actions near the funeral home were self-initiated; he did not receive instructions from anyone. The only instructions BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received were when WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to leave the south side of the school to assist at the funeral home (timestamp 00:48:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have a body-worn camera during the shooting at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) primarily communicated with others via cell phone. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did receive text messages from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) throughout the day. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not draft a memorandum or report about the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have an interview with TXDPS



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about the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he has been employed by USBP for 16 years and has never received Active Shooter training (timestamp 00:51:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he learned the girlfriend of the shooter at Robb Elementary School made a threat directed at Uvalde High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended Morales Junior High School, which is located near Uvalde High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after he received texts from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and a call from a friend of his, he left UVA and went to Morales Junior High School to pick up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at approximately 3:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there was heavy traffic and a significant police presence at Morales Junior High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked as close as he could to Morales Junior High School and then called his friend (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a local reserve police officer. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) are in the same grade at Morales Junior High School, and both play on the softball team. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he got (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) out of Morales Junior High School. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was in the process of getting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) out of Morales Junior High School and offered to get BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) out as well. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) out of the school and bring her to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) so he could take her home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to park in the Morales Junior High School parking lot, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) brought BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) out to his car. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had body armor on, but he could not remember if it had police markings. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hugged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then took (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he learned some time after that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was inside Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:56:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the parents of the children at Morales Junior High School were located at the front of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the parents had to wait in a single file line and request the teachers to release their children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there was a lot of vehicle traffic preventing some parents from getting to the front of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not see or hear any parents yell at or criticize (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for getting both girls out of Morales Junior High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he took (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directly home in his personal vehicle (timestamp 01:02:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have body armor on and was carrying his CBP-issued pistol on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he left UVA in such a hurry that he did not get body armor or a rifle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned the incident at Robb Elementary School was a school shooting when he was traveling from the south side of the school to the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised he did not have to render medical aid to anyone near Robb Elementary School or Morales Junior High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated he did not have any confrontations with civilians at Robb Elementary School or Morales Junior High School on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) are good friends and have known each other for several years. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) coached (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in softball and soccer (timestamp 01:06:22).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized printed maps to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).



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National Border Patrol Council Representative (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) present during the CBP OPR interview, stated the individual identified as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)UVA.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 91**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 16, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to work at UVA. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to work from (b) (7)(E) (timestamp 00:09:33).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that although his shift started at (b) (7)(E) he routinely arrived at the office at 1:00 p.m. and stated that on May 24, 2022, he arrived at UVA at approximately 1:00 p.m. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he routinely commuted in plain clothes to UVA then changed into the green USBP uniform in his office upon arrival. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, upon his arrival at his office, he heard activity on the USBP radio that a shooting incident had occurred at Robb Elementary School and that the shooter was killed (timestamp 00:10:22).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he ordered his immediate subordinates, UVA Supervisory Border Patrol Agents (SBPAs) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to remain at UVA to handle matters while he responded to Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he changed into his USBP uniform and drove to Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was driving a marked USBP vehicle and drove there with his emergency equipment activated. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated no one directed him to respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:26:43).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:30 p.m. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a lot of traffic on the street. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked near the funeral home. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed Border Patrol agents (BPAs) congregating under a tree situated within the Robb Elementary School perimeter fence. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he walked to this location where he recalled seeing Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP, Del Rio Sector (DRT), and Deputy CPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, as well as WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, plus UVA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:13:22).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while by the tree, CPA Owens advised WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) every BPA needed to report to UVA for the 2:00 p.m. shift muster brief. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then walked back to his USBP vehicle and reported to UVA. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spent approximately 25 minutes by Robb Elementary School but never went inside (timestamp 00:13:58).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the muster brief, CPA Owens asked him to be the USBP point of contact at the funeral home next to Robb Elementary School, which had been designated as the incident command center (ICC) (timestamp 00:18:18).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at ICC at approximately 3:00 p.m. and began coordinating directly with the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper who was the scene incident commander, later identified as Captain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was at ICC, he offered available USBP resources to Captain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in turn, Captain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested USBP provide security assistance at all the schools and the civic center in Uvalde (timestamp 00:20:13).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in turn, he (WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ordered SBPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to relay orders for available USBP personnel to report to different schools in Uvalde to provide security assistance for students being released from the schools, so students could get out safely. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated these were the only requests he recalled Captain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) making to him. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled information being put out concerning the shooter's girlfriend allegedly making threats over social media, but that matter was addressed by Uvalde police. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not receive any other requests from any other agency. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were many different agencies at ICC. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall the names of specific individuals. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did recall Assistant Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, Del Rio, being there. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained at ICC for approximately three hours, then he returned to UVA and stayed there until past midnight. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the time he initially went to Robb Elementary



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School, and during the time he was at ICC, he never witnessed anyone use their authority or any force against anyone, and he never did so either. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never provided aid to anyone at any time (timestamp 00:30:37).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have a body-worn camera on the date of the incident. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have text messages concerning the incident. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not generate any emails, reports, or memorandums about the incident. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not interviewed and did not have discussions with anyone concerning his response to the incident. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had participated in USBP sponsored Active Shooter training before but did not recall what year (timestamp 00:32:08).

Concerning USBP’s authority to respond to this incident, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPAs had specialized training such as Active Shooter training to be able to respond and assist local agencies when shooting incidents occurred. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was an expectation for USBP to respond, especially being a large force in more rural communities such as Uvalde (timestamp 00:34:41).

Concerning USBP’s responsibility to respond to this incident, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP had a responsibility to the community and to the United States. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPAs had taken an oath to enforce the laws of the United States. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that although sometimes these were state and local laws, USBP would be called upon to assist, especially if innocent people were being injured; USBP was going to respond (timestamp 00:36:21).

During the interview, OPR interviewers presented WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with maps illustrating Uvalde and the surrounding area. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated the route of travel he took from UVA to Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also identified the area where he parked and walked to Robb Elementary School when he initially responded (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 16, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dressed in his rough duty USBP uniform and assigned to COM from (b) (7)(E). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said COM is approximately one and a half hours away from Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to muster at COM and was asked by Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) COM, to get with him after muster. After muster, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get two boxes of USBP uniforms and take them to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned what had happened at Robb Elementary School from social media and what was briefed at the (b) (7)(E) COM muster. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood that an active shooter situation occurred but did not know any details. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) loaded up two boxes of uniforms and left COM at approximately 2:20 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took a marked USBP Silverado vehicle containing his body armor and did not activate his emergency equipment on the way to UVA (timestamp 00:09:22).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at UVA at approximately 4:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pulled up to the door where the muster room was and unloaded the two boxes of uniforms, and an agent told him to just place them in the muster room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio Sector (DRT), Texas, and other staff having a meeting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked another agent if they needed anything else, and the agent denied needing any additional assistance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were three or four Special Operations Detachment (SOD) BPAs there as well (timestamp 00:12:42).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left UVA, and on his route back to COM, he passed the civic center, where he saw a bunch of BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pulled into the parking lot of the civic center and asked BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), Texas, if they needed help or relief. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the agents responded that they were good, so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left without exiting his vehicle. He continued back to COM at approximately 4:30 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any contact with civilians at UVA or the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe any confrontations between civilians and law enforcement at the civic center (timestamp 00:15:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it is the responsibility of USBP to respond to active shooter situations because they are usually the first law enforcement agency to arrive on scene. If another law enforcement entity relays the information or is present on scene, it is the responsibility of USBP to assist in any way possible. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said COM is a perfect example. There is only one officer assigned to the Val Verde Sheriff's Department, and when a call comes in through 911, the officer will usually call COM and request assistance because it could take 30 minutes for additional officers to respond out of Del Rio (timestamp 00:23:09).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he participated in Active Shooter training in Carrizo Springs sometime in 2017. The Active Shooter training was jointly hosted by USBP and the Dimmit County, Texas Sheriff's Office. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied hearing any shots fired on the date of the incident or being issued a body-worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any text messages but did notify his supervisor that he was heading back to COM via text. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not send or receive any emails or produce any written memorandum regarding the shooting at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has not been interviewed about the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:25:05).

Prior to concluding the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized printed maps illustrating Uvalde and the surrounding area to outline his actions on May 24, 2022, in response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to DRT where he is currently detailed as the Peer Support Coordinator. At approximately 11:00 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was having lunch with Acting Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Eagle Pass Station, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, when he initially learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:41:23). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School from social media posts he saw on Facebook and shortly after, everyone at the table began to receive notifications on their government cellphones about the incident. Acting Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initially received instructions from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, for personnel to remain at the station and she passed down the information to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Simultaneously, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began to receive calls from BPAs in Uvalde notifying him about the shooting and requesting Peer Support help (timestamp 00:16:58).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he returned to his workstation to retrieve the Peer Support roster and then received instructions from Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, for all Peer Support personnel to report to Uvalde (timestamp 00:17:12). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pulled up the Peer Support roster and began contacting personnel to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a total of approximately 25 to 26 Peer Support personnel on the roster of which all 25 to 26 responded to UVA (timestamp 00:19:30) except for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who responded directly to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not instruct BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to report to the school (timestamp 00:46:32).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 12:00 p.m., he departed from Del Rio to UVA along with Mission Support Specialist (MSS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who is also Peer Support. MSS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in his government vehicle as he was still in the process of contacting the Peer Support personnel. MSS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove through Highway 90 straight to UVA, they never passed through or near Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:45:05). Upon their arrival to UVA at approximately 1:00 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began to coordinate and assign tasks to the Peer Support personnel present. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent a group of Peer Support BPAs to hold security at the house of a BPA whose (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was one of the deceased children from the shooting, however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to recall the name of the BPA (timestamp 00:20:21). In addition, there were other Peer Support groups at UVA providing support to BPAs who responded to the incident, ordering food to the station for BPAs, and sorting clean uniforms by sizes for responding BPAs to change into clean uniforms. BPAs with blood on their uniforms were instructed to change into clean uniforms. The soiled uniforms were put in bags and were held as evidence or for proper disposal (timestamp 00:18:07). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of what happened to the uniforms after they were placed in the bags.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained at UVA providing support until approximately 9:00 p.m. Through the duration of his response on May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood Chief Patrol Agent Owens was in command and control at UVA (timestamps 00:28:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unable to provide text and call records from the day of the incident because he was given a new phone after the incident (timestamp 00:43:50). CBP OPR interviewers requested BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provide the roster he used on May 24, 2022, which he subsequently provided via email after the interview concluded (timestamp 01:19:08) (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Peer Support Roster reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 94**



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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to DRT conducting (b) (7)(E) operations. He was working at a remote location north of Eagle Pass, Texas, when he learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working in BORTAC uniform and driving an unmarked USBP vehicle. On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working with other DRT BORTAC BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was waiting with a group of migrants to be transported to the USBP station for processing and his service canine was on the verge of heatstroke. Several government vehicles (GOVs) were stuck in the mud. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GOV was parked approximately 5 miles away when he and the other BORTAC agents received a text message on their personal cell phones from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD. The text message told the BORTAC BPAs to immediately respond to Robb Elementary School for a shooting and that a person was barricaded (timestamp 00:10:47). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took a screenshot of the text string notifying the BORTAC team of the shooting incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took a screenshot of it because he thought the text string should be kept (timestamp 00:17:00) (Attachment 2).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he waited until the migrants were transported to the highway by BORTAC. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) After the last group was transported, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to his GOV. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove approximately 10 minutes to Highway 90, activated his emergency vehicle equipment (lights and sirens), and drove towards Uvalde, Texas, for approximately an hour.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived in Uvalde and was told via a text string on his personal cell phone to report to a specific location, which he could not recall, but believed it was either a local fire department or health facility. Upon arrival, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received another text telling him to report to the USBP Uvalde Station. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the station and met with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who told him to immediately report to Uvalde High School and provide security as there were other possible shooters (timestamp 00:13:48).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he arrived at Uvalde High School and conducted a site survey security assessment. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed other law enforcement agencies arrived but were under their own chain of command and were occupied with their own responsibilities. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mother worked at Uvalde High School and oversaw students at the school. She called BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked if everyone was ok and if there were any issues or concerns. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to his mother's location in the school, and she went to the door crawling on the floor. He made sure she was ok and then started working with her and helping. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mother told him there was a student hyperventilating who needed assistance (timestamp 00:14:47). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had BPA emergency medical technicians who were at the school had already reported to the student's classroom to assist.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at the school, he believed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in command and control of the situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received his orders from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and was told to help with traffic, to help maintain some type of order, as it was very chaotic with parents arriving to retrieve their children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted parents picking up their children for a few hours and helped his mother where he could. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) teammates were also positioned around the school keeping order, directing traffic, and trying to control the chaos. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not enter the school building to tactically clear classrooms or evacuate any children. After an unknown number of hours, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and all BORTAC BPAs returned to USBP Uvalde Station for an out briefing by Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when the out briefing concluded, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and he drove together inside BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GOV back to where BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GOV was stuck in the mud on the unidentified ranch, which was over an hour away from Uvalde (timestamp 00:16:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after freeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GOV from the mud, he drove to his residence and arrived at approximately midnight.

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:43:11) (Attachment 3). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively.



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On the map labeled 2, South Uvalde, Texas, and the map labeled 3, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from an unknown ranch in Texas, then on Highway 90 into Uvalde.

On the map labeled 4, Uvalde, Texas Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again marked his route of travel to the USBP Uvalde Station prior to driving to the Uvalde High School on May 24, 2022. On the map labeled 4, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the Uvalde High School where he responded on May 24, 2022, to control traffic and provide security after information was received concerning a threat of a possible second shooter (timestamp 00:13:47).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated all other provided maps were not applicable, as he never responded to Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 00:47:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he did not have a body worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had text messages concerning the CBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting and provided those via email (Attachment 4).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Screenshot of text message string from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4	Email from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with text messages.

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was assigned as the Sector Medical Coordinator at the USBP Del Rio Station coordinating EMT certification classes on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he checked in on the class when one of his instructors, identified as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Brackettville Station, advised him there was an active shooter in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the SOD team house to try and get more information on the situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Detachment (SOD)/USBP Del Rio Sector, and Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Comstock Station, TX, were inside the team house. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he inquired about the situation. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained they did not know a whole lot and told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not to respond because they did not want to flood the scene (timestamp 00:16:57).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Date:	09/18/2023
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then received a phone call from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who instructed him to head to Uvalde (timestamp 00:17:43). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got off the phone with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and informed DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was heading to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he left the SOD team house, stopped by the medical supply warehouse, and loaded up his government-owned Chevrolet Tahoe (unmarked) with medical supplies, to include IV bags and tubing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it took him approximately fifteen minutes to load his vehicle.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove as fast as he could to Uvalde and said it took him approximately 45 minutes to get there. He was getting information on where BPAs were deployed by checking the ATAK program on his phone (timestamp 00:20:26). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the ATAK program allows live GPS tracking of employees who have the program on their work phone. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not getting any updates via phone, radio, or email but could see through the ATAK program that employees were leaving Robb Elementary School and relocating to the hospital (timestamp 00:21:04). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to go directly to the hospital to provide aid.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that upon arriving at the hospital in Uvalde, he observed there was a lot of traffic and there were a bunch of law enforcement officers (LEOs) standing around (timestamp 00:21:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the LEOs were either local law enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), or possibly U.S. Marshals. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested their assistance to help him unload the medical supplies from his vehicle into the emergency room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed the hospital staff the supplies were there for them to use if needed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the hospital staff told him there were possibly 14 additional victims enroute. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard there was another BPA that was "hit" during the incident at Robb Elementary School and transported to the emergency room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to check on their status. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not see the BPA but did run into a supervisor that was there with the BPA, who he identified as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked hospital personnel where he could help and they asked if he could set up outside the emergency room to conduct initial triage to determine which patients needed immediate medical attention (timestamp 00:24:34). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) set up his medical kit outside at a table provided by the hospital. While he was outside, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) overheard some of the LEOs talking about a possible second shooter who might be the first shooter's girlfriend. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked the ATAK program on his phone and noticed BPAs were relocating to the high school and another elementary school, which he identified as Dalton Elementary. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had not triaged anyone since his arrival at the hospital and felt he would be better utilized at one of the schools. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked with the hospital staff to ensure he was not needed any further, packed up his equipment, and decided to go to Dalton Elementary to help (timestamp 00:26:40).

Upon arriving at Dalton Elementary, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed that an outer perimeter had been established by BPAs and other LEOs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the school grounds and met with the BORSTAR (Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue) agents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORSTAR, was at the school as well as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to meet with the school principal and staff to



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coordinate an orderly and secure system to reunite the students with their parents (timestamp 00:29:18). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the school provided BPAs with school handheld radios and they began to bring parents in one at a time, verifying who their child was, linking them with their child, and having them leave. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Texas Department of Public Safety and other LEOs assisted with the release of the students. The other LEOs were either HSI or U.S. Marshals. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they did not finish getting all the students out until approximately 7:00 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after leaving Dalton Elementary, he returned to the USBP Uvalde Station. He saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector, having a meeting. As he approached them, they advised him that now was not a good time to talk. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told them he was going to head home, at which time he left.

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which route he took to Uvalde from the USBP Del Rio Station. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he took a left out of the USBP Del Rio Station parking lot, took a left at Biddle, and then another left onto Highway 90. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he took Highway 90 all the way to Uvalde (timestamp 00:38:04).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he did send a text from his personal phone to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) while he was in route to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the text was to inform them he was enroute with medical supplies. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated neither replied to his message (timestamp 00:41:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated this was the only text he sent.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never provided any medical attention to anyone at the hospital or at Dalton Elementary.

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had any interaction with media personnel at any of the locations. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied there was a female reporter at Dalton Elementary who was attempting to film the children as they left the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked the reporter to move farther away, and she complied. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the reporter then began to slowly move back at which time he told her to move back away from the perimeter and she again complied. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then instructed the personnel on the perimeter to make sure the reporter stayed outside the perimeter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who the reporter was or for which news organization she worked (timestamp 00:51:20).

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inquired if he knew of anyone else from the USBP Del Rio Station that responded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he exited the SOD team house, he ran into BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Station, both of whom were EMT instructors. They advised him they got word to respond to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who instructed them to go (timestamp 00:57:15).

SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he understood USBP's authority or responsibility to respond to these incidents to which he responded he did not know (timestamp 01:03:19).





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not remember the exact times associated with his response to this incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. Prior to the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a Warnings and Assurances to Employee Required to Provide Information, which he signed acknowledging he understood his right and obligations (Attachment 1). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with the form titled Your Required Appearance and Sworn Testimony, as well as Weingarten Rights Employee Notification Regarding Union Representation. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness and the Authentication Code is (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 2).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to the radio room of the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) station in Uvalde, Texas. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) this room is known as “the bubble”. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) duties included facilitating communications and information sharing amongst agents in the field, handling telephone calls from Del Rio Sector, monitoring local police radios, and answering two incoming phone lines to the Uvalde Station.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned Uvalde Police Department (PD) was in pursuit of an unknown individual. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the Uvalde PD radio communications indicated the individual being pursued crashed his vehicle near Robb Elementary school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began receiving calls from USBP Del Rio Station and the USBP Brackettville Station asking if agents were needed to assist with the unfolding situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he instructed them not send agents at that time because he felt the situation was being handled by the Uvalde PD.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned from further Uvalde PD radio transmissions that shots were being fired at the elementary school (timestamp 52:07). After learning shots were being fired at the elementary school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed other BPAs begin checking M4 rifles out of the armory in preparation for responding to the elementary school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from the Uvalde PD requesting USBP assistance at Robb Elementary.

According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde, TX, instructed the USBP Uvalde checkpoint to close and for all available agents to respond to Robb Elementary to assist (timestamp 54:17). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated available agents from the USBP Uvalde station, including BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began heading towards the elementary school to assist.

While working in the radio room, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began receiving numerous calls from media outlets requesting information about the evolving incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) referred all media inquiries to the Del Rio Sector public information officer. In addition, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received calls from the USBP Brackettville station as well as the USBP Del Rio Station. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed both stations to send all available assets to the elementary school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received a call from Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) reporting they were sending a helicopter to the area.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the radio traffic as very unorganized and chaotic but he understood the Uvalde PD to be in charge of the unfolding incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not understand the full extent of what was happening at the school. Based on the radio traffic, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed there was a barricaded suspect at the school (timestamp 54:54).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio transmissions about finding keys needed to enter the school. He recalled the conversation regarding the keys to have lasted approximately 10 minutes.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described most of the radio traffic as emanating from Uvalde PD. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard Uvalde PD attempting to set up a command post, a staging area, and managing the evacuation of children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood the Uvalde PD to be in charge of the incident based on the radio traffic.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde, TX, contacted him to report he had secured a crashed vehicle near the elementary school containing ammunition, a weapon, and knives.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from an unknown BPA stating he was headed to the Uvalde High School in order to provide security.

BP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde, TX, asking if he should head to the elementary school to assist. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to not respond because he thought the situation was under control and many BPAs were already on site.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not seek supervisory permission before telling USBP Stations and individual BPAs when and when not to go to the elementary school (timestamp 1:27:19). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he felt it was more important to just make decisions than to overwhelm supervisors with time consuming questions.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the radio had an “open mic” issue that lasted approximately 1 to 3 minutes. During this “open mic” incident, radio communications were hindered. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not provide a specific time as to when USBP and Uvalde PD patched their radio communications. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled the patch ending at approximately 1:30pm (timestamp 3:30:17).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood the role of the USBP at the school was to provide assistance to the local police department.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not have any text messages or emails concerning the CBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) produce any reports concerning the incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Warning and Assurances to Employee Required to Provide Information.
2	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 97**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is currently the DPAIC of COM and is responsible for most of the operations at the station, including administrative matters on behalf of the Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described his primary responsibility is to execute the vision of the PAIC. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there are approximately (b) (7)(E) Border Patrol Agents (BPA) assigned to COM.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the day of the shooting at Robb Elementary School, he was assigned as the Acting PAIC ([A]PAIC) of the Special Operations Detachment (SOD) for the Del Rio Sector (DRT), Texas. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was filling in for PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Nogales Station, Arizona, who was detailed to the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he commenced his role as the (A)PAIC of the SOD in November 2021 and was responsible for overseeing the operations and administration for the two departments under SOD which are the Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) and Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) (timestamp 00:23:45).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned about the incident at Robb Elementary School via a telephone call from an unknown person at the DRT Border Intelligence Center (BIC). According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the initial information he received was that there was a shooting incident at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde (timestamp 00:24:30). Approximately 15 to 20 minutes after the original notification, he received additional information indicating it was a male with a longarm (rifle) inside the school. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall how much additional time elapsed after the initial notification or the source of the information, but in addition to the fact it was a male with a longarm, he later came to understand that the situation was that of a barricaded shooter at the school (timestamp 00:43:20).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his first action was to make a telephone call to the BORSTAR commander, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD. While DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on the telephone with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or directly after, he received an incoming telephone call from the BORTAC Commander, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall if he merged the two telephone calls or if he separately informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the preliminary information he received about the shooting incident at Robb Elementary School. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him that he was already aware of the situation and had a team en route to the school (timestamp 00:25:45). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his initial conversations with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were to initiate the process of deploying SOD personnel to the scene. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) any subsequent calls during the initial stages were related to accountability of personnel and resources needed (timestamp 1:02:00). The primary means of communication between DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the commanders was via cell phone. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he did not want to send text messages for them to read when he knew they were deploying and opted to verbally communicate with them for ease of communication.

Following the notifications to the SOD commanders, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the (A)DPAIC of SOD, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, maintained accountability of the assets (personnel) being deployed. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were listing the names of the BPAs who were responding to Robb Elementary School, which including some BPAs who were off-duty, and ensuring these BPAs had directions regarding where they needed to go. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the initial documentation of the accountability of assets started with a list on a white board in the SOD office. Shortly thereafter, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD, also assisted with tracking and accountability of assets as well as sorting through information which was incoming in what





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DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described as bits and pieces. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he wanted to ensure the right resources and tools were identified for the job (timestamp 00:27:00).

While DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the others were tracking assets, the Medical Coordinator, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Carrizo Springs Station, Texas, arrived and offered assistance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered the use of a response truck to take emergency medical technicians (EMT) to respond. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he authorized its use and instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get it loaded up and go (timestamp 00:28:15). According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made notifications to EMTs to meet him, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to Uvalde with the medical response truck from DRT.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he soon started receiving inquiries from DRT staff via the BIC as they were then formulating a plan to provide guidance and leadership for the situation (timestamp 00:29:15). To maintain clear lines of communication and avoid any disconnect, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relocated their efforts from SOD to the radio room at the BIC at DRT Headquarters. Command staff present at the BIC included the Acting Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and Sector Intelligence Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Acting Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was reporting to Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it was helpful to have everyone in the same room to consolidate information and listen to radio communications.

After moving from SOD to the BIC, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started coordinating different lines of effort which included the following considerations: tactical, medical response, resources needed and/or necessary, and an after-action plan (timestamp 00:29:45). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that upon receiving information indicating the situation was a barricaded shooter, considerations were being made for less-lethal munitions, including the deployment of a trailer containing less-lethal munitions. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall whether said trailer was deployed. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated all notes related to the above were documented on a glass wall to provide visibility to all who were involved. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any additional notes.

Around the time he relocated to the BIC, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had contact with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Although PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was away on detail from his position as the PAIC of SOD, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) happened to be in Del Rio at the time of the incident and informed DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was en route to the scene. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it was a relief to him to know PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was responding because the commanders for BORSTAR and BORTAC were both responding to Robb Elementary and now the PAIC of SOD was also responding (timestamp 00:30:30). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once he knew PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be responding and would be involved with the situation, he backed off his direct communication with the SOD commanders and turned his focus over to ensuring the SOD personnel had the resources and tools they needed (timestamp 1:04:50). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took over communicating with the commanders before they arrived on scene at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 1:10:30).

Following his contact with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued listening to radio communications and identifying requirements in the field, to include establishing a landing zone



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for air evacuations. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did receive confirmation this task had already been completed.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned during this time period that some of the SOD assets were working near Eagle Pass, TX, and had become aware of the shooting situation from one of the SOD spouses, which was before DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or the BIC had even been notified. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) those BPAs were approximately one hour away from the incident scene and went from tracking a group of undocumented migrants to responding to this situation (timestamp 00:31:50).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the continuous monitoring of radio communications made him aware there was a lot of law enforcement present at the scene. In addition to monitoring incoming information, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated one of the priorities was maintaining accountability of SOD personnel, to include where they were located and what they were doing. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he had numerous telephone conversations with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). As for the SOD personnel in the field, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he tried to limit his direct communication with them, unless it was something critical, so they could focus on their responsibilities and the situation at hand. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) once he knew PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was en route to the scene, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became the primary point of contact between the SOD team and Sector staff. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was, in turn, providing the information, as needed, to Acting Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:33:15).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) detailed the coordination efforts regarding personnel in the field. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) coordinated the air evacuations and medical response. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also explained that although he originally was tracking personnel from just SOD, he later expanded his efforts to include BPAs from different stations within the entire DRT (timestamp 00:35:00). In addition, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working with Sector staff to determine what the different roles and responsibilities would be for each BPA. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that coordination and accountability efforts were further complicated by the fact that some BPAs were responding from an off-duty capacity.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they continued to monitor radio communications. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also explained that although PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was his primary point of contact, he attempted to restrict his communications so PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could focus on the SOD personnel at the scene. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) once PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) physically arrived on scene, which was after entry was made into the classroom, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directly coordinated with the SOD personnel and was specifically involved with the follow-on response to the original incident. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed SOD personnel from Robb Elementary to another school, based upon information about another possible threat (timestamp 0:37:40). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the Sector Intelligence Unit (SIU) obtained some type of open-source intelligence from social media which involved an unknown female stating she would be going to another school to finish the job. Eventually, the secondary threat was determined to be unfounded, and the SOD personnel were subsequently called off.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the incoming information during the event as sketchy. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the sequence of the information coming in and the timeframes of the events being



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described were unknown. For example, they heard a male dropped a magazine or a backpack with ammunition before going into the school. Additionally, there was information about the shooter wrecking his vehicle outside of the school, possibly related to a failure to yield event. Also, there was information he had shot his mother at his house (timestamp 0:45:00).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as he was receiving the information, he was attempting to disseminate it to the BPAs in the field via PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he also had a few conversations with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who had informed him BORSTAR was staging and starting to prepare to provide medical assistance. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it was not until the team made entry that he understood that it was an active shooter situation (timestamp 0:47:45). Additionally, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was only after the team had eliminated the shooter and started treating people, that he fully understood the gravity of the situation. Prior to that, he was under the impression that it was a barricaded subject (timestamp 0:48:25).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that some of the information he knew related to the details of what took place during the entry and subsequent response, he obtained after the fact from conversations following the event. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated that he was primarily receiving the information via radio and third-party information from the SOD commanders and other personnel from Uvalde on scene. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained, up until that point, he was not even certain as to how many of SOD personnel were involved with eliminating the threat. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it was not until after approximately 30 minutes to one hour after the breach, that they learned there was more than one SOD member involved with the shooting (timestamp 0:50:40).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after SOD made entry and eliminated the threat, they immediately went into rescue and preservation of life efforts (timestamp 0:50:00). After the fact, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned BORSTAR agents had set up triage rooms to treat victims; however, the process of separating victims related to the level of care needed was chaotic. One problem that was identified was that at one point there were so many personnel on hand attempting to help; many of the victims that were being brought for treatment were no longer treatable as there was nothing that could be done for them (timestamp 0:51:45). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the medical training required of the BORSTAR personnel and declared that he had no doubt that if the BORSTAR personnel were not on scene, more lives would have been lost. Law enforcement personnel who did not have medical training assisted with evacuations (timestamp 0:54:00).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he later found out one of the BORTAC agents, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shot during the operation (timestamp 0:56:42). At the time, he did not know how severely BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been wounded, only that he had been shot in the head but was still conscious.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently sent DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the hospital to check on the status of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was one of several BPAs who responded from an off-duty status and was not on the initial roster of personnel on scene. Information obtained later, identified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a last-minute addition to the stack of SOD personnel who made entry. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) suffered a graze wound to the head and had shrapnel in his foot.



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DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the command structure for the situation at Robb Elementary. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had control of all the medical assets, to include search and rescue and EMT personnel; SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was responsible for the entire tactical response and personnel (timestamp 1:15:30). When responding to a scene, standard practice would be for the SOD commanders to report to the highest ranking USBP official on site.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who the SOD commanders contacted when they initially arrived on scene. Although it was typical for SOD to contact the highest ranking USBP on scene, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if that occurred in this case. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it was his understanding there was a lot of law enforcement on site and it was unclear as to where the incident command post (ICP) was located. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know where the ICP was located or if one even existed and explained, had he known where it was, he would have communicated such information to the on-site personnel (timestamp 1:22:25). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that if neither of the SOD commanders were able to contact anyone from USBP command staff and if they were unable to identify or locate an ICP, the SOD commanders would have figured it out on their own and improvised in the situation. DPAIC perceived this was likely the case, given there was a lack of clear guidance at the scene (timestamp 1:41:10).

According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) set up triage rooms and pre-staged life-saving equipment while SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) coordinated tactical considerations with other agencies, such as TXDPS. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know, however, if there was any coordination with the Uvalde Independent School District Police. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) surmised that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not go out on his own and made decisions without coordinating with the other agencies on site. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the other agencies were looking to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to resolve the situation (timestamp 1:42:50). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he was not given any orders instructing the SOD commanders to take control of the scene (timestamp 1:43:30).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained SOD responded to Robb Elementary school in a support role to local law enforcement. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained, "Understand that any response like this is a support role. We're almost always going to be in a support role per somebody else's request" (timestamp 1:17:30). SOD would not deploy without being requested to do so by another agency. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that Uvalde station (UVA) responded to a support call from an unknown agency, UVA then contacted the BIC requesting assistance from SOD, an unknown person from the BIC contacted DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently made the decision to deploy the SOD personnel (timestamp 1:20:00).

When asked about authorities, policies, and standard operating procedures (SOP) related to USBP and/or the SOD responding to situations such as what took place at Robb Elementary School, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated USBP's response to such situations was strictly support at the request of other law enforcement agencies (timestamp 2:17:15). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that USBP responds to approximately 95 percent of the 9-1-1 calls in the Comstock area at the request of the Valverde County Sheriff. Additionally, Comstock USBP station has a verbal agreement with the Valverde County Sheriff which stipulates that USBP would be the primary initial response in an active shooter situation. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) however, did not think an actual memorandum of



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understanding exists detailing the specific procedures or roles and responsibilities associated with this commitment (timestamp 2:22:00).

At no time during his involvement with the situation did DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ever know of any one person or entity that was in command or control at Robb Elementary School. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the date of the incident, at the scene, it was not clearly defined who was in charge (timestamp 1:46:30).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that during the incident, the radio communications were disrupted by an individual who had inadvertently depressed the transmit button on their radio for an extended period (one to three minutes) making it difficult for others to communicate on the channel. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the situation was resolved by making a phone call directly to the SOD commanders informing them someone had an open mic and for all SOD personnel to check their individual radio (timestamp 1:27:30).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) listed the other outstanding radio communications which stood out in his mind: when SOD made entry, when he learned one agent had been shot, and when he heard there were dead children, and children who needed help. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unsure as to the sequence of what he heard but also recalled he heard that the threat had been eliminated and children were being treated. Additionally, there was information of a follow-on threat at another school (timestamp 1:29:30).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of any communication on the radio related to shots fired within the school at approximately 12:21 PM (timestamp 0:1:34:30). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated he did not know it was an active shooter situation until after SOD had made entry. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered having a discussion with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) related to unconfirmed information that the shooter may have taken his own life (timestamp 1:36:00). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear any information on the radio related to keys or the status of gaining access to the classroom (timestamp 2:32:00).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, following the events at Robb Elementary School, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with the SOD team at the Uvalde BP Station, except for the few personnel he had sent to the hospital to provide assistance at the hospital's request. Following the debrief, the BPAs who made entry completed interviews with the TXDPS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPAs were not compelled to submit to the interviews, but they were not discouraged from participating (timestamp 1:54:00).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he assisted in providing information for the USBP Evolving Situation Report (ESR) and Significant Incident Report (SIR) (timestamp 2:04:15).

The following day, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had their own debrief to discuss the events from the incident. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) detailed some of the key points discussed during his debrief with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 2:05:30). According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they identified that communication was poor and questioned the value of the radio patch with other responding agencies. DPAIC



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they also talked about the chaos on scene and failure to use the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage the response.

In the days following the incident, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked to coordinate with DRT to contact a specific clinician, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide professional mental health support for the SOD team. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had previously worked with the SOD related to a tragedy the year before and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the best person to assist the team related to the incident at Robb Elementary School. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to ensure the team received support from a clinician with a trauma background (timestamp 2:00:24).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was informed of the shooting at Robb Elementary School by his direct supervisor, Executive Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who told him that if he wanted to go, he could. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based on experience, when a direct supervisor makes a statement like that, it is an order. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was on duty, in uniform, and responded in his unmarked government owned vehicle (GOV). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not direct anyone to respond to Robb Elementary School. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on the way to Uvalde, he called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) (timestamp 11:01:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he grabbed his friend and subordinate BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) boarded an unmarked GOV equipped with emergency equipment, and began driving to Uvalde (timestamp 10:22:37).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the drive from DRT to Uvalde, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were attempting to gather information via service radio, but due to communications issues, they were only picking up partial information. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was concentrating on driving while BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was manning the radio and emergency equipment. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the drive, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received information from an unknown agent on scene that the shooter had been stopped; however, there were mass casualties. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while driving, he ignored all calls to his government phone and instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to handle all communications (timestamp 10:31:30).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was able to get in behind a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) state trooper vehicle running with lights and sirens and followed it for the approximately 80 to 90 miles to Uvalde. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived in Uvalde, there were already other law enforcement officers (LEOs) on scene. When he arrived on scene, the shooting was over (timestamp 10:23:00).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arriving on scene, he parked his GOV approximately four blocks from Robb Elementary School and proceeded to the school on foot. As he was walking to the school, he walked past the shooter's vehicle that had crashed in the ditch. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the school was roped off with police tape and the area had a "sad feeling at the time." ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had been informed by others at the school there were fatalities inside the school and that it "didn't look good." By the time he arrived, the shooting had concluded, and he was there in a support role (timestamp 10:24:32).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arriving at Robb Elementary School, it was his perception that nobody was in charge. He attempted to find the incident commander with no luck. Everyone on scene looked like they were attempting to help in some way, but there were no directions being given. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw and spoke with Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Brackettville Station. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him that USBP was being instructed to stand by and that they may be needed at another location. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed there was a command post set up at the funeral home across the street from Robb Elementary School, but he did not go there. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated most of the radio traffic he heard were BPAs relaying their positions and asking if assistance was needed (timestamp 10:33:31).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they entered the school property near the student drop off/pick up driveway along Geraldine Street.

During the interview, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized maps provided by CBP OPR interviewers and marked and initialed the only two locations at Robb Elementary School where he and BPA



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went. Location one was the student drop off/pick up driveway along Geraldine Street and location two was the outdoor walkway near classrooms #6 and #12 (Attachment 2).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had received information that the shooter's girlfriend had threatened to shoot up another school, so he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to the local middle and Catholic schools to provide security (timestamp 10:25:42).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to the middle school to provide security. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was at the middle school for approximately one hour. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had no interaction with the public at the middle school (timestamp 10:47:39). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while it was chaotic at the middle school, nothing of note happened (timestamp 10:25:42).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at the middle school, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were asked by unknown local law enforcement personnel to assist in reuniting school kids with their parents at Robb Elementary School. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall which local law enforcement agency asked for assistance but noted that by the time he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived to assist, there were already numerous BPAs and TXDPS troopers assisting so he just observed (timestamp 10:36:02).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an unidentified law enforcement personnel had also mentioned that assistance was needed at a local Catholic school. When he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the Catholic school, there were already several other LEOs there and only two students left (timestamp 10:28:10).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that when he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the Catholic school, he ran into (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were assigned to UVA. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was only at the Catholic school for approximately 20 to 30 minutes. He and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then traveled to UVA (timestamp 10:49:25).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at UVA, the DRT chief and deputy chief were already there. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he noticed there was a big pile of USBP uniforms at the station brought by BPAs for agents involved at the school who may have soiled their uniforms. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he felt he did not play a big part in the response that day. He said he wished he could have contributed more. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was "really nothing more anyone could do at that point." ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 6 p.m., he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began driving back to DRT (timestamp 10:29:30).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at UVA, he observed Deputy Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) talking on the phone to an unknown person. He believed he observed a BPA taking a list of names of BPAs at the station. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was at UVA for approximately one to two hours before returning to Del Rio (timestamp 10:51:15).



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ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in the days following the incident at Robb Elementary School, he heard that a BPA stationed at USBP Brackettville Station had lost a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during the incident (timestamp 10:55:50).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was his perception, based on the information he had at the time of the incident and what he learned the following days, that local police were in charge of the scene at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 10:56:38).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he responded to Robb Elementary School as a public servant. He felt it was his duty, especially as a BPA, to help where he could. The whole time he was travelling to Uvalde, he was thinking about where and how he could help during the incident. He was not thinking about his authority. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated if a threat arose, BPAs were trained to react. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has not participated in CBP active shooter training. He said he was unaware of any specific authority that mandated BPAs to respond to incidents like the one at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 10:59:15).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that throughout the entirety of the day's events, he could not identify who was in charge. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was later told that the local LEOs were in charge of the incident. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while on scene at the various locations to which he responded, there was no BPA that he would consider to be in command (timestamp 11:06:17).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at no time did he hear gunfire. He never attempted to enter the school, nor did he observe any BPAs attempting to enter the school. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not wearing a body worn camera. He did not send or receive any text messages or emails related to the event. He said he did not write any reports or memoranda related to the incident (timestamp 11:07:35).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based on his training and experience, establishing an incident command post and a designated incident commander sooner, may have mitigated the outcome of the incident. He said there were so many people on scene, no one knew what to do. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he attempted to seek out the incident commander to offer assistance; however, he was unable to locate one. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed numerous people standing around in a state of shock. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was his impression that BPAs were on scene only to assist local LEOs (timestamp 11:16:27).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning her involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, she was in her office when she learned there was an active shooter in Uvalde (timestamp 13:33:57). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that no one seemed to have a clear understanding of what had happened. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, called and informed her that peer support was needed at Robb Elementary School. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to deploy to Uvalde in a peer support role with very little details concerning the situation. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then informed her supervisor, Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, she was responding to Uvalde (timestamp 14:20:25). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she asked a few Border Patrol agents (BPAs) if they wanted to go with her, however, none were available to respond. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while en route to Uvalde, she spoke with someone on the phone, possibly SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and was instructed to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) rather than to Robb Elementary School.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arriving at UVA, everyone appeared to be in “chaos mode” (timestamp 13:35:58). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled speaking with Acting Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who asked her to pick up food for everyone. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that before she left, BPAs involved in the incident at Robb Elementary School began arriving at UVA, and her responsibility shifted to providing clean uniforms and collecting the blood-stained uniforms for evidence (timestamp 13:36:20).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described seeing a BPA with a blood-stained uniform who appeared to be in shock. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall his name, but stated he was crying and very emotional. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she and others comforted the BPA and provided him with a clean uniform and emotional support (timestamp 13:36:36).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when she left to pick up pizza for everyone, she wanted to stop by Robb Elementary School to check on other BPAs still on scene. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she spoke with Watch Commander (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who told her not to go to the school as he already had other BPAs on scene (13:38:00).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when she returned with the pizza, she observed USBP Special Operations Detachment (SOD) agents being interviewed by another law enforcement agency. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know which agency was conducting the interviews, but recalled being told it may have been the Uvalde County Sheriff’s Office. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that at approximately 10:00 p.m., she and another BPA drove an SOD agent to his home in San Antonio due to his emotional state.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that due to the emotional impact of the situation for all involved, she did not notice or take note of any of the names of the BPAs she assisted. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed UVA at approximately 11:00 p.m. and returned to DRT to pick up her personal vehicle. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she arrived back at her home at around midnight.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained she did not know who was in charge at Robb Elementary School, but recalled hearing that SOD was in charge or had taken over at the school. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that she thought Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, oversaw the BPAs at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 14:29:15).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP’s role in the incident at Robb Elementary School was to provide back up for local law enforcement (timestamp 14:32:35). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what authority USBP had to respond to an active shooter incident, but she stated BPAs had a duty to respond to such an incident (timestamp 14:36:35).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any text messages or emails concerning the USBP response to Robb Elementary School shooting nor did she produce any reports concerning the incident.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 100**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, (SSA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, interviewed United States Border Patrol (USBP) Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Carrizo Springs, Texas, concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. Prior to the interview, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with an Administrative Warning Acknowledgement for Non-Bargaining Unit Employees, which he signed acknowledging he understood his obligations (Attachment 1). The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness and the Authentication Code is (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 2).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to USBP, Carrizo Springs, Texas, and assigned to the swing shift. (b) (7)(E) WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the following information.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at home before his shift reading emails on his work phone regarding the incident at Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was under the belief there was an active shooter at the school from reading the emails (timestamp 00:13:40). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the Carrizo Springs station shortly before his shift started and was told by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Carrizo Springs, TX, to send four agents from his shift to assist with traffic control at the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 00:28:40). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initially believed it was PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Station, who directed him to send agents to Uvalde, however it wasn't until later in the interview he recalled it was PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who directed him.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed Border Patrol Agents (BPA) to respond to Uvalde and contact the incident commander. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the agents as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told by one of the agents that they found Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Carrizo Springs, TX, and he advised the agents to respond to the Uvalde Civic Center (timestamp 00:18:05).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not directed to respond to Uvalde, rather, he went on his own in support of the agents he sent to Uvalde. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled via HWY 83 to Uvalde from Carrizo Springs in his assigned unmarked USBP vehicle. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not activate the emergency equipment while en route to Uvalde (timestamp 00:29:30). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initially went to the incident command post at Robb Elementary School and did not speak with anyone there and departed for the Civic Center. When he arrived at the Civic Center, he did not meet with anyone from another agency nor was he given any guidance or direction from anyone (timestamp 00:31:20). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see other agencies already had control of the situation and could see other agencies escorting what appeared to be parents of children attending Robb Elementary School to rooms in the civic center where apparently, they were being given information.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed his role at the Civic Center was to provide security and crowd control as needed. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide any direction to any BPAs at the Civic Center nor was any BPA in charge of the operations at the Civic Center. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in charge at the Civic Center nor did he see anyone giving directions to the officers there.

At some point while he was in Uvalde, he and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the Uvalde Station to see if they needed any assistance and remained there for approximately an hour and a half and then returned to the Civic Center (timestamp 00:34:15).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had the understanding at the time that the Border Patrol's authority or role during this incident was to support the local law enforcement agencies by providing security (timestamp 00:35:10).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the agents from his shift stayed at the Civic Center for a few hours and once he determined their support was no longer needed, they departed. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see any of his agents engage with members of the public while there nor did he personally have any contact with the public (timestamp 00:32:40).



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During the interview WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:20:35). These maps are labeled 1-5, respectively (Attachment 3). On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from Carrizo Springs, Texas, Highway 83 into Uvalde.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Warning and Assurances to Employee Required to Provide Information.
2	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 101**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the DRT Strategic Communications Branch (STRATCOM). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School from Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and informed him there was a shooting incident in Uvalde, TX area and that perhaps it was an active shooter situation (timestamp 00:06:23). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to deploy STRATCOM personnel to Uvalde. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) along with Public Affairs Specialist (PAS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT STRATCOM, traveled together in an unmarked government owned vehicle and did not activate the lights and sirens. While en route, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT STRATCOM, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT STRATCOM, who were in Eagle Pass, Texas, at the time of the incident and ordered them to report to Robb Elementary School.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that by the time he arrived in Uvalde, “the threat was already neutralized” (timestamp 00:09:41). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when they arrived at Robb Elementary School, there were no children or buses and the scene had been cleared (timestamp 00:14:13). While at Robb Elementary School, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tried to collect information about the incident, provided support to USBP personnel, and ensured USBP personnel were not speaking to the media.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while on scene, he learned the incident command post (ICP) was located at the Hillcrest Funeral Home. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the ICP to gather information for USBP leadership. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized and spoke with SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, and received general information regarding the situation. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he did not receive any instructions from anyone when he arrived on scene (timestamp 00:18:10). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he did not know who was in charge (timestamp 00:19:46). However, he explained that since it was a local incident, he assumed local law enforcement were in charge (timestamp 00:20:17).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after exiting the ICP, he met with Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and asked if he needed any support on scene at Robb Elementary School; WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied no further assistance was needed (timestamp 00:21:54). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled hearing a request for USBP to assist at the Uvalde Civic Center, however, he could not remember who made the request (timestamp 00:22:47).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then responded to the Uvalde Civic Center to assist (timestamp 00:23:53). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that when he entered the Uvalde Civic Center, he observed Texas Department of Public Safety personnel, law enforcement officers, and BPAs in the hallways and noticed families being ushered into separate rooms by local law enforcement and school officials (timestamp 00:24:15). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he and his STRATCOM personnel stayed out of the way. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall who was in charge (timestamp 00:25:16).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were tasked with providing security inside the Uvalde Civic Center and stated that neither he nor his STRATCOM personnel had any interactions with the public (timestamp 00:25:45).

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:11:37) (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from Del Rio on Highway 90 into Uvalde and straight to Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled as 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the Uvalde Civic Center and the route he took when he responded from Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:27:15). All other maps were not applicable.



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ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that as federal law enforcement officers, agents had a responsibility to respond to an active shooter situation to save lives (timestamp 00:29:40).

ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> recalled receiving text messages indicating there was a potential active shooter. However, he has since changed government cellphones and did not have access to the text messages (timestamp 00:28:17).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
2	Maps reviewed by ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 102**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y





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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working the USBP Carrizo Springs checkpoint when he received a text message from his mother (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notifying him there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the text messages from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were how he learned of the active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated the time of the text messages was approximately 11:30 a.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he told his co-worker, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, there was an active shooter at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) school (Robb Elementary School), and he had to go (timestamp 00:13:45).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he called the on-duty supervisor, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and advised him there was an active shooter in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he could take his government owned vehicle (GOV) to the active shooter situation in Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed from Watch Commander (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, that he should leave his GOV, pick up his personally owned vehicle (POV), and to go to Uvalde in an off-duty status” (timestamp 00:14:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he left USBP Carrizo Springs Station in his POV. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in addition to his USBP uniform, he was wearing his duty belt that carried his pistol, baton, magazine, handcuffs, and radio (timestamp 00:45:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated the drive time to Robb Elementary School was 50 minutes. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while driving to Uvalde, he tuned his USBP handheld radio to the USBP Uvalde Station frequency and heard, “we just got a call from a kid inside the classroom, she is saying she needs help and there’s multiple victims” (timestamp 00:23:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he did not know who relayed the information on the radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained it was the only radio traffic he remembered hearing and that everything else was a blur (timestamp 00:24:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he drove Highway 83 to Robb Elementary School and parked near the intersection of Highway 83 and Old Carrizo Road. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not inform USBP management that he was at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:31:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated his time of arrival at Robb Elementary School was 12:30 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he started walking towards the school and there was a perimeter set up by law enforcement officers and added that he had not fully processed what was going on, referring to the active shooter situation (timestamp 00:15:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not go to the law enforcement officers at the perimeter because he heard (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) call his name. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was down the street with school administrative staff.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not go onto school grounds and once he found out where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was, he got back into his POV and drove to W. Cargile St. and found (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with a school nurse (timestamp 00:16:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that prior to driving to W. Cargile St, he saw off-duty BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, near the intersection of Old Carrizo Rd and W. Cargile St., who asked him for a ride back to his vehicle and told him he had helped clear classrooms (timestamp 01:05:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a long gun with him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he drove his POV to the intersection of S. Park St. and W. Cargile St., where he was able to find (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and drop off BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at W. Cargile St., he heard school administrative staff talking about rumors of another active shooter at other Uvalde schools. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he heard the rumors of other active shooters, he went to the other Uvalde schools to pick up his other kids.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he left W. Cargile St. with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grade student at Robb Elementary School and traveled to Dalton Elementary School to pick up



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at Robb Elementary School to help with evacuations.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at Dalton Elementary School at approximately 12:50 p.m. and was unable to get (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) due to the school being on lockdown. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after leaving Dalton Elementary School, he traveled to the civic center and arrived at approximately 12:55 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was at the civic center for approximately 45 minutes waiting for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and decided to secure the back door of the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he notified other law enforcement officers in the civic center that he was securing the back door (timestamp 00:30:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he met (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the civic center after she was evacuated there with her class.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after meeting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the civic center, he, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to Morales Jr. High School to try and pick up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but was unable to do so due to the school being on lockdown. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated their time of arrival at Morales Jr. High School to be between 1:45 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after leaving Morales Jr. High School, he traveled to Dalton Elementary School and was able to pick up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that after picking up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Dalton Elementary School, they departed from the school at approximately 2:15 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after picking up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Dalton Elementary School, he traveled back to Morales Jr. High School and was able to pick up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he left Morales Jr. High School at 3:30 p.m. and traveled back to the civic center to drop off (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist with students. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after dropping (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) off at the civic center, he and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to their home (timestamp 00:42:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he believed he would not have the authority to leave and go to Robb Elementary School based on the limited information he received from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he never was given permission by USBP management to go to Uvalde while on-duty (timestamp 00:43:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not go in and assist at Robb Elementary School because he was off duty, alone with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and there was already an abundance of law enforcement at the school when he arrived (timestamp 00:48:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was in the vicinity of Robb Elementary School, he did not hear any gunshots (timestamp 00:51:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he did take off his USBP uniform at some point and believed it was when he was picking up his two kids at Dalton Elementary School and Morales Jr. High School (timestamp 01:00:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School and was at the school on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) towards the playground when she heard gunshots. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) found cover for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in what he believed would be classrooms 19-23 (timestamp 01:46:30).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School and his mother (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working as a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took shelter in the school office at the time of the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were evacuated by school administration from the school office.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he had taken the Active Shooter Training and it was a “blur” because it had been long ago (timestamp 00:25:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he was not wearing a body worn camera (timestamp 00:35:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any text messages, email threads, or any documentation regarding the incident (timestamp 00:35:45). During the interview, CBP OPR investigators provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde, south of Uvalde, the city of Uvalde, Uvalde schools, and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). The maps were labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde was not applicable. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his route of travel after arriving at Robb Elementary School. The map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot (1) upon arriving to the school followed by the route he took to pick up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and drop off BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the vicinity of the school (2). On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) route with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when they were outside and heard shots fired. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 8. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the classrooms in which he believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) prior to being evacuated.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 103**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned as a SBPA for DRT BORTAC. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was dressed in a camouflage tactical duty uniform and drove an unmarked silver USBP Chevrolet Tahoe. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his team, which included a group of approximately eight or nine BORTAC agents, were working in the field near Eagle Pass, Texas, on May 24, 2022. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the roads were muddy due to rain. As a result, three USBP vehicles got stuck on May 24, 2022, when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his team responded and apprehended a group of nine or ten migrants. At that time, a nearby camera alerted and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to respond to the camera alert.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he was tending to the stuck vehicles and the migrant apprehension, he became aware there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:16:03). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he received texts on his personal cellular phone possibly from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, about the active shooter incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, however, he no longer had the texts.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard about the active shooter at Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to gather their gear and to respond to the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he estimated it would take approximately an hour to get to Robb Elementary School from where he was located.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he stayed behind with a BPA and his canine to coordinate the movement and transfer of the migrants. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he transported and transferred custody of the migrants, he dropped off the BPA and his canine at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) where his vehicle was parked. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) travelled via Highway 181 to Uvalde while he listened to radio broadcasts (timestamp 00:19:24).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that initially the information relayed to him was that there was an active shooter. However, while enroute to Robb Elementary School, he received or heard information the incident had turned into a barricaded subject situation. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opined one really cannot determine whether it was an active shooter or a barricaded subject situation if one was not present as the incident unfolded (timestamp 00:27:42).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the difference between a barricaded subject and an active shooter. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in an active shooter situation, the threat actively fires a weapon. A barricaded subject, however, could mean the subject fired shots and then barricaded himself. The barricaded subject typically waits or does not come out unless forced to come out (timestamp 00:28:54).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his initial thought when he heard about the active shooter was that the incident would be quickly resolved, but he felt it was necessary to respond because USBP had been called to assist (timestamp 00:30:13).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated no one specifically directed him to respond to the shooting at Robb Elementary School, but it was his understanding that it was implied. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated it took him about an hour to get to Robb Elementary School from his location in Eagle Pass and estimated he arrived fifteen or twenty minutes after the incident had ended (timestamp 00:19:36). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had to park several blocks away because there were a lot of law enforcement vehicles. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he noticed a heavy presence from the Texas Department of Public Safety. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he approached the funeral home, he could see the chaos, children were crying, parents were crying, and it did not seem there was any command and control in place (timestamp 00:20:21). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the funeral home appeared to be a consolidation point for reunification.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he called someone from his group, but could not recall who, and was told the incident was over and to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) (timestamp 00:20:30). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he arrived at UVA at approximately 2:20 p.m. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that upon arriving, he saw his BORTAC team exiting UVA. The team told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they had been assigned to go to Uvalde High School to provide perimeter security because information had circulated the shooter's girlfriend was going to shoot another school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed UVA and caravanned with members of his BORTAC team to Uvalde High School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he could not recall the name of who directed BORTAC to Uvalde High School to provide perimeter security. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that upon arriving at Uvalde High School, he spoke with the principal who asked him to help maintain perimeter security of the school because it was on lockdown. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while he served as perimeter security, he encountered two or three parents who were visibly upset and frustrated with the manner in how the school implemented the release of one student at a time (timestamp 00:48:50). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he interacted with possibly hundreds of parents at Uvalde High School conveying the principal's instructions that each student would be released one by one. Most of the parents appeared to be appreciative of how the coordination was handled. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not render aid or use force against any member of the public. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he remained at Uvalde High School until the last student was picked up and departed between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after departing Uvalde High School, he went to UVA. BORTAC had a short debrief because it was apparent that everyone was distraught. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained it was evident the situation was weighing heavy on his team especially for the ones who were directly involved. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed how tough it was to see the emotional breakdown of everyone involved and could only imagine how the BPAs who rendered aid must have felt (timestamp 00:55:20).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from his perspective, USBP's role at the incident was to assist. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that it was common for local law enforcement agencies in small towns like Uvalde to ask USBP for assistance because small towns had limited resources. As law enforcement officers, BPAs were trained to respond and the mere fact the incident occurred at a school warranted a response from law enforcement. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no question on his part whether USBP should have responded (timestamp 00:43:24).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drafted and completed the CBP Enforcement Action Statistical Analysis and Reporting report on behalf of the BPAs involved in the incident at Robb Elementary School because the BPAs were given three days of administrative time off (timestamp 01:17:38).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated where he was when he first became aware of the unfolding incident. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the route he traveled from Hwy 181 to





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Uvalde. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, SBPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> indicated it was not applicable. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, SBPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> indicated he provided perimeter security at Uvalde High School. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, SBPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> indicated where he stopped as he approached Robb Elementary School.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 104**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Investigative Analyst (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was teleworking at his residence in Uvalde, Texas. Shortly after 11:00 a.m., ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a phone call from Special Agent (SA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, who advised that Border Patrol Agents (BPA) were enroute to a Uvalde school to respond to reports of a man with a firearm (timestamp 00:20:10). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any additional details to provide ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again called ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advising he had not received any additional information, but U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) was responding. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then called Uvalde County Sheriff Ruben Nolasco who advised there was a barricaded subject at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that Sheriff Nolasco did not mention that any shots were fired (timestamp 00:21:30). During a third telephone call after approximately 11:30 a.m., SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) was responding to the incident at Robb Elementary School.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then dressed in his tan pants and black CBP polo shirt, gathered his handgun, rifle, and ballistic armor and went to Robb Elementary School. When ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived near the school the streets were blocked with law enforcement vehicles, so he parked at a distance and walked towards the school. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed an ambulance could not drive near the school, he then instructed drivers to move out of the way to allow an ambulance to pass. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that he spent 5 to 10 minutes working to get vehicles moved to allow the ambulance to pass (timestamp 00:22:50). ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that he arrived at Robb Elementary School 15 to 20 minutes before the classroom was breached and the shooter was shot.

As he approached Robb Elementary School, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the school entrance on the west side of the building. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with Sheriff Nolasco who again advised it was a barricaded subject (timestamp 00:23:55). ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also spoke with USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who advised BORTAC was determining how to make entry into the classroom with the barricaded subject (timestamp 00:24:06).

As ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was outside the west entrance, he noticed there were so many people inside the he could not enter the school. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), San Antonio, Texas. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who advised he did not know anything. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then saw Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) bring a stretcher towards the school and someone said there were multiple victims inside a room. After hearing that there were multiple victims in the building, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized there had been a shooting inside the school (timestamp 00:25:19). Within approximately one minutes or less, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard shots fired inside the school and realized the classroom was breached.

Immediately following the classroom breach, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the west entrance of the school and saw the first children being removed from the school (timestamp 01:19:42). ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a child removed from the school and placed on a stretcher, as well as a wounded teacher escorted from the school who was subsequently administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he was unable to enter the school because the entrance and hallway were full of people and even if he wanted to, he could not pass through the hallway.

Following the breach, a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS), Criminal Investigation Division (CID), SA said the shooter escaped. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the name of the DPS CID SA who said the shooter escaped, but he was operating the TXDPS drone. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and others then began to form a perimeter around the school. A few minutes later, someone announced the shooter was down.

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not enter the school and along with FBI SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to locate the Incident Command Post (ICP). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived a few minutes later followed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not specifically remember but said Group Supervisor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, might have also responded to the funeral home near Robb Elementary School where the ICP was established.



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Subsequently, information was received concerning another threat on social media and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent OPR SAs to other Uvalde area schools to assist with security and evacuations. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed OPR SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were sent to Uvalde schools. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued working at the ICP, providing updates to OPR Headquarters, and coordinating activity and information dissemination.

On May 24, 2022, while at Robb Elementary School, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware that 9-1-1 calls were being made from inside the school. However, while subsequently working at the ICP on May 24, 2022, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of the 9-1-1 calls made from inside Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:17:28).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he later learned that Lieutenant Mariano Pargas, Uvalde Police Department, who was the acting Chief of Police on May 24, 2022, attempted to establish an ICP at the funeral home near Robb Elementary School. However, other agencies did not arrive at the funeral home ICP but instead responded to the school, so it was abandoned (timestamp 00:31:20).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the funeral home ICP until TXDPS brought a trailer and the ICP was moved to the trailer approximately one block from the funeral home. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the ICP until the early morning of May 25, 2022, and returned to the ICP at approximately 5:00 a.m., on May 25, 2022. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued working at the ICP for the next weeks gathering information and assisting the Texas Rangers and other law enforcement agencies.

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in charge of the incident response at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:10:30). ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe orders being given to responding law enforcement at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:10:35). ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide orders or guidance to any responding law enforcement officer except to CBP OPR SAs (timestamp 01:10:41)

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not speak with Chief Pete Arredondo, Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD), while at Robb Elementary School, but spoke with Arredondo at the ICP. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that Chief Arredondo came into the ICP acting as though he was in charge and providing direction and instruction to others (timestamp 01:11:20).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not overhear any conversations that Acting Chief Pargas had with others at Robb Elementary School. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed acting Chief Pargas pacing while at the school (timestamp 01:13:48).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not specifically remember speaking with SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, but said he might have spoken with SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he was near the west entrance to the school (timestamp 01:14:38). ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember speaking on the phone with SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on May 24, 2022.



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When asked about communication barriers at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he did not have a radio and relied on personal relationships to obtain updates. Additionally, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned that radio communications were not working to allow communications from outside to inside the school or from inside to outside of the school. Additionally, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the information concerning the initial shots fired inside the school was not relayed to law enforcement who subsequently responded to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:20:50). Additionally, a CBP helicopter was circling over the school, and the noise made communications difficult even with someone a few feet away.

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that responding law enforcement at Robb Elementary School only knew there was a barricaded subject and the information concerning shots fired inside the school was not relayed to law enforcement who subsequently responded to Robb Elementary School. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first understood shots were fired inside the school shortly before the classroom breach when he learned there were wounded children in the school (timestamp 01:23:29).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the overall scene at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022, as chaotic. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he saw Acting Chief Pargas pacing at the school, and he appeared lost. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not understand why if Acting Chief Pargas was aware shots had been fired inside the school that the information was not relayed to responding law enforcement (Timestamp 01:24:48).

Following the classroom breach, while ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was walking to the north side of the school, he encountered three law enforcement officers, including a young UPD detective, at the east entrance to the school. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told by the UPD detective that another officer had engaged in gunfire with the shooter (timestamp 01:39:40).

On May 24, 2022, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw Texas Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walking out of the school and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was possibly on the phone when ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw him. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not speak with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 02:22:20).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that on May 24, 2022, while outside the school he believed the ambulances and EMTs were present because law enforcement might engage in gunfire with the barricaded subject (timestamp 02:28:40).

On May 24, 2022, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any interactions with the public or render aid to anyone. Additionally, on May 24, 2022, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not exercise authority impacting anyone's movement except for his efforts to have law enforcement vehicles moved so the ambulance could approach the school (timestamp 1:25:55).

When asked about the Robb Elementary School surveillance camera system and the associated digital video recorder (DVR), ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he understood TXDPS, and the Texas Rangers recovered the DVR and took the DVR to the FBI for an examination. ASAC



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to remember who from the FBI examined the DVR but believed his first name was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he is assigned to San Antonio.

The TXDPS, Texas Rangers, and the FBI decided the video from the DVR would be retrieved and the DVR would be wiped to prevent its release to the public. The DVR was wiped to prevent the video from being released to the public because the DVR was connected to a networked system and if the DVR was again connected to the networked system the video could be accessed by others with system access. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know why the decision was made to wipe the DVR instead of simply not reconnecting the DVR to the networked surveillance camera system. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said OPR was not part of the decision on how to handle the DVR or involved in the decision to wipe the DVR (timestamp 01:26:25).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know when the DVR was secured or wiped, but explained that on May 25, 2022, he and former Del Rio Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, viewed some of the video from the DVR inside an FBI van (timestamp 01:28:46). The FBI later unsuccessfully attempted to retrieve video which was wiped from the DVR.

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the USBP authority to respond to the Robb Elementary School shooting would be to assist other law enforcement agencies (timestamp 01:31:40). ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was aware that when the UCISDPD hosted active shooter training, both the USBP and Uvalde Police Department participated in the training (timestamp 01:32:25).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that OPR's authority and responsibility to respond to the school shooting was to assist other law enforcement agencies. Additionally, since BORTAC responded, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) viewed it as a critical incident and believed he need to respond to handle the OPR review of the incident (timestamp 01:34:00).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio Sector (DRT). ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember providing any instruction to ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the ICP. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as shown a photo of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 2). ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from the photo and said he had seen ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) before. ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not specifically remember but said he might have provided information to ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the IPC related to sending agents to other Uvalde schools to provide security because of the social media threat (timestamp 02:39:08).

During the interview ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed maps labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas; 2. South of Uvalde, Texas; 3. Uvalde, Texas; 4. Uvalde, Texas Schools; 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; 5.a Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, Texas; 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; 8. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas (Exhibit 3).

ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the maps labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas; 2. South of Uvalde, Texas; and 3. Uvalde, TX, were not applicable. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde Texas Schools, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he went to Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022, at approximately 11:50



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a.m., and that he did not go to any other Uvalde schools, the Uvalde Civic Center or hospital. On the map labeled 5, Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated where he parked his vehicle, encountered the ambulance while approaching the school, and the route he walked towards Robb Elementary School. Additionally on Map 5, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated where he walked following the breach of the classroom attempting to locate the ICP and the route he walked to the ICP at the funeral home near Robb Elementary School.

On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated Map 5 should be reviewed for additional details. On the map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, TX, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that on May 24, 2022, he did not respond to the Uvalde Civic Center. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated his route of travel from his residence to Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 8. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the route he walked near Robb Elementary School attempting to locate the ICP (timestamp 00:39:55).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Photograph of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to DRT where he oversees the Training and Traumatic Incident Branch which includes all agent support services (Peer Support, Employee Assistance Program, Chaplains, and Canine Support). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also served as the Acting Deputy Division Chief for the DRT Mission Readiness Operations Division (MROD) (timestamp 00:15:00).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at approximately 11:00 a.m., he was having lunch with DRT's Division Chief (DC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MROD, DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Deputy DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when he initially learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:16:28). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initially learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School from either a text message or a call he received. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall how the notification was received (timestamp 00:41:13), or if he directly received it or if it was received by DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:17:17). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately left the establishment where they were getting lunch and returned to the office.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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Upon arriving at the office, they reported to the DRT Border Intelligence Center where Executive Officer (EO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Acting DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began to evaluate the situation and the information being received from the field. By this time, Border Patrol agents (BPAs) from USBP stations in Uvalde, Del Rio, Brackettville, and surrounding stations were already being deployed to Robb Elementary School. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said his role was to provide the resources necessary to support the responding BPAs by overseeing the agent support services (timestamp 00:18:00). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) coordinated the deployment of Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Brackettville Station, (timestamp 00:47:18), along with a medical supply trailer. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tasked Acting ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Station, with activating all Peer Support and Chaplain personnel to respond to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the DRT Peer Support Coordinator who responded to Uvalde and maintained accountability for all Peer Support members who deployed. In addition, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) coordinated with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector, to send out a message through the Emergency Notification System (ENS) to alert personnel of the emergency and for individuals to be able to reply to let them know their status (timestamp 00:27:44).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested through USBP Headquarters (HQ) for additional clinicians and agent services to respond to Uvalde on a long-term basis. HQ immediately activated a surge team which responded to Uvalde the day following the incident deploying in two-week rotations. Additionally, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested funds to be allocated for the replacement of equipment and uniforms of the BPAs who were hands on at the scene.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, was responsible for supervising field personnel responding to the incident (timestamp 00:23:43), whereas PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was managing USBP personnel at UVA. However, because PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) child was at Robb Elementary School during the shooting, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, took responsibility at the station (timestamp 00:24:09). From DRT, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was tracking all personnel deploying from outer stations, Acting ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was tracking all EMTs, Peer Support, and Chaplains, and EO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was keeping an overall list of all personnel who responded. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the master list was already provided to CBP OPR (timestamp 00:46:55).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not respond to Uvalde; his efforts were all coordinated from DRT. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) intended to immediately identify the support and resources needed. He said information was being deconflicted to identify the points of contact and where to send resources (timestamp 00:50:17). At DRT, the lead person in charge was DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:51:30). Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, responded to Uvalde with ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Comstock Station, (timestamp 00:53:00). DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went straight to Robb Elementary School. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived post-breach (timestamp 00:54:28). Prior to the arrival of DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in charge of the support functions at UVA (timestamp 00:55:17).



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ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing the event characterized as a barricaded subject at Robb Elementary School, or potentially an active shooter. However, he was not aware who made that determination. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated discussions over CBP's authority to respond to the incident never occurred (timestamp 01:02:03).

On May 25, 2022, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from USBP Del Rio Station was moved to UVA as interim PAIC to cover for PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:36:17).

OPR interviewers provided ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with a break during the interview to verify his agency issued mobile phone for available text messages regarding DRT's response efforts. However, all data before November 2022 had already been replaced by new data on the phone (timestamp 01:42:48). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided an email as evidence of the ENS message which was sent out (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	ENS email.

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was attending an emergency medical technician (EMT) course when BPA EMT instructor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and another unidentified instructor told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was a shooting and that the two instructors were immediately leaving for Uvalde to assist.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that Acting Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Training and Traumatic Incident Management Branch, asked him to report to Robb Elementary School to assist as a certified chaplain. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately entered his unmarked government owned vehicle, a Chevrolet Tahoe, and drove with his emergency equipment activated along Highway 90 to Uvalde. While driving, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message or phone call on his personal cell phone directing him to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) instead of Robb Elementary School.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, an unknown Chaplain, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Peer Support, and he were told to provide support wherever possible. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spent the rest of the day offering his support and assistance to the BPAs returning from Robb Elementary School to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended a briefing provided by Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, at UVA where he spoke to all BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) introduced himself to all the BPAs in attendance and offered them his support. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, as he walked into the station and gave him a long hug, as he could tell that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was emotional and observed his uniform was covered in blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered support to another USBP Tactical Unit member, whom BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he assisted with distributing clean uniforms to the BPAs returning to UVA covered in blood. He was not aware of what happened to the bloody uniforms and equipment after they were placed inside garbage bags.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained at UVA late that night but could not recall doing anything specific. He also could not recall the exact time he went home but was one of the last people to leave UVA who were involved with the Robb Elementary School shooting incident response.

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:41:55) (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively. On the map labeled 1, North Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from DRT along Highway 90 into Uvalde and drove directly to UVA.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not aware of his legal authority to respond to the Robb Elementary School incident, or his status as a peace officer in Texas.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began his day at (b) (7)(E) at StratCom. Later that morning, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) StratCom, travelled to Carrizo Springs, TX, in an unmarked government owned white Ford Expedition to film a weekend recap video summarizing apprehensions and other events that occurred the previous week. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated StratCom creates videos throughout DRT for release on social media to highlight USBP's activities. After finishing the video, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to DRT.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	09/18/2023
Approved by:		Date:	

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While enroute to DRT, a supervisor contacted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on his personal cell phone and informed him there was a possible shooting in Uvalde. The supervisor said there was not many details and instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to head to Uvalde (timestamp 00:15:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not remember which supervisor contacted him but identified his two supervisors as Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) StratCom and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) StratCom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were close to Eagle Pass, TX, when they received the call.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated as they travelled to Uvalde, he received information about the shooting on social media. It took approximately forty-five minutes for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to arrive in Uvalde.

When they arrived at Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked to the school and encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), Del Rio, and another unknown BPA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what was going on and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied the threat was stopped and there were enough people inside the school to provide support. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed Texas Rangers standing outside the entrance to the school and he never went inside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what occurred at Robb Elementary School until he arrived on scene. Prior to his arrival, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed LEOs were chasing a smuggler who bailed out of their vehicle and ran into the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the command center located at the funeral home across the street from Robb Elementary School to find out how he could help. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard over his radio possible shots fired at the high school (timestamp 00:17:48). Approximately three minutes later, he heard another radio transmission telling everyone shots had not been fired at the high school and to disregard the previous radio transmission.

Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) StratCom, contacted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and stated he was in Uvalde at the Civic Center. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to relocate to the Civic Center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the Civic Center and met with ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Public Affairs Specialist (PAS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Media Relations Division (MRD), Del Rio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back to Robb Elementary School.

After arriving at Robb Elementary School, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went into the command center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), Texas Department of Safety (TXDPS), and the Sheriff's Office around the Robb Elementary School area providing support. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he stood outside the command center waiting for ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who or which agency was running the command center.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the command center and instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to take them back to the Civic Center (timestamp 00:19:54).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he took general pictures while at Robb Elementary School of all the LEOs outside the school and the pictures were uploaded into the StratCom database (timestamp 00:26:41).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the Civic Center in case any statements from USBP were going to be released to the media. After arriving at the Civic Center, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided support by giving breaks to BPAs stationed outside the Civic Center (timestamp 00:29:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that an employee from the school district would go out and escort some parents to the conference rooms inside. DPS guarded the entrances to the conference rooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed parents entering and exiting the Civic Center and described them as being upset, crying, and distressed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see any children or where they were being held at the Civic Center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the School District and DPS were running the Civic Center (timestamp 00:30:12). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised no one told him who instructed USBP to guard the exterior doors. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received his instructions from the BPAs he was relieving. The BPAs told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the school district gave a briefing to the parents earlier explaining the process to pick up their children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised he did not interact with any parents during the time he was at the Civic Center (timestamp 00:32:57).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the Civic Center for approximately sixty to ninety minutes before ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to leave and go back to DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive any debrief at the Civic Center or in DRT.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised he did not know CBP’s legal authority to respond to this type of incident and does not know his peace officer status in Texas (timestamp 00:46:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received CBP active shooter training approximately two years ago.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map the route he took to Uvalde (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not remember the exact times associated with his response to this incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 108**



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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code is (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in his office located at DRT SOD when he was approached by Acting Patrol Agent in Charge ([A]PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Station (DRS), Texas, and was informed an active shooter situation was unfolding at a school in Uvalde. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately went to the conference room and began to write the information being relayed onto a white display board. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled an unknown BPA informed him that Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called the DRT SOD and informed them he was currently on days off but heard there was an ongoing active shooter situation at a school in Uvalde and was responding to the scene. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he made the decision to immediately contact all SOD BPAs on duty and instructed them to report to the Robb Elementary School located in Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began a group text message with the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) supervisors to establish communication for the dissemination of information and for the accountability of all assets being deployed to the shooting.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the deployment of assets to the shooting was more of a gesture due to the time it would take for the assets to arrive at the scene (time stamp 00:24:32). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) figured the shooter would be taken care of quickly but thought the BORSTAR medical assets could potentially be of assistance in the event anyone was shot or injured (time stamp 25:57). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to relay information via text and cell phone to responding BORSTAR and BORTAC BPAs until leaving at approximately 12:37 p.m.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD, and was informed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was enroute to the school and was in contact with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to leave the office and head to the school to offer supervision and assistance. While driving to the school, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from BORSTAR BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRS, informing the school was a very bad site and estimated there to be approximately 20 casualties. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informing BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shot and being taken to the Uvalde hospital for treatment. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go directly to the hospital to ensure BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was receiving all needed assistance and treatment.

Upon arrival to the hospital, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke briefly with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station (CAR). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assisting with administering medical care to incoming patients. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relieved BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD, from assisting BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with filling out medical paperwork for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the USBP Uvalde Station for a debrief with the SOD BPAs returning from the school. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told all SOD BPAs they were free to take a few days of administrative leave and encouraged all to participate in the USBP provided peer support services. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall if SOD BPAs were interviewed by the Texas Department of Public Safety or SAs with the Federal Bureau of Investigation that evening or the prior day. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make the participation with these interviews mandatory and informed BPAs participation was voluntary.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the weeks following the school shooting. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the school there did not appear to be a type of command and control in place and law enforcement seemed to be looking to him to come up with a plan to deal with the shooter (time stamp 1:11:34). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he originally responded to the school to assist with an active shooter situation but was told by unknown law enforcement that the situation was a barricaded subject situation (time stamp 1:12:10).



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DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received information from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he (SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) was told the door to the classroom containing the shooter was locked and would require keys to make entry. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) considered using explosive breachers to open the door but decided to wait for keys. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was told by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he had the green light to make entry into the classroom and eliminate the threat. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have the authority to make the call to eliminate the threat and must have received permission from higher ups within USBP (time stamp 1:35:24). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) eventually was given keys to the classroom door and subsequently used the keys to open the door for entry (time stamp 1:36:45).

After BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and left the hospital, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had conversations with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the time he spent at the hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) per the request of the hospital staff, assisted with crowd control of parents coming to the hospital attempting to see their children. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the hospital staff did not want the family members to view the mutilated bodies of the deceased children and requested BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) prevent the parents from entering the area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described having to physically hold back a female family member (time stamp 1:45:10).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained USBP only responds to requests from other law enforcement agencies as a secondary backup roll to the requesting agency (time stamp 1:54:35).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the text messages between members of SOD from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	SOD text messages.

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 109**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 28, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to USBP, Uvalde Station (UVA), Texas. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to UVA from February of 2022 to December of 2022. At the time of the interview, he was assigned to ERP.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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During the February 28, 2023, interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the following information: He stated on May 24, 2022, he was at UVA performing administrative duties. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was sitting at his desk when a radio transmission occurred on his CBP issued radio asking for all available agents to respond to Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated It took a minute for him to comprehend what was happening, but he looked up from his desk and saw a Border Patrol Agent (BPA) run past his office door. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled he immediately ran to the armory and retrieved his assigned M-4 rifle. When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the armory, he witnessed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, UVA, Texas, handing out equipment to other BPAs who responded to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 08:13:30). He recalled that an unknown BPA asked if there was a failure to yield (FTY) in the Uvalde, TX, area, just prior to the transmission about the active shooter (timestamp 11:16:27).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retrieved the keys to his assigned government vehicle (GOV), donned his ballistic vest, loaded his M-4 rifle, and started his drive to Robb Elementary School. Upon leaving UVA, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Google Maps to locate Robb Elementary School. When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived in the area, the main street in front of the school, Geraldine Street, was blocked. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then traveled to the intersection of Old Carrizo Road and Cargile Street, where he blocked off the intersection of Old Carrizo Road and Cargile Street with his GOV and set up security (timestamp 08:15:02). Shortly after he blocked the intersection, he encountered a Hispanic male filming the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed the individual to move, and after a brief hesitation, the Hispanic male complied and moved to a different location. He also told a young female in a little red car to move, which she did. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated other than the above encounters, he did not have any other encounters with the public (timestamp 09:29:30). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then encountered a person described as a heavy-set male with salt and pepper hair, and mustache who he believed to be a school security guard. The security guard was observed pointing his weapon in the direction of the school cafeteria. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked the security guard what was going on, and he responded that there was a school shooter, and he thought the shooter was in the area near the cafeteria. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that was all the information he knew at that time (timestamp 08:16:59).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated, shortly after arriving on scene, he received information that the incident turned from an active shooter to a hostage situation. He did not recall where he received this information. Upon arrival, he did not know who oversaw the overall incident and several people asked him if he was in charge. He replied to them he wasn't in charge, and he was there to assist. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unaware if anyone was designated in command of all CBP personnel. He could not recall if he directed any BPAs in a supervisory capacity. He was under the impression that the USBP was on scene in a support role (timestamp 09:15:55). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he may have heard the term "hostage" after the incident; however, he did remember receiving information on scene that the shooter was locked in a room or closet and had barricaded himself (timestamp 09:44:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated while providing security, two unknown law enforcement officers (LEOs) arrived dressed in dress shirts wearing ties, ballistic vests, and carrying shotguns. He provided them with the information he knew, and they left on foot shortly thereafter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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assumed the two unknown LEOs were detectives with either the local Sheriff's office or Police department (timestamp 08:42:45).

SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> observed BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> USBP, UVA, Texas conduct crowd control near Old Carrizo Road. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> attempted to contact both Watch Commander (WC),<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> USBP, UVA, Texas and WC<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> USBP, UVA, Texas via their cellphones. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> could not remember which one of WCs answered, however, he learned that WC<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> and WC<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> were together at the time of his call. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> was instructed by either WC<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> or WC<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> to remain at his current location because there were plenty of LEOs at the front of the school and they were trying to figure out what was happening. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he remained at his location and provided cover to that area (timestamp 08:18:25).

SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated school buses started to arrive and staged behind his position for a potential evacuation of the students. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated the buses eventually evacuated numerous students as he and BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> provided cover. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated this is when an unknown member of U.S. Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) arrived and asked for an update. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> provided the BORTAC agent with all the information he had. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated the BORTAC agent was then called to the front of the school (timestamp 08:19:15).

SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he then heard that a breach was going to be attempted and all emergency medical service (EMS) personnel needed to be prepared and staged to provide medical aid. He did not recall how he received this information, or from whom he received the information. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> escorted EMS personnel from his location into the school grounds near the cafeteria building. He then escorted the EMS personnel along the south side of the building, which contained classrooms 13 to 18, and staged near classroom 18. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated from this location, he was able to see the south entrance, near classrooms 102 and 108, and observed several LEOs with their weapons drawn and aimed down the hallway towards classrooms 111 and 112. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he and the EMS personnel held their positions near classroom 18 as to not enter the field of fire from the exterior windows of classrooms 111 and 112 (timestamp 08:21:15).

SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> utilized the provided maps to mark and trace his locations throughout the incident. Please see the attached maps for context and exact locations of SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> movements (Attachment 2).

While staged near classroom 18, SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> observed LEOs as they rushed into the entrance of the south hallway. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> then moved the EMS personnel across the open area to the entrance to the south hallway. When SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> arrived at the entrance to the south hallway, he observed several BPAs exiting the building. He observed BPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> USBP, UVA, Texas exiting the hallway dry heaving and gasping for air, while others seemed to have a "thousand-yard stare" expression on their faces. SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated a different BPA exited the building and SBPA<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> described him as looking like he had the soul sucked out of him



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and he looked like the shell of a man. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when he looked in the hallway, everything looked foggy and dark inside (timestamp 08:23:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he attempted to enter the hallway to provide aide, and before he could enter the hallway, an unknown voice yelled out, “if you’re not EMS, get the fuck out”. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not enter the hallway and stepped away from the door. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could smell iron in the air from all the blood. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated at that point he noticed a little girl on the ground under a tarp that had been removed from one of the classrooms and described it as not a good sight to see (timestamp 08:25:26).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated during a post incident discussion, he learned that the person that yelled out, “if you’re not EMS, get the fuck out,” was a BPA from the USBP, Brackettville Station (BRA), Texas (timestamp 09:27:20).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated after his attempt to enter the south hallway of the building containing classrooms 111 and 112 to provide aide, he observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, International Falls Station (INF), Minnesota, and possibly BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, UVA, Texas performing CPR on a victim (timestamp 09:38:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then obtained accountability of all the BPAs in the area. He observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, UVA, Texas, exit the south hallway covered in blood and carrying the bodies of victims outside. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was asked to make a landing zone for a medivac helicopter to land in a nearby open field; however, after about 20 minutes, the victim that need the medivac was transported to the hospital via ambulance (timestamp 08:26:02).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the south hallway with a victim that appeared to be breathing but going in and out of consciousness. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed this was the victim EMS intended to medivac (timestamp 08:52:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was informed by either WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the incident was now a “post incident” and to gather everyone together at a rally point to get accountability and to debrief. He then retrieved his GOV from where he initially parked, grabbed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and drove near the rally point. At the rally point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BPAs from numerous stations, BORTAC and U.S. Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated several of the BPAs at the rally point had the look of helplessness on their faces. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP, Del Rio Station (DRT), Texas arrived on scene, said a few words, and then instructed all the BPAs to return to the UVA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, UVA, Texas to UVA. On the ride, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to talk to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) several times, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not respond and just stared at the dashboard of the vehicle. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not sure the role BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had in the incident; however, he was covered in blood (timestamp 08:27:30).



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At UVA, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several BPAs from several different stations attempting to assist other BPAs. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, DRT, Texas was in the station near boxes of clean uniforms. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated CPA Owens said a few words to the BPAs, but he could not remember exactly what was stated (timestamp 08:30:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at UVA, he received information that the shooter's girlfriend threatened to attack another school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the information may have come from CPA Owens. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several BPAs leave the station to provide security at local schools due to this threat (timestamp 09:09:21).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was asked by Mission Support Specialist (MSS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, UVA, Texas, to go to the local hospital to deliver the CA-1 paperwork needed for injured BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, BORTAC. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it was a team effort, and no one should be made a hero after such a tragic event. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA and went home shortly thereafter (timestamp 08:31:20).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the radio traffic throughout the entire incident was problematic. He described the radio traffic going digital numerous times, LEOs stepping on each other's transmissions, and misinformation being broadcasted. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated at one point during the incident, someone broadcasted that the shooter may be on the roof. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did hear over the radio that the team was about to breach, and shortly after the transmission, the shooter was down. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was still at his GOV when he heard the broadcast that the shooter was down (timestamp 08:57:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on May 24, 2022, he was on duty, in uniform, driving his assigned GOV. (timestamp 09:13:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, on May 24, 2022, he was not wearing a Body Worn Camera, did not have any text messages or emails, nor did he write any reports or memorandums related to the May 24, 2022, shooting incident (timestamp 09:28:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of a specific authority that required BPAs to respond to an incident like this in an official capacity. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know a BPA that would not respond to an incident like an active shooter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when he heard the radio traffic requesting all agents to respond to Robb Elementary School, he didn't think twice before responding (timestamp 09:21:15).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated at no time on scene did he hear or see any shots being fired (timestamp 09:26:52).



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not personally provide medical aid to any victims (timestamp 09:32:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he last attended the CBP Active Shooter training in 2016 and he is not familiar with the new CBP active shooter policy. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is not familiar with the difference between an active shooter and a barricaded subject in relation to the CBP policy (timestamp 09:46:10).

In hindsight, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt that better communication between the law enforcement agencies, and an establishment of an incident command structure sooner may have mitigated the outcome of this incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further added, frequent and additional training may have also produced a more positive conclusion to this incident (timestamp 09:50:10).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Additional Information Provided by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received an e-mail from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022 shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School (Attachment 1). Attached to the e-mail were the CBP OPR provided interview maps with detailed notes that identified SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) movements. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the maps and determined SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) movements were consistent with statements provided in his audio and video recorded interview, which was documented in a separate report.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also attached a screenshot of his personal telephone records from May 24, 2022, which identified three calls SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made during the shooting to Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Station (UVA), Texas (telephone number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). The calls were made at 12:20 p.m., 1:43 p.m., and 3:08 p.m. He also made four calls after the shooting to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA (telephone number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). The calls were made at 3:15 p.m., 3:38 p.m., 3:59 p.m., and 4:33 p.m. In the March 1, 2023 e-mail, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the calls to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were regarding a CA-1 (Federal Employee’s Notice of Traumatic Injury and Claim for Continuation of Pay/Compensation) and hospital paperwork for Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Email from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated March 1, 2023. (Detailed maps and phone records included).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

<b>Prepared by:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
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<b>Approved by:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 110**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y





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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to UVA and on his way to the USBP Uvalde checkpoint when he heard radio traffic about a vehicle crash which he assumed was related to a “bail out” (timestamp 11:40:40).

[Agent Note: The term “bail out” refers to occupants abandoning a vehicle and fleeing following a police pursuit or vehicle stop].

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he turned around to head back to UVA and then received a call from ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, asking if Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, was “on the ground.” SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was confused about why ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be calling about a bail out. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately called WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and learned there was a shooting at Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were on scene and set up by the funeral home (timestamp 11:53:00).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he drove to UVA, grabbed a bag with magazines and ammunition, and headed to Robb Elementary School. Upon arriving at approximately 12:25 p.m., SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several vehicles parked along the road. To avoid blocking the road for emergency vehicles, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked on South Grove Street and got out on foot (timestamp 11:25:33).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he first encountered Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, near the intersection of South Grove Street and Geraldine Street where the shooter’s vehicle had crashed into the concrete ditch. According to SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had taken it upon himself to secure the crash scene after discovering a rifle and a black bag on the ground outside the passenger side of the shooter’s vehicle (timestamp 12:02:44).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described running on Geraldine Street toward Robb Elementary School and briefly interacting with Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) USBP Search, Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he observed Texas Department of Public Safety officers holding rifles and facing the west side of the school building (timestamp 12:07:25).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled briefly encountering Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, but his attention quickly turned to someone escorting a woman and yelling for a medic. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he turned around to where emergency medical services (EMS) were parked and called for an emergency medical technician (timestamp 12:12:22).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he refocused his attention on a group of children running from the south side of the school building. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a law enforcement officer running alongside the children toward the northwest corner of the school grounds where a female appeared to be waving them toward her location. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he guided other children in the same direction of the woman (timestamp 12:18:42).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he made his way to the south side of the school building, approximately 10 feet from the southeast corner of the building. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described observing a group of law enforcement officers in tactical positions on the east side of the school building (timestamp 12:24:00).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he briefly interacted with Constable Emanuel Zamora, Uvalde County, who informed him law enforcement officers were waiting on keys; later, Constable Zamora informed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and others in the vicinity that the breach was about to happen (timestamp 12:26:00).



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SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing what sounded like a single series of gunshots, and he then entered the building through the south door entrance (timestamp 12:31:08). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described passing other officers standing alongside the hallway as he made his way towards classrooms 111 and 112.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he holstered his pistol after seeing bodies being pulled out of the classrooms. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed an unconscious female child being dragged out and described blood being everywhere. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed two girls crying who appeared to be uninjured and directed them to the triage area (timestamp 11:31:17).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, carrying a teacher to the triage area (timestamp 11:32:05). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as he tried to enter classroom 112 to help pull children out, he observed a pile of bodies along the left wall of classroom 112 and heard someone say that only medics were allowed in the classroom (timestamp 11:32:54).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he made his way back to the south door entrance of the building and was passed by two BPAs bringing out an injured male child. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they handed him their rifles and he followed them outside to EMS.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, called for all USBP personnel to regroup on the north side of the school building to meet with Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT (timestamp 11:34:02).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated CPA Owens directed all personnel not actively engaged at the school to report to UVA. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he began working on logistical matters such as obtaining clean uniforms for agents covered in blood when he received a call about another possible shooter at Uvalde High School (timestamp 11:35:22). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to Uvalde High School and assisted with traffic and perimeter security. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was at the high school for approximately one hour before returning to UVA. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he returned to his home sometime between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that evidence bags with the bloodied uniforms were initially stored in the armory and destroyed later. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the uniforms were taken to the hospital for disposal as hazardous material through the bio-hazard program (timestamp 13:14:24).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not directed by anyone to respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 13:57:05). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he believed Constable Zamora was in charge of the south entrance of the school because Constable Zamora was communicating directly with Chief Pete Arredondo, Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department, inside the school (14:03:05). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he believed Chief Arredondo had overarching command of the incident since he heard Chief Arredondo communicating with the shooter. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled Chief Arredondo say, "We don't want anyone else to get hurt" (timestamp 14:04:04).



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SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the situation was a barricaded subject because Constable Zamora informed him the shooter was barricaded and Chief Arredondo was communicating with the shooter (timestamp 14:05:10).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not believe anyone from USBP was in charge or in command of the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 14:07:21). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he believed USBP's role at the incident was to provide support to local law enforcement agencies (timestamp 14:09:32).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not aware of any legal authority for USBP to respond to an active shooter situation, however, as law enforcement, an agent responds when assistance is needed, and furthermore, law enforcement backs each other up (timestamp 14:11:15).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any text messages or emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did he produce any reports concerning the incident.

CBP OPR interviewers provided a map package to SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on which he labeled his movements and location during the Rob Elementary School shooting incident. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed the notes section in the map package (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 111**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified with Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned as the day shift administrative watch commander at UVA. At approximately 11:30 a.m., (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Agent-Intel (BPA-I), DRT, came on the radio and asked the Operations Center at UVA if anything was going on due to a heavy police response in town. Several minutes later, an unknown agent broadcast on the radio there was a shooter at Robb Elementary School and USBP assistance was being requested by local police for perimeter security and crowd control (Timestamp 00:18:10). With this information, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that shots had been fired at the school.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, began to gather their equipment and decided who was going to stay back at the station. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, at his office, to ensure he could take calls, run the station while others responded, and asked him to contact USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) Border Intelligence Center to make sure the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) was aware and was responding to the incident. Both went to the armory to get long guns. All M-4 rifles and magazines were already issued, so both grabbed 12-gauge shotguns with 00 buckshot rounds. After gathering equipment and a case of water, they got into WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government owned vehicle (GOV) and left to respond to the incident scene. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove the GOV while WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to make phone calls and notifications of the situation.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he attempted to contact Acting (A) Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, since it was known he had been at the school earlier in the morning for an awards ceremony. There was no answer. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then attempted to contact Deputy PAIC (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, since the contact information for the acting executive officer was not known. He did not answer either. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall contacting anyone from DRT. Eventually, at an unknown time, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call back from (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who stated he was in his vehicle driving back to the station when the call on the radio initially came out. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he had responded to the station to gather his body armor and other gear and immediately responded back to the school.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized a map provided by CBP OPR interviewers to explain and trace the route he took from UVA to the school (Attachment 2). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that traffic was gridlocked and the initial direct route from UVA through the middle of town had to be altered, taking a few side streets to eventually arrive on Geraldine Street between High Street and Park Street, two blocks from Robb Elementary School. Due to vehicles on the road, they decided to park the car and walk. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the water in the truck but responded with his equipment to include the shotgun. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained with the vehicle when WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left for the school. To recount his movements of the day, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized map 8.A Robb Elementary School Layout (Attachment 3) and marked several positions by number.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon leaving the vehicle, he responded towards the funeral home on Geraldine Street. He noticed there were lots of people along Geraldine Street. His reason for responding to the funeral home was based on the knowledge he had from the original call indicating shots were fired near the funeral home. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted Uvalde County Sheriff's Office (UCSO), Sheriff Ruben Nolasco (Attachment 3, position #1). Sheriff Nolasco explained the subject had shot his grandmother, wrecked a vehicle near the funeral home, and fired several shots towards the people at the funeral home. He did not mention how the subject got into the school or if anyone was injured. Sheriff Nolasco explained the subject was isolated and contained inside the school. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood the subject was barricaded (Timestamp 00:48:45). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the UCSO was overseeing the scene. (Timestamp 00:51:00)



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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he proceeded towards the west door of the west wing of the school and saw Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UCISO (Attachment 3, position #2). While walking towards the school, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed that USBP and other law enforcement personnel were breaking school windows and evacuating children through the windows. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) planned to speak with Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to see what was needed but ended up speaking to Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department, who asked for assistance with crowd control at the funeral home. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a couple of BPAs in the vicinity and ordered them to go with Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not give any further instructions and did not recall the names of the BPAs.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that communication was very hard at the scene. At some point, the radio frequencies were patched together which created a situation where it was hard to hear who was talking on the radio, which was detrimental to the response. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the command post was established at the funeral home where he initially spoke with Sheriff Nolasco. At an unknown time, information was relayed the command post was relocating to the front of the school (Timestamp 00:55:20). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the new command post was established prior to the breach of the classrooms.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he proceeded to go to the school driveway area on Geraldine Street to assist getting emergency medical services (EMS) and ambulances closer to the west door area. (Attachment 3, position #3). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he noticed a woman, probably a teacher, was escorted by two uniformed officers towards him from the south side of the building (Timestamp 01:31:06). She was injured and had possibly been shot. CBP OPR interviewers showed a screenshot of a person to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 4), but WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not confirm the screenshot was of the person he remembered seeing (Timestamp 02:53:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved to the front of the school near a locked gate on Geraldine Street and attempted to break the lock to facilitate the evacuation of the children in the other classrooms (Attachment 3, position #4). An unknown person mentioned to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the officers inside the school were looking for a key to get in the classroom. Another unidentified person showed up and unlocked the gate on the fence.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Sheriff Nolasco showed up at the gate and explained they were going to attempt to evacuate the children in the classrooms (numbers 1-6) in the farthest north hallway. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved to a position in the breezeway to provide cover and direct the children when they exited (Attachment 3, position #5). After several minutes, the Sheriff Nolasco came back out and stated they were no longer going to evacuate the children and they were going to stay in place (Timestamp 01:03:40). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know where the shooter was specifically located (Timestamp 01:04:10).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he met with (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and proceeded south along the breezeway near the east doorway to the west wing building. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked inside the doorway and saw a lot of people in the hallway and was waved back, which indicated to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was getting closer to where the shooter was located. While in this position, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





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believed he heard “shots fired” over the radio (Timestamp 01:13:00). There was a male Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) trooper at the northwest outside corner of classroom 34. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked the trooper if there were shots fired; the trooper waved his finger back and forth and stated, “No.”

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he moved back towards the north side of the building and noticed individuals showing up with tactical gear but could not identify what agency they were with (Timestamp 01:06:00) (Attachment 3, position 7). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also noticed they were carrying equipment such as a Halligan tool (used for forcible entry), ballistic shields, and a drone. All this equipment was not present at UVA and indicated to him that local and state police were working the situation. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see any BORTAC on scene at this point. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he ran into Assistant Special Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, but said the conversation was quick and he did not remember what was discussed. Additionally, he spoke to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and asked if he wanted to indicate on the Evolving Situation Report (a USBP internal report) that BORTAC was on scene. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, “Yes, put BORTAC on scene.” WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not assume SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in command of the situation at this point, as SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was leaving the area in a hurry.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spent time telling people where others were located and answering a variety of questions. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Sheriff Nolasco did not have a radio and they were going to relocate the command post to the front area of the school. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went towards the area of the new command post but returned a short time later. At this point, (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORTAC was getting ready to breach the classroom (Timestamp 01:18:00). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved closer to the northwest corner of the building, closer to the west doorway. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not sure who he believed was in command at this point in the incident but thought it was whoever was in the new command post at the front of the school. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him TXDPS was also present at the command post.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at 12:47 p.m., a time that stood out to him, he received a phone call from DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). During the call, he heard shots fired from within the school (Timestamp 01:21:00). He hung the phone up and made his way to the west doorway area. He saw an adult female brought out and laid on the ground where EMS started to render aid. He stated she was carried out by USBP and other law enforcement by her limbs. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also saw a juvenile female brought out, carried by unknown personnel. She was placed on a gurney and brought to an ambulance.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly thereafter, a couple of BORTAC members escorted out BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and eventually brought him towards the north side of the building. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw him walking by himself, confused, and noted there was blood on his face. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked over to check on him and told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was shot. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) showed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) where a round had grazed the top of his head. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then realized that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed to go to the hospital. A BORTAC member named (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed to be SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, showed up and started yelling at BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get to a hospital. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back east on Geraldine St. to a



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vehicle to have him transported to the hospital by an unknown agent. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran into SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and explained that a BPA needed to be with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the hospital. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to go to the hospital.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that around the same time, he observed an unknown female civilian placed on the ground by an unknown local police officer. He believed she had made her way through the perimeter and recalled her screaming while being detained on the ground (Timestamp 01:46:19). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not believe any USBP personnel were involved in the detaining of this individual and at no point saw any USBP personnel impacting the public's movements at the scene (Timestamp 01:47:15). Lastly, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that USBP personnel should know USBP did not have any [statutory] authority to respond and anything USBP was doing was at the direction of the local police department.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he gathered water and walked back to the scene where he noticed Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, was on scene under a tree with other USBP personnel at the scene. Chief Owens gave several remarks and asked everyone to return to UVA by (b) (7)(E) (A) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked him to start taking over all incoming calls due to his need to go to the civic center and find his child who was at the school that day. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he departed the scene, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, reached out and asked which department was going to oversee the investigation, which he confirmed with others on scene, was going to be the TXDPS Rangers (Timestamp 01:40:20). Additionally, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked into the allegation that the incident had started as a "load driver" failing to yield to USBP units earlier in the day. The allegation was proven false and had been generated from social media.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on the way back to the station, other threats were reported at other schools because the shooter's girlfriend allegedly said she was going to "come and finish the job" (Timestamp 01:43:40). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to Flores Elementary School to assist but did not remember who directed him to respond.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that USBP did not have statutory authority [to respond to an incident such as the shooting at Robb Elementary School] and was there in a backup capacity. He was not shocked to see BORTAC make entry but explained he was never in the building and did not know the decisions made inside the building. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP had a responsibility to respond and assist, stating it would be "negligent" to not respond, but reiterated there was no statutory authority or responsibility to respond. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at no point did he think the incident was an active shooter incident based on what he observed and was told by the local Sheriff upon arrival on scene (Timestamp 01:51:08). He believed that in the beginning [when he first heard of the incident] it was an active shooter, but not when he was on scene.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated did not have any text messages or emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) produce any reports concerning the incident.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Legend of points indicated on map by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4	Screenshot of injured female escorted from scene.

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR interviewed Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT BORSTAR, Texas., concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. Prior to the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with an Administrative Warning Acknowledgement for Non-bargaining Unit Employees form, which he signed acknowledging he understood his right and obligations (Attachment 1). On February 27, 2023, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with the form titled Your Required Appearance and Sworn Testimony, as well as Weingarten Rights Employee Notification Regarding Union Representation. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness and the Authentication Code is (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 2).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on May 24, 2022, he was on duty and assigned to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at the United States Border Patrol (USBP) Sector in Del Rio, TX. His supervisor, Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him there was an active shooter in Uvalde, TX. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if they were going to respond and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said yes (Timestamp 11:48). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was not ordered to respond to the school, he self-deployed. At approximately 12:00 p.m., he returned to his Government Owned Vehicle (GOV), “kitted up”, and began driving to Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, TX. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added communications from the radio in his GOV were limited so he decided to check his ATAK cellular phone. At this point, he noticed numerous agents were responding to the incident.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was very limited communication on the way to Uvalde, TX, however, as he got closer to Robb Elementary School, he noticed agents began describing the event as a barricaded subject (Timestamp 13:08). As he got closer to Robb Elementary School, he heard communications that the team began to take positions at the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added while he was driving to the school, he remembered hearing SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the radio state they “were going in” (Timestamp 16:12). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated once he arrived near the school, he donned his medical bag, weapon, and helmet and began to make his way to the school. At approximately 1:00 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the school and noticed people were standing around as if nothing was going on which seemed very usual to him.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he noticed his Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Detachment/Del Rio, and asked him where the team would be meeting. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go to the school. Once BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the west entrance of the school, he smelled and saw blood in the hallways as he looked inside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never entered the school, nor did he see anyone being carried out of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he did not provide any medical care for any of the children because they were already taken out of the school (Timestamp 15:22). While outside of the west entrance of the school, he saw his fellow agents were affected by the events and began to help them by providing water and emotional help.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not enter the school because he did not feel he needed to at that point and did not want to contaminate the situation. He added he knew there would be an investigation, was not asked to go inside of the school, and no further medical interventions were needed (Timestamp 20:30). While at the scene, he felt he knew who was in charge because he saw his PAIC, and his supervisor, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) providing guidance to his team (Timestamp 27:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated after he met with his team, he was then directed by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go to the side of the building where everyone was mustering (Timestamp 14:59). He added he and his team were receiving guidance from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) while mustered in front of the school. During the muster, he and his team were ordered to go back to the Uvalde Border Patrol Station to assess the situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated shortly after his arrival, he and his team were informed of a message that the shooter’s girlfriend was going to finish the job. In response to this



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new threat, he and the other agents were told by their leadership to go to schools around Uvalde, TX, to assist. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed to Dalton Elementary School where he was stationed by the back door to ensure no one gained entrance into the school. He also assisted with directing traffic for parents picking up their children. He added no incidents occurred while at that school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has attended an active shooter course. He explained in the presence of an active shooter, you must move towards the threat and eliminate it. He added if you have a barricaded subject, you have time to assess the situation, gather resources, and get a negotiator. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was his belief, from a BORSTAR point of view, that USBP's authority to respond to an active shooter situation is when lives are being threatened, the threat must be stopped as soon as possible. He added BORSTAR provides Emergency Medical Technician and Tactical Casualty Care training to the National Park Service and some local Sheriff's offices. The BORSTAR team also provides triage training. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he still had the government cellular phone he had in his possession during the incident in Uvalde, TX; however, he did not have any of the text messages from the date of the incident.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment C). These maps are labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde marked the location of the EOC and his route to Robb Elementary School. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where he was located at Dalton Elementary School. The map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving to the school followed by where the route he took to the west entrance of Robb Elementary School as well as the muster location in front of the school. The map labeled 5.a. was not applicable. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 8. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route along Geraldine St. and the West entrance of the school.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Administrative Warning Acknowledgement for Non-bargaining Unit Employees.
2	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**EXHIBIT 113**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on-duty at the USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) firearms range located at Spur 405 below the dam in Del Rio, Texas. He believed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) COM, received a phone call regarding an active shooter and possible bailout in Uvalde. He explained BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received information about a possible smuggler in a vehicle that shot at the Uvalde Police Department and had “something to do with a school” (timestamp 00:18:00). He stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have received a phone call about the incident from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, but was not certain who called BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He stated this was at approximately 11:45 a.m.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the other USBP personnel at the range were BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) COM, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Law Enforcement Safety and Compliance (LESC), and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) LESC. He stated that after BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put out the information regarding the active shooter, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, left with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in a government owned vehicle (GOV) while he, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left in another GOV (timestamp 00:20:00). He stated he was wearing tan pants, a red USBP firearms instructor shirt, and a green USBP plate carrier (timestamp 00:31:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they traveled from the DRT firearms range on Highway 79 loop to U.S. Highway 90 to Uvalde. He estimated it took him an hour and 15 minutes to travel from the DRT firearms range to Uvalde. They arrived in Uvalde at approximately 1:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he based his arrival time from the radio traffic stating the room had been breached and the shooter was stopped (timestamp 00:44:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not notify USBP management that he was at Robb Elementary School because he believed his departure had been announced when he left the firing range. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated management knew he was on his way to Uvalde (timestamp 00:47:40). He stated he was not directed to go to Uvalde to help with the incident and he took it upon himself to self-deploy and assist with the incident.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived in Uvalde and was traveling to Robb Elementary School, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) near the intersection of Geraldine Street and Evans Street. He stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him that he had shown up and decided to help with directing traffic and parking for law enforcement vehicles (timestamp 00:22:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after talking to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he parked in a local resident's driveway who gave him permission. He stated he was told by an unknown law enforcement officer (LEO) there was a lookout for the shooter's mother, aunt, or girlfriend. The LEO also stated the girlfriend may have been looking to "finish" what the boyfriend started. He added that he walked to the intersection of Geraldine Street and South Grove Street where he met with two unknown BPAs near the disabled truck in the drainage culvert (timestamp 00:26:15). He helped provide security at the disabled truck because there was a rifle, a bag with magazines, and ammunition near the truck (timestamp 00:26:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after assisting with security at the disabled truck in the culvert, he was told by an unknown local LEO that there were vehicles blocking Geraldine Street that needed to be moved. He also heard radio traffic regarding a USBP truck that needed to be moved off Geraldine Street. He found a truck matching the description with keys and removed it from Geraldine Street and parked it on the curb (timestamp 00:27:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the command center was in the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home (timestamp 00:30:25). He stated the command center room was set up inside the funeral home and in a room to the right of the front door as you entered the funeral home. He believed there were Texas



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Department of Public Safety troopers, rangers, and local law enforcement inside the command center.

He stated he went into the command center and was advised by a LEO who he believed was a Texas Department of Public Safety commander to assist with security at the Uvalde hospital. He added that before he could go to the hospital, he was told by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go to the USBP Uvalde Station for a muster (timestamp 00:34:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed the LEO at the command center who gave him instructions to go to the hospital was not Texas Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after he viewed a photograph of him presented by CBP OPR interviewers (timestamp 00:45:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not believe he saw USBP personnel in the command center and that it appeared to be local and state LEOs (timestamp 00:52:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he traveled to various Uvalde schools to help with security based on information that the shooter's girlfriend may be going to the high school to "finish" what the shooter had started. He said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he were together for the remainder of the day while providing security at the Uvalde High School, Morales Jr. High School, and Flores Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he first arrived at Uvalde High School where he helped provide security and cleared the school with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and possibly BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He stated they heard the shooter's girlfriend may have been targeting room 606. They then helped clear the school including room 606. He met LEOs in tactical gear inside the school and believed they were with the Drug Enforcement Administration.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after clearing the Uvalde High School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he traveled to Morales Jr. High School and helped provide security for the special dismissal of the students. He added that after leaving Morales Jr. High School, they went to Flores Elementary School and provided security for dismissal. He stated that after they left Flores Elementary school, they traveled back to Morales Jr. High School and continued to provide security for special dismissal. He stated he traveled back to the DRT firearms range after leaving Morales Jr. High School but did not remember at what time.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that while providing security, all his interactions with the public were positive (timestamp 00:59:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he did not have a body worn camera and added that he did not have any text messages or email threads but did have documentation regarding his actions that he provided to USBP management after the incident. He added that the timeframes on his documentation were wrong (timestamp 00:55:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP did not provide local and state agencies with active shooter training. He added that through the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT), he has



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worked with both federal, local, and state agencies as a safety officer. He continued to state he was not able to assist as an instructor with ALERRT active shooter training because he was not certified as an instructor with ALERRT. He assisted the Edwards County Sheriff’s Office (ECSO) active shooter training by serving as a safety officer. The point of contact for this training was ECSO Sergeant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) He stated that when he assisted ECSO during active shooter training, he was acting in his official capacity (timestamp 01:10:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the state and local agencies he assisted in active shooter training were Brackettville County, Del Rio Police Department, Texas State troopers, game wardens, and Kinney County. He did not remember if he interacted with any Uvalde Police Department officers while assisting with the active shooter training. He estimated the active shooter trainings were in 2022 (timestamp 01:13:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not remember if he believed it was an active shooter situation or a barricaded subject situation at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:16:30). He explained that an active shooter was a situation where there was active killing or dying. He continued to explain that a barricaded subject was not a situation involving active killing or killing with time [hostages subsequently dying due to injuries] (timestamp 01:18:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided examples of possible authority that BPAs could use to respond to an active shooter incident such as a felony occurring in front of USBP or a smuggling vehicle incident (timestamp 01:20:00). He stated the way ALERRT taught command structure was that the first agency on scene oversees incident command (timestamp 01:21:55). He stated that he had a backup role during the Robb Elementary School shooting by providing security because he arrived after the shooter was stopped.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route of travel from the DRT firing range to Uvalde, TX. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route of travel to Uvalde, TX. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his route of travel to Robb Elementary School. The map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving to the school followed by where the route he walked on foot and the location of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) The map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the location of the command center. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 8. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Additional Information Provided by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On May 3, 2023, Special Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, received an email from Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Comstock Station, Texas. The email included the dates BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) texted a photograph of the points of contact related to the shooting at Robb Elementary School to Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Law Enforcement Safety and Compliance Directorate (LESC), Harpers Ferry, WV. The email string and photograph are provided as Attachment A.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Email from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated May 5, 2023.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

<b>Prepared by:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
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<b>Approved by:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 114**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 1, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness and the Authentication Code is (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was assigned to Del Rio Sector (DRT) as a first line Supervisory BPA (SBPA). On said date, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the firearms range because he had recently been told he had obtained the position of BPA-P and was there getting a briefing from the person he was going to replace. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dressed in the United States Border Patrol (USBP) rough duty uniform (timestamp 00:12:38).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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At approximately 11:45 a.m., someone at the range was notified that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when the range staff heard about the active shooter at Robb Elementary School, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and others gathered their gear. Some went to the armory to gather their rifles and got into at least two or three government own vehicles (GOV). BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unsure whether he drove a GOV or if BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Brownsville, TX, drove. The other vehicle had BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Comstock, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Gulport MS, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Harpers Ferry. According to BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they drove with lights and sirens via the 79 loop to Highway 90, and at times Department of Public Safety (DPS) and civilian vehicles were passing them while they were enroute to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:13:21).

According to BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, arrived at Robb Elementary School about a half hour before BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a shorter distance to travel from Brackettville, TX to Robb Elementary School. As BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) travelled BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been communicating with them and provided instructions where to park. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated the distance was approximately 75 miles from the range to Robb Elementary School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they arrived in Uvalde between 1:05 p.m. to 1:10 p.m.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his initial thoughts when he heard about the active shooter was that USBP personnel from the range were deploying to go help with the aftermath. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) anticipated that the incident would be resolved by the time they arrived at Robb Elementary School.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was not specifically directed to respond to the active shooter incident at Robb Elementary School; however, he said that is what they train USBP to do. Prior to arriving near the incident area, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had already received information that it was now a barricaded subject situation; however, he does not know who relayed that information.

Upon arriving, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed that BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had already assumed the role of directing traffic and establishing a traffic control point (timestamp 00:16:21).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the team split up temporarily and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) headed towards the school and made it up to the doorway of the school. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked down Geraldine Street, Evans Street, and as far as Nichols Street to see how he could help.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a heavy presence of law enforcement. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a lot of people standing around, heard a helicopter arrive, and saw a distraught mother coming from the direction of the school screaming and crying.

From BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) perspective, incident command was nonexistent. At one point, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard someone blurt out the shooter was dead; however, he did not recall hearing any shots fired.





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BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) overheard that assistance was needed at Uvalde Hospital with perimeter security and traffic control. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to the Uvalde Hospital to assist. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that while at the Uvalde Hospital, a female yelled obscenities at them, but he was unable to recall what exactly she said. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told that the female was a relative of the shooter.

While at the hospital, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was contacted to report back to the Uvalde Border Patrol Station to provide peer support assistance. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed the Uvalde Hospital and travelled to Uvalde Border Patrol Station.

After information was received concerning a threat of a possible second shooter, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then travelled to Uvalde High School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) along with BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted clearing the school. While clearing the school, he found the principal locked in a classroom with 13 students. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself as a BPA and escorted them out of the classroom. After clearing Uvalde High School, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to Flores Middle School, Morales School, and Dalton Elementary School to clear the schools and assist with reuniting the students with their parents. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not use force against any member of the public. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not render aid to any member of the public.

After clearing all the schools, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove back to the Uvalde station and observed that the station was providing peer support for the BPAs involved in the incident. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the Uvalde Border Patrol Station between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., back to the firearms range. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the BPAs were distraught.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from his perspective, USBP's role in the incident was to assist. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not sure if there is a written authority or policy; however, he assumed that if you are trying to do the right thing and trying to save lives you are obligated as a sworn officer to respond because that is what you get paid to do (timestamp 00:56:56).

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained his knowledge of the difference between an active shooter and a barricaded subject. In a hostage situation, you do not go in guns blazing, because the person has not done anything yet. You give the negotiator a chance to talk the person down or you get Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) or a specialized team there. If there is stimulus, gun fire, kids screaming, chaos, you cannot wait and if you are by yourself then that is the luck of the draw, and you go because that is the only way you save lives (timestamp 00:58:09). BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated on May 24, 2022, he was a USBP Active Shooter trainer and was not Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response (ALERRT) certified. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he obtained certification as an instructor in ALERRT in September 2022. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained his knowledge of the difference between a hostage taker and a barricaded subject. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described a hostage taker as someone who wants something or is trying to lure someone in or



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looking for something. A barricaded subject would be just barricaded in a room and has more time to do damage.

On May 24, 2022, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have a Body Worn Camera and he does not have any saved messages related to the incident.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not draft a report and did not send any e-mails regarding the incident at Robb Elementary; however, he typed a short timeline which he provided to CBP OPR during the interview. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also typed a synopsis for his leadership regarding the actions that his team performed on May 24, 2022. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to forward the synopsis to CBP OPR on his next scheduled workday.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the only discussion he had related to the incident was with the Texas Rangers when they interviewed him on June 3, 2022 (timestamp 01:05:24)

During the interview, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the route he traveled from Loop 79 and Hwy 90 to Uvalde. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it was not applicable. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it was not applicable. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated all the schools he responded and assisted. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the spot where he staged at the school.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 02, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to the (b) (7)(E) and was working at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). While at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) split up and (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E). At some point, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) that Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, was driving towards their location. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) and informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that there was a shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, and they were ordered to respond.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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At approximately 11:30 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA; and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed towards Robb Elementary School in four different USBP marked vehicles (timestamp 00:23:01). While en route, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) listened to radio communications and recalled hearing the following (timestamp 00:50:56):

“Are you shot? Are you hurt? Where are you hurt?”

“Can you see in the windows” or “break in the window?” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed this was the voice of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT).

“There are casualties.”

“Shooter down.”

“How many on the bus to hospital?” followed by “A lot.”

“Help needed at the civic center.”

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, upon hearing the request for assistance, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) redirected the team towards the civic center. Upon their arrival, unidentified Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) officers informed them that children were being transported from Robb Elementary School to the civic center to be picked up by their parents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that they were asked to clear a path for the buses, set up a perimeter, and provide security for the children and parents (timestamp 00:30:21). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any confrontations, nor did he witness any confrontations with parents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added the parents cooperated with the instructions provided (timestamp 00:31:58).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further added that, prior to the arrival of school buses transporting children to the civic center, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, arrived in his USBP vehicle and dropped off children who ran from Robb Elementary School to a nearby neighborhood (timestamp 00:39:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 5:00 p.m., the swing shift arrived at the civic center and he was relieved. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA and, as he was putting his equipment away in his vehicle, he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) talking on the phone in the UVA parking lot. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR), DRT, in the parking lot wearing his blood-stained uniform. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he gave BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a hug and asked if he was okay. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not respond and began to cry. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he did not have any other interactions at UVA and headed home (timestamps 00:58:53).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not aware who was in command and control of the Robb Elementary School incident (timestamp 00:33:58). However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed SBPA



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in command and control at the civic center, as he was the first USBP SBPA to arrive (timestamp 00:27:18). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of CBP's authority to respond to the incident nor was he aware of his peace officer status in the state of Texas (timestamp 00:35:46).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the maps labeled 3-Uvalde, Texas and 4-Uvalde, Texas Schools. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took State Highway 41 north and U.S. Route 90 to the Uvalde Civic Center. It took the team approximately 30 to 35 minutes to arrive (timestamp 00:25:47).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 116**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Bracketville, Texas, concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School.

Prior to the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a Warnings and Assurances to Employee Required to Provide Information, which he signed acknowledging he understood his right and obligations (Attachment 1). On February 23, 2023, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with the form titled Your Required Appearance and Sworn Testimony. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness and the Authentication Code is (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 2).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were attending Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, TX. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was off duty, wearing jeans, a black polo shirt, and a ball cap, and was not carrying a firearm. He finished having lunch with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at a local restaurant in Uvalde and then he and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went grocery shopping at H.E.B. While at H.E.B., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message alert from the Uvalde School District notifying him that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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While in the H.E.B., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard people openly discussing that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also received text messages from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) teacher at Robb Elementary School. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that she and the other students in her class were safe and were being evacuated to the mortuary across the street from the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were concerned about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the school, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as he had a substitute teacher that day, and they weren't aware of his status.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) towards Robb Elementary School. When they arrived at the intersection of Geraldine and Evans Streets (timestamp 12:32), BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and exited the car. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked him for information and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have much to provide, but he asked for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assistance with traffic control (timestamp 12:51).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of how long he helped with traffic control, but he spent time directing emergency vehicles arriving and told them where to park. On approximately two occasions, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left their position at the intersection and went to Robb Elementary School to gather additional information. Upon BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) return each time, he provided BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with very limited information. After the initial return, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned there was a barricaded shooter and he was not sure if there were any injuries. After his second return to the intersection, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) related that some children were hurt, and the shooter was still barricaded. A local police officer from an unidentified agency arrived at the intersection and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) overheard over the officer's radio that the breach into the classroom occurred and the shooter was killed. Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard via the officer's radio that there was a potential second shooter at a different school, a white female wearing a spaghetti strapped shirt.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was taken from the mortuary to the Civic Center and was reunited with her. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked toward the Civic Center and located another unidentified BPA in a vehicle who recognized him and offered to drive him there. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got into the vehicle and was on his way to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when she texted him and said that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the funeral home (timestamp 15:59). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the vehicle and walked to the funeral home but was denied entry. He then saw (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and they exchanged a thumbs-up, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then boarded a school bus to the Civic Center.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked towards the Civic Center and located a friend who offered to drive him there. Upon arriving at the Civic Center, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reunited with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then received a text message from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Uvalde High School stating there were people with guns in the school hallway (timestamp 17:07). He and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exchanged texts for a while and then BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drive to and ultimately drop (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) off at Uvalde High School. After reuniting with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived and drove them all home.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 36:27)



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(Attachment 3). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the map labeled 4-Uvalde, Texas Schools, map 5-Robb Elementary School, map 5.a.-Robb Elementary School, and map 6-Robb Elementary School and Civic Center. He traveled from the local restaurant, to the H.E.B., to the intersection of Geraldine and Evans Streets to conduct traffic control, to the funeral home to see (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the location where a family friend picked him and drove him to the Civic Center, to where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove him from the Civic Center to Uvalde High School.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was in the bathroom for approximately 30 minutes and refused to exit the stall until he saw a law enforcement badge held under the stall. Neither (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) nor BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were able to identify from which law enforcement agency the officer was who retrieved him from the bathroom stall and took him to the funeral home.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not identify who was in command and control at any time during the event, as he was not close enough to things to provide any additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of his legal authority to respond to the Robb Elementary School incident but knew that as BPA he had no status as a peace officer in Texas. He expressed that based on the active shooter training he's received; when an active shooter incident occurs, BPAs are expected to respond with their firearms and body armor.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	Warning and Assurances to Employee Required to Provide Information.
2	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 117**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he arrived at work at (b) (7)(E) At approximately 10:45 a.m., while driving on his way to lunch, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was passed on Highway 90 by two unmarked units from an unknown agency with their emergency lights activated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) purchased his lunch at the drive through window at an unknown restaurant and drove back to DRT. On his way back, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed three Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) marked police units with their lights activated driving towards Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated he received a text from his sister on his personal phone during his drive back asking if he had heard about a shooting in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got another text from his sister as he arrived at DRT stating the shooting had occurred at a school.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	09/18/2023
Approved by:		Date:	

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 11:15 a.m., he went into his office and asked if anyone heard about a school shooting in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated no one heard about a shooting so he called Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to inquire about the shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lived in Uvalde and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a BPA in Uvalde. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he did not hear about any school shooting but would get back to him. A few minutes later, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) came to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office and told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to grab his stuff and to go with him to Uvalde (timestamp 01:05:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he drove code to Uvalde while following two TXDPS units. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it took them approximately fifty minutes to get to Uvalde traveling on Highway 90. About ten minutes before they arrived at Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), on his personal phone stating “they” got the shooter (timestamp 01:12:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at approximately 12:45 - 1:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School or anywhere else that day.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he parked about two blocks from Robb Elementary School and continued toward the school on foot. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the school, he observed the shooter’s truck in the canal, and it appeared to have extensive damage. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also observed helicopters on the ground in the playground behind the school. He continued toward the school and observed multiple people exiting the school. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got closer to the school building, he observed an unknown BPA with blood on his uniform, crying, and looking distraught. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) comforted the BPA and brought him over to the funeral home where they released him to other BPAs to care for him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never entered Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the scene did not appear chaotic but there was a lot of stuff going on. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in command at the scene or who was running the command center (timestamp 01:21:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while standing at the funeral home, he noticed several TXDPS troopers running toward their vehicles. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) overheard one of the troopers say there was a threat of another shooter at the middle school or high school. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they were going to relocate to the high school. While enroute to the high school, they received information the additional shooter may be a girlfriend. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unsure how they received the information.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he arrived at the high school and observed numerous law enforcement officers at the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed TXDPS, USBP, sheriff’s office, Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department, and Uvalde Police Department personnel on scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in charge at the high school and stated everyone was taking positions on their own and relaying their positions on the radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) set up on the east side of the school in the parking lot in an



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observation role. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed parents at the school but did not interact with any of them except while directing traffic and telling them where to go.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he were at the high school for approximately thirty minutes when they received information there was a private Catholic school nearby that needed security. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they were going to relocate to the Catholic school. Upon arrival, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with a school official who BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed was the principal. The principal informed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there were only about ten students left in the school and they were all centrally located by the front office. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were six BPAs at the Catholic school and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in command. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recognize the other BPAs on scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the other BPAs provided security for the Catholic school until all the students were released to their parents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not interact with any parents but did observe they appeared scared as they came to pick up their children.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that once the Catholic school was clear, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he relocated back to the high school and set up in an observation role in a field behind the high school. They stayed in their position until all the students were evacuated from the high school. After the school was evacuated, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message or an email (BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to accurately recall) instructing all BPAs who responded to return to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were at the high school the second time for about thirty minutes.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he arrived at UVA and went to the muster room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, and Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, were present at UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained they had food in the muster room for the agents and uniforms for the agents who needed to change. While in the muster room, someone pointed out the BORTAC agent who shot the shooter, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recognize the BORTAC agent and did not know him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed at UVA for about thirty minutes then returned to DRT.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never saw any children being evacuated or treated at Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the only time he understood who was in command and control was at the Catholic school with ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not know what legal authority CBP had in these types of incidents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware he did not have peace officer status in Texas.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map the route he took to Uvalde and his position at Robb Elementary School and the high school (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not remember the exact times associated with his response to the incident.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 118**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y





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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, CBP OPR SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified with Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned as the dayshift WC at UVA performing administrative duties. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard a Border Patrol agent (BPA) ask over the service radio if something was going on because the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) was running lights and sirens through the Uvalde area. No one responded via the radio. Approximately ten minutes later, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard the same BPA transmit over the service radio, “Active shooter, Robb Elementary” (timestamp 08:09:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spoke to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and they decided to respond to Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the UVA armory to retrieve their assigned M-4 rifles but discovered there were no M-4 magazines available. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked out two shotguns instead (timestamp 08:11:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he self-deployed to Robb Elementary School. He did not direct any BPAs to respond or assist. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had to direct BPAs not to respond as there were already plenty of law enforcement officers (LEOs) on scene. To his knowledge, all BPAs had self-deployed (timestamp 08:59:10).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled together to Robb Elementary School in WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned government owned vehicle. While en route, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed heavy traffic in the immediate vicinity of Robb Elementary School and had to park several blocks away. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he arrived on scene at approximately 12:00 p.m. (timestamp 08:34:40).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival, he observed a few BPAs, possibly BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, walking in and out of the school. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he also noticed numerous TXDPS officers in tactical gear all over the place. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that TXDPS and the Uvalde Police Department were in charge of the incident (timestamp 08:12:25).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arriving at Robb Elementary School, he tasked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, to create an Evolving Situation Report to provide information to USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that initially there was not a lot of information to report (timestamp 08:16:51).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that because WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was more familiar with the local LEOs on scene, he spoke with them, and the LEOs requested BPAs assist with perimeter security. As additional BPAs arrived on scene, they assisted along the perimeter of Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of the location of the shooter or how many victims were in the school. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was under the impression the shooter was barricaded in a classroom or closet by himself (timestamp 08:14:35).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based on the amount of local LEOs on scene at the time of his arrival, his initial assumption was the situation was well in hand (timestamp 08:51:50). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) impression on arrival and throughout the incident was that TXDPS and Uvalde Police Department were in charge of the incident. He did not believe any member of USBP was in command of the incident (timestamp 09:05:35).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was inaccurate information transmitted over the radio throughout the incident, causing confusion. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, for example, an unknown LEO transmitted that the shooter was on the roof; another unknown LEO transmitted the shooter was barricaded in a closet in a classroom alone. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) speculated the information was coming from local LEOs (timestamp 08:15:32).



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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he observed students and teachers being evacuated and noticed at least one of the teachers appeared to have been shot. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recognized one of the injured teachers because two years prior to the shooting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended Robb Elementary School and was a student of the teacher who was killed (timestamp 08:18:20).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed his neighbor, off-duty BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walking towards Robb Elementary School with a personally owned shotgun. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a student at Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made no attempt to prevent B (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from getting to the school (timestamp 09:03:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he also observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, loading students into a USBP transport van and evacuating them from the area. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (APAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, several times throughout the incident; however, they did not stay together for very long (timestamp 08:28:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, talking to an unknown LEO and then walk into the school with a breaching tool. A little while later, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, arrive on scene in plain clothes. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the school and a short time later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the building with an injury to his head and foot. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as disoriented upon exiting the school. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and passed him off to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to take BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the hospital for medical treatment. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the shooter was "taken out," he observed BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit, UVA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, exit the building; all were covered in blood. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly thereafter, all BPAs met and were addressed by Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT (timestamp 08:19:11).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that to his knowledge, USBP did not take charge of the situation in any way. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived, "He did what he had to do." WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was only aware of LEOs requesting perimeter security from BPAs on scene. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received this information from WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 08:53:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware that BPAs were involved in the breach and the engagement with the shooter until later that evening. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear gunfire at any time while at the school (timestamp 08:22:30).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the first time he became aware children had been killed was when, post breach, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the building and told him, "He killed all those kids" (timestamp 09:18:45).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left Robb Elementary School together and traveled to Flores Elementary School to provide security. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had received information that a threat



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to other local schools had been made via social media. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the additional threats to local schools did not materialize and he remained at Flores Elementary School until approximately 7:00 p.m. (timestamp 08:23:26).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after concluding at Flores Elementary School, he returned to UVA. Upon returning to UVA, he observed that most BPAs had gone home for the evening and the swing shift was out in the field continuing normal duties. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went home at approximately 7:00 - 7:30 p.m. (timestamp 08:26:25).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in discussions with APAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) following the incident, he and APAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concluded that if they had been aware of how unorganized local law enforcement was, USBP would have taken command of the incident. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that TXDPS should have attempted to immediately enter the classroom (timestamp 08:25:15).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the area. He marked the locations at Robb Elementary School where he operated during the incident (Attachment 2). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated on the maps that he never entered any school buildings and only patrolled an area along Geraldine Street on the north side of the school. At times, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see the west entrance that led to the T-intersection. From his vantage point, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed the initial evacuation of students from classrooms near classrooms 111 and 112.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based on the information he received, he was operating under the impression the shooter was barricaded and alone somewhere in the building that contained classrooms 111 and 112 (timestamp 08:34:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated most of the information he received was word of mouth. He further stated the radio communications were sporadic and full of bad information (timestamp 08:49:40).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of a specific statutory authority permitting BPAs to respond or intervene in an incident such as the shooting at Robb Elementary School. He further stated that in the State of Texas, BPAs do not have peace officer status or authority. However, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt that BPAs had a responsibility to respond to shooter incidents. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was also common practice to assist local LEOs at UVA; however, he was unaware of any memorandum of understanding between USBP and local LEO agencies (timestamp 08:56:50).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty, in uniform, and not wearing a body worn camera when he responded to Robb Elementary School in his assigned government vehicle. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any text messages or emails, nor did he write any reports or memorandums documenting the incident (timestamp 09:06:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any interaction with the public during the incident (timestamp 09:06:00).



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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he has not received the CBP Active Shooter training. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not familiar with the difference between an active shooter and a barricaded subject. He stated if a barricaded subject had already fatally injured a victim, or had injured victims with them, he would treat the situation as an active shooter (timestamp 09:08:00).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not see nor was he aware of the presence of a command post on scene (timestamp 09:12:05).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the incident, he was told the classroom door was locked and a key was needed to make entry. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a teacher at Robb Elementary School, and after the incident, the neighbor informed him the classroom doors could only be locked from the outside using a key (timestamp 09:13:30).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of any conflict between local, state, or federal LEOs that would have impacted the command structure during the incident. He further expressed that due to the current immigration crisis, the school security was “laxed.” WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that schools had been recently placed on lock down numerous times during bailout events (subjects abandon a smuggling vehicle and flee) in the area. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the initial lock down on the day of the incident may have been assumed to be “just another bailout,” prompting a slower response by school security (timestamp 09:30:00).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**EXHIBIT 119**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) (b) (6) CBP OPR, and Senior Special Agent (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CBP OPR, interviewed Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Brackettville, Texas, Station (BRA), concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School.

Prior to the interview, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was provided with the Administrative Warning Acknowledgment for Non-Bargaining Unit Employees, which he signed acknowledging he understood his right and obligations (Attachment 1). On February 23, 2023, ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was provided with the form titled Your Required Appearance and Sworn Testimony (Attachment 2). The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness and the Authentication Code is (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 3).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) typically arrived to work at (b) (7)(E) PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained he occasionally went to work at (b) (7)(E) so he could speak with those assigned to the day shift. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unable to remember if on May 24, 2022, he began his workday at (b) (7)(E) or (b) (7)(E)

On May 24, 2022, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in his office and in uniform when he heard BRA Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stopped a suspected smuggling vehicle alone and PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to assist BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was driving an unmarked Chevrolet Tahoe. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) location and remained there until the transport van arrived. While BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) waited for the tow truck PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued traveling towards Rockspring, Texas, to determine if there was possibly another vehicle involved in the smuggling. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) traveled for a distance and saw a sports utility vehicle registered to an address in San Angelo, Texas.

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) followed the vehicle and subsequently notified another U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Station of the vehicle and returned towards Brackettville. As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was driving towards Brackettville, he heard radio communications on the Uvalde radio channel that someone was shooting through windows (timestamp 00:37:54). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) estimated he heard this radio communication approximately one hour to one hour and twenty minutes after he assisted BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with the smugglers and undocumented migrants (timestamp 01:21:55).

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed there was an active shooter in Uvalde. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called BRA or possibly acting BRA Assistant Patrol Agent in Charge (APAIC) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) directly and inquired about the shooting in Uvalde. Acting ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he was not aware of an active shooter in Uvalde and PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told him to inquire and send any necessary resources to Uvalde (timestamp 00:39:40).

As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued driving, he received a group text message from Acting Division Chief (DC) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Del Rio Sector (DRT), concerning the active shooter in Uvalde. The message indicated that all required resources were at the location. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then spoke with acting APAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) or possibly BRA Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to let them know BRA BPAs did not need to respond to Uvalde. Either APAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) or SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) informed PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that BRA BPA Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) were already at Robb Elementary School treating wounded (timestamp 00:42:00).

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and others directed SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to respond to the Incident Command Post (ICP) at Robb Elementary School to relay information to BRA and assist. As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached Brackettville, he received a call from DRT Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who said he was traveling to Uvalde with DRT ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and DRT Acting Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) requested PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) send resources to Uvalde. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that he already sent BPAs to Uvalde (timestamp 00:44:43).





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SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed that the shooter was barricaded inside Robb Elementary School, parents were agitated, and children were being evacuated to the Uvalde Civic Center. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was uncertain, but believed it was possible he received the information concerning the shooter being barricaded inside the school from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) through a text message or phone call (timestamp 01:27:59).

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned to BRA where he retrieved a rifle and other equipment and self-deployed driving toward Uvalde. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) departed Brackettville for Uvalde between 11:45 a.m., and 12:15 p.m. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was driving with emergency equipment activated and was passed along the way by Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Troopers. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that he activated the emergency lights and occasionally the vehicle siren. As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached the Uvalde Border Patrol Checkpoint, he learned through radio communications that the shooter was down. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke with BPAs at the Uvalde Checkpoint and believed they might need to be relieved, so he contacted the BRA Station and directed that BRA BPAs be sent to the Uvalde Checkpoint. As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached the Uvalde Checkpoint he received a text message from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicating that the shooter was shot (timestamp 01:28:19). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) estimated he received this text message from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at approximately 12:20 p.m. (timestamp 01:29:50).

As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered Uvalde following the DPS Troopers, he drove to the area near Robb Elementary School where he saw numerous law enforcement vehicles parked. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) parked, gathered his equipment, and went towards Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) estimated that he arrived at Robb Elementary School between 12:30 p.m., and 12:40 p.m. (timestamp 01:33:30). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not notify anyone of his arrival at Robb Elementary School and he did not receive any instructions when he arrived at the school. As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked towards Robb Elementary School, he attempted to locate BRA BPAs and determine how he could assist.

When asked to explain the command and control structure at Robb Elementary School when he arrived, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained he did not know who was in command and he did not go to the ICP at the funeral home near Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:50:10). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know who had overarching command at Robb Elementary School.

As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached the west entrance of Robb Elementary School, he saw BRA BPAs, including BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who appeared distraught. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was then approached by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who hugged PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) began to cry. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked as if he was in shock as he approached PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then told PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that there was a call to the ICP reporting there were still students in some of the classrooms. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) if that information had been relayed to anyone and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know (timestamp 00:55:25).

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed the DRT Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens was near a tree by the school speaking with BPAs. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw BPAs and DRT management beginning to leave



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the school. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw a group of law enforcement officers walking towards the older section of the school, so he followed.

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw students and a teacher evacuated from the older section of the school. After the students and teacher left, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked two uniformed officers if the classroom had been cleared and the officers responded no. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the officers then entered the classroom and PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw a male student on the floor with his torso and head covered with a jacket. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the officers determined the student was not injured but was sleeping. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the officers escorted the male student to his teacher and classmates. As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked away from the class and teacher, he heard the teacher chastising the student for sleeping in class. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not identify the officers who entered the classroom where the student was sleeping but believed they might have been State of Texas Game Wardens. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed this student found in the classroom was possibly named (b)(6) (timestamp 01:00:25). A USBP van arrived, and the students are loaded into the van to be taken to the Uvalde Civic Center so they can be reunited with their families.

After the students were loaded into the van, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) began walking towards the front of the school when he saw a retired BRA SBPA (b)(6) (b)(6) told PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that he was trying to locate a family friend who was a teacher at Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) later learned (b)(6) family friend was Robb Elementary School teacher (b)(6) who was murdered during the school shooting (timestamp 01:08:33).

As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued walking along the school perimeter fence, he encountered SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Carrizo Springs, Texas, Station (CAR). SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he was concerned because SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received conflicting direction from CPA Owens and the CAR PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed CPA Owens directed SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to remain at the school to assist and provide updates while PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed him to do something else. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to remain at the school and advise any arriving BPAs they should go to UVA or return to their station.

As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued walking, he saw Captain (b)(6) Texas Department of Public Safety (TX DPS) walking toward the ICP and greeted him. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) subsequently learned from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that BRA BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had not yet located (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was a student at the school. As PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued walking towards his vehicle, he encountered BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who looked distraught. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) if he was alright, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) responded that he had not been able to locate (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was a student at Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) there was a meeting at the Uvalde Station (UVA), but (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he need to return to his other grandchildren (timestamp 01:12:30).

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then returned to his vehicle, which he had parked three to four blocks from Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) subsequently received information concerning a social media threat by a female claiming to be the girlfriend of the shooter who said she would finish the job.



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PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not remember when it occurred but remembered hearing radio communications that there were shots fired at the Uvalde High School (timestamp 01:15:50).

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then went to the Uvalde High School. Subsequently, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard radio communications that shots were not fired at the high school. When he arrived, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) parked across the street from the high school. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had difficulty remembering the time of events related to his activities at Uvalde High School. However, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) estimated he arrived at the high school between 2:15 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. and departed the high school between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. because he remembered the sun was setting when he departed (timestamp 03:12:50). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) texted other USBP management to let them know he was at the high school and would not be at the UVA meeting. When PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the high school, he noticed law enforcement officers exiting the school as though they had cleared it.

Parents and others gathered at the school after the posting on social media concerning a shooting at Uvalde High School. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and others stood outside the school and information was received through radio communications that students would be released by grade through multiple school exits. Individuals approaching the school were asked to use the sidewalk and not approach the school. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and other law enforcement officers assisted with moving traffic in and out of the high school so that students could be reunited with their families. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not enter the high school but remained there providing security until students were released and faculty departed (timestamp 01:16:30).

After leaving Uvalde High School, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to UVA where he spoke with USBP management and BPAs. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unable to estimate when he arrived at the station, but remembered it was still light outside. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that uniforms were brought to the station for BPAs to exchange for their bloody and dirty uniforms. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) picked up dinner and after eating at UVA he left for the Uvalde Civic Center.

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went to the Uvalde Civic Center where the families of victims were being notified of deaths, which occurred during the Robb Elementary School shooting. At the Civic Center, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw retired BRA SBPA (b) (6) whose family friend, Robb Elementary School teacher (b) (6) died during the school shooting. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke with (b) (6) and they hugged (timestamp 03:37:00).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made his way into the Civic Center to locate BRA BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) whose (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was missing following the school shooting. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unable to find (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or his family Civic Center. After leaving the Civic Center, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) departed Uvalde, and returned to the BRA Station and subsequently to his residence. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not remember what time he made it back to BRA.

At Robb Elementary School, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not observe orders or direction being given to responding law enforcement officers. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) directed Acting APAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to deploy BRA BPAs to Robb Elementary School, the Uvalde Checkpoint and Uvalde Civic Center. Later, while at Robb Elementary School, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) directed SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to check on BRA BPAs



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who were at that location. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not provide direction to any responding state or local law enforcement officer and did not provide any direction concerning entry into the school or classrooms (timestamp 01:52:30). While at Robb Elementary School, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not act or exercise any authority to impede anyone's movements or render first aid or medical treatment to anyone (timestamp 01:55:06).

When he arrived at the Uvalde High School, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not receive any instruction and he did not provide instruction to any law enforcement officers while at the high school. While at the Uvalde High School, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not act or exercise authority to impede anyone's movements or provide first aid or medical assistance to anyone (timestamp 03:25:13). While at the Uvalde Civic Center, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not act or exercise any authority to impede anyone's movements or provide first aid or medical assistance to anyone (timestamp 03:55:25).

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the names of BRA BPAs and management who he remembered responding to Robb Elementary school and associated locations on May 24, 2022, including Acting APAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C); and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (timestamp 01:35:30). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was uncertain but believed that BRA BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) might have responded to Uvalde because (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attended Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:37:20). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) later learned that BRA BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered Robb Elementary School classrooms 111 and 112.

During the interview PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reviewed maps labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas; 2. South of Uvalde, Texas; 3. Uvalde, Texas; 4. Uvalde, Texas Schools; 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; 5.a Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Brackettville to Uvalde and indicated he departed for Uvalde between 11:45 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. On the map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that the map labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas, should be reviewed for additional information. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that the map labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas, should be reviewed for additional information.

On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that on May 24, 2022, he went to Robb Elementary School, the Uvalde High School, and the Uvalde Civic Center. On map 4, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also marked his route of travel from Robb Elementary School to the Uvalde High School based upon directions he obtained from his cell phone, as well as the approximate location where he parked his vehicle at the high school.

On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he arrived at the school after the classroom was breached and the shooter was shot. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he parked several blocks from the school and walked from his vehicle to the school. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also marked the route he walked to the school, where he assisted with clearing classrooms in the older section of school, and where the students were loaded into a USBP van for transport to the Uvalde Civic Center.



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On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that map 5 should be reviewed for additional information. On the map labeled 6 Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that after leaving the Uvalde High School he when to UVA and then to the Uvalde Civic Center.

On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated his route of travel from UVA to the Uvalde Civic Center, as well as the approximate location where he parked his vehicle near the Uvalde Civic Center.

On the map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) marked the rooms he assisted with clearing in the older part of the school after student evacuations following the classroom breach. Additionally, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that it was classroom 10 or 11 where the student was found sleeping. On the map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the map labeled 8.a. should be reviewed for additional information. On the map labeled 8.d. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated map 8.a. should be reviewed for additional information. On the map labeled 8.e. Robb Elementary School layout, Uvalde, Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the map labeled 8.a. should be reviewed for additional information.

When asked about his understanding of USBP's authority and responsibility to respond to the shooting at Robb Elementary School and associated incidents, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that on many occasions USBP is the first to arrive at an incident and USBP has a secondary role in active shooter responses if local officials are there. When asked about USBP's responsibility to respond to the school shooting, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said the USBP is responsible to respond and protect the public along with other law enforcement agencies (timestamp 03:55:40).

In 2015 or 2016 in Presidio, Texas, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received active shooter training and he has received some training during quarterly firearms qualification concerning room clearing (timestamp 04:17:20).

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was issued a new government cell phone but kept his old government phone with the text messages related to the school shooting in case they were needed. However, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) moved, and the old government cell phone was misplaced. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) will continue looking for the cell phone and will contact ASAC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) if he locates the missing government cell phone.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Administrative Warning Acknowledgment for Non-Bargaining Unit Employees.
2	Your Required Appearance and Sworn Testimony, dated February 3, 2023.
3	StarWitness interview of PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
4	Maps reviewed by PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Additional Information Provided by PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 3, 2023, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sent ASAC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) an email, which contained two attached emails. The emails were dated June 1, 2022, and January 5, 2023, respectively (Attachment 1). The email dated June 1, 2022, sent within DRT, addressed a request from the Texas Rangers asking for locations of BRA agents at Robb Elementary School. The email dated January 5, 2023, included a text retained by PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sent from PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USBP Del Rio Station. The text was an “awareness only” message alerting there was an active shooter at an Uvalde school.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Emails from PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) dated March 3, 2023.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

<b>Prepared by:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
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<b>Approved by:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 120**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and AD (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he is a BPA at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) with responsibilities that include line work and responding to camera activations.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was originally scheduled to attend a training; however, when he arrived, he found out he had completed the training. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was subsequently assigned to local patrol. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) local patrol meant he was to stay in the Uvalde area and respond to camera activations and agency requests for assistance. Although he was scheduled for training, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was wearing his USBP uniform.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated radio traffic indicated other law enforcement agencies were “running code” through town (driving with emergency lights and siren activated). According to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) this type of activity was usually related to events such as a failure to yield or a pursuit. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was on the north side of Uvalde and decided because of his experience to travel (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) When BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived on the (b)(7)(E) he realized there was no activity. A short time later he heard an announcement on his service-issued radio that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:23:00).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he did not know where Robb Elementary School was located, but he began making his way towards the center of Uvalde via Highway 90. While in route, an unknown BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the physical address of the school via radio. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) eventually found his way to Robb Elementary School and arrived at what he described as the teacher’s parking lot near the school cafeteria.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) parked his government owned vehicle (GOV) on the side of the road and started making his way towards the school on foot, using the other vehicles as cover as he was unaware of the location of the threat. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed there was a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper vehicle in the parking lot and approached the unknown female TXDPS Trooper. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked the TXDPS Trooper what was going on and she stated she had also just arrived. The TXDPS Trooper did not have any knowledge about the situation and was waiting for additional information. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated there was no other law enforcement personnel in the area (timestamp 00:25:30).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he noticed an older male law enforcement officer (LEO) from an unknown agency standing on the sidewalk next to classroom 13. According to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he was waived down by the unknown LEO, who beckoned him his way. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked the LEO about information related to the threat and the LEO stated shots were fired through the open area between classrooms 34 and 18. The LEO also said one of the windows on the east side of building 100 was shot. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he did not observe any shattered windows (timestamp 00:28:50). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remained in the general vicinity of classroom 13 until he saw two sheriff’s deputies arrive.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made his way through the school with the sheriff’s deputies to the southwest corner of classroom 18. From the corner of classroom 18, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed a large group of LEOs across the courtyard on the south side of building 100. According to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the LEOs across the courtyard yelled over to him, stating the situation was under control and that the chief was inside the room with the shooter (timestamp 00:30:15). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know who the chief was but assumed he was a higher ranking official or negotiator. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated, at that time, he did not know if there were any casualties and he had not heard any gunshots (timestamp 01:18:15).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) questioned, in his mind, the information related to the Chief being in the room with the shooter and stated the information was not announced via radio. According to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) it did not make sense for an active shooter situation; for the chief to be in the room



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when the shooter was not down (timestamp 01:52:30). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) confirmed he completed active shooter training at the USBP Academy. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was trained to eliminate the threat and press toward any stimulus such as screaming, shooting, or glass breaking. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he did not hear any sort of stimulus until the short burst of gunshots much later (timestamp 01:54:00).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he paired up with one of the sheriff's deputies and they maintained their position at the southeast corner of classroom 18 while watching the windows along the east side of building 100. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated, because he had traveled from training, he did not have his vest or a longarm weapon, but he did have his service-issued radio. His sheriff's deputy partner had a vest and a longarm but did not have a radio. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took note of his surrounding area, planned for avenues of approach and cover, and observed Troopers near the library. Seeking out additional means of cover, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opened the door to classroom 18 with the intent of locating a more advantageous position. When BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opened the door, which was unlocked, he noticed there was a teacher and students still in the classroom. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then realized the whole building was likely filled with teachers and students (timestamp 00:32:20).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the classroom, assessed the vantage point, and decided the classroom was not an advantageous location. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then told the teacher and students that the police had arrived, reassured them everything would be okay, and told them to remain in the classroom.

Once outside, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) informed the sheriff's deputies there were people inside the classroom. According to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he and the sheriff's deputies decided together to maintain their position to safeguard the building in case the threat moved toward their direction. While BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the sheriff's deputies were planning, they noticed people peeking out the window of the adjacent building (classrooms 19 to 23) which led them to assume the adjacent building was also filled with teachers and students (timestamp 00:33:30).

At this time, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided his location via radio transmission and relayed that the threat was located at the seventh window on the east side of building 100. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he heard radio transmission about air support and setting up a sniper on the roof. More LEO personnel arrived at their location, including two unknown Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) agents. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he provided a quick brief to the BORTAC agents and one BORTAC agent then stood at a concrete wall between the courtyard and classroom 18. The other BORTAC agent went across the courtyard to meet with the LEOs at the south entrance of the building 100.

As the additional LEOs arrived, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) briefed them regarding the location of the threat and informed them there were teachers and students in the classrooms. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said the classrooms needed to be evacuated. The LEOs then began evacuating the teachers and students in classrooms 13 through 18 while BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and his sheriff's deputy partner covered the threat across the courtyard in building 100. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know where the students were evacuated to because the activity was happening behind him while he was focused across



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the courtyard (timestamp 00:35:30). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated a BPA from the intelligence unit and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, were among the LEOs assisting with the evacuation of the classrooms (timestamp 00:1:22:45).

After the building was evacuated, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed BPAs across the courtyard evacuating students from classrooms 108 and 109. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed the BPAs breaking the windows and removing the students. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed one BPA jump into a classroom through the window to assist a teacher with getting out. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the students proceeded towards the south entrance of the building before heading in a westerly direction. While the evacuations were taking place, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) maintained cover of the threat (timestamp 00:36:20). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated UVA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were helping with the evacuations.

After the evacuations were complete, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) moved across the courtyard and joined other BPAs on the south side of building 100 while his sheriff's deputy partner stayed at the corner of classroom 18. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he tried to enter the building but noticed there were too many people inside the hallway. Additionally, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed there were approximately 15 LEOs in the area outside of the south entrance of the building. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated there were a lot of sheriff's deputies and he could hear the sheriff's deputies talking and planning amongst themselves. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) identified one of the sheriff's deputies as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he assumed that he would be notified if his assistance was required (timestamp 00:38:30). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), UVA, and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, in the vicinity of the south entrance.

Since he was unable to assist inside, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) busied himself with covering the window known to contain the threat, this time from the southeast corner of building 100. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was accompanied by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), UVA. During this time, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could hear chatter on the radio related to the shooter possibly being on the roof or moving through the ceilings. With the new information about the shooter possibly moving through the ceilings, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) expanded his cover to include all the windows on the east side of building 100 (timestamp 00:39:15). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted there was a time where there was an open microphone, which disrupted radio communications (time stamp 01:29:15).

While BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was covering the east side of the building, he heard a short burst of gunshots (timestamp 00:40:20). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that was the first time he heard gunshots or any type of stimulus while on the school property. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that when the short burst of gunfire erupted, it immediately tightened up the atmosphere. According to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) prior to the short burst of gunfire, everyone seemed to be spread out but then they all took cover after hearing the shots (timestamp 01:33:15).

Shortly after hearing the short burst of gunshots, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard information over the radio stating BORTAC was moving in (timestamp 00:40:55). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he heard it three or four times over the radio, approximately 2 minutes apart each time (timestamp 01:29:30). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he maintained his position on the southeast corner and heard the shootout



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when BORTAC made entry. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated entry was made approximately 15 minutes after he heard the short bursts. Immediately after the breach by BORTAC, people started rushing into the building.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held his position for approximately one minute following the breach until he saw someone come out of the south door with a little girl wearing a blue or green shirt. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the little girl was placed in the alcove outside the door. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he could tell from the injuries to her head that there was nothing that could be done to treat her. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a paramedic attempted to treat her and he stood by for any assistance he might be able to provide as he received Combat Life Saving (CLS) training when he was previously in the military. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the paramedic made the decision to stop the medical assistance and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was tasked with finding a blanket. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to locate the specific blanket, and someone provided a mylar blanket to cover the girl (timestamp 00:41:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he walked into the building and observed several LEOs walking in and out of the classrooms (timestamp 00:43:30). As he walked down the hallway, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) passed different people; some were on the phone, others were crying. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also noticed blood on the floor. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at classroom 111, four or five BORTAC personnel were inside securing the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed the shooter was on the ground and noted he was no longer a threat. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could smell gunpowder and could see blood everywhere, like a scene in a movie. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he did not enter classroom 112, he could see inside and observed there was a pile of students with a teacher on top in one of the corners of the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he was there for less than one minute when someone, possibly a paramedic, shouted, "Scene security... If you are not working on somebody, get out." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently exited the building via the south entrance (timestamp 01:36:30).

Upon exiting the building, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a paramedic, possibly BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, on the southwest side of the building providing care, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation, to a little boy on a gurney whose clothes were mostly cut off. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached to see if there was any assistance he could provide. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the boy was eventually taken to an ambulance (timestamp 00:44:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a request made by an unknown person to assist with establishing a landing zone for helicopters. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and several of the Troopers went out to the adjacent open field and set up a perimeter large enough to land two to three helicopters. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he waited in the field for approximately 20 minutes, but no helicopters arrived (timestamp 00:45:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made his way back to the buildings from the field after receiving instructions to meet at a tree at the front of the school. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made his way to the rally point, he walked through the west parking lot and saw there was a backpack and magazines adjacent to the center of building 100. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also observed the windows and bricks of the building



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were shot. As BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued walking north, he noticed the west entrance of the building where he observed blood on the pavement and a group of LEOs standing near the area (timestamp 00:46:00).

At the tree, everyone from USBP was gathered, including Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector, Patrol Agent in Charge (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, and BORTAC personnel. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they were instructed to meet at UVA at (b) (7)(E) for a debrief and for accountability purposes.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the long route back to his vehicle located on the opposite side of the school, walking south and then east before exiting the school grounds through a gate. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the surrounding streets were full of vehicles and it was difficult to navigate his way out of the vicinity. At one point, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove past the suspect's vehicle crash site, which he was unaware existed before then. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed there were Troopers keeping the area secure (timestamp 00:48:45).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) finally made his way out of the town onto highway 83 when he heard information on the radio stating there was a need for more buses to evacuate people. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed there was a bus behind him, stopped his vehicle, and approached the bus driver. After speaking with the bus driver, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) escorted the bus back to the funeral home adjacent to the area of the school. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) upon arriving at the funeral home, the police officers on site instructed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to leave the area, stating he no longer needed to be there. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attempted to explain he was simply attempting to assist by escorting the bus and then departed (timestamp 00:50:35).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) eventually arrived at UVA, attended the debrief, was instructed to return the keys to his GOV, and was released for the day. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), UVA, and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were the onsite supervisors at UVA. As BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was walking to his personally owned vehicle (POV), he noticed BPAs departing the station with a sense of urgency. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) turned on his radio and heard a request for assistance at the schools as there was a second threat. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he followed the USBP units in his POV. While driving, he heard a request for assistance at the Uvalde Dual Language Academy and reported to the school where Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) agents, Troopers, and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, were also on site. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the TXDPS Troopers were tasked with perimeter duty while he and the others were requested to assist with the release of students to their parents. When most of the students were reunited with their parents, school personnel stated they no longer needed his assistance (timestamp 00:51:50). No significant incidents occurred during the time he assisted with student and parent reunification (timestamp 00:58:25).

Following his departure from the Uvalde Dual Language Academy, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove home and listened to his service-issued radio in case additional assistance was needed. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he kept his radio on, even after arriving home, and continued listening to the radio until he eventually fell asleep (timestamp 00:56:15).



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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discussed his prior CLS training while in the military. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he knew he had this prior training and was not going to hesitate to use it; however, he also expressed his concern that the training was prior to joining USBP. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was aware he was not authorized or trained through USBP and possibly would not be covered if he used any of his previous training skills (timestamp 01:01:45).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he never heard anything about a plan of action. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated, from his point of view, there was no one in charge on the south side entrance of building 100. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated there was a lot of people standing around waiting for something. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted there was a person in plain clothes wearing slacks and a vest walking in and out of the building and talking on the phone. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that this person was not giving orders or commands, however it appeared they were attempting to gain an understanding of the situation. (timestamp 01:30:15).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he believed the overall agency in command at Robb Elementary School on the date of the incident was the Uvalde Police Department (UPD). Even after other agencies arrived, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed it was still UPD. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated there was no specific person in command on behalf of the USBP, only BPAs on their own actively looking for work and attempting to find ways to help (timestamp 02:02:00).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he believed USBP's role at Robb Elementary School was to eliminate the threat of harm to others due to the active shooter and to provide support. Regarding USBP's authority to respond, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) referenced first responder and law enforcement, explaining the responsibility to protect the public once an oath was sworn (timestamp 01:55:15).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that several days later he was instructed by an unidentified supervisor to complete a map indicating the time and locations he was at the school.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was provided a Map Package which was utilized to mark his routes of travel and significant areas where he was throughout the day (Attachment 2):

- BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) utilized Map 4 – Uvalde, TX Schools to indicate his route of travel and note the location of the school he responded to in his POV.
- BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) utilized Map 5 – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate his arrival at the school.
- BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) utilized Map 5a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the status of the road in the vicinity of the school and the locations where he initially met a female Trooper and unknown LEO upon arrival at the school.
- BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) utilized Map 7 – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate his route of travel to the school.
- BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) utilized Map 8a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the path he took while moving through the school.
- BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) utilized Map 8b – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the significant areas he was at while at the school.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 121**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was assigned to use of force training at UVA when, during a break, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard over the radio about an incident unfolding at Robb Elementary School. Although he did not recall the specific words spoken over the radio, the words “active shooter” were used in the radio transmission (timestamp 00:20:46). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, and Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, also heard the radio transmissions. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then opened the UVA armory and issued rifles and plates to BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also instructed them to go to the school to assist.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove to the school while BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) rode as a passenger. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) followed in a separate vehicle. Due to crowding on the road from other emergency vehicles, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) parked the unit a block away from the school on Geraldine Street and walked towards Robb Elementary School. At the corner of Geraldine Street and Old Carrizo Road, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke with an unknown sheriff's deputy to gather information. The deputy told BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the shooter was firing rounds from the school in a northern direction. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drew his route of travel on the provided maps (Attachment 2).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stayed close to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) because BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) didn't have a radio as they walked west on Geraldine Street until they were near the bus drop-off area across from the funeral home. Where BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw parents had gathered and wanted to go inside the school to get their children. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) verbally reassured parents that law enforcement was going to take care of the situation. No one tried to move past BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and he did not use any means of force to prevent parents from proceeding (timestamp 1:09:10).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then saw law enforcement officers pulling children out of room 103 and 105 on the west side of Robb Elementary School and assisted. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) joined an unknown Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper in directing the children west away from the school. At some point during the evacuation of these students, an unknown person directed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to come closer to the school to provide cover for the students' evacuation. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) moved closer and provided cover until the evacuation was complete, at which time he transitioned to the southeast corner of the building near the corner of room 108.

While providing cover along the east side of the building, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assisted with evacuating children and an adult through the window of Room 109 (timestamp 44:40). When the adult was pulled out of Room 109, she indicated she was injured, but BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is unsure of the nature of her injuries. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not make entry into the classroom during this evacuation.

After the evacuation of room 109, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and another unknown agent were told to watch the windows on the east side of the building to ensure the shooter did not exit. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) held this position and was told by an unknown person they were waiting for USBP Tactical Unit to arrive. After an unknown amount of time, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard over an unknown radio about a breach attempt. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recall hearing any gunshots prior to the breach (timestamp 00:48:42).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard the shooter was down over a radio and attempted to make entry into the school to assist with the medical response. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) witnessed a teacher being taken out of the building and receiving first aid by unknown people, but it looked as if she was deceased given her unresponsiveness (timestamp 00:49:55). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also witnessed a child being given first aid by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and possibly another unknown BPA near the south exit (timestamp 00:50:30).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) attempted to enter the building through the south entrance, but an unknown person refused him entry, stating there were enough people. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) agreed with this assessment



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and went to go be helpful elsewhere. As BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked away, he walked along the west side of the building and saw an ambulance pulling into the bus drop-off lane along Geraldine Street. As he was assisting with guiding the ambulance, he became distracted by an unknown BPA who was distraught, so he moved to console him.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw other BPAs moving towards a tree on the north side of the building and was told by an unknown BPA to gather there for Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, to address the group. During the approximately 10-minute wait, the BPAs consoled each other. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), UVA, and brought him over to the group. CPA Owens attempted to console the BPAs as he spoke to the group at the tree. An unknown BPA instructed the group to go to UVA so CPA Owens could debrief the group. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) walked back to his vehicle alone and waited for BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for approximately 5 minutes. BPAs (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove back to UVA and went to the muster room. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sat next to and spoke to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, in the muster room. After Chief Owens spoke to the group, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned his plates and rifle back into the armory. While at UVA, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard talk of an accomplice or second shooter and moved outside to listen to the radio traffic, however, based on what he heard over the radio, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not think the threats were credible. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went home from UVA.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received medical training in the military, including basic combat care and tactical combat casualty care. He is also issued an individual first aid kit and received training in how to use the contents (timestamp 00:55:34).

Based on his interactions on-scene, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not feel anyone was in charge of the scene at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 1:11:24). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not feel anyone was in control of communications either since the radio channel was crowded with multiple agencies. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know who, if anyone, was in charge of the medical response, although he noticed a lot of BPAs providing medical assistance.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is unsure what his authority to respond to the incident at Robb Elementary School was on the day but felt he should help as a law enforcement officer (timestamp 1:19:33).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 122**



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, SSA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was on light duty on May 24, 2022, due to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and was assigned to the Sensor Program at UVA. While in the office, he lowered the volume on the radio to make a phone call. An agent then called him and informed him there was a shooting somewhere (timestamp 00:17:21). He added he heard the incident involved an active shooter. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated a couple of agents wanted to take water to the agents who responded to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) decided to self-deploy to the school as well, knowing he was injured, to assist in any way he could (timestamp 00:18:05). At approximately 12:30 p.m., he arrived at the school in his government owned vehicle.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spoke to an unknown BPA on the way to the school who informed him agents had the shooter in a building and they were about to go in. He added that either Uvalde Police Department or Uvalde Sheriff's Department personnel asked him to assist with crowd control and move people back to make room for buses and ambulances in front of the funeral home (timestamp 00:19:02). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the crowd was not disturbing anyone, but they were in the way. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) helped for approximately 10 minutes. After the crowd was under control, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to an opening in a fence just outside of the west entrance of the school where a lot of people were standing.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the crowd parted and an unknown person advised "they" were coming out. Children began running out of the west entrance of the school and into an ambulance while everyone else ran into the school (timestamp 00:19:34). He added the children were screaming and covered in blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a bus and multiple ambulances finally made their way to his location. He also stated an adult female was brought out and medical teams performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation on her. After the woman was placed into an ambulance, law enforcement officers began to exit the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide any medical assistance; however, he did provide emotional support.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated agents gathered by the fence and where an unknown acting chief told everyone to go back to UVA to talk about the event. While at UVA, the agents were informed there was a post on social media that there was a possible second shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he did not know who provided the information regarding the second shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated most of the agents went to Uvalde High School, however, he deployed to the Uvalde Dual Language Academy (UDL). He added agents were already present at UDL. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he spoke to the principal in the school office when he arrived (timestamp 00:20:39). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed the principal and the teachers that a lot of parents were about to show up and they needed to devise a plan to release the students and handle the parents (timestamp 00:20:42). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performed crowd control while at UDL and stated parents were cooperative.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he was present at Robb Elementary School, there was no sense of command present (timestamp 00:27:05). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he did not see any incident command structure, however, there were little clusters of agents and other law enforcement officers (timestamp 00:27:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he did not take any commands from anyone except for when the Sheriff's Department personnel asked him to conduct crowd control. He stated the only authority he knew to respond to these types of incidents was that he was a law enforcement officer and a first responder. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he has taken the CBP Active Shooter course. He explained that in this scenario agents are taught to find and isolate the shooter, eliminate the shooter, and render aid (timestamp 00:48:08).

CBP OPR interviewers showed maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde was not applicable. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3.



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Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX, Schools, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) marked where he was located at Robb Elementary School and UDL. The map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving to the school followed by the route he took to the west entrance of Robb Elementary School. The map labeled 5.a. was not applicable. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 8. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled his arrival location, where he performed crowd control in front of the funeral home, where he staged near the west entrance, and the muster location.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SSA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b)(7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was off-duty and doing yard work at his residence in Del Rio, TX, when USBP Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), notified him via text message at approximately 11:45 a.m. that there was a barricaded subject at a school in Uvalde, TX. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that after he received the text message he put on his BORTAC uniform, left his residence in his Government owned vehicle (GOV), and traveled to Uvalde with his emergency lights activated (timestamp 00:12:45). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that he was not directed to go to Robb Elementary School, but it was his duty and added that he is always on call (timestamp 00:18:00). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed the incident to be a barricaded subject and described his thoughts to be a subject held up in a room within the school and refusing to come out (timestamp 00:30:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA [REDACTED] explained he drove on U.S. Highway 90 the entire way from his house in Del Rio to Uvalde, estimating he arrived at Robb Elementary School at 1:30 p.m. He stated he parked on Villa St., between S. Grove St. and Nicolas St. BPA [REDACTED] heard bits and pieces of radio traffic while driving to Uvalde but does not remember specific radio traffic (timestamp 00:22:15). BPA [REDACTED] stated that after he arrived, he walked towards Robb Elementary School to join his BORTAC teammates and met Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) [REDACTED] Special Operations Division (SOD), DRT, near the intersection of Geraldine St. and S. Grove St. BPA [REDACTED] explained that PAIC [REDACTED] advised him to go to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for muster. BPA [REDACTED] stated that he returned to his GOV and drove to UVA (timestamp 00:14:00).

BPA [REDACTED] believed that local police departments were in command of the incident because when BORTAC responds to situations like a shooting, it is always to assist other agencies (timestamp 00:20:50). BPA [REDACTED] added that there were unknown police officers that had a perimeter set up and had control of the scene, which also led him to believe that USBP was not in command of the incident.

BPA [REDACTED] stated that after arriving at UVA, he learned of another possible threat at the Morales Junior High School. BPA [REDACTED] and teammates went to Morales Junior High School and provided perimeter security at the school for approximately one hour. BPA [REDACTED] provided perimeter security at Morales Junior High School with BPA [REDACTED] BORTAC, DRT; BPA [REDACTED] SOD, DRT; and PAIC [REDACTED] USBP Bracketville Station. BPA [REDACTED] stated that while providing perimeter security at Morales Junior High School he did not physically restrain civilians or provide aid to members of the public (timestamp 00:28:30).

BPA [REDACTED] explained that after leaving Morales Junior High School, he traveled back to UVA and met with other SOD agents that included BORTAC and Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) agents. BPA [REDACTED] remembered SBPA [REDACTED] talking to the SOD agents and described the meeting as an informal muster (timestamp 00:32:30).

BPA [REDACTED] stated after he left UVA he assisted BPA [REDACTED] BORTAC, DRT; BPA [REDACTED] BORTAC, DRT; BPA [REDACTED] and BPA [REDACTED] BORTAC, DRT, retrieve their GOVs that were stuck in the desert prior to the incident in Uvalde.

BPA [REDACTED] understood the role of USBP at the school was to assist local and state police departments and added that it was his duty as a Law Enforcement Officer to respond to an active shooter incident. BPA [REDACTED] believes his authority allows him to respond to any incident if they are requested to assist by any local, state, or federal agency (timestamp 00:39:00).

BPA [REDACTED] does not have any text messages or emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. BPA [REDACTED] stated that he believed the original BORTAC text message string was on his personal cell phone but he obtained a new personal cell phone since the incident occurred (timestamp 00:37:00). BPA [REDACTED] added that he does have a write



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up he completed describing his actions after the incident and he would provide that to OPR via email.

During the interview, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-8 respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled his route of travel from his residence in Del Rio, TX, to Uvalde, TX. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled his route of travel to Uvalde, TX. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) marked his route of travel to Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving to the school followed by the route he walked on foot and the location of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled his route of travel from Robb Elementary School to UVA. The map labeled 8. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Additional Information Provided by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, and again on March 3, 2023, SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CBP OPR, received an email from BPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DRT BORTAC, Del Rio, Texas.

On March 2, 2023, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received an email from BPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with a PowerPoint attached. The PowerPoint had a map of the vicinity around the Robb Elementary School, and a brief synopsis of his actions on May 24, 2022 (Attachment 1). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) synopsis included his time of arrival at Robb Elementary School, parking location, encounter with PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and statement that he never entered Robb Elementary School.

On March 3, 2023, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received an email from BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stating he believed the BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he referenced in his interview with OPR on March 2, 2023, is BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from the U.S. Border Patrol, Brackettville Station (BRA) (Attachment 2). BPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) believed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was an “upper-level agent.”

SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reviewed the Threat Mitigation and Analysis Division CBP employee list and determined BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was the BRA Patrol Agent in Charge on May 24, 2022.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	Email from BPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) dated March 2, 2023.
2	Email from BPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) dated March 3, 2023.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b)(7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to USBP Brackettville Station (BRA) as a BPA Trainee (BPA-T). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was working the BRA area of responsibility (AOR) in full rough duty USBP uniform along with BPA Field Training Officer (FTO) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BRA, and BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BRA. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were waiting for a transportation vehicle to arrive for a group of four migrants. As they were loading the migrants into the transport vehicle, the driver asked if they heard about the active shooter at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:20:13).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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After returning to BRA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were advised that all Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) from BRA were being deployed to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was an EMT and told BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to accompany him to the school. According to BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was previously an Uvalde Police Officer and familiar with the school and the City of Uvalde.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove a marked USBP Government owned vehicle (GOV) from BRA to Robb Elementary School, accompanied by BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated the vehicle emergency lights and sirens as they traveled to Uvalde. As they passed the Uvalde Checkpoint, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed many civilian and law enforcement vehicles were passing the Checkpoint without stopping and it appeared the BPAs at the Checkpoint did not know about the school shooting (timestamp 00:22:58). BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was listening to the radio communications and at one point someone had a "hot mic," which prevented others from transmitting on the radio channel. On the drive to Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a student at Robb Elementary School.

Upon arriving near Robb Elementary School, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed the GOV displayed the time as 11:15 a.m., and there were many parked vehicles blocking the streets due to the law enforcement response. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the initial shots were fired at the school at 11:33 a.m. and the classroom was breached at 12:49 p.m. Following discussions between SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Union Representative (b) (6) BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed it was possible the clock in the GOV had not been changed from Standard Time to Daylight Savings Time, resulting in the clock displaying one hour earlier than the actual time.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked approximately two blocks from the school and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran to the funeral home across from the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the funeral home was the headquarter base (timestamp 00:48:23). BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed numerous law enforcement agencies near Robb Elementary School, including the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS), Texas Rangers, Uvalde Police Department (UPD), United States Marshals Service (USMS), USBP, Galveston County Sheriff's Office, and local Constables.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to enter the school because he was an EMT and told BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to accompany him because he had experience rendering first aid. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to remain with Supervisory BPA (SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and follow SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructions. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to document the names of all the BPAs he saw. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to provide the list of names to CBP OPR (timestamp 01:02:04).

While at the funeral home, two UPD officers directed BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to establish a perimeter creating space between the funeral home and the school. BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified one of the UPD officers as having the last name (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) established a perimeter and instructed civilians to move because they were too close to





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the street. BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recall the name of the street where the perimeter was established, but remembered it was between the funeral home and school. BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) maintained the perimeter for a couple of hours (timestamp 00:26:35). The UPD officers also told BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to clear everyone out of the way if they saw any ambulances trying to get through and to prevent anyone from passing the perimeter (timestamp 00:27:24).

BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told the crowd to move back because they were too close, and BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained to the crowd that they were moving them back to create space for ambulances and buses to enter the school parking lot. BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told the parents that the students were being evacuated to the Uvalde Civic Center, Uvalde High School or the hospital if needed.

BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the parents were initially compliant and remained behind the established perimeter between the school and the funeral home. However, when the buses arrived, parents saw the students and became emotional. Parents then attempted to move past the established perimeter. BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told parents they could not enter the buses and that parents had to pick up their children at the Civic Center or Uvalde High School. BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then heard a noise behind him and, when he turned, saw SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the ground with an unknown male. BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know what caused SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to go to the ground with the male. An unknown law enforcement officer engaged with SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the male, so BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) turned back toward the crowd.

As the children were being loaded onto a bus a woman noticed a child, who she claimed was her child or grandchild. This woman ran towards BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from the west side of the funeral home. BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told her in a firm voice “Hey hey stop”, but the woman continued towards BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The woman ran into BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who wrapped his arms around her in a hug. The woman pulled away from BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and an unknown TXDPS Trooper took her aside and had her sit on the ground. The TXDPS Trooper squatted next to the woman and spoke to her (timestamp 00:29:20). BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained CBP training taught him to move offline and take to the ground any person who charged him. However, BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not believe the woman intended to harm him, so he chose to absorb the impact and embrace the woman to prevent her from being injured (timestamp 01:33:33).

As children exited the school and were directed to the buses, BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed a female student had blood running from her head down to her face. BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also noticed a male student that initially did not appear to be injured but looked as though he was traumatized. When BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) looked at the male student’s legs, he noticed what appeared to be a gunshot wound to his calf. BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not understand how the male student was able to walk. According to BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) other law enforcement personnel were escorting the students from the school to the buses (timestamp 00:33:33).

While performing perimeter security near the funeral home, BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard radio communication that the shooter had been stopped (timestamp 00:55:31). SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and UPD Officer (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) subsequently told BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to assist Border Patrol Tactical Unit



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(BORTAC) personnel with clearing the rooms, so BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked with BORTAC personnel towards the school. Upon entering the school, BORTAC personnel entered each room in the northern most row of the school, consisting of classrooms one through six. After BORTAC cleared each classroom, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was handed a chair and placed it in the doorway to indicate it was cleared (timestamp 00:36:50). When the classrooms were cleared, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that they were done and departed to USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). As BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked past the shooter's truck on his way to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vehicle, he noticed the tires on the shooter's truck were deflated.

At UVA there were peer support personnel assisting BPAs who responded to the school shooting. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) determined that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, could not drive himself so he instructed BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to drive BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to BRA (timestamp 00:37:50).

BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was astonished at how USBP responded to the surrounding areas. BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP responded to the school shooting due to their status as first responders and law enforcement officers. BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received active shooter training at the USBP Academy and one of the training scenarios was designed to mimic a school active shooter. BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was trained that if there was an active shooter it is USBP's responsibility to respond, assist, and stop the threat, if needed (timestamp 01:08:30).

BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the Texas Rangers had command and control in the perimeter area. While he was working perimeter, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that TXDPS was in charge and to follow their direction (timestamp 00:50:45). Following the classroom breach, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed UPD Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed law enforcement to areas where they were needed. Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also informed the parents where they could pick up their children (timestamp 00:52:45).

While at Robb Elementary School and the funeral home, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not render any medical aid to anyone. On May 24, 2022, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not wearing a body camera and he did not draft any reports or emails concerning the shooting at Robb Elementary School.

On June 3, 2022, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed by a Texas Ranger and the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning the shooting at Robb Elementary School.

During the interview, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). The maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the route he traveled US 90 to Uvalde. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it was not applicable. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the route he traveled US 90 to Uvalde.

On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he responded to Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the spot where he staged at the school. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary



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School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the spot where they parked the vehicle when they arrived. On the map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, Texas, BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated it was not applicable. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated where SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) vehicle was parked and the route they traveled to UVA. On the map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA-T (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the rooms that were cleared out by BORTAC, where he assisted by placing the chairs in the doorways to indicate they were cleared.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 125**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 3, 2023, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the DRT Sector Intelligence Unit. During the morning hours, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was checking the roads for vehicles which had been breaking down fences when he received a text message on his government issued cell phone stating “school shooting at Robb Elementary” and a subsequent request for support. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he received the text messages from a Zavala County Sheriff’s Office (ZCSO) group chat.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he contemplated whether to respond because he was over an hour away from Uvalde and did not feel he would make it on time. After approximately 20 minutes, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) decided to respond and drove straight to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove an unmarked government owned vehicle and was dressed in plain clothes (timestamp 00:31:05). As BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered Uvalde, he heard over the radio that entry was made into the classroom. Shortly afterwards, he heard the threat was “down” (timestamp 00:21:58).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that after an hour and ten minutes, he arrived at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke with a Crystal City Police Department officer who he knew and requested information about the status of the incident; however, the officer was unable to provide any information. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then saw Emergency Medical Technician BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), USBP Carrizo Springs Station, walk into the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw and spoke with many law enforcement officers (LEO) present at the school to identify where he could be of assistance; however, everyone was either briefing or awaiting instructions.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that moments later, he observed a group of LEOs from various agencies heading towards the other side of the school. School personnel informed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) there were still children inside the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) joined the group of LEOs, all of which were unknown to him, and began clearing the classrooms and escorting children and teachers outside. After clearing approximately five classrooms, the group was told the San Antonio Police Department was going to take over searching and clearing the classrooms (timestamps 00:24:30). Once relieved from clearing classrooms, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left the school and drove back to DRT where he briefed his supervisor, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, regarding his response to the incident.

CBP OPR interviewers asked BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to provide additional details about the ZCSO group chat where he initially received notification about the incident at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained he was part of a group chat and the purpose of the group was to share law enforcement intelligence expeditiously. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he no longer belonged to the group chat because his government issued phone was replaced and he had not been added back to the group (timestamp 00:27:00). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that Captain (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ZCSO, was a good point of contact to obtain more information about the group chat (timestamp 01:37:15).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was an active shooter instructor, and as a LEO, his authority in an active shooter event was to “neutralize” the threat and respond to the people. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was aware he did not have peace officer status in Texas (timestamp 00:49:45).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 126**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 3, 2023, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CBP OPR, and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CBP OPR, interviewed MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Del Rio, Texas, USBP, DRT, concerning her involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, TX.

Prior to the interview, MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was provided with a Warnings and Assurances to Employee Required to Provide Information, which she signed acknowledging she understood her right and obligations (Attachment 1). On February 23, 2023, MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was provided with the form titled Your Required Appearance and Sworn Testimony. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness and the Authentication Code is (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 2).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had just returned from lunch between noon and 1 P.M., when she was approached by Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), DRT, and Branch Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, who asked her if she would be willing to assist as a peer support member with an active shooter situation with mass casualties. MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) agreed to go even after they confirmed to her that some of the casualties were children (timestamp 13:25).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was given keys by SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 14:04) and told to drive the government vehicle (GOV) so that Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could be on the phone gathering information regarding the incident.

MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove the GOV with the emergency equipment activated and drove approximately 90 miles per hour at some intervals from the Del Rio Sector station towards Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was on two different phones throughout the car ride and passed some information along to MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as he received it. She wasn't certain who was passing along that information, but believed it was from SOS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). At one point on the drive, MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a text message on her personal cell phone from Branch Chief (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, who stated there were approximately 10 casualties from the incident. At an unknown time during the drive, MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned from BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) there were approximately 10 casualties, 11 wounded, and that the shooter was detained.

Additionally, MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was told by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to go to the Uvalde Border Patrol Station instead of Robb Elementary School, which she believed was at the direction of SOS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). They arrived at the Uvalde BP Station at approximately 2 P.M. and entered the muster room where BPAs were mingling in groups throughout the room. She recognized Patrol Agent in Charge (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USBP, Carrizo Springs, Texas in the room, but they did not have any interaction together. MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assisted where she could but did not want to interrupt conversation that BPAs were already having amongst themselves.

While in the muster room, MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) helped sort the piles of uniforms that other BPAs brought in so that the responding agents could change out of their bloody uniforms. She assisted BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who entered the muster room with a blank stare and was shaking and covered in blood. She assisted him finding a uniform in his size and talking to him to calm him down. She was in the muster room during a speech given by Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens and Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT. MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) helped organize tables and the food and drinks that were brought in for the BPAs arriving from Robb Elementary School.

MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remained at the Uvalde BP Station until approximately 6:30 P.M. and was driven by an unknown BPA back to the DRT in a GOV. She departed DRT and was at her residence by approximately 9:30 P.M.

During the interview, MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 36:27) (Attachment 3). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) marked the route she traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the map labeled 1-North Uvalde, Texas. She traveled from DRT to the Uvalde Border Patrol Station.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Warning and Assurances to Employee Required to Provide Information.
2	StarWitness interview of MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by MSS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 127**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 3, 2023, SSA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORTAC detained a group of about ten to fifteen undocumented migrants on the eastside of Highway 131 on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on May 24, 2022. The BORTAC agents on scene were Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), DRT SOD, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT SOD, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT SOD, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT SOD, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Rio Grande Valley Sector SOD, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT SOD, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), DRT SOD.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

<b>Prepared by:</b>	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	<b>Date:</b>	09/18/2023
<b>Approved by:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	

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While detaining the group, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got their vehicles stuck in the mud due to heavy rainfall a few days earlier. As the BORTAC agents detained the group, a motion camera went off and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to go check the camera. As BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were in route to the camera, Air and Marine Operations (AMO) helicopter, call sign (b) (7)(E) stated via the radio that he had to leave because he got a call about a school shooting in Uvalde (timestamp 00:19:25). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know who the AMO pilot was.

Approximately five minutes later, the BORTAC agents received text messages on their personal phones about the shooting at the Uvalde school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believes the messages came from the DRT office to SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed the information to the rest of the BORTAC agents. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know who sent the messages from the office. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to break off from the motion camera and go to Uvalde. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to his vehicle and used a tow strap to get his vehicle out of the mud. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then picked up BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and headed to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed behind with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to transport the detained group. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed it took about thirty minutes to get BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vehicle out of the mud.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved the group to Highway 131 where they were picked up by an unknown USBP transport BPA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it took about one hour for them to transport the group to Highway 131 and for the group to be picked up. After the group was picked up, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to his vehicle and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) headed to Uvalde in his government owned Ford F150. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took Highway 131 to Spafford, then took an unknown county road to Highway 90 to Uvalde. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he did not receive any texts or radio transmissions while enroute to Uvalde.

As BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reached the checkpoint on Highway 90, he caught up with BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT SOD, who was driving the BearCat Armored Vehicle from Del Rio. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke with BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the phone who told BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) he did not know the location of the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) instructed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to follow him to the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the only radio traffic he heard as he approached the school was an unknown law enforcement officer (LEO) trying to move traffic to get ambulances to the school.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached the school on Evans Street, parked his vehicle, walked to Garland and then to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the time was 1:22 p.m. (timestamp 00:14:20). As he was walking to the school, he got a message, possibly a text, to meet by the tree in front of the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) met with his BORTAC teammates at the tree where he observed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) had blood on his uniform. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) if he was ok, and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) replied he was fine, and the blood was not his (timestamp 00:31:00). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT SOD, standing by the tree talking with a deputy from the Sheriff's Office. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know the deputy, but he was wearing a tee shirt and gym shorts.



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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unsure what agencies were at Robb Elementary School and did not know who was in command of the scene. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not see any children being evacuated or receiving medical treatment. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) never entered Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was at Robb Elementary School for only a few minutes when SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told the BORTAC agents to go to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) because Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT wanted to speak with everyone. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left Robb Elementary School and went to UVA. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was at UVA for approximately thirty to forty minutes when everyone started talking about a possible girlfriend who was mad and would shoot up the high school. It was passed down the line between everyone in the muster room to head to the high school (timestamp 00:34:25).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the high school and stood guard on the southwest side of the school with BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT SOD. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated everyone filled gaps and did not know who was in charge at the high school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said there were several supervisors on scene and on the radio, but he was taking his direction from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was at the high school for about one and a half hours before the school administration said all the students were evacuated from the school (timestamp 00:37:30).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went back to the UVA with the rest of the BORTAC and BORSTAR agents and they were there for about thirty minutes before they left. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they went back to retrieve the remaining vehicles that were stuck in the mud earlier. After retrieving the vehicles, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went home.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he does not know USBP's authority to respond to these types of incidents but stated there is an understanding within the community that BORTAC will respond to school shootings because they have the best training. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believes that if someone is in danger, it is their responsibility to do something.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided maps detailing the routes he took that day (Attachment 2).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also provided his own map of his movements at Robb Elementary (Attachment 3).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he did not remember the exact times associated with his response to this incident.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
3	Map created by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 128**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 3, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in his office at USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) when he learned from ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, about a possible active shooter in Uvalde, Texas (timestamp 08:36:16). ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) invited ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to ride with him and Acting Deputy Chief Patrol Agent ([A]DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to Uvalde.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he, (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) obtained M4 rifles and then the three departed DRT sometime before lunch in (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) unmarked Government owned vehicle (GOV), which he described as a Chevrolet Tahoe.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the normal travel time from Del Rio to Uvalde is approximately one hour and twenty minutes. While driving near Laughlin Air Force Base, Val Verde County, Texas, they learned the incident was an active shooter, at which point (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) turned on his lights and sirens and began driving at a high rate of speed. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) estimated the trip from DRT to Robb Elementary School took approximately 45 minutes (timestamp 09:07:25).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed that during the trip to Uvalde, (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was on a call with Acting Division Chief of Operations ([A]DC) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, who confirmed there was an active shooter in Uvalde. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained there were other calls he overheard on speaker phone between (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and others, but generally the information received about the incident was incomplete and unclear. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they did not know if the shooter was still shooting, quit shooting, or was dead (timestamp 09:08:36).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated he, (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) collectively worked together to identify and address priorities during their commute to Uvalde. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the three of them made the appropriate notifications. They also received and made several phone calls, some of which were on speaker phone when made or received by (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unable to specifically recall the details of all the communications that took place during the drive from DRT to Uvalde.

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not recall who he spoke with at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) “duty bubble,” but was told again there was an active shooter incident at Robb Elementary School and that an Incident Command Post (ICP) was established at an unknown funeral home in Uvalde.

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated during the drive to Uvalde, (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a call from Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT. CPA Owens advised that the agents on scene had the full support of Chief Raul Ortiz, Chief of the USBP, Washington, DC., and CPA Owens to do whatever needed to be done to get the shooter (timestamp 08:57:10).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) further explained that halfway between DRT and Uvalde, (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in on-going telephonic communications with Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Special Operations Division, DRT. (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relayed the message to PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that they had the support of Chief Ortiz and CPA Owens to do what was necessary to get the shooter (timestamp 08:58:00). ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not give PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) any specific orders.

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained, while en route to Uvalde, he unsuccessfully attempted several times to obtain the phone number to the ICP from Sheriff Brad Coe, Kinney County Sheriff’s Office (KCSO), Brackettville, Texas, and agents at UVA. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also attempted to contact Sheriff Ruben Nolasco, Uvalde County Sheriff’s Office (UCSO) but received no answer (timestamp 08:59:13).



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ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that when they arrived at Robb Elementary School, civilian and law enforcement vehicles were parked everywhere, and streets were blocked with multiple law enforcement personnel and civilians at or near the elementary school. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described the scene as “chaos” (timestamp 09:01:00).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he called the Strategic Communications Branch, DRT, the group in charge of internal and external communication through the CBP Public Affairs Office, and informed them of the incident in Uvalde (timestamp 09:22:30).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he recognized the need to get USBP Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) personnel, Peer Support, and Chaplain services to Uvalde. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) contacted someone at training and made the request to have those assets respond (timestamp 09:32:00).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) further stated that shortly after arriving at Robb Elementary School, they learned the threat had been stopped. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated they locked their M-4 rifles in the lock box in the back of the GOV, grabbed the EMT bags from the back of the GOV, and ran to Robb Elementary School to assist (timestamp 09:44:00).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that when he, (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached Robb Elementary School they witnessed triage being conducted and, after entering the school, they saw several deceased children. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted there were no other USBP personnel inside the building at that time and there was nothing they could do inside the school to assist (timestamp 10:06:33).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited the building, separated, and began gathering USBP personnel to meet with CPA Owens on the northside of the school near a tree. CPA Owens briefly addressed the group and assured them emotional support would be provided. CPA Owens then directed personnel to return to UVA.

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described seeing BPAs in uniforms covered with blood. He called Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Training and Peer Support, DRT, and asked her to collect clean uniforms and send them to UVA.

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that he, (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were in the process of leaving Robb Elementary School when a police officer asked them to assist getting children onto a school bus from inside the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home (timestamp 10:17:32).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he, (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were asked to join a line with other law enforcement personnel to help keep the children separated from the large number of nearby parents and to ensure they were safely placed on the school bus. The children exited the funeral home and walked between two lines with approximately ten law enforcement personnel in each line (timestamp 10:17:30).



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ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed the parents became frustrated and blamed the incident at Robb Elementary School on USBP. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated there was no incident or confrontation between the parents, them, or any other law enforcement personnel (timestamp 10:19:45).

Due to the obvious frustration demonstrated by some parents, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made the decision to leave after notifying a local law enforcement officer.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the area and went to UVA. After arriving at UVA, peer support personnel began arriving at the station, but several BPAs redeployed due to rumors of a second threat posted by the shooter's girlfriend on social media.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that at approximately the same time, two Texas Rangers from the Texas Department of Public Safety arrived to interview the BPAs who fired rounds inside Robb Elementary School.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was tasked by CPA Owens to assist in communicating with USBP Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Additionally, he was tasked to compose a list of UVA personnel who responded to Robb Elementary School.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he was in telephonic communication with Assistant Chief (AC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Headquarters, who was briefing Chief Ortiz.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 7:00 p.m. he, (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to DRT for a few minutes and for a welfare check. After the meeting ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to his home.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked if he was familiar with CBP's Active Shooter Policy. He stated he was unaware one existed (timestamp 11:13:53).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated he was not directed to respond to the Robb Elementary School incident but instead "self-deployed" (timestamp 11:34:20).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at Robb Elementary School, he did not stop to ask if anyone was in charge and headed straight to the school to assist (timestamp 11:39:00).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that once he entered Robb Elementary School property, he did not witness anyone from any law enforcement agency giving orders (timestamp 11:41:19).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide any orders or guidance other than communicating with other supervisors about having additional EMT personnel available or staged while they attempted to understand the actual situation at Robb Elementary School.



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ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that from his perspective, the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) Border Patrol Agent who took tactical control and put a team together was in charge at Robb Elementary School; however, he did not witness any communication that occurred inside the building prior to his arrival at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:44:37).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed USBP's role at Robb Elementary School was to support other federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies and to take joint action if necessary (timestamp 11:48:04).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he believed he had a moral obligation to respond to Robb Elementary School because he took an oath to protect America. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed he had a personal responsibility to respond to an incident like the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 11:50:35).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was asked who he believed was in command and control of the overarching incident at Robb Elementary School and he stated he had "no clue," but it was not USBP. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed it would have been a local agency or state agency that had jurisdiction over the incident.

When asked to describe his interpretation of an active shooter versus a barricaded subject, ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated both terms come with "shades of grey." ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated if you hear active gunfire, it requires an immediate response. He stated a barricaded subject who is alone and cannot cause more harm is only a threat to themselves and law enforcement has the luxury of time to decide the next move. If the barricaded subject is in a room with others, whether injured or not, it requires a response (timestamp 12:08:15).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he witnessed care being administered by paramedics to a victim of the shooting upon his arrival at Robb Elementary School. He stated he also heard BPAs attempted to save the lives of some of the victims at the school (timestamp 12:15:03).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was asked if CBP has a statutory authority to respond to an incident like the Robb Elementary School shooting and he stated he believed it did. He explained if a crime is taking place in one's presence, statutory authority applies because it is a federal crime. He further added there is a moral and personal responsibility to act. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was unaware if there is a CBP Policy that addresses responding to an active shooter (timestamp 12:23:14).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not have any text messages or emails concerning the CBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did he produce any reports concerning the incident.

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he utilized his government cell phone on the day of the incident but was no longer in possession of the phone. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained he was issued a new government cell phone and, during the transition, he was required to wipe the data from the old phone.



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ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he had initially received instructions to preserve phone data concerning the Robb Elementary School incident but months later was directed to comply with the transition to the new phone. ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he assumed he would have heard from someone if he needed to continue to preserve the phone data concerning the incident (timestamp 09:20:00).

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not recall if he used his personal phone during the Robb Elementary School incident.

ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was provided with a map package and labeled his movements and location during the Robb Elementary School shooting incident. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed the notes section in the map package (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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**EXHIBIT 129**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 3, 2023, ASAC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (A) Director (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was on detail and assigned as the adjutant to Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). While working at his computer, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), DRT, leave CPA Owens' office. Subsequently, CPA Owens summoned SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to his office and advised him there was an active shooter at an Uvalde elementary school.

SBPA (b) (6) (b) (7)(C) stated CPA Owens was on the phone, and a few minutes later CPA Owens told SBPA (b) (6) (b) (7)(C) they were going to Uvalde. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) retrieved the Government owned vehicle (GOV) keys and his ballistic vest (timestamp 00:19:20).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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As they drove to Uvalde, the GOV's emergency lights and siren were activated as necessary to move through intersections. While traveling to Uvalde, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and CPA Owens monitored Uvalde radio communications and CPA Owens was taking phone calls. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not recall who CPA Owens spoke with other than DCPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). CPA Owens spoke with DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to obtain updates concerning the shooting and the USBP response to the shooting. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that CPA Owens did not have the phone on speaker as they drove to Uvalde. As they approached Uvalde and were near the Uvalde Cemetery, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard on the radio that the shooter at Robb Elementary School had been shot. He added the streets near Robb Elementary School were blocked with vehicles (timestamp 00:21:15). SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) estimated that he and CPA Owens arrived at Robb Elementary School approximately 10 minutes after the classroom was breached and the shooter was shot (timestamp 00:31:30).

After parking, SBPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and CPA Owens walked towards Robb Elementary School. CPA Owens remained on the phone with DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who advised CPA Owens that Border Patrol Agents (BPA) were gathered near a tree by the school. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and CPA Owens walked to the tree on the north side of the school and CPA Owens addressed the group of gathered BPAs. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not recall CPA Owens' exact words to the group, but remembered CPA Owens saying that he wanted all BPAs to meet at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not recall the time the meeting was scheduled to begin at UVA (timestamp 00:23:08).

After addressing the BPAs, CPA Owens wanted to meet with Senior Manager (SM) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS). SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and CPA Owens walked towards the west school entrance and DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) informed them that they should not go into the school. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and CPA Owens then walked around the school to the south entrance, where they found SM (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). CPA Owens spoke with SM (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) however, SBPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that he did not hear their conversation. Following the conversation, SBPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and CPA Owens returned to their vehicle and returned to UVA (timestamp 00:25:50).

At UVA, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and CPA Owens reported to the muster room, where CPA Owens ensured clinicians and others were available to assist those involved in the response to the school shooting. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left to pick up food and brought it to UVA (timestamp 00:27:30). CPA Owens addressed a group of BPAs in the muster room about the school shooting and response and told the group he was proud of them (timestamp 00:33:50).

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that, while at UVA, BPA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station, told him that he was bothered because it took too long to enter the classroom and that they wanted to go in, but they would not let them. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not provide him specific information or explain his statements. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) informed SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and rather than going home, he was going to the hospital (timestamp 00:35:17).



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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not recall when he left UVA, but he drove back to USBP Eagle Pass Station (EGT), and CPA Owens drove back to DRT. On May 25, 2022, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove back to Uvalde to accompany CPA Owens to a press conference.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know who was in command of the incident at Robb Elementary School, but believed TXDPS was responsible for investigating the incident. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recall any interactions with the public on May 24, 2022, nor did he exercise any authority or take action to impede anyone's movements. Additionally, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not provide medical treatment to anyone (timestamp 01:27:41).

When asked to explain his understanding of the USBP authority and responsibility to respond to the Robb Elementary School shooting and related incidents, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he understood that if there was an incident of that type, USBP would respond and added that USBP was obligated to respond to active shooter events and assists other agencies regularly (timestamp 01:32:35).

During the interview, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) reviewed maps labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas; 2. South of Uvalde, Texas; 3. Uvalde, Texas; 4. Uvalde, Texas Schools; 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; 5.a Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center, Uvalde, Texas; 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; 8. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas (Attachment 2).

On the map labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated his route of travel from DRT to Uvalde. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that the maps labeled 2. South of Uvalde, Texas, and 3. Uvalde, Texas, were not applicable. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde Texas Schools, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that he accompanied CPA Owens to Robb Elementary School and the Uvalde Civic Center, but they did not get out of the vehicle at the Civic Center.

On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that on May 24, 2022, he did not enter the school. Additionally, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated approximately where he parked near the school; the route he and CPA Owens walked to the school; where CPA Owens met with BPAs near the tree; and where CPA Owens spoke with SM (b)(6)

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated the maps labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; and 6. Robb Elementary School and Uvalde Civic Center were not applicable. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) marked UVA and indicated that on May 24, 2022, he accompanied CPA Owens to UVA, where CPA Owens addressed BPAs who responded to the school shooting.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that the maps labeled 8. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas; 8.a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas; 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas; 8.c. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas; 8.d. Robb



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Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas; and 8.e. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, were not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBP (b)(6) (b 7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b)(6) b(7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 130**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 3, 2023, SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in his office at the USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) Headquarters and was working as Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) over the Professional Standards Branch when he learned from his subordinate, Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, of an incident at a school in Uvalde (timestamp 00:15:50). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was not aware of how SOS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned the information.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with Acting Deputy Chief Patrol Agent ([A]DCPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, and ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, and they all agreed that they should proceed to Uvalde, in case the situation was serious. (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove the unmarked government vehicle (GOV) with ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the rear-passenger seat, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the front-passenger seat.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was receiving third and fourth-hand information via cell phone, and they were not certain of what was occurring and where it was occurring. They continued traveling towards Uvalde and as they approached U.S. Highway 90 learned via the service radio that a significant law enforcement response was occurring, but they still weren't clear on the extent of the situation.

PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) handled communications for (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and controlled (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cell phone, while (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) drove the GOV with the emergency equipment activated (timestamp 00:20:48). ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) gathered information regarding the who, what, when, and where, relating to the incident. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) maintained communications with PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Special Operations Detachment (SOD), and learned PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) activated the Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) and Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) BPAs to the scene (timestamp 00:21:45).

During the drive to Uvalde, (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) cell phone was connected to the GOVs car speaker, and PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) overheard Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, mention that he had been in contact with the Chief of the Border Patrol, Raul Ortiz, who mentioned that if SOD was ready, they had permission to do whatever they needed (timestamp 00:22:04). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) mentioned that information was relayed to PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who shared it with the BORSTAR and BORTAC teams (timestamp 00:22:46).

While the group was en route to Uvalde, ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) identified the location of the incident as Robb Elementary School and guided (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the school. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said they were told on their way to the school that if there was an Incident Command Post (ICP), it would be at the nearby funeral home and that it would also be a deployment point for those in command on scene (timestamp 00:23:30).

Approximately 5-10 miles before entering Uvalde, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned the shooter in the incident was down and the threat was eliminated (timestamp 24:10).

(A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) parked his GOV on the north side of the funeral home, and they gathered a few medical bags from the back of the GOV for (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who was a prior BORSTAR team-member. They thought (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) may need to use his medical training and medical gear. While walking towards Robb Elementary School, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was unable to identify any ICP at the funeral home, so the three of them proceeded to the school grounds and entered the gate of the school on the northwest corner near the funeral home. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) witnessed someone he believed to be a BPA just outside the west door of the school, performing life-saving measures on a victim (timestamp 00:26:18). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and ACPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) entered the school and walked eastbound down the hallway past the "T-Intersection" and the bathrooms. The floors were covered with blood and dead children were covered with garments. The three of them walked east through the halls and looked for things to do, but learned they were not going to be needed for medical assistance or for clearing classrooms. PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that he was not needed as a BORSTAR member but needed to lead as the Deputy Chief Patrol Agent of DRT. The three of them turned and exited through the west door.



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Upon exiting the building, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked south through the parking lot and asked all BPAs not actively engaged in something to meet on the north side of the building near the large shade tree. He could not recall if the instruction came from CPA Owens or (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but he walked south along the west side of the building and told all the BPAs he located.

While walking south, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered Acting PAIC ([A]PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), and learned that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a student at Robb Elementary School and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) status (timestamp 00:33:12). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depart from the school to tend to his family.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended CPA Owens' briefing at the shaded tree, but PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not provide an approximate time the briefing occurred or how long the briefing lasted. At that meeting, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed all the BPAs who had blood-stained uniforms and he and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked with the support staff at DRT to have extra uniforms gathered at UVA to be given to BPAs arriving from Robb Elementary School. At the meeting, CPA Owens instructed all BPAs to reunite at UVA at (b) (7)(E)

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked across the street towards their parked GOV and were approached by an unknown law enforcement officer who asked them to assist in providing security for children who were loading onto school buses headed to the Civic Center. The three of them formed a line with other law enforcement officers to offer protection for the children. They encountered several upset community members and parents, but they did not use force on any of the individuals and did not see anyone use force on any of the community members. The three of them assisted for approximately 10 minutes and then departed the scene and drove towards UVA.

While at UVA, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spent time fielding phone calls and answering emails regarding the situation and learned of other potential shooters at different locations. They knew BPAs were scattered throughout Uvalde performing a variety of duties and they wanted to make sure the BPAs were supported. They also wanted the BPAs to return to UVA quickly. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to the UVA muster room and tried to assist wherever possible including helping the BPAs exchange their bloody uniforms for clean ones.

At some point, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio Station (DRS), arrived at UVA and learned from either (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or CPA Owens that he was transitioning to the (A)PAIC for UVA, while PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dealt with his family situation.

After leaving UVA, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to the Civic Center to check on the well-being of the BPAs assisting there, and then drove back to DRT.

At approximately midnight, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at home and received a phone call from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who asked for guidance regarding the process for asking the eight officer safety questions



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which were supposed to be asked immediately after the deadly force incident (timestamp 00:49:20).

During the interviews, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned the bloody uniforms from the agents were placed inside plastic bags and stored in the armory. A few days after the incident, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed CBP OPR, or the Texas Rangers said the uniforms could be discarded in the garbage. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall who exactly gave the order to throw them away, but it could have been him.

During the interview, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 1:00:39) (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the map labeled 1-North of Uvalde, Texas Schools, map 5-Robb Elementary School, and map 8.a.-Robb Elementary School Layout School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the maps with the locations showing where they parked the GOV, the route they walked into and out of the Robb Elementary School building, where CPA Owens spoke to the BPAs near the shade tree, and where they aided the children loading onto buses at the funeral home.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not identify if the situation was ever an active shooter versus a barricaded subject. On the way to Robb Elementary School, he had not received enough information to understand what was occurring. He knew there were injuries which made him think it was an active shooter, but he was not certain. At some point during the drive to Robb Elementary School, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) overheard either via radio transmissions or from cell phone calls from (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that BPAs on scene were trying to locate keys to unlock the classroom door (timestamp 00:56:57).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe anyone in command and control of the situation at Robb Elementary School. When PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the school, he was searching for PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as he believed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to be the person on scene in command with the most information, however, upon entering the scene, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt that there was no one in command and he never identified an ICP.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of his legal authority to respond to the Robb Elementary School incident. He expressed that he could not recall a policy that stated BPAs have authority to respond to floods, tornadoes, or to provide back-up to other law enforcement agencies either. He believed that based on past precedents, BPAs and other law enforcement officers have a mandate to provide public safety and to protect the innocent. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPAs do not have peace officer status in Texas.





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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 131**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 3, 2023, SAs (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b)(7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the evening shift but went had gone to the station a few hours early to work on paperwork associated with a smuggling case from he was involved in the day prior. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained he went to the station at approximately 11:00 a.m. and was working in an area near the station dispatch room. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that while working near the station dispatch room, he overheard a radio transmission in which someone stated shots were fired. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then went into the station dispatch room to gather additional information. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) overheard BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, on the radio with Uvalde Police Department (UPD) regarding a shooting incident near Robb Elementary School.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that after learning of the shooting near Robb Elementary School, he went to the station armory at which time Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, was issuing out rifles. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) checked out a rifle and went to the station parking lot. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) called the UPD dispatch and obtained the address for Robb Elementary School. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left the station and drove to Robb Elementary School accompanied by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, to aid the UPD.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled approaching the school and seeing several UPD officers around the exterior of the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained he and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) parked their USBP vehicle near the corner of S. Park Street and Geraldine Street. BPAs (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached the school via Geraldine Street. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled encountering several pedestrians at the corner of Geraldine Street and Old Carrizo Rd. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not speak to any of the pedestrians. As BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached Robb Elementary School, he witnessed numerous law enforcement agencies, including Texas Department of Public Safety, UPD, and deputies from the sheriff's office. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recognize any of the officers and proceeded to the west entrance of Robb Elementary School. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described the scene as somewhat quiet and there was no one in charge. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled looking down the hallway and trying to figure out in which classroom the shooter was located. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted he did not know there were any children in the classroom (timestamp 00:53:45). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled that a plain clothes officer, wearing a white dress shirt, was on the phone asking someone about getting keys to the classrooms (timestamp 00:54:30). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled being told by an unknown individual that the classrooms were all locked and a key was needed to make entry. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled checking classroom 131 and 132 and verified the classrooms were locked.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he did not have any contact with his USBP supervisor, nor did he relay any information to his chain of command.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled assisting several BPAs with the evacuation of children from classrooms 102 through 106. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained he then moved to the south entrance of the building. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled hearing approximately four gunshots (timestamp 00:58:30). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not know the direction of the gunfire. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled he and several BPAs began breaking the windows of classrooms 108 through 110. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled assisting with the evacuation of children and teachers from these classrooms. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled one of the teachers evacuated from this area had blood on her shirt (timestamp 00:59:51).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that upon completing the evacuation of the children from the classrooms, he assisted with providing cover near the south entrance of the building. While providing cover, a member of BORTAC (USBP Tactical Team) exited the south entrance and informed members of the BORTAC that they would be making entry into the classroom soon. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued to provide cover near the south entrance. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled suggesting he and other BPAs create a distraction for the shooter by breaking windows, however, his suggestion was denied by someone inside the hallway.



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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled that shortly thereafter, he heard numerous gunshots from the inside of Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:02:45). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately entered the school through the south entrance and made his way down the hall to classroom 111. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled entering the classroom and seeing the deceased gunman. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw several officers removing children from the classroom. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) described the classroom as filled with blood and he could not recall seeing any children being attended to within classroom 111. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not administer any medical treatment to any of the victims. Someone within the classroom told BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that he must leave the classroom because the classroom was a crime scene. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exited the classroom.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he exited Robb Elementary School through the west entrance. Upon doing so, he witnessed BPAs providing medical aid to a female teacher and a student. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled seeing many officers standing around watching BPAs providing aid to the female teacher.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled assisting with providing security in the field next to the school for the establishment of a landing zone.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was told to muster near a big tree located near the front of the school. BPAP (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) saw many BPAs who were upset. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated Chief Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector, said a few words and instructed all BPAs to report back to UVA.

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) depicting Robb Elementary School, Robb Elementary School Layout and Robb Elementary School Layout (Attachment 2). The maps were labeled 4, 5, and 8a, respectively. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) marked the route he drove from UVA to Robb Elementary School. On map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) marked the location he parked his USBP vehicle, the location he interacted with members of the public prior to arriving to the west entrance and the west entrance of the school. On the map labeled as 8a Robb Elementary School Layout, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted the west entrance, the classrooms from which children were evacuated, the classroom the shooter was in, the landing zone, and the muster location.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he did not have a body worn camera. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not have any text messages or emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did he produce any reports concerning the incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 132**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 3, 2023, SSA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) and eating lunch at the Sunrise Café in Uvalde, Texas, when he heard “shots fired” over his radio. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left the café and went to his Government Owned Vehicle parked outside, where he heard “shots fired, all agents respond to Robb Elementary School” (timestamp 00:26:21). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) responded to the call and arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 11:50 a.m. He stated he parked on Geraldine Street.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that when he arrived, the school was already surrounded by law enforcement officers (LEOs) and there was no guidance on the radio about where to go. Shortly after his arrival, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) met Sherriff Reuben Nolasco, Uvalde County Sherriff, and was asked to help with crowd control (timestamp 00:27:22). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that parents were beginning to crowd the streets and attempting to enter the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that parents were beginning to become rowdy, a little aggressive, and agitated. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assisted Sheriff Nolasco with clearing the street and asked the parents to move back towards the funeral home. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that the parents complied, and he did not restrain anyone.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed multiple BPAs gathering around the windows on the west side of the school (timestamp 00:27:51). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained he was with BPAs (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, as they broke the windows, extracted children and teachers from classrooms 102 through 106, and guided them towards the funeral home (timestamp 00:28:30). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled that the extraction process took 15-20 minutes.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that a male in plain clothes with a shotgun came up to him from behind and said he needed help getting his little girl out of the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) identified the male as BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA (timestamp 00:29:26). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) followed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) around the south end of the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated when he arrived, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) UVA, were there with a Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was informed that classrooms 19 through 23 had not been cleared yet. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the rest of the BPAs began clearing the classrooms of children and guided them east towards Old Carrizzo Road, where more LEOs were present. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that no one from these classrooms was injured. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that he believed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) extracted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and left the scene (timestamp 00:31:17). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) remained at the corner of classroom 23 to provide security.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that radio communications were flooded with traffic, and someone had the transmit button on their radio depressed, making it difficult to hear and speak. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that he heard someone over the radio say, “they are about to stack and breach the door” (timestamp 00:45:09). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled hearing another person say, “there are subjects everywhere”. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that he was confused by the transmission and believed the shooter was in a room by himself. Moments later, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) heard another transmission over the radio informing everyone the shooter was down. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) immediately ran towards the south entrance of the school to offer aid.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that after he arrived at the south entrance, he witnessed a lot of LEOs departing the building. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that the LEOs were gagging, throwing up, crying, and some even had a “thousand-mile stare”. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that he wanted to help; however, he was not Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) certified. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that he offered emotional support to the BPAs as they came out of the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that he observed a drone flying around by the southeast corridor of the school (timestamp 02:31:30).





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BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled that when he arrived at the school, a deputy sheriff (unknown county) informed him the shooter dropped a black backpack by the trees before entering the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled seeing the backpack the entire time he was evacuating children out of the school. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that he did not know what happened to the backpack. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was not aware of any CBP leadership guidance while he was on the scene (timestamp 01:17:55).

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that he observed a deceased girl laying on the ground outside of the south entrance of the school and an unknown BPA performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on her (timestamp 01:20:26). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that he did not know why the BPA was performing CPR on her because it was a waste of time and described (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that eventually someone covered her body. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that he also observed a boy on a stretcher receiving chest compressions. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) added that a short while later, the chest compressions were stopped.

BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that once all the BPAs exited the south entrance of the school, they went to a large tree at the north end of the school to rally up. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed USBP Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) members, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USBP Del Rio Station. He added Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector, ordered everyone to return to UVA (timestamp 02:31:55). BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that all BPAs had a debrief with CPA Owens once they returned to UVA. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they heard there was the possibility of a second shooter in one of the local schools; however, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not respond.

During the interview, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde was not applicable. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, was not applicable. The map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, was not applicable. On the map labeled 5a. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving to the school followed by where he arrived at the west side of the school. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center, Uvalde TX was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. On the map labeled 8c. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled where the BORTAC sniper position was located, the drone flying around the southeast corridor of the school, and the rally point on the north side of the school. On the map labeled 8d. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled where the injured boy and girl were located, and which BPAs left the building post breach. On the map labeled 8e. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled which classrooms he helped evacuate on the west side of the school, where he was located, and which BPAs assisted him.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 133**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 6, 2023, SAs (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), Texas, conducting line watch operations as a member of BORTAC. He was working at a remote location on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) north of Eagle Pass, Texas, when he initially learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was in his BORTAC uniform, driving an unmarked USBP vehicle and working with other DRT BORTAC agents SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The group of BORTAC BPAs were dealing with several government owned vehicles (GOV) stuck in the mud and were also waiting for a transport vehicle to transport several groups of migrants to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for processing. While working on those issues, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received notification from an unidentified CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) pilot on a tactical radio channel saying there was a school shooting, and he was leaving the area to assist (timestamp 00:13:57). SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) notified the other team members of the shooting and said they needed to start getting ready to leave the area in case they were deployed to the location of the school shooting.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he spoke with the unidentified AMO pilot on an unidentified date and time after the Robb Elementary School incident. Both the unnamed pilot and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) wondered why the pilot did not land and transport some of the BORTAC members from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. The pilot was in the area tracking the migrants with the BORTAC team at the time of the school shooting (timestamp 00:49:31).

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that at approximately 11:44 a.m., about one minute after hearing the pilot announce the shooting, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a phone call from Acting BORTAC Commander, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, to tell him to get the BORTAC team to the school (timestamp 00:14:40). Immediately after the phone call, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a text from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on a group chat on his personal cell phone telling all BORTAC members to report to Robb Elementary School.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he told all the BORTAC BPAs on the tactical radio channel to immediately respond to Robb Elementary School. The group split into two teams. The first team was SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the front passenger seat, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, driving, and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station, in the rear passenger seat. The second team was BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, driving with BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, in the front passenger seat. Both teams activated their emergency equipment and drove to Robb Elementary School in Uvalde via U.S. Highway 90. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, remained at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E) to gather some of their GOVs and ensure the migrants were transported properly. BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) a Level II Energetic Breacher, had explosive charges and other breaching tools that remained locked and secured within his GOV which was stuck in the mud at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E) (timestamp 03:29:44). As the BORTAC BPAs prepared to leave (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E) SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to leave his breaching equipment in the locked GOV and explained to him that BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) would be needed for other roles once they arrived at the school.

AGENT NOTE: A Level II Energetic Breacher is an individual trained and certified by CBP to use various types of explosives to breach locked doors.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that while driving to Robb Elementary School, he received texts on his personal iPhone using iMessage, as well as Signal, an encrypted messaging application. The radio worked intermittently, and the communications were not clear, so SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relied on his personal cell phone communications for updates. The iMessage and Signal applications were used by all BORTAC and a few USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) BPAs within the DRT area of responsibility.

At 11:45 a.m., SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) learned from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) via text on the “Admin iPhone” group, that the subject was barricaded.

At 11:47 a.m., SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) texted BORTAC BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, via the “BORTAC Field Guys” text string, and told him to respond to the shooting at Robb Elementary School.



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SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not recall when, but remembered he called BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and notified him to prepare his breaching charges in case they needed to apply an explosive charge to enter the classroom door.

At 12:07 p.m., SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) texted the group via the “Admin iPhone” group stating that he was on scene and trying to figure things out (Attachment 2).

At 12:27 p.m., SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a text via the “Admin iPhone” group from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stating, “a guy is taking shots at children in the room and the door is locked.”

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recalled one of the conversations with SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stating the door was locked and that they didn’t have a key (timestamp 00:21:05).

AGENT NOTE: Attachment 2 contains the entire “Admin iPhone” text string.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it took approximately an hour for him to arrive at Robb Elementary School. BPAs (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at the school approximately 10 minutes prior to SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) parked approximately two blocks away from the school due to numerous law enforcement and parents’ vehicles blocking the streets.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he went to the funeral home across the street from the school and encountered BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) preparing his breaching charges (timestamp 00:21:55).

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he observed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) preparing a water-based charge which

**(b) (7) (E)**

(b) (7)(E) SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained that BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) typically prepared (b) (7)(E) SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed that BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b) (7)(E) SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could not

recall what BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) prepared as his (b) (7)(E) explosive, but knew he also had a Halligan tool (used for prying, twisting, punching, or striking), a ram, and a DeWalt mini saw in his truck. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) how long he needed before the charges were ready to go, and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) responded, “Five minutes.” SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) replied, “You have two minutes” (timestamp 00:22:07).

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he understood the incident was an active shooter situation with a barricaded subject. He also believed the subject probably had hostages. He thought that if there were hostages and a barricaded subject, BORTAC would need to enter the classroom immediately for a hostage rescue attempt (timestamp 03:18:05). According to the last information SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received, he assumed the door to the classroom was still locked and that without a key, they were going to be forced to use explosive charges to make entry.



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At 12:21 p.m., (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Acting PAIC ([A]PAIC) Special Operations Division (SOD) texted the group, via iMessage group titled “SOD Management,” and mentioned, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on scene and about to make entry” (Attachment 3).

At 12:24 p.m. (A)PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) texted a map picture of Robb Elementary School via iMessage on the “SOD Management” group chat (Attachment 4).

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was on scene for approximately five minutes before he heard shooting from inside the school, which was SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and the other BPAs breaching the classroom. When he heard the shooting, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran to the school and approached the west entrance. On his approach, he noticed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD, bleeding and being assisted by and unknown SBPA from UVA walking towards him and the funeral home along the west side of the school building. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) asked if BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was ok and was told he was, “ok, but was shot.” SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) approached the west entrance and could not enter the building immediately because several other law enforcement officers were in the way, and children were attempting to exit the building. He stated it was very chaotic, and he was trying to get people to move out of the way so he could enter the school and help the wounded.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he observed children running out of the school. While standing just inside the west entrance, he yelled, “Take them! Take them!” to other law enforcement officers (LEO) standing around outside and behind him. He observed a boy in a dark shirt with a gunshot wound in the shoulder exit the building just after a little girl covered in blood walked past him. He could not recall where the children went after they passed his location. Once inside the school, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed a triage point next to the “T-Intersection,” and saw, BPA emergency medical technicians (EMT) and paramedics performing life saving measures on several children.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated his priority was to enter the school, locate SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and other team members, and provide medical assistance. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) wanted to locate any BORSTAR or BORTAC BPAs, as he was familiar with their level of training and response. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also understood that the field commander, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made decisions and passed them down the chain of command and would have the most accurate information.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said that as he approached the “T-Intersection,” he passed several LEOs frozen against the wall (timestamp 00:26:28). He recalled observing a lot of people not triaging the injured properly (timestamp 00:27:10). He observed people moving children that were deceased and appeared to have been deceased for a while. He felt that people were clogging the triage area with deceased people instead of those who could be saved.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he heard BORSTAR BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, yelling for someone to, “Bring me a kid I can save!” (timestamp 00:29:05).



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SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he made his way past the “T-Intersection” and found someone he recognized, Texas Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was standing near the utility closet next to classroom 112. He checked on Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and noticed BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and another unidentified LEO walking past him carrying Robb Elementary School teacher (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:31:35).

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he looked down the hallway towards the south entrance and recognized BPA EMT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BRA, performing life-saving measures to someone along the east wall near the south entrance.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that when he entered classroom 112, BPA EMT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, stated everyone was “black,” meaning deceased. He observed BORSTAR Paramedic (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, trying to triage within the room and noted Robb Elementary School teacher (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was deceased and laying on top of all the children in the corner of the room. He stopped and looked at the whole room, focused on the living and tried to find work to do. He had a quick prayer, then entered classroom 111 through the adjoining door and spoke with SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) about the situation.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he told SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was shot during the breach and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) acted genuinely surprised (timestamp 00:35:55). While in classroom 111, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noticed an extremely large pool of blood on the floor and a ballistic shield laying on the floor. He spoke to SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and they asked each other about BORTAC BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) status. Since the amount of blood on the floor was extensive and BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was initially carrying the shield, but it was found laying on the floor, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wondered if BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was shot (timestamp 00:36:20).

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said that after the breach, most of the children exited through the north end of the hallway, towards triage; however, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed a few children exit through the south entrance. He did not know why they exited through the south but thought it may have been due to a lack of room on the north side, as many LEOs were crowding the hallways.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he never went “hands-on” or performed any life-saving measures on any of the children. He was very impressed with the medical response by BORSTAR and BPA EMTs and said they did a phenomenal job setting up triage stations. He witnessed other LEOs, whom he believed did not have the same level of training, not triaging children well. He witnessed a couple of unidentified LEOs moving deceased children. In one instance, he observed several LEOs dragging (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) girl across the floor by her arms and legs, whom he believed was clearly deceased based on her massive head trauma. He believed she should have been left where the LEOs originally located her. He believed they were trying to help but were perhaps in a state of shock and doing things that were not logical.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he believed everyone on scene was trying to be helpful but believed there were too many LEOs on scene and the responses on the north and south ends of the hallway seemed totally separated. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed BORSTAR, BPA EMTs, and paramedics, maintained command and control regarding patient triage and treatment. BPAs outnumbered





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state and local LEOs throughout the scene. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did not pay much attention to the state and local LEOs but observed BPAs telling other state and local LEOs what to do and where to go. He witnessed multiple BPA EMTs triaging and treating patients simultaneously. He ultimately believed BORSTAR was in command and control regarding triage and treatment, despite the chaos and a few individual outliers doing their own thing.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he told BORTAC BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as well as BORTAC SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to clear the classrooms in the west building. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then exited through the south entrance to gather the rest of the BORTAC BPAs outside the school building.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that when he exited the south entrance, he noticed the person who BPA EMT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was performing life-saving measures on earlier, was covered in a blanket and appeared deceased. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then walked north along the west side of the building and observed BORSTAR SBPAs (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, performing life-saving measures on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the pavement (timestamp 00:38:13).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he located BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) standing with the unknown UVA SBPA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then told the UVA SBPA to take BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the hospital because the UVA SBPA's GOV was nearby and not blocked by other vehicles.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he provided BORTAC Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, Acting Deputy Chief Patrol Agent ([A]DCPA) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DRT, and Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, a situation report, informing them that BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was going to the hospital and SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was with the shooter (timestamp 00:40:13). PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and CPA Owens told SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to have BORTAC and BORSTAR members not actively involved in something at the moment to rally in front of the school.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he walked around the school building and notified all the BORTAC and BORSTAR members he could find to report to the shade tree on the north side of the building.

At 1:00 p.m., SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) texted the BORTAC and BORSTAR group members via the "Admin iPhone" group, that the subject was dead and there were multiple people injured (Attachment 2).

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said that while walking around the south part of the building, an unidentified LEO, possibly a sheriff's deputy, informed SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that a life-flight was enroute and needed to land. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took it upon himself to establish a landing zone; however, a few minutes later, the LEO told him an unknown entity did not send that life-flight and the landing zone was no longer needed (timestamp 00:40:50).

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he walked back towards the tree and CPA Owens requested all BPAs report to UVA at 2:00 p.m. in the muster room. Once back at UVA in the muster room, PAIC



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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they received information that the shooter's girlfriend was going to Uvalde High School to "finish the job."

At 3:00 p.m., (A)PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) texted photographs of the shooter's supposed girlfriend (Attachment 5). SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and several BORTAC and BORSTAR BPAs responded with some BPAs going to Uvalde High School and others to Uvalde Middle School (timestamp 00:43:00), however, both schools shared a parking lot.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that when he arrived at the middle school, the BPAs noticed the principal had placed a sign on the door stating the school was on lockdown. The principal saw the BPAs on a security camera, exited the school, and asked the BPAs to help evacuate the children to the gymnasium and ultimately to their parents. The BPAs on scene assisted with escorting over 200 children from the gymnasium to their parents' vehicles. Additionally, a group of students were on a field trip and were returning late, so the BPAs remained at the schools until approximately 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. to escort the last group of children to their parents' vehicles.

At approximately 6:33 p.m., SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned to UVA before he and his team ultimately returned to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E) to remove the GOVs stuck in the mud. He then he went home for the evening.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that while at Robb Elementary School, he never located an incident command post anywhere. He never identified an incident command post at the school or the funeral home. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) goal the entire time while on scene was to enter the school, find SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) as he believed he was in command and had the most accurate information, and provide medical care to those in need.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) said he noted that outside the school, PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) initially had overall control until he appeared to transfer control to (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and CPA Owens. He further noted SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) relinquish command within the school to BORSTAR once actions on the objective were completed so they could handle medical triage and treatment. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed control ultimately returned to the Texas Rangers after the children were evacuated, as they started processing the crime scene. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) commended (A)DCPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for stepping back and handing control over to the local LEOs (timestamp 01:52:10) before they departed for UVA.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that overall, he believed that communication during the entire event could have been a lot better, especially if the north and south hallway groups would have talked to each other. He understood they did not want to cross in front of classrooms 111 and 112 out of fear of more shots being fired through the doors. Additionally, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believed Uvalde was not prepared for a mass casualty event, as emergency services were clogged for approximately a week after the event. He was glad BORTAC was there to stop the shooter, as he believed without BORTAC BPAs, the scene would have been much worse. Lastly, he said there was no formal organization at the scene, and it was total chaos.



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SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he believed his authority to respond to Robb Elementary School was related to a federal law banning guns on public school property. Additionally, he believed that an active threat to life required a response from all law enforcement. SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) knew that BPAs did not have peace officer status in Texas.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated BORTAC BPAs typically carried the following gear: armor plates, rifles, individual first aid kits, tourniquets, extra ammunition magazines, a less-than-lethal device, a helmet, and a gas mask. The BORTAC BPAs on scene did not have a shield, but used a rifle-round ballistic rated shield, which belonged to the U.S. Marshals Service.

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 03:49:30) (Attachment 6). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively.

On the map labeled 2, South Uvalde, Texas, and the map labeled 3, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) in Texas, then onto Highway 90 into Uvalde.

On the map labeled 4, Uvalde, Texas Schools, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) again marked his route of travel to Robb Elementary School.

On map 5, labeled Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) labeled where he parked his GOV and where he met with BPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at his parked GOV at the funeral home.

On the map labeled 5.a, Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) started marking how he entered the school grounds, but moved to the next applicable map, labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School, where he drew a more detailed layout of his route of travel while on the Robb Elementary School grounds.

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided four separate text strings from his personal cell phone with various BORTAC and BORSTAR members and supervisors from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 7).

- Text String One, on iMessage, titled BORTAC Supervisors, (8:27 PM-9:54 AM). The string included the following BPAs: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
- Text String Two, on iMessage, titled Admin iPhones, (11:47 AM-7:51 PM). The string included the following: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
- Text String Three, on iMessage, titled BORTAC SOD Management, (12:05 PM-6:37 PM). The string included the following BPAs: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and three unidentified phone numbers.

- Text String Four, on Signal application, titled BORTAC Field Guys, (11:47 AM-6:56 PM). The string included the following individuals: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Admin), (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (Other), (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Work Phone, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also emailed a photograph from his personal cell phone to SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) containing an image of the shield shot by the shooter, which the BORTAC agents held when they breached classroom 111 (Attachment 8).

During the interview, at approximately 1:06 p.m., SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CBP OPR Cyber Division, entered the interview room and recorded the text strings found on SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) personal cell phone. SA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) recorded the messages using his CBP-issued iPhone (timestamp 04:43:39).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
2	Text messages from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
3	Text message from (A)PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
4	Text messages with map picture of Robb Elementary School from (A)PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
5	Text from (A)PAIC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with picture of shooter's girlfriend.
6	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
7	Group text messages from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
8	Photo from SBPA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of ballistic shield used during the breach.

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 134**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 6, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned as (A)PAIC for UVA. He had attended his son's award ceremony at Robb Elementary School earlier in the morning and was on his way back to UVA.

At approximately 11:40 a.m., he heard radio traffic about shots being fired near Robb Elementary School (timestamp 13:28:00). He continued to drive to UVA to retrieve his government issued Glock 47, handheld radio, and body armor.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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At approximately 11:46 a.m., he began making phone calls to Uvalde Chief of Police Danny Rodriguez, Uvalde County Sheriff Ruben Nolasco, Acting Division Chief ([A]DC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, and Executive Officer (XO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Station (DRS) but was unable to reach anyone (timestamp 13:29:25).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the only information available to him at the time was that someone had crashed a vehicle in the area, fired shots toward a funeral home near Robb Elementary School and was held up in a building. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the subject was in Robb Elementary School (timestamp 13:30:20).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Watch Commanders (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP UVA, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP UVA, were in the same vehicle and driving to Robb Elementary School a few cars length in front of him. He further added, WCs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any more information about the incident than he did.

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered receiving a call from either Acting Deputy Chief Patrol Agent ([A]DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, or (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He indicated he passed along the limited information available to him concerning the situation and would provide additional updates upon arriving on scene (timestamp 13:31:00).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to drive up to the school and was forced to park a distance away due to the large number of first responders and civilian vehicles parked in the middle of the street. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived on scene at 12:05 p.m. and observed a line of children being evacuated from the school in the direction of the funeral home (timestamp 13:32:45).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw Sheriff Nolasco and his Lieutenant standing by a patrol vehicle near the funeral home and walked over to him to ask what was happening. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed Sheriff Nolasco had set up a command post since he was the highest-ranking law enforcement officer on scene (timestamp 13:33:24).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Sheriff Nolasco told him a truck had crashed through a fence, the driver fired a few rounds toward the funeral home, entered the school and was currently held up in a classroom. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told students were being evacuated and it appeared only two people were injured. There was no mention of injured students at that time (timestamp 14:47:03).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained Sheriff Nolasco requested that USBP provide perimeter security. He also learned from Sheriff Nolasco that Chief Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde County Sheriff's Office, was across the street at the school. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed Chief Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exit the school building (timestamp 13:35:00).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) crossed the street and approached Chief Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to ask what USBP could do to help. Chief Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him it was going to be a while because law enforcement personnel were trying to negotiate with the subject. Chief Deputy



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could provide pallets of water for law enforcement personnel on scene (timestamp 13:35:08).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called UVA to request the pallets of water and to instruct a supervisor to begin working on the Evolving Situation Report. He stated he then returned to Sheriff Nolasco's location, advised him the water was on the way, and asked again how USBP could help. Sheriff Nolasco requested assistance guiding parents to the funeral home where children were being evacuated to. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and another Border Patrol Agent (BPA) walked up and down the street directing parents to the funeral home (timestamp 13:37:00).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then returned to the north side of Robb Elementary School where Sheriff Nolasco was talking to other law enforcement personnel about clearing classrooms on the older part of the school (rooms 1-12). Sheriff Nolasco later decided against evacuating students after accessing the classrooms were well fortified in that section of the school (timestamp 13:38:20).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that either upon arriving at Robb Elementary School, or shortly thereafter, he observed the presence of USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) BPAs on scene. He remembered seeing USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Team (BORSTAR) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, and possibly BORTAC SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT (timestamp 14:40:48).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed by 12:15 p.m., the BORTAC team was on scene. He also recalled seeing BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, laid up in a bush with his sniper rifle pointed in the direction of the classroom where the subject was supposed to be (timestamp 13:41:34).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was routinely making and receiving phone calls and speaking with (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide them with updates on the situation. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not communicate directly with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall at what moment he learned there were students inside the classroom with the subject. He stated he was not aware that any people had been hurt or killed, aside from the two injuries Sheriff Nolasco mentioned to him upon arriving on scene (timestamp 13:43:42).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that at approximately 12:30 p.m., he learned BORTAC was preparing to make entry. He recalled seeing ballistic shields and pry tools and hearing that emergency medical technicians (EMT) were staging in the hallways and at the front of the school (timestamp 13:44:25).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recalled a conversation with (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about reaching out to other USBP stations to deploy EMT personnel to the scene. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he explained UVA (b) (7)(E) USBP Carrizo Springs Station and both agreed additional EMTs were needed at the scene (timestamp 13:45:00).





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(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that at approximately 12:40 p.m., he spoke with Sheriff Nolasco, who informed him the command post was being moved to the southeast side of the main school campus. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked with Sheriff Nolasco to the new command post location (timestamp 13:47:30).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the new command post, he observed Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) leadership, expressing concerns to themselves about breaching the classroom and they wanted wait and negotiate. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered during the conversation between the two TXDPS personnel, he received radio traffic that the classroom door had been breached. He described all law enforcement personnel at the command post ran to the school after the breach (timestamp 13:51:07).

At approximately 12:52 p.m. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the south entrance of Robb Elementary School and observed a deceased student outside the door and EMTs performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation on another student. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing BPAs who were visibly shaken up, and he attempted to console them and encouraged them to remove themselves from the scene (timestamp 13:52:45).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated efforts were made by BPAs to establish a landing zone for a life flight helicopter but was eventually called off because the helicopter was too far away.

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then encountered Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, who informed him Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP DRT, was asking for all USBP personnel, not actively engaged, to meet on the north side of the school for a briefing.

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP UVA, extremely distraught. He attempted to console BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and to tried to help wash his hands and convince him to clean the brain matter off his pants.

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) found him and told him to go find (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the civic center, where students from Robb Elementary School were being relocated. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that at that time, he still did not know where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was.

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he was eventually reunited with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the civic center and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later took (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) home. While at the civic center, (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of a secondary threat made by the shooter's girlfriend on social media, threatening to finish the job (timestamp 14:02:26).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the civic center with approximately ten BPAs and various law enforcement agencies, providing perimeter security for the students and members of the media still present in the building (timestamp 15:46:15).



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(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he contacted WCs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked for help coordinating resources to participate in safely evacuating the remaining schools and ensuring there were no threats at those locations.

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was under the impression TXDPS had established command post trailer at Robb Elementary School. He further believed (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had directed swing shift WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP UVA, to go to the TXDPS command post.

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spoke with Assistant Chief (AC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Washington, D.C, and confirmed that USBP was not in pursuit of the shooter who crashed near Robb Elementary School (timestamp 15:50:30).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not go back to UVA for the briefing held by the Chief Owens but instead remained at the civic center to coordinate the perimeter security provided by BPAs. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he returned to UVA shortly after 6:00 p.m.

Upon returning to UVA, (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was happy to see clean uniforms had been provided to BPAs whose uniforms were stained with blood. He also observed peer support and Chaplains on site and food and water made available to USBP personnel.

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his old government cell phone contains call logs and text messages concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 15:55:18).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not produce any reports concerning the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 15:57:21).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained it was his belief Sheriff Nolasco was in charge at Robb Elementary School shooting because he was the highest-ranking law enforcement official in the county (timestamp 15:58:10).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when he arrived on scene, Sheriff Nolasco told him the shooter was held up in a room, so he believed the situation was a barricaded subject (timestamp 15:59:14).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not render first aid to anyone at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 15:59:41).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not physically restrain or hold anyone back at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 15:59:51).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he self-deployed to scene after learning about shots being fired near Robb Elementary School (timestamp 13:30:19).



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(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP’s role in the incident at Robb Elementary School was to support other law enforcement agencies for the benefit of public safety and rendering aid (timestamp 16:04:43).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not cite a statute granting USBPB the authority to respond to an active shooter incident but stated it was a felony in progress and USBP has a duty to respond even though they may not have jurisdiction (timestamp 16:00:17).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he overheard discussions regarding classrooms 111 and 112 being locked and attempts being made to obtain keys, but he could not recall who had the conversations (timestamp 16:01:10).

(A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a map package and labeled his movements and location during the Rob Elementary School shooting incident. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed the notes section in the map package (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Email from (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received an email from (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School (Attachment 1).

In the email, (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified he may not have been in front of the school at 12:05 p.m. as stated in his March 6, 2023, interview. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believes he may have been in the vicinity of his first contact with Sheriff Ruben Nolasco, Uvalde County Sheriff's Office.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Email from (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated March 10, 2023.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

<b>Prepared by:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
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<b>Approved by:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 135**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 6, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is a BPA at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) and is assigned as a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is responsible for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not wear a USBP uniform. Instead, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wears a black CBP polo shirt and khaki pants.

On May 24, 2022, at approximately 11:30 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was completing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) duties in the UVA government owned vehicle (GOV) parking lot when he saw BPAs running towards vehicles. Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, then ran out of one of the buildings and informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) volunteered to accompany SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he returned to his office to retrieve his vest, extra magazines, and handheld radio before departing UVA with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Robb Elementary School is approximately 10 to 15 minutes from UVA (Timestamp 00:23:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) similar events in the past were called off after it was determined the threat was not credible. However, on May 24, 2022, the information being disseminated continued to provide notification of an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was driving the marked USBP vehicle, he attempted to direct traffic from the passenger side window to get to the location as fast as possible. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they traveled to the school by means of Highway 90 to Highway 83 South and arrived at the back side of the school near the playground at approximately 11:50 a.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were the third unit to arrive on scene (Timestamp 00:24:45).

As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got out of the vehicle, parents from surrounding homes started approaching and inquiring about the situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated there were approximately 20 people in the area when they arrived. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they told the parents to stay back and that they would be informed about what was going on later. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were no physical altercations with the parents, only verbal dialogue regarding the situation (Timestamp 01:26:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper arrived approximately one minute after their arrival. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a chain-link fence surrounding the school and a gate locked with a chain at their location. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated one of the neighbors in the area provided them with bolt cutters to cut the chain to allow the group to enter the school grounds. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were initially behind cover when they were trying to unlock the chain on the gate. They then learned the “threat” was on the other side of the school and they went towards the “threat” as soon as they made it through the gate. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went towards the front of the school while BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the rest of the group stayed on the south side of the school (Timestamp 00:27:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they followed the sidewalk adjacent to the last building on the south side of the school campus (classrooms 19 - 23) and made their way to the southwest corner of classroom 23. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed there were approximately 25 law enforcement officers (LEOs) across the way at the south entrance of the building across the courtyard (Building 100). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, at that time, they still did not have any solid information regarding the “threat,” so they took cover at their location. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered there was a lot of confusion and he heard information about launching a drone and warnings that the shooter may have been on the roof (Timestamp 01:29:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) specifically remembered that at approximately 12:10 p.m., he received a news alert on his watch of an active shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also remembered it was at approximately the same time a helicopter arrived (Timestamp 00:28:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again noted the abundance of LEOs on the south end of building 100, so there was no reason for them to move to the other side. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) still felt the need to take some type of action as they heard over the radio that an unknown team was 30 minutes away. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they should check the classrooms and let the kids out. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the windows in the classroom doors were covered but there was a window panel above the door (depicted in Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used his hands to lift BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to



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help him see through the window panel above the door to classroom 23. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed there were still kids in the classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they tried to open the door, but it was locked. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they knew no one would open the door if they simply knocked so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided his USBP ballcap to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to wave in the window to identifying themselves while they knocked on the door. Eventually, a teacher peeked out and, upon seeing their vests, opened the door to the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified themselves and stated they were going to evacuate the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pointed the kids and teachers towards BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was further down the sidewalk, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then directed the kids to the playground. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) evacuated the classrooms, the TXDPS Trooper with them covered their location from the corner of classroom 23. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they continued evacuating each classroom until they evacuated all the classrooms in the building (classrooms 19-23) (Timestamp 00:31:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered there were two classrooms where kids had locked themselves in the interior restrooms and refused to get out. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it took extra time to convince the kids, but they eventually got out (Timestamp 01:03:45).

After the classrooms were evacuated, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated additional LEOs arrived, including a TXDPS Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team member who asked where the TXDPS personnel were located. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed him to building 100 (Timestamp 00:30:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered that after the classrooms were evacuated, an unknown male in civilian clothes and a vest and in possession of a rifle, who claimed to be a BPA, arrived at their location and asked about the kids in the classrooms. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the unknown BPA claimed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in one of the classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed the unknown BPA that all the kids had been evacuated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not see the BPA again.

After the evacuations of the classrooms, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw other BPAs across the courtyard evacuating classroom 108 on the east side of building 100. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed the BPAs breaking windows and taking kids out of the adjacent windows. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was a mix of agencies assisting with the evacuations, to include BPAs and local agencies. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, was one of the BPAs involved (Timestamp 01:42:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they held their position and listened to the communication over the “patched” radio, which included transmissions from TXDPS Troopers and LEOs from other agencies in addition to BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered information was sent specific to two different calls from within the classroom. One call was from a little girl requesting help and the other was from a little girl saying there were multiple victims on the ground (Timestamp 01:39:00). Prior to hearing the information on the radio, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought it was a hostage situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the person was in the classroom but did not know he had shot the kids. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had not heard any shots during the time he was on campus and confirmed he did not hear the gunshots fired at 12:21 p.m.





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of the situation or status of the door to the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard information over the radio announcing Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) was preparing to breach and to standby for the breach. Approximately one to two minutes later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard the announcement, “breach, breach, breach.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he heard shots after the breach and an announcement that the shooter was down (Timestamp 01:48:00).

After the breach, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw everyone at the south entrance of building 100 enter the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran to the building but, before he could enter, a victim, described by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a teacher with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was brought out the door and placed on the concrete sidewalk. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), there were approximately four or five Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) working on the teacher, including BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were “pumping” on her chest and putting patches on her. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached and offered his assistance. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached, he noticed the teacher’s head was severely injured. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered that one of the EMTs held her hand and the teacher seemed to be able to squeeze. However, with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) basic medical knowledge, he could not state what the hand squeezing by the teacher was attributed to or what it meant. When her head injury was discovered, the EMTs determined she would not survive and left her to reenter the building to tend to others. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the assistance from another LEO, covered the teacher with a yellow blanket (Timestamp 01:07:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw LEOs visibly emotional and upset walking out of the building’s south entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (AKA: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who he described as emotionally distraught. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) commented that it was too late (Timestamp 01:10:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to console BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) until another BPA took over and led BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) away. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), as he exited the building accompanied by another agent. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also observed one local officer collapse immediately after exiting the south entrance because the officer had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was in the building (Timestamp 02:13:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unsure as to the order of events but remembered that at one point he observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) providing medical care to a young boy near the west entrance to building 100. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) providing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and applying patches to the boy. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated ambulances were parked in the loop off Geraldine Street north of the west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted with escorting the gurney and loading the boy into the ambulance, which BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated was blocked for some time from departing the school (Timestamp 02:17:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered seeing a large group of approximately 100 parents in the perimeter area of the school, who he described as fighting and arguing with the Troopers. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could hear the parents asking why no one was going into the school and others pleading to be allowed to get their children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not help with addressing the parents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not observe any physical altercations (Timestamp 02:17:00).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then entered the building from the south entrance to see how he could assist. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see multiple people going in and out of the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not walk because there was blood in the hallway, which caused him to slip and slide. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was dark and it smelled like blood and described the smell as a meat market where meat had gone bad (Timestamp 00:42:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, in the hallway looking into an unknown classroom (room 111 or 112). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in a state of shock, almost in a trance, and he attempted to console him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not go into the classrooms but looked in where SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was staring and saw blood everywhere and piles of kids in the corners.

There were approximately six or seven USBP and local EMTs, including USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) BPAs, inside assessing who could be saved. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed one unknown BPA amongst the EMTs who appeared to be taking charge and coordinating efforts. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who he was (possibly from the USBP Brackettville Station) but described him as having a large build and wearing a black shirt. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the BPA taking charge was the one who ordered everyone who was not an EMT to get out of the area (Timestamp 01:11:10).

At approximately 1:30 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with other BPAs near the tree at the front of the school. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, ordered all BPAs to clear out and muster at UVA. CPA Owens said TXDPS was taking over (Timestamp 02:19:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the mood at UVA was somber and quiet. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described as drenched in blood, led a prayer followed by CPA Owens providing information about support services. Following muster, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to his office with other BPAs and listened for updates from the news and family. BPA (b) (6) departed UVA with the other BPAs in his carpool group. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not witness any BPAs changing out of their uniforms at the station (Timestamp 02:27:10).

When asked about his understanding about what was taking place at the other building while he was across the courtyard near classroom 23, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he kept thinking about what was taking so long. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not receive any calls from any supervisors nor was he taking any orders from anyone. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) whichever agency is first on scene is in charge and his role was to provide backup. This includes events such as shootings and pursuits (Timestamp 01:35:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his role as a BPA when responding to Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022, was to take down the active shooter. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) their job was to react, but he did not do so as they were not the first ones on scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the personnel who arrived on scene first were in command and in control of the situation. He stated the first personnel on scene were the locals: Uvalde Police Department, Sherriff's Office, or the school police (Timestamp 02:27:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a point when he saw local SWAT



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arrive, but nothing was done. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also saw TXDPS SWAT arrive, but again, nothing was done. However, when BORTAC arrived BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a shift in command as it seemed the previous teams needed someone else to take over (Timestamp 02:31:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the breach, BORSTAR and USBP EMTs took charge of the medical aspect (Timestamp 02:31:50).

TXDPS seemed to take over the investigation after everything was done. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated TXDPS began pouring into the area and taking ownership of the situation only after the threat was eliminated and the medical portion was addressed. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it was as if TXDPS didn't want to get their "hands dirty" (Timestamp 02:34:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wondered if the outcome would have been different if USBP arrived first on scene.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP's authority to respond was related to the oath he took and his responsibility to help whoever needed help (Timestamp 02:37:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not wearing a body worn camera on the day of the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not write any reports related to his response to Robb Elementary School, but stated he was interviewed by a TXDPS Ranger.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a Map Package which was utilized to mark his routes of travel and significant areas where he was throughout the day (Attachment 3):

- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 4 – Uvalde, TX Schools to indicate his route of travel to the school.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 5 – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate his arrival at the school.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the area he was at during the majority of the time he was at the school and the path he took to that location.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8b – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the location he witnessed medical treatment while at the school.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Drawing behind Map 7
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 6, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working the (b) (7)(E) day shift. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned camera/sensor duties and was changing out batteries on cameras located in various locations throughout ranches within the UVA area of responsibility.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 10:30 a.m., while performing camera/sensor duties on a ranch located approximately (b) (7)(E) of Uvalde, he heard over the radio that all agents should report to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:20:05). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately began driving to the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained it took him approximately 20 minutes to arrive at the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the radio communications were very poor while driving to Robb Elementary School and he did not have a good understanding of what was happening at the school.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival at the Robb Elementary School, he used his vehicle to block the traffic down one of the streets near the school. Upon exiting his vehicle, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began walking towards the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a black pick-up truck that had crashed in a ditch. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, near the crashed pick-up truck. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the truck contained unused ammunition, an AK-47 rifle, and loaded magazines. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw .223 caliber rounds and AK-47 rounds near the truck (timestamp 01:01:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he began to make his way towards the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the west entrance of the school near the "T" intersection. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) briefly spoke to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and asked if he had an extra M-4 rifle to let him use. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied he did not have any extra guns. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued towards the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at the west entrance of the school near the "T" intersection and spoke to an unknown Uvalde Police Department officer. The officer explained the shooter was in the school, but that the Uvalde school police (Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department) chief was in the classroom negotiating with the shooter (timestamp 01:06:57).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began walking along the west side of the school and noticed bullet holes in several of the windows. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked every law enforcement officer he encountered if they had any additional information to share but no one had information. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then encountered another unknown police officer. The officer said the Uvalde school police chief was in the classroom negotiating with the shooter.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he began to assist with the evacuation of children from the west classrooms 102 through 106. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went to the south entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and began to evacuate children from the east facing classrooms (108 through 110). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) along with other BPAs broke the classroom windows while extracting the children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered classroom 110 through the window to assist the teacher. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the teacher was injured and needed assistance with getting through the window. Upon the completion of evacuating all the teachers and children from classrooms 108 through 110, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staged near the south entrance of the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inquired if BORTAC (USBP Tactical Unit) wanted them to break windows of classrooms 111 or 112 to attempt to distract the shooter while entry was being made. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was told not to break any windows due to officer safety concerns. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall with which BORTAC agent he had communicated.

While waiting at the south entrance of the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with his neighbor, an Uvalde Police Department officer named BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed with him for several minutes and prayed because BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the shooter was in BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) classroom (timestamp 01:29:45).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at no time prior to the agents entering the classroom did he hear any gunshots (timestamp 01:35:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described looking into the south entrance of the school and witnessing numerous law enforcement agents lined up in the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled speaking to someone about why it was taking so long for the agents to enter the classroom. The unknown person stated the agents were waiting for keys because the door to the classroom was locked. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described Supervisory BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), as taking charge within the hallway (timestamp 01:39:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing over the radio a request for radio silence because the breach of the classroom was imminent. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see anyone utilizing keys (timestamp 01:41:20). Shortly thereafter, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed agents entering the classroom and recalled the sounds of numerous gunshots. Immediately following the gunshots, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the south entrance and made his way down the hallway towards the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing a ring of keys laying on the floor just outside the classroom (timestamp 01:41:26). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the hallway as very smoky and smelling like gunpowder.

Upon arriving at the classroom, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who was injured and was being assisted out of the hallway by two unknown agents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered a small girl being taken out of the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall who had taken the girl out of the classroom but had left her on the floor just outside the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) carried the girl to a waiting emergency medical technician outside the south entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and another unknown BPA attempted to perform CPR on the little girl but noticed she had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) found a blanket and covered the little girl.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he re-entered the school through the south entrance and entered classroom 112. Upon entering classroom 112, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed the shooter lying face down on the floor. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being told to leave the classroom if he was not a medic. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the school utilizing the south entrance.

Upon exiting the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed several BPAs attending to a little boy. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Brackettville, Texas, was performing chest compressions on the little boy (timestamp 01:58:02). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the assistance of other unknown BPAs, wheeled the little boy to a waiting ambulance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall any identifying information regarding the little boy.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing numerous BPAs attending to a woman. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized the woman as a teacher named (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated five to ten BPAs were attending to the teacher.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being told to gather near the front of the school for a muster. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled many BPAs were upset, vomiting, and blankly staring. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told to head back to UVA. Shortly after arriving at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with securing and evacuating several local schools.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the entire incident as chaotic. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP responded to the incident to assist the local police departments. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPAs took control of the situation because no one else was doing anything. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said USBP did not have the authority to handle situations like the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 02:21:55).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 6, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was driving to UVA in his assigned government owned vehicle (GOV) when he heard “shooter” and “school” over his radio (timestamp 00:14:53). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he began driving towards Uvalde High School as he did not know which school was involved. He called UVA to gain a better understanding of the incident and was informed the shooting took place at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to respond to the school and offer any assistance. He arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:30 p.m. and described the scene as a “parade of blue and red” due to the law enforcement officers (LEO) presence on scene.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked along Old Carrizo Road and observed LEOs escorting children and teachers out of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to assist with the evacuation and explained that no one appeared to be injured. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that civilians in the area began questioning him about the situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at this time, no one knew what was going on (timestamp 00:18:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there was a “hot mic” situation that most of the information transmitting over the radio was unnecessary.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated numerous emergency medical technicians (EMT) arrived at his location and asked him about the situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard on his service radio that the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) had arrived on scene. A few minutes later, he heard the shooter was “down” (timestamp 00:20:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he then heard that EMTs were needed at the incident location and proceeded to guide the EMTs to the south entrance to the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once he arrived at the south entrance, he observed victims being carried outside and medical personnel performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation on them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a covered body lying by the south entrance door.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, Special Operations Supervisor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, Supervisory BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, at the south entrance of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he never heard any communications regarding classrooms 111 and 112.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he proceeded to his GOV to retrieve his first aid kit to offer to assist medical personnel. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that while he was not EMT certified, he wanted to help with the “controlled chaos.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was back at his GOV, he observed a USBP transport van, driven by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, picking up children to transport them to the civic center.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ordered him to go back to UVA. While back at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard there was a second shooter at one of the local schools and that gunshots may have been heard at Uvalde High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that no one was ordered to deploy to a particular school, however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed most of the BPAs responded to Uvalde High school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he deployed to Dalton Elementary School where he conducted crowd control and vehicle checks. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed pedestrians walking by with backpacks and stated he ordered the pedestrians to lift their shirts and open their backpacks to check for weapons due to the threat of a second shooter (timestamp 01:02:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the pedestrians were compliant. He saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on scene at Dalton Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he decided to respond to Robb Elementary School because he was a first responder and the incident merited a first response (timestamp 00:30:02). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he acted on his own accord and assisted as needed (timestamp 00:33:45). At no time



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did he perceive there was an incident command (timestamp 00:42:55). When BORTAC arrived on scene, he knew they were trained to handle the situation; however, there was no official communication identifying BORTAC as overseeing the incident response (timestamp 00:44:19). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed that when USBP responds to these types of incidents, they are on scene in a supporting role.

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde was not applicable. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, was not applicable. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled where he parked along Old Carrizo Road, where the transport vehicle was located, where children were positioned prior to pick up, and where the pickup area was located south of the school. The map labeled 5.a. was not applicable. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. On the map labeled 8. c. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route from Old Carrizo Road to the South entrance of the school. The map labeled 8. d. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 8. e. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 6, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the UVA checkpoint when he heard BPA-Intelligence (BPA-I) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), Sector Intelligence Unit, transmit over the radio there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked over at his partner, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and they both immediately grabbed their equipment and headed to their vehicles. Once in his assigned unmarked canine vehicle, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Special Operations Detachment (SOD). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at home and off-duty at the time of the call. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School and that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should probably have his USBP tactical unit personnel respond to the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then drove approximate 15 minutes in light traffic to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall radio traffic during his response to the school (timestamp 12:37:22).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Robb Elementary School and parked their vehicles on the east side of the school on Old Carrizo Road near the cafeteria building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made his way to the parking lot near the cafeteria where he met with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and they both took cover behind a vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a locked gate at the entrance to the school and asked a civilian in the area if they could find bolt cutters. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the civilian returned a few minutes later with bolt cutters. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the bolt cutters to gain access to the school through the gate, and he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the school grounds. At that time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had not received any updated information and was unaware of the location of the shooter (timestamp 12:25:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made their way to the southwest corridor of the building that housed classrooms 19 through 23. From his location, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several law enforcement officers (LEOs) outside the south hallway entrance near classrooms 102 and 108. A few minutes later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informing him that he (BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) needed to relocate because the shooter was believed to be located in a classroom with windows facing towards his location. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then realized BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not with him and was outside the south hallway entrance with other LEOs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relocated near classroom 23 (timestamp 12:26:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, breaking out the window to classrooms 108 and 109 and evacuating students and a teacher. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the teacher appeared to have suffered a gunshot wound (timestamp 12:31:17).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, arrived at his location.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that due to the proximity to the shooter, he decided to evacuate the students and teachers from the building containing classrooms 19 through 23 and directed them through the gate where he had initially entered the school grounds near Old Carrizo Road (timestamp 12:27:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the evacuation, he held a USBP hat at the classroom window so the students and teachers would know he was law enforcement, prompting them to open the locked classroom doors. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the classrooms had adjoining restrooms connecting one classroom to another (timestamp 12:53:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the evacuation, he encountered off-duty BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station, near one of the classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as wearing plain clothes and carrying a shotgun. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have been in one of those classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and left. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not assist in clearing or evacuating any of the classrooms (timestamp 13:15:48). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as LEOs began exiting the south hallway of the building where the shooter was located, he observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisting BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD, out of the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked disoriented. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was



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about to enter the south hallway, he encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, carrying a female student over his shoulder. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) followed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist; however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed that the child had a gunshot entrance wound to the forehead and was deceased. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not want to leave the child exposed, so he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) covered her with a what he recalled was a blanket. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a second victim being brought outside, placed on a stretcher, and given medical aid (timestamp 12:29:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he attempted to enter the south hallway for the second time, he encountered an unknown Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) agent, who asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to take his M-4 rifle so he could assist with medical aid. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lost track of the BORSTAR agent and later returned the M-4 rifle to other SOD members during the muster near the tree area prior to departing Robb Elementary School (timestamp 12:32:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the response as “a mess” with a lack of coordination. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the entirety of the incident, he had no idea who, if anyone, was in command of the scene, and did not recall hearing any radio traffic that would indicate who was in command (timestamp 13:07:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he walked to the tree area where the BPAs were gathering and observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were several other BPAs; however, he could not remember who else was there (timestamp 13:10:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall who addressed the group but stated it may have been Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT. After a few words, the BPAs were instructed to return to UVA (timestamp 13:08:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at UVA, it was “all a blur” and he did not remember any specifics nor how long he was at UVA before he went home (timestamp 12:34:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that in the days following the incident, he discussed the incident with other BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the common theme was that everyone wished they could have done more (timestamp 13:30:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from the initial report from BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) until the conclusion of the incident, he thought it was an active shooter situation (timestamp 13:31:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of the status of the doors to classrooms 111 and 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall ever hearing any shots fired (timestamp 13:46:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of any specific authority allowing BPAs to respond to an incident like an active shooter other than being law enforcement and first responders. BPA





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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any negative interactions with any members of the public. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not issued a body worn camera at the time of the incident (timestamp 13:47:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had not been through the CBP active shooter training. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed it was his responsibility as a BPA to respond to an active shooter incident (timestamp 13:53:50).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 139**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 6, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working in the BRA area of responsibility in full rough duty USBP uniform and wore a uniform issued USBP ballcap. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was a certified emergency medical technician (EMT), therefore, served in the capacity of an EMT and a field training officer (FTO), to BPA trainee (BPA-T) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA. BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wore a full rough duty uniform and all three drove together in a USBP marked government owned vehicle (GOV).

According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) due to the remote location and to communication issues, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) transferred from the (b) (7)(E) to tactical radio (b) (7)(E) to utilize the walkie-talkie proximity function in (b) (7)(E) while they actively engaged in field apprehensions.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he were alerted to an area where migrants had apparently activated some cameras. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested assistance from Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) air support to monitor the area. TXDPS air support acknowledged and advised they would monitor the area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to track the group of migrants on foot. TXDPS air support arrived on scene and were provided with the direction of travel for the group. Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, TXDPS air support relayed they had visibility of the group and lead BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the BPA-Ts to the location of the group. While BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the BPA-Ts apprehended the group, TXDPS air support relayed they had to break off and respond to a possible active shooter call (timestamp 00:21:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the group was secured and transferred to the transport vehicle, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the BPA-Ts travelled back to BRA to heat up their lunch and rewater up. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the BPA-Ts drove approximately 1/10th mile from BRA to an area called Las Moras near Highway 90 and had their lunch (timestamp 00:22:42).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that while they operated in the tactical radio (b) (7)(E) they were unable to hear what was broadcast in the (b) (7)(E) radio communications; however, when they returned to the BRA station, they transferred back to (b) (7)(E) recorded radio repeater (b) (7)(E)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received a call from his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who asked him if he was aware that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Robb Elementary School, was on lockdown. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he had read about it on a social media site, referencing it as a bail out lockdown (timestamp 00:24:13). At that point, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not think much of it because bail outs occurred every other day all around the Uvalde schools. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that a bail out is a term used to describe a vehicle being utilized in an alien smuggling event when a driver abruptly pulls off to the side of the road and any or all individuals run out in different directions (timestamp 00:31:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that a few minutes later, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) co-workers called and informed him that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been crying hysterically because she had been informed there was a shooting at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called BRA to gather the facts and to get information and was informed they had sent an EMT and a supervisory BPA (SBPA) to Robb Elementary School due to a possible active shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again spoke to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he could hear the panic in her voice as she explained that her neighbor, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Uvalde Police Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the situation and that they needed to go (timestamp 01:02:46).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he contemplated for a second on whether he should drop off the BPA-Ts first or deploy to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ultimately made the decision to take BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to respond to the school because he was an EMT and could render aid if necessary and because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended Robb Elementary School and was present at the school (timestamp 00:25:36).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they deployed, and he drove to Robb Elementary School in a USBP marked GOV with the emergency lights activated and only activated the sirens when they came across traffic areas and travelled via highway U.S. 90. While travelling to the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted BRA and informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, that he, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were responding to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated the distance was approximately 41 miles from his location at Las Moras to Robb Elementary School. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to the school, he recalled hearing a radio transmission that they [law enforcement officers] were at the window of the classrooms and getting the kids out.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that upon arriving near Robb Elementary School, he came across backed up streets and said there were many parked vehicles blocking the streets. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get out of the vehicle and clear traffic so he could park the GOV (timestamp 02:59:10). The streets were congested with a lot of people on the sidewalk and a lot of people pacing back and forth. All three BPAs ran up toward the school and he asked the first TXDPS trooper he saw where they were staging emergency medical services (EMS) and where the EMS triage was going to be set up. TXDPS trooper pointed to the school pick up and drop off zone; however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see other EMTs but recalled seeing possibly one ambulance (timestamp 03:00:03).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked the same TXDPS trooper where he could help and the TXDPS trooper stated they needed to secure the area around the funeral home and asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to help with getting the crowd back away from the funeral home (timestamp 02:28:48). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was his assumption that the funeral home was going to be utilized to set up a hostage negotiation or a tactical operation command center (TOCC). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) chose to assist and stay in that area because that gave him proximity to the EMS staging area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the crowd to scoot back and explained the area was going to be used for a TOCC (timestamp 3:01:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard a radio communication that they [law enforcement officers] were going to “breach” [forcible opening of closed or locked door] (timestamp 02:55:53). Almost immediately, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made visual contact with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and he informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was going inside the building to assist with any EMT duties and that he was taking BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to remain with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and instructed him to write down all the names of all the BRA BPAs that were onsite and any information that needed to be relayed or recorded (timestamp 03:18:48).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he observed the following law enforcement agencies present at the location: Texas Rangers, Department of Public Safety (DPS), TXDPS troopers, UPD, and USBP. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a heavier presence of TXDPS; however, did not specify if there were more rangers or troopers. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there were a lot of plainclothes law enforcement officers/agents; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew they were law enforcement because they wore bump helmets, plate carriers, badges, and carried long arms (rifles) (timestamp 03:05:03).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that upon initial arrival, from his perspective, TXDPS had command and control because they had the most viable information to take charge (timestamp 03:07:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that collectively all law enforcement personnel who initially set up the perimeter around the funeral home spoke to the crowd in the utmost professional way. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified a father in the crowd who he believed had influence with the other parents and plead with him to help him get the crowd back. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) specifically empathized with the father as he relayed to him that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also inside, so he related to how he was feeling. The father obliged with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) request and moved back, and the rest of the crowd followed suit (timestamp 03:08:51). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that yellow with black lettering caution tape was placed around the perimeter area of the funeral home. While assisting with establishing the perimeter, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not witness any altercation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not render medical aid to anyone near or at the funeral home (timestamp 03:15:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon hearing the radio transmission that they [law enforcement officers] were going to breach, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hurried toward the school. At the edge of the gate closest to the west door entrance, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a DPS medic carrying a medic bag. Due to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not having his EMT medic bag, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself as a USBP EMT and told the DPS medic he would provide support and work out of his medic bag. Following that brief discussion, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the DPS medic proceeded to enter through the west door entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not get the name of the DPS medic (timestamp 03:20:00).

According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was no discussion between him and the DPS medic as they approached the west door entrance of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that from a law enforcement perspective, he understood what a breach consisted of and knew it required a breaching team and EMTs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was inside the school. Up until that point, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had not heard gunshots or screams. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thoughts were that he was responding to either an active shooter or a barricaded subject (timestamp 03:12:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the west door of Robb Elementary School and made entry into the building. The door was held open by Uvalde Police Department Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 03:14:16).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the classroom was breached at 12:49 p.m. Following a discussion between SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he entered the building approximately five minutes before the breach occurred (timestamp 03:26:25).

Branch Chief (BC) Investigative Analyst, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, assisted OPR SAs and presented BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with body worn camera (BWC) video footage obtained from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 2). The BWC footage presented to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ranged from overlay time of 11:49:31 to 11:49:51 (timestamp 04:58:20).



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During review of the BWC video footage, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself, confirmed his arrival to the location at overlay time of 11:49:51, identified BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wearing the USBP rough duty uniform and carrying a brown pack bag, and identified BPA-Programs (BPA-P) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon entering the west door entrance, he identified law enforcement personnel staged on the right and left sides of a hallway and said they were getting ready to breach; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a visual of the classrooms down the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not pull out his weapon because he did not want to be pointing at other law enforcement personnel and because he knew his specific role was to provide EMS care. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the hallway was designated as the triage and medical supply area with blackboards and gurneys. The room to the left from when he entered the door was designated for deceased victims (timestamp 05:02:48). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified five certified BPA EMTs that provided patient care at Robb Elementary School post breach as: BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA; BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and himself. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also identified that BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided patient care; however, he was not a certified EMT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a TXDPS EMT, who had a medic bag, also provided patient care, but he could not identify him by name. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be able to provide more details regarding the EMS staging area (timestamp 05:06:26).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing a pre-breach conversation about a key and at one point, he pointed to a Halligan bar (tool used for forcible entry) and sledgehammer that were leaning against a wall and said there was a key right there. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled one of the law enforcement personnel stating they needed an actual key for the door; however, he did not recognize the officer and could not recall the description or clothing items to describe the officer.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he heard what he believed to be three flashbangs and looked down the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw the door open. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard gunfire and believed the gunfire was from the shooter and saw a group of law enforcement personnel enter a classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw someone from the group of law enforcement personnel bounce back out of the classroom and observed them immediately reset and commit to breaching the classroom again and then he heard more gunfire (timestamp 05:34:26).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that following the classroom breach, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) waited to hear all clear, but never did. Following the breach, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed two law enforcement personnel, wearing camouflage rough duty uniforms, carry out a deceased female child, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and placed her in the hallway, followed by another two law enforcement personnel carrying out a deceased male child (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew that it was not going how it was supposed to go, so the EMTs started to move into the classrooms to look for any live children (timestamp 05:17:52). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not sure if he entered room 111 or 112; however, he went into the classroom to look for anyone alive and in need of medical attention (timestamp 06:00:04). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when the EMTs realized that things were not going as planned, the EMTs went in. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that as he entered the room it was dark. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a pile of deceased children to the left side of the classroom (timestamp 05:38:42).



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Immediately, he scanned the classroom and at the same time BPA [REDACTED] and another law enforcement officer located a female child in the classroom who was alive with a gunshot wound (GSW) to her left arm. They both lifted her, but the other law enforcement officer appeared to have the better hold of her, so BPA [REDACTED] let her go as they rushed her to the triage medical supply area (06:01:21). BPA [REDACTED] explained he knew she was alive because she was breathing and had her eyes opened. BPA [REDACTED] noticed she was not bleeding and was starting to shunt. BPA [REDACTED] grabbed a tourniquet and started to apply a tourniquet on her [REDACTED] BPA [REDACTED] continued to tighten the tourniquet and noticed that the bullet had pierced through her [REDACTED] so he applied a chest seal. BPA [REDACTED] noticed that the law enforcement officer helping him was struggling with what was going on and made an utterance of "OH GOD." BPA [REDACTED] had to tell him that he needed him to snap out of it and continue. BPA [REDACTED] stated he recognized the female child [REDACTED] because she was a friend of [REDACTED] BPA [REDACTED] wanted her to fight, so he told her to look at him and told her she was going to be okay and to stay with him. BPA [REDACTED] knew she was going to die because she was critically wounded. BPA [REDACTED] decided to place her on a stretcher and had someone else take her to an ambulance. BPA [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] had her hair down and wore a [REDACTED] blouse and blue jeans (timestamp 05:46:36).

BPA [REDACTED] said that afterwards, he stayed in the hallway and looked for work. BPA [REDACTED] saw BPA-T [REDACTED] providing first aid and noticed a female TXDPS trooper, wearing a tan uniform, comforting a boy. Standing in front of the TXDPS trooper was the TXDPS medic. BPA [REDACTED] noticed that no medical intervention was being provided to the child, so he told the TXDPS trooper to move and asked what injuries he had (timestamp 06:08:10). The TXDPS medic said he had a gunshot wound on [REDACTED] BPA [REDACTED] asked to let him see and the TXDPS medic removed a gauze from the wound. BPA [REDACTED] observed it was an entry wound, so BPA [REDACTED] asked the TXDPS medic for a chest seal and BPA [REDACTED] began his patient care assessment by asking the child his name, the child responded [REDACTED] After BPA [REDACTED] completed the massive hemorrhage, airway, respirations, circulation, head injury, hypothermia (MARCH) assessment, BPA [REDACTED] placed a seal on [REDACTED] and told the TXDPS trooper and medic to get [REDACTED] up because he was ambulatory and instructed them to walk him to the ambulance. BPA [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED] male [REDACTED] complexion, [REDACTED] and wore either [REDACTED] shorts (timestamp 06:21:36).

BPA [REDACTED] described the smell in classroom 111 and 112 as that of a "meat market" and said there was blood everywhere including the floor which made it slippery. BPA [REDACTED] commented that the law enforcement personnel were slipping as they moved within the area due to the bloody floor (timestamp 05:50:04).

BPA [REDACTED] heard someone say there were more rooms down the hall that needed to be cleared. BPA [REDACTED] stood nearby in case he was needed to react or respond to a medical emergency (timestamp 05:49:10).

BPA [REDACTED] said that after things settled, he walked down the hall and saw a deceased person that appeared to be an adult on the floor near the door. BPA [REDACTED] did not recall any other details.





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the first bodies removed from the classroom had head wounds and appeared to be deceased. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at one point, he and two others, possibly one being BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) picked up two deceased children lying on the hallway floor and moved them to the classroom designated for the deceased and covered them with a mylar blanket (timestamp 05:22:23). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when he entered the room designated for the deceased, he saw a total of four deceased to include the boy and girl that he had placed there (timestamp 06:13:36). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that not knowing the circumstances inside the classrooms was like going in blind; however, an EMT knows that a deceased person should not be moved because it is a crime scene. An EMT should first look for victims with signs of life that are conscious, breathing, and with a pulse. In this case there were not that many, so it was not hard to make those determinations.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after the classrooms were cleared, he exited through the south door and saw BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Minnesota, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, providing patient care on a boy that rested on a stretcher right by the exit of the door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with chest compressions, an automated external defibrillator (AED) was placed, and inserted an oral airway adjunct. Someone performed an assessment and felt a GSW on the back of the boy's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at which time it was determined that the boy had perished. Patient care continued as the boy was rolled to the ambulance and patient care was transferred (timestamp 05:57:34).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that at one point he walked outside and observed BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performing chest compressions on the teacher, Mrs. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with lifting the stretcher from the grass area to the concrete area. BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) jumped onto the stretcher as he continued to provide chest compressions. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and others rolled her to the ambulance. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was there at the ambulance and patient care of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was transferred to the ambulance personnel. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they stayed there with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for moral support (timestamp 06:16:32).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not witness injured children being placed in a school bus; however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did hear after the fact about how injured children had been placed in a school bus for transport (timestamp 06:31:22).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see the body of the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the shooter was lying on the opposite room of where he entered to provide patient care (timestamp 6:33:48).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opined that the shooter did not give EMTs much to work with in terms of providing patient care; the shooter did not shoot hands or feet. The shooter took mainly head shots (timestamp 06:35:58).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after everything was over, there was not much being said; everyone appeared to be in a state of shock.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP's role in responding to an active shooter call was that USBP had to respond for both the EMT and tactical skills that USBP could provide. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that



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state or local officers do not get the same level of training that USBP does. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opined that he whole heartedly believed that if USBP were the first responders to have gotten there, the outcome would have been different (timestamp 06:41:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP was there in a support role until time ran out.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know USBP's authority to respond; however, he expressed that in a situation of an active shooter, authority is out the window. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) articulated that if he hears gunshots he will run to the gunshots and he will not sit and wonder what his scope of authority is; he will address the threat and deal with the consequences (timestamp 06:43:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that it has been past practice to assist other law enforcement agencies when they request for assistance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware he did not have peace officer status in Texas (timestamp 06:44:31).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was not wearing a BWC and he did not draft any reports or emails concerning the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 06:49:51). Other than providing patient care to the injured, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not exercise authority impacting any individual's movement during the incident of May 24, 2022.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he received his first Basic Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) certification in 2002 and worked for a private ambulance company in Corpus Christi, TX and in San Antonio, TX. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was recertified as an EMT for USBP in 2021 and had received USBP EMT training at DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had received Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) training at DRT, provided by the USBP Special Operations Division. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) passed the National Registry Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMT) EMT exam in 2021 and his affiliation was through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CBP USBP, DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Medical Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Health & Science Center, University of Texas, served as the Medical Director overseeing USBP protocols. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had taken various additional courses such as, but not limited to GSW training, Tactical Casualty Care Course (TCCC), Combat Lifesaver Course (CLS), Tactical Awareness Course (TAC), and Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was trained to apply Intraosseous Infusion (IO) therapy; Intravenous (IV) therapy; needle decompressions, and MARCH model when performing patient care (timestamp 00:42:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was certified to instruct USBP personnel in the following courses: CPR, IFAK, and EMT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was certified through the American Heart Association (AHA) to provide CPR training to other law enforcement agencies and to civilians from the community (timestamp 00:48:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said USBP had issued him a suburban mobile ambulance unit which is equipped with a stretcher, oxygen tank, collapsible backboard, AED, triage cards, and an EMT bag; however, on May 24, 2022, there was another BPA assigned as the primary EMT for BRA and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) primary role was as an FTO to BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) therefore, he utilized a



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GOV that would accommodate all three in a vehicle. As far as medical equipment, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was carrying his IFAK (timestamp 01:33:22).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned he was interviewed by the TXDPS rangers regarding the Robb Elementary School incident (timestamp 06:51:02).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide moral and spiritual support, while all other USBP personnel reported to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) commented there were peer support personnel helping BPAs at UVA (timestamp 06:53:18).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he was done with his EMT responsibilities, he went to the funeral home and picked up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and escorted both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to their mothers down the street (timestamp 6:54:31). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had changed since the day of the incident but was getting better day by day. As for himself, he experienced some heart palpitations, weight loss, physically and mentally, the incident broke him down. He said there was no way to escape what had happened as he attended funeral after funeral (timestamp 07:01:00).

During the interview, OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 3). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the route he traveled US 90 to Uvalde. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it was not applicable. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the route he traveled US 90 to Uvalde. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he responded to Robb Elementary School, exited Highway 90 and went south on Grove St. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any indications or marks. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the spot where they parked the vehicle when they arrived and the path he took to the school. On the map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated it was not applicable. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any indications or marks. On the map labeled 8.a Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated, the entrance, the triage area, the area where he met with SCBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) where the air life was, and the perimeter area with caution tape. On the map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any indications or marks.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	BWC footage from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, dated May 24, 2022.
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 140**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 21, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to day-shift checkpoint duties near Uvalde, TX. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also a canine (K9) handler assigned to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was performing K9 duties at the UVA checkpoint when he first learned of a possible active shooter at Robb Elementary School via his USBP radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing over the radio that there were shots fired at the Robb Elementary School. K9 BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, was also assigned to the checkpoint and they both responded to the Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the drive to the Robb Elementary School took approximately 10 minutes.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove his USBP vehicle to the Robb Elementary School and parked close to the funeral home near the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing approximately four other law enforcement individuals already on site. Upon exiting his vehicle, an unknown male approached him and stated he witnessed a male crash his vehicle into a ditch and, upon exiting the vehicle, the male began shooting at him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the unknown male pointed to the wrecked vehicle in the ditch near the school and identified it to be the vehicle driven by the male shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the unknown male described the shooter as wearing all black clothing, carrying a bag and a rifle.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he approached the wrecked vehicle, described as a truck, and stated there was ammunition scattered throughout along with a rifle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not touch anything or remove anything. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took several photos of the items scattered throughout the truck (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained at the vehicle providing scene security until he was relieved by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. Upon being relieved by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw several children being taken out of windows of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled running towards the school to aid with evacuating the children from the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed children coming out of the school's west side windows towards other officers down the street. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPAs breaking all the windows, all west facing classrooms being evacuated, and all children being taken out.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled looking down the hallway of the south entrance and seeing several law enforcement officers (LEOs) BPAs and Texas Department of Public Safety Troopers pointing guns towards classroom 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled moving to the other side of the school building, where he assisted other BPAs with the evacuation of children (timestamp 01:01:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled assisting a teacher with climbing out of the window of a classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that the teacher complained of an injury and recalled seeing blood on her shirt (timestamp 01:03:01). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not provide any medical assistance to the teacher.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled waiting for a long period of time and wondered why it was taking so long for someone to enter the classroom and take out the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not determine who was in command and control of the situation (timestamp 02:10:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled unknown officers talking about why the wait was taking so long and they indicated it was because they were waiting for keys to enter the classroom (timestamp 02:23:33).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was his understanding that the children in the classroom with the shooter were alive and the shooter had only barricaded himself in the room with the children (timestamp 02:45:57).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard over the radio that LEOs were about to make entry into the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing several shots being fired and witnessed several LEOs rushing into the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered the school through the south entrance and encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was stumbling and appeared to be injured. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) out of the school via the south entrance and brought him to a waiting Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) for medical assistance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went back towards the school and noticed a female child laying on the concrete just outside the south entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the female child was deceased because she was not displaying any signs of life. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued into the school and made his way to classroom 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the hallway was filled with gun smoke.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled entering classroom 112 and described the scene as chaos (timestamp 03:07:06). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled several people screaming and stated there were several piles of deceased children (timestamp 03:28:06).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed several LEOs attempting to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on several children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the names of any of these LEOs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not perform any lifesaving actions on any of the children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he left the room after being told only EMTs were permitted within the classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and numerous other BPAs gathered near a tree at the front of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled seeing several BPAs he described as emotional, and several were covered with blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained by the tree before receiving instructions to report back to UVA for additional debriefs.

Upon arriving at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being told about another potential threat; therefore, he responded to the Uvalde Theater of Arts School where he provided security for several hours.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting Uvalde, TX; Robb Elementary School; and Robb Elementary School Layout (Attachment 3). The maps are labeled 3, 5 and 8a, respectively. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the location he was working on the morning of May 24th, 2022, and the route taken to the Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled as 5. Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted the location he parked his vehicle upon arriving at the Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 8a, Robb Elementary School Layout, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted the door location used to enter classroom 112, the briefing location in front of the school near a tree, and his movements while evacuating children from classrooms.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have a body worn camera on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not have any text messages or emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting, and he did not produce any reports concerning the incident.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Photos taken by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the shooter's vehicle.
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 141**



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 7, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a local (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in Uvalde, Texas, and was speaking to the owner, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). At approximately 11:41 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stating, "Active shooter, help, love you" (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a student. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he had a weapon. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the school, then left the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and responded to Robb Elementary School. At approximately 11:48 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked in an alley off Geraldine Street, just east of Old Carrizo Rd. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a shotgun and four shotgun shells. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he ran towards the school; however, he did not have any of his assigned work gear or a radio.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while walking towards the school, he found a USBP plate carrier with plates on the ground on Geraldine Street (timestamp 00:51:54). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put the plates in the vest and put the vest on for protection. At approximately 12:00 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked towards the west entrance of the school and encountered Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) seemed distraught and was accompanied by Lieutenant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department (UPD) (timestamp 00:48:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he then walked towards the west entrance of the school, where he was confronted by the unknown owner of the vest he had put on earlier (timestamp 00:53:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he removed the vest and began walking south. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he never heard of a command post being setup (timestamp 00:48:51). He also stated he never entered the school (timestamp 00:53:39).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informing him that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was out of the school and at the funeral home across the street. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then decided to search for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and walked towards the older wing of the school on the southeast side. At approximately 12:30 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered two unknown UPD officers at the corner of classroom 23 and identified himself as an off-duty BPA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that neither officer asked for his identification. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he informed the officers that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in one of the classrooms and that he needed assistance getting her out.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and the two UPD officers cleared classrooms 19 to 23. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he waited outside the classrooms, while the officers opened the doors to the classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he directed the students and teachers to walk towards the sidewalk on Old Carrizo Rd. (timestamp 01:08:10). When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at classroom 21, he stated that saw (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who had locked herself inside of a restroom, and directed her to walk towards the same sidewalk as the other students and teachers. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the two officers finished clearing the classrooms, they moved north and began clearing classrooms 13 to 18. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he never saw any other BPAs in his vicinity; however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the two UPD officers may have been BPAs (timestamp 03:38:14).

While at the corner of classroom 18, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he observed other law enforcement officers breaking the windows to classrooms 108 to 110 from across the courtyard. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he guided those children and teachers towards the same sidewalk on Old Carrizo Rd. (timestamp 01:15:35). After the classrooms were cleared of students and teachers, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked towards Old Carrizo Rd. to look for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Afterwards, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station, and asked for a ride to his vehicle, which was located off Geraldine St.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he arrived at his vehicle, he decided to walk to the funeral home to see if anyone needed assistance and met up with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that, at that time, the breach had not yet occurred, and the shooter was still active (timestamp 01:21:57). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he spoke to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), after the breach when they were on the northwest side



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 7, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was off duty and working out with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at an Uvalde area track. On their way home, they saw a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) vehicle with the lights and siren activated, driving fast through town. To potentially assist the trooper, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) followed the trooper and saw a vehicle in a ditch near the intersection of Grove St. and Geraldine St. by Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed it was a traffic related crash and proceeded to depart the area and headed home.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while en route (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who is an emergency room nurse, received a phone call from the Uvalde Memorial Hospital requesting her to come to work immediately due to a shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed the information from the hospital was related to the accident they had just observed. Upon their arrival home, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed separately to the hospital and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gathered his duty belt, firearm, and ballistic vest and self-deployed back to the scene of the accident (timestamp 00:22:20).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that due to heavy traffic on the north side of Robb Elementary School, he decided to drive towards the south side of the school and parked his vehicle on Old Carrizo Springs Road between W. Cargile St. and U.S. Highway 83. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at the school around 12:20 p.m. and called the duty officer in the Operations Center at CAR. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and notified her that he was on scene at the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC), donning his equipment. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) referred to BPA Carter's Android Team Awareness Kit (an Android smartphone geospatial infrastructure and situational awareness application), which showed most of the deployment on the north side of the school and decided to proceed in that direction.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as they moved towards the school, an unknown police officer in a black uniform, informed them there was a barricaded shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he then saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, with a couple of children moving in the opposite direction. Eventually, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the west building, near classroom 18, where BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) set up his patrol rifle and took cover. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from Watch Commander (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who informed him that BORTAC was on scene and to not get involved.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw a TXDPS trooper checking classrooms 15 and 16 and he assisted the trooper in evacuating the children and directing them to the east parking lot. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and observed several unknown BPAs breaking the windows of classrooms 109 and 110 and evacuating children (timestamp 00:27:15). At that point, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard someone over his radio ask if there was anyone else alive and a child's voice responded, "Yes." Moments later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard gunshots and assumed the shooter had shot and killed the person heard on the radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the situation had changed from a barricaded subject to an active shooter (timestamp 00:28:23).

[Agent Note: a barricaded subject is a term generally meaning a person, believed to be armed, who has taken a position in a physical location that does not allow police access and is refusing police orders to exit.]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he moved to the south side of the west building and saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC, with a sniper rifle and an unknown BPA in a shooting stance trying to get an angle into the windows of classrooms 111 and 112. Over his radio, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard someone requesting permission to break a classroom door and someone responding, "No." Later, someone stated over the radio, "We are going in." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard someone he believed to be Chief Pete Arredondo, Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department, respond that the shooter's uncle was on the phone and to wait to see if the shooter would talk his uncle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the message was ignored and the classroom door was breached.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he moved to the door on the south side of school and approached the classroom that was breached. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC, come out of the classroom in an apparent daze and could tell BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been injured. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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was then escorted down the hall by an unknown BPA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked into classroom 112 and picked up a girl, who he described as ghost white as if all of the blood had drained from her body (timestamp 00:31:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed the girl had been shot a while before the breach and placed her back on the ground. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a boy sit up and did not observe any injuries on him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed the boy towards other officers down the hallway.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he reentered the classroom and saw an unknown officer pick up a deceased female, holding the upper torso and dragging her out of the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed the lower half of the female as she was moved to the hallway intersection (timestamp 00:33:05). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded back to the classroom and was informed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, that no one else needed to be removed from the classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, were asked to assist in clearing the rest of the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cleared classrooms 108 to 110 and then exited the building through the south door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to a tree on the north side of the building to meet with Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, where he was instructed to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for a briefing at 2:00 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, checked in on him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then spoke to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who informed him there was no security at the hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed to the hospital to assist. Upon arrival, they observed several USBP personnel and determined there was enough security. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw the boy he had helped earlier in classroom 112 speaking with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the lobby of the emergency room.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed to the civic center after being told by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained, however, he did not understand his purpose for being there. Later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back to UVA to retrieve his vehicle and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned home around 5:30 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unable to identify whether anyone was in command and control during the incident (timestamp 02:07:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of his legal authority to respond to Robb Elementary School but knew USBP routinely assisted local law enforcement. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there was a stark difference between how federal and state and local agencies responded to incidents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that in an incident such as the Robb Elementary School shooting, USBP had a responsibility to respond and assist as needed (timestamp 02:04:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received first aid training at the USBP Academy in 2019, which included cardiopulmonary resuscitation and automated external defibrillator training. Additionally, he received Individual First Aid Kit training in 2020 when he first arrived at CAR.





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BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated he did not have any text messages or emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> produce any reports concerning the incident.

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively. BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the map labeled 3-Uvalde, Texas, map 4-Uvalde, TX Schools, map 5-Robb Elementary School, map 6-Robb Elementary School and Civic Center and map 8.a/b-Robb Elementary School Layout.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
2	Maps reviewed by BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 7, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on-duty at UVA when he heard radio transmissions regarding a shooting at the Robb Elementary School. He added that Border Patrol Agent Intelligence (BPA-I) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Sector Intelligence Unit (SIU), was the agent who relayed the information on the radio regarding a shooting at the school. He explained that when he heard the radio traffic about the shooting, he thought it was only a threat of a shooting and not an actual shooter (Timestamp 1:16:45).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stated he retrieved a rifle at the UVA armory and drove a Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) to Robb Elementary School and parked southbound on S. Grove Street. He ran eastbound on Geraldine Street and met a Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) from the Uvalde County Sheriff's Office (UCSO) or Uvalde Police Department (UPD), who told him they have a guy pinned in a room and they are negotiating with him (Timestamp 1:22:30). He added that he did not hear any USBP radio traffic and was trying to get information from the LEO he saw on Geraldine Street. He believed the incident was a barricaded subject because there was no stimulus such as gunshots, and there was no information put out about children being in the classrooms (Timestamp 2:10:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stated he entered the Robb Elementary School using the south door between classroom 102 and 108. He estimated he entered the south door for the first time at approximately 12:15 p.m. and added that he was in and out of the south door an unknown number of times (Timestamp 00:36:00). He added that he did not hear any shots being fired during the incident other than the ones fired when the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) breached the classroom at 12:49 p.m.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stated that he observed four to six LEO's near the west side of the school outside of classrooms 102-106. He said the LEO's were evacuating the classrooms and they started with 102 and moved north to 106. He explained he does not remember breaking any windows but added that he obtained what he believed to be a tablecloth from a USBP GOV and used it to cover the broken glass in the windows. He said the reason for putting the tablecloth on the broken window was to prevent injuries to students and faculty that were being evacuated through the window (Timestamp 1:23:40). He described seeing a black bag laying outside the school on the west side of the classrooms but did not know it was the shooter's bag with loaded magazines, until after the incident.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stated after he helped evacuate students, he entered the south door of the school and overheard LEO's discussing the classroom doors being locked and that they needed to get the keys. He called BORTAC SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Division (SOD), and told him the classroom was locked and they were looking for keys. He explained that he called SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) numerous times and each call was very short, estimated they were 10-15 seconds each. He remembered the discussions consisted of the locations of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs, and the discussion SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) overheard. He said believed the discussions about needing keys to unlock doors were from Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District (UCISD) Chief Arredondo (Timestamp 38:10). He added that he did not call SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after he saw him on the north end of the hall.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stated that none of the information regarding the 9-1-1 calls from the classroom were being relayed to LEO's at the south door entrance (Timestamp 1:00:00). He added that there was no information regarding children being in the classroom and remembers hearing LEO's in the south end of the hallway saying "We're going to wait for BORTAC" but could not remember who was saying it (Timestamp 1:25:30). He explained that from his location on the south end of



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the hallway, he was unable to see if anyone attempted to check the doors to see if they were locked (1:31:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he did not know who was in charge or in command of the incident when he first arrived on scene, but after making entry to the south end of the school, he believed UCISD Chief Arredondo was in command of the incident (Timestamp 1:22:00). He explained that he believed UCISD Chief Arredondo was in charge because he was dictating what to do for fellow LEO's in the south end of the hallway (Timestamp 2:17:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he was inside the hallway near the south door, he saw BORTAC stacked in the hallway near rooms 111 and 112 and he overheard agents in the stack stating they have the keys (Timestamp 1:36:45). He explained that once he heard BORTAC had the keys to the classroom, he believed BORTAC was going to breach the classroom. He added once he heard the north side discussing the keys, he exited the south door and went to the grassy open area to the east side of classrooms 108-112 to make sure there was no one in that area to prevent any crossfire situation once the breach occurred (Timestamp 00:42:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he was outside of the school when the breach occurred, and right after the breach, he saw Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Sergeant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rush BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, out of the south side door. He added that he believed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was hurt by the way he was holding his head as he was exiting the building. He said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Sergeant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran west bound from the south door towards the parking lot (Timestamp 00:43:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) being rushed out of the south door, he made entry into the school and moved north towards room 111 and 112. He stated, his "thought process" was to go to the rooms and give medical aid. He stated that when he got near rooms 111 and 112, he saw UCISD Chief Arredondo escorting children out of classroom 112 and out of the west side door of the T-intersection (Timestamp 00:45:00). He continued to explain the Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) and USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) agents were moving people to the hallway for treatment (Timestamp 00:45:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw BORSTAR BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORSTAR BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, and BPA EMT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, providing medical care to children at the north end of the hallway on the east side of the T-intersection.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that his thought process was more tactical than medical because he is not EMT certified and added that he never entered room 111 or 112 (Timestamp 00:46:20). He helped move three deceased children that were laying outside of classroom 132 and the stem room near the T-intersection. He said SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an unknown LEO, and himself moved the three children into room 132 because it felt disrespectful to have the children laying in the hallway (Timestamp 00:47:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not remember if he physically moved the three deceased children or assisted by opening the door to 132. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not remember how long he was in the school and added that he did not provide medical aid or assisted with medical aid to anyone during the incident.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stated that he exited the school by leaving the east side door near the T-intersection and helped assist other LEO's in clearing the library. He said there was one female that was still in the library in a locked room (Timestamp 00:50:30). After clearing the library, he believed the remaining areas of the school were already cleared. He added that after leaving the T-intersection and assisted in clearing the library, he never returned into the school (Timestamp 1:52:55)

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) explained that Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, Del Rio Sector (DRT), arrived and had a muster near a tree at the school and he advised BPAs to go back to UVA (Timestamp 00:51:00). He said prior to leaving the incident, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, guarding the wrecked truck in the culvert.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) went back to UVA and attended muster by CPA Owens, and then he and Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, compiled a list of all USBP personnel from UVA that were at Robb Elementary School (Timestamp 00:54:00). He did not leave UVA until he went home for the day at approximately 8:00 p.m. (Timestamp 1:07:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) explained that USBP's role would be a support role if it did not have anything to do with drugs or immigration. He continued to explain that he believed that USBP would have an obligation to respond because it was a shooting and we would be in a support role (Timestamp 02:29:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stated that he was not wearing a Body Worn Camera (BWC) (Timestamp 00:35:30). He stated that he does not have any text messages, email threads, or any documentation regarding this incident (Timestamp 2:13:00). He explained any text messages on his personal cell phone may have been deleted due to the length of time since the incident.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) explained that UVA reached out to all Uvalde schools approximately three to four years ago and offered active shooter training and the only Uvalde area school that responded for the training was Knippa school district. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) believes it was Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who contacted the Uvalde area schools offering the training (Timestamp 1:05:00).

Prior to completing the interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) viewed UPD Sergeant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body worn camera footage (b) (7)(E) and (b) (7)(E) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) confirmed he was on UPD Sergeant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BWC video (b) (7)(E) at the overlay time of 12:22:16. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed on UPD Sergeant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BWC video (b) (7)(E) that he exited the south hallway at the overlay time of 12:40:30, which was the time he heard BORTAC agents in the north end of the hall discussing keys prior to breaching the room (Timestamp 3:54:00).

During the interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde, was not applicable. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, was not applicable. The map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) labeled his initial parking spot upon



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arriving to the school followed by location of the initial contact with the UCSO/UPD. The map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) labeled his route of travel from UVA to Robb Elementary School. The map labeled 8a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) labeled the location of the medical triage area. The map labeled 8b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) labeled his location at the south entrance and listed other LEO's present at the south door. The map labeled 8c. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) labeled his direction of travel in the hallway and room 132 where he assisted placing deceased children. The map labeled 8d. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7) labeled his location when he saw BORSTAR agents providing medical care to victims. The map labeled 8e. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 7, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to transport and was transporting migrants to Eagle Pass, Texas. Afterwards, while heading South on Highway 55, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a radio transmission requesting all available agents respond to an “active shooter” or “shots fired” at Robb Elementary School (Attachment A, timestamp 00:12:18). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the request came from Border Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) (Attachment A, timestamp 00:29:51).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated the emergency lights on his Government owned vehicle (GOV) and responded to Robb Elementary School. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived, he parked and ran to the school alongside BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and an unidentified BPA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised there was a hostage situation and Hostage Negotiator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department (UPD), was responding (Attachment A, timestamp 00:13:08). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then entered the school through the west entrance.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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When he entered the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw law enforcement officers (LEO) from multiple agencies, including BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and other identified BPAs (Attachment A, timestamp 00:35:46). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recalled seeing Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD), and Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UPD (Attachment A, timestamp 00:36:43). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, with evacuating a female teacher and escorting her out of the school (Attachment A, timestamp 00:37:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then saw Constable Emmanuel Zamora, UPD, breaking exterior windows on the west side of the building (Attachment A, timestamp 00:38:44). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised that there were children inside the classrooms and he broke the exterior windows to either classroom 105 or 106 to evacuate everyone.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then made his way to the south entrance of the school, where he was informed a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) helicopter was flying too low. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he utilized his hand-held radio and requested the TXDPS Air Unit to fly higher (Attachment A, timestamp 00:46:33). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then encountered Chief Pete Arredondo, UCISDPD, who advised him that there were children and a teacher inside classroom 110. In response, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UPD; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA; and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, went outside to the east side of the building, broke the exterior windows to classroom 110, and evacuated everyone inside (Attachment A, timestamp 00:48:14). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he was unable to see inside classrooms 111 and 112 and described them as very dark with the windows still intact (Attachment A, timestamp 00:51:14).

Immediately after evacuating classroom 110, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard an open microphone on his radio, which tied up the frequency for approximately five minutes (Attachment A, timestamp 00:52:29). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) headed towards the south entrance of the school and recalled hearing that the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) was going to make entry (Attachment A, timestamp 00:58:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked an unidentified person if he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could break the exterior windows of classroom 111 as BORTAC made entry. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told no due to potential crossfire.

When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reentered the school through the south entrance, he heard gunshots as BORTAC breached the classroom (Attachment A, timestamp 00:57:05). After the breach, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw at least four children evacuated through the west entrance of the school (Attachment A, timestamp 01:06:42). Afterwards, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the casualties were taken to a “make-shift clinic” (Attachment A, timestamp 01:07:16). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that there were two triage areas, one inside the school near the T-intersection of the hallway and the other outside the school near the west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall who oversaw the triage areas but stated that he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, providing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to an adult female (Attachment A, timestamp 01:07:47). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, USBP Del Rio Station (DRT), being escorted through the south entrance of the school and recalled hearing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) say that he was shot or that a bullet grazed his head (Attachment A, timestamp 01:03:43).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then entered classroom 111 and, after a short time, everyone aside from Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) were told to leave (Attachment A, timestamp 00:18:29). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the school through the south entrance and was instructed to meet at a tree in front of the school to be briefed by Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT. During the brief, everyone was instructed to report to UVA, where CPA Owens advised everyone about the support services available. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at UVA for approximately 30 to 45 minutes and was released for the day.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not feel anyone had command and control of the Robb Elementary School incident and explained that the only direction he received was from Chief Arredondo, when he instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to clear classroom 110 (Attachment A, timestamp 01:00:37). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked if he knew whether there was a rally point or command post. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that there was not; however, he recalled seeing a lot of people gathered at the T-intersection on the northside of the hallway, near the south entrance (Attachment A, timestamp 01:02:10).

During the interview, the StarWitness equipment had to be changed due to a technical issue, and the remainder of the recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown Constable Zamora's body camera footage of the south entrance of the school and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to identify himself (Attachment 3).

An audio recording of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interview with the TXDPS Texas Ranger Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was played for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 4). During that interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he heard multiple gunshots before the breach. However, when asked if he recalled saying that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall hearing any gunshots prior to the breach (Attachment 2, timestamp 00:08:40).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 5). These maps are labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled to Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from Highway 55 into Uvalde and straight to Robb Elementary School (Attachment B, timestamp 00:14:10). On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled through town to Robb Elementary School (Attachment B, timestamp 00:15:26). On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where he parked his vehicle and the route he walked to Robb Elementary School (Attachment B, timestamp 00:15:56). On the map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the west and south entrances, the classrooms he evacuated, the triage areas, and the tree where CPA Owens briefed everyone. All other maps were not applicable.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued.
3	Constable Zamaro's body camera.
4	Audio recording of TXDPS Texas Ranger and FBI interview.
5	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 8, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was detailed to the USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) as an emergency medical technician (EMT) coordinator and was providing EMT training when he was notified there was an active shooter in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was notified by a trainee, Trooper (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Texas Department of Public Safety, who received notification of a school shooting and was instructed to respond. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, another trainee, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment, USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit, received notification regarding the shooting and was also instructed to respond (timestamp 00:40:44). At approximately 12:00 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was directed by Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:43:03).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he gathered his medical gear and responded with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Station, to Robb Elementary School in an unmarked USBP vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Robb Elementary School approximately 60 to 90 minutes later, parked a block away, and headed to the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall an approximate time of arrival, however, he stated that when he arrived, the shooter had been “taken down” and the last school bus was leaving the school and heading towards the civic center (timestamp 01:16:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the funeral home, he saw Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, who informed him that he was helping children get on school buses to transport them to the civic center and advised him of the command post inside the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the funeral home with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) signed in on a white board and asked where the medical triage area was located. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised the medical triage area was located outside; however, no further details were provided. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked towards the school and looked for the medical triage area (timestamp 00:51:50). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) crossed the street, he encountered the San Antonio Fire Department chief who appeared to be in command and control of the local emergency medical services (EMS) on site. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked the fire chief how he could be of assistance and was advised he would not be allowed in the school because it had been declared a crime scene (timestamp 00:52:06).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he signed out of the command post at the funeral home and contacted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who informed him that he was at Uvalde Medical Center with the DRT medical trailer. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided he would meet with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist at the Medical Center (timestamp 00:53:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 2:00 p.m., he walked back to his vehicle to respond to the Medical Center when he heard a radio transmission concerning a second shooter. While en route to the Medical Center, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard over the radio, “Shots fired at the high school.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to respond to Uvalde High School along with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) helped to search and clear the inside of Uvalde High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then proceeded to Flores Elementary School, an unknown charter school, and Dalton Elementary School to provide perimeter security as each school was evacuated (timestamp 00:56:45). Afterwards, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove back to DRT, arriving at approximately 6:00 p.m. (timestamp 01:29:04).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when he responded to Robb Elementary School, he only knew there was a shooting at the school with the possibility of multiple victims. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he understood he was responding to a mass casualty event (timestamp 02:14:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know USBP’s authority to respond, however, he expressed that as a certified EMT he would provide first-aid to anyone in need.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as the EMT coordinator detailed to DRT, EMTs who hold a national certification are not required to hold a state license in Texas, therefore, DRT EMTs were only required to be certified by the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMT). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that USBP EMTs follow the Department of Homeland



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Security (DHS) EMS Basic and Advanced Protocols 2020 (Attachment 2), which outlined the scope of practice for a DHS EMS professional. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the local medical director for DRT and was responsible for all aspects of operations concerning provisions of medical care (timestamp 01:33:33).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the DRT EMT training program was an eight-week course where trainees received six weeks of lecture and academic work followed by two weeks of advanced skills training to include intravenous access, needle chest decompression, intraosseous access, and administration of medication. In addition, trainees were expected to complete a clinical rotation at a local hospital and/or local EMS provider and successfully complete the NREMT exam. EMTs were required to maintain their NREMT certification by participating in a 40-hour continuing education refresher training every two years. In addition, DRT required all EMTs to complete annual advanced skills training (timestamp 01:40:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the DRT EMT course syllabus (Attachment 3) to CBP OPR interviewers and explained the training program included instruction on the National Incident Management System, Incident Command System and Disaster Management. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that EMTs were also trained on mass casualty triage (timestamp 02:21:11).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 4). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the map labeled 1-North of Uvalde, TX, 4-Uvalde, Texas Schools, 5-Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, and 8.b.-Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde TX. On map 1, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route from DRT to Uvalde. On map 4, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the Uvalde schools which he responded to assist with evacuations. On map 5, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his parking location at Robb Elementary School. On map 8.b., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his location at Robb Elementary School. The other maps were not applicable (timestamp 02:28:31).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	DHS EMS Protocols.
3	DRT EMT Course, Revised 06/2022, Course Approval # DHS-EMSI-2022-009.
4	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 146**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 8, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is currently the strategic planning supervisor at USBP Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), which includes oversight of various programs for sensors and other technology as well as facilities and fleet. On the day of the shooting at Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was an administrative supervisor over the Field Training program.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned about the incident at Robb Elementary School via information relayed over his service issued radio at approximately 11:45 a.m. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP dispatch requested air support to respond to Uvalde for a shooting at a school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the information caught his attention because he lived in Uvalde and had a child who attended a school in Uvalde. Additionally, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had interest in the situation because he is a paramedic and was also responsible for the Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) program at CAR (timestamp 00:23:30).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) dispatch to obtain additional information and to ask if additional medical assets were needed. According to dispatch, the incident location was Robb Elementary School, the incident was still active, and any available assistance was requested (timestamp 00:25:10). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately called Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, informed him of the situation, and notified him there were at least three EMT personnel on duty at CAR who were available to respond. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for approval to respond to Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said no and instructed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to standby for additional guidance from Sector (timestamp 00:26:00). Following his call to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message at approximately 11:51 a.m. from Acting Deputy PAIC ([A]DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, instructing SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not to go to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied to (A)DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informing him there were six EMTs, including himself, available to respond. (A)DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated the instruction not to respond (timestamp 00:26:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed his disagreement with the decision not to allow the EMTs to respond to an active shooter event. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that if he were closer to the location of the incident instead of a 45-minute drive away, he would have disobeyed the order not to respond (timestamp 00:28:00). At approximately 12:31 p.m., SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received an email from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which was sent to all CAR supervisors, stating "Sector Leadership has instructed all station PAICs to not send agents on duty to this incident unless directed by them" (timestamp 01:33:00).

At approximately 12:35 p.m., approximately 50 minutes after he originally learned of the incident and shortly after receiving the email, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a telephone call from (A)DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informing him EMTs could now respond (timestamp 01:34:50). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, obtained her gear and they departed CAR for Uvalde in SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) medical vehicle. In addition to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, also deployed.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made their way to Uvalde via Highway 83 North. En route to Uvalde, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took inventory of the medical bags and supplies available in the vehicle while SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also discussed a plan of action. They converted their radio channel to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) frequency, which was already patched with the other law enforcement agencies, to obtain updates on the situation at Robb Elementary School. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the information being relayed over the radio was hard to decipher and they were unclear as to the status of the situation and if there was still an active shooter. At one point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard discussion that the shooter was barricaded somewhere (timestamp 00:29:50).

Prior to their arrival at Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call on his personal phone from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was en route and informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the shooter was currently barricaded and suggested SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceed to the west side of the school upon arrival. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he tried to contact SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) upon his arrival but was unsuccessful (timestamp 00:32:00).



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When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was approximately five minutes away from parking, he heard someone over the radio announce “We’re at the door. We’re preparing to breach.” SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was very confident the announcement was by made by BPAs. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard something to the effect of, “Standby... Don’t breach... San Antonio PD SWAT is coming through Sabinal right now” and was very confident Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD) Chief Pete Arredondo made that statement. A few seconds later, they heard “Breach, breach, breach, breach” followed by a request for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) (timestamp 00:33:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear anyone acknowledge the order not to breach and estimated it was approximately 30 seconds from the time of the order to standby to the time he heard the breach occur (timestamp 01:08:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained they made their way to Robb Elementary School from Highway 83 to South Evens Street and encountered a bottleneck of vehicles. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked his vehicle in front of a home on the corner of Geraldine Street and Nicolas Street. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed law enforcement officers (LEOs) standing around the area. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he obtained his medical bag and a monitor while SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obtained a trauma bag, and they ran towards the west side of the school (timestamp 00:35:20). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as they made their way towards the school, there were civilians and LEOs everywhere (01:44:20).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he contacted the Uvalde EMS team at the bus loop off of Geraldine Street as they could not find anyone who knew what was going on or where anything was located. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he saw EMS personnel assessing a patient in an EMS unit. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) based on his training and experience, the assessment he witnessed was not for any type of major injury. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed there were three to four helicopters in the field area of the school, but none deployed while he was there.

Shortly after arriving and meeting with the EMS personnel, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) members SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, exit the west side of building 100. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BORSTAR members had an indescribable look on their faces, as if they had seen something they never thought they would ever see in their life (timestamp 00:35:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started making contact amongst the personnel on site attempting to ascertain what was needed. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no communication taking place and even the EMS personnel were unsure about the status of the situation. They only knew that they had already transported two to three patients (timestamp 00:37:25).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then observed USBP leadership arrive, including Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT; Acting Deputy CPA (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. All USBP personnel were called to meet by a tree near the front of the school, where CBPA Owens addressed the group before instructing them to meet at UVA.



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Prior to departing Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with the local EMS personnel again. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with local EMS Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and a supervisor, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to inquire if his assistance was still needed. Since SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a monitor in his possession, they contemplated having SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assist with “running strips,” a method EMS personnel used to confirm there was no cardiac activity for those determined to be deceased (timestamp 00:40:00). According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CPA Owens approached him while he was talking to EMS personnel and inquired if SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard about the instruction to meet at UVA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he did hear the instruction but informed CPA Owens he had been requested to possibly assist with running strips. BPA Owens told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist EMS if required, but if he was not needed, he should proceed to UVA (timestamp 00:40:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he ultimately did not assist the local EMS with their task. Additionally, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he did not enter the school and he did not treat or assess any patients while he was at Robb Elementary School on that date (timestamp 01:53:30). While SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was still at the school, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed with an unknown BPA to assist with Peer Support duties and stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the hospital to follow-up with injured BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed Robb Elementary School and reported to UVA at approximately 1:30 p.m. As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was arriving at the UVA parking lot, he heard a transmission over the radio indicating there was a second threat at the high school. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was a threat indicating the shooter’s girlfriend was going to “finish what he started” (timestamp 00:44:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed the BORSTAR and BORTAC teams depart from UVA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained, during the time the event related to the second threat was unfolding, no one was able to provide clarification regarding the specific threat or a description of the alleged subject (timestamp 01:18:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered UVA to briefly meet with personnel before departing for the Uvalde Civic Center in support of the information related to the second threat (timestamp 00:46:45). Upon arriving at the Uvalde Civic Center, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and then met with some of the onsite BPAs who were providing security in the area. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall which BPAs were onsite. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then transitioned to assessing what needed to be done at the nearby schools. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Dalton Elementary School and Uvalde High School were already secured by USBP personnel, so he drove to the other schools to ensure they were secured. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to the Uvalde Dual Language Academy, Sacred Heart Catholic School, and Uvalde Classical Academy (UCA). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stopped at UCA, contacted the principal, and assisted with the release of students to their parents, which took approximately one hour (timestamp 02:25:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then reported back to the Uvalde Civic Center, briefly met with USBP personnel, and drove back to CAR. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were no negative interactions or incidents with parents or the public during the time he assisted at the various location in Uvalde.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's role at Robb Elementary School on the date of the shooting was as a law enforcement entity helping in the best interest of the community; USBP's role was to stop the killing and save kids and people. Regarding authority, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that although USBP did not have legal jurisdiction, they had authority to respond because it was a significant incident and a felony (timestamp 02:30:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in command and control of USBP on the date of the shooting at Robb Elementary School. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP is not well-versed in incident command (timestamp 02:34:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he did not believe USBP had a clear understanding of true incident command and mostly relied solely on rank. At one point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood the funeral home was supposed to be a command center but was unsure as to when or where he heard it. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when he passed the funeral home en route from his vehicle to the school, it did not look like a command center; it looked like a parking lot. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at no point while he was at Robb Elementary School did he see anything that looked like a command post, and he never saw anyone that looked or acted like they were in charge. He added even EMS stated they did not know if there were more patients that needed assistance (timestamp 01:48:20).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided information related to his medical background and stated he originally obtained his EMT and EMS certifications via his prior career as a firefighter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obtained his Paramedic certification in August 2021. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained, as a certified paramedic, he operates under the licensure of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who was delegated under (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Chief Medical Officer, CBP Office of the Chief Medical Officer (OCMO), Operations Support. Additionally, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he maintains his national registry certification, which subsequently allows him to operate as a paramedic for USBP (timestamp 02:41:30). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the USBP EMT program operates very similarly to the USBP hierarchy and chain of command. He explained the lowest level would be an EMT coordinator at a station level, which would then fall under the sector level, which would then fall under the national level under OCMO. Related to the aspect of medical triage and coordination at Robb Elementary School on the day of the incident, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in charge either prior to or post-breach and did not know where they were staged (timestamp 03:13:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not wearing a body worn camera on the date of the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not produce any written statements or memorandums related to his involvement at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he still had text messages and call log history information from May 24, 2022, stored on his government cellular phone and provided them to SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR (Attachment 2). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also forwarded the above-referenced email from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 3).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also shared information he learned from a conversation he had with Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, shared some of their experiences from their involvement at Robb Elementary School with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). According to



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they were ready to enter the classroom, but they were told over the radio by a BORTAC supervisor not to enter. The BORTAC supervisor was working with an unknown incident commander wearing a suit and body armor at the time they were instructed not to enter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted the information he learned was second- or third-party information and he was not clear as to its accuracy (timestamp 03:38:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was controversy related to his conversation with CPA Owens when he requested permission to stay behind at Robb Elementary School to assist local EMS. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received messages and information from different people indicating he was viewed as being insubordinate. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in his opinion, there was nothing confrontational about his conversation with CPA Owens. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that while he was at UVA, he saw CPA Owens and apologized, but CPA Owens informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the apology was unnecessary (timestamp 00:44:50). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and possibly BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as witnesses to the conversation he had with CPA Owens (timestamp 02:15:20). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall having a conversation with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Brackettville Station, TX, regarding conflicting orders to remain at the school or report to UVA, as directed by CPA Owens (timestamp 02:29:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a Map Package which was utilized to mark his routes of travel and significant areas where he was throughout the day (Attachment 4):

- SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 2 – South of Uvalde, TX to indicate his route of travel from the USBP Carrizo Springs Station to Uvalde.
- SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 4 – Uvalde, TX Schools to indicate his route of travel to Robb Elementary School and to indicate the location of other schools he visited on May 24, 2022.
- SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 5a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the location he parked upon arrival and where he reported to upon arrival at the school.
- SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate his arrival on foot and locations of the areas he met with personnel while on site.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Electronic media recording obtained from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government cellular phone.
3	Email from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) forwarded from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 147**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 2, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to firearms qualifications at the firing range. He arrived at the firing range around 7:00 a.m. and finished around 10:30 a.m. After qualifications, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was fixing his medical equipment when he heard over the radio about a subject with a weapon at Robb Elementary School. A few minutes later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard about an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. After hearing this information, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acked his medical equipment and drove towards Robb Elementary School using lights and sirens.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled that as he approached the intersection of U.S. Highway 90 and U.S. Highway 83, USBP radios were patched with other agencies and he heard on the radio about a girl calling from the classroom (timestamp 00:29:16). Near the intersection, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a stream of emergency vehicles from multiple agencies going south on South High Street, so he followed them. The street was so crowded, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could only get as close as 100 to 150 yards from the school; he parked in a residential yard.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon exiting his vehicle, he grabbed his medical bag and ran to Robb Elementary School. When he made it to a gate near the bus loading area, Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station, Texas, who was the acting Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) at UVA at that time, and Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, recognized BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as an emergency medical technician (EMT) and motioned him to go towards the west entrance. When a law enforcement officer in a black vest tried to prevent him from entering the west entrance, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him he heard on the radio there were victims in the classroom and asked where the shooter was located. The unknown officer said, "In there," gesturing towards the classrooms.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he entered the school, he saw multiple people in the north end of the school, including law enforcement officers from the Uvalde Police Department, the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department, the Uvalde County Sheriff's Office, a deputy U.S. Marshal, and a Texas Parks and Wildlife Game Warden wearing shorts and flip flops. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the situation as "mass confusion" when he entered the school. During his first moments in the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard different things from unknown people including that the shooter was barricaded, the shooter was on the roof, and someone was looking for a master key. He also heard an unknown person towards the south end of the hall trying to talk to the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recalled hearing the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) was going to gas the classroom and he remembered looking for gas masks. During this time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed those gathered in the north end of the school about the girl on the phone calling from the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed there were too many people in the hallway and said it seemed like what people knew inside the school was different from what was known outside of the school (timestamp 00:31:04).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing four to five shots at some point but did not remember the time. The shots caused those in the hallway to form a stack facing towards classrooms 111 and 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Brackettville Station, Texas, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, both EMTs, arrived around this time to assist and were sent by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the south entrance (timestamp 00:32:15). A casualty collection point (CCP) was established near the restrooms on the north end of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall who decided on the location of the CCP, but felt the situation was mass confusion, as no one person was giving orders.

[Agent Note: stack is a term for a formation used in law enforcement when a team forms up single file along the entrance or doorway to a room where they believe a threat is located.]



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall anything during the time between hearing four to five shots from the classroom and BORTAC preparing for entry. Wanting to be close to the stack in case a law enforcement officer was injured, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lined up near the double doors in the hallway behind one of the stacks with two tourniquets in his hand. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered the door being opened by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and 15 to 20 shots being fired (timestamp 00:39:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once the shooting stopped, he yelled at people several times to prevent them from entering classroom 111 until the room was declared clear. As soon as the classroom was declared clear, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered classroom 111. He estimated 10 to 15 people were in the classroom at the time he entered.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon entering the classroom, he immediately noticed the classroom was very dark. He turned right and saw bodies under a table. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reached for one of the bodies, a boy, and noticed "obvious signs of death," so he moved on to the child next to the boy (timestamp 01:10:37). The child next to the boy was a girl, whose head was positioned in a way he could easily feel a pulse. Feeling a strong pulse, he picked her up, and with the assistance of an unknown law enforcement officer, carried her to the CCP near the water fountain. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the girl had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hair and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) eyes. Her wounds included a gunshot wound near her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which was not bleeding much, and a gunshot wound near her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the right side, which also was not bleeding much. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the assistance of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, whom BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) referred to as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) applied a chest seal to both wounds. After applying the chest seals, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled feeling a strong pulse, and he told others the girl needed to be taken outside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall who took the girl outside but believed she left on a backboard.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he attempted to treat a nearby boy. After an initial evaluation and attempting to find a pulse multiple times, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the boy was deceased (timestamp 01:20:23).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in an attempt to find more victims requiring care, he returned to classrooms 111 and 112 but was denied entry. After being denied entry, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a girl being treated outside the west entrance. He stated he believed others were calling her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the girl and relieved the Texas Department of Public Safety trooper performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) (timestamp 01:21:16).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he performed two cycles of CPR on the girl while a BPA with the Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit attempted to initiate an intravenous line and an intraosseous line. While treating the girl, someone suggested she be taken out of plain sight, so she was transferred to a nearby ambulance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled CPR was still being performed on the girl 15 minutes later when he walked by the ambulance, as the ambulance was shaking (timestamp 01:22:38).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after performing CPR on the girl, he attempted to reenter Robb Elementary School but was prevented from entering the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard all USBP personnel were meeting by a tree on the north side of the school. Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector, spoke to the group, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not pay attention to what was said. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being surprised by the number of people present, as he was unaware of the number of people who responded to the incident.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the meeting near the tree, he walked back to his vehicle and cleaned up as best he could. He recalled talking to someone wearing a black CBP polo shirt and tan pants about the number of casualties. All BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought about while walking to his vehicle was whether the first female patient he treated would survive. He washed his hands with water he kept in his vehicle and returned to UVA. From UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tried to clean up some more and went home at approximately 4:30 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unsure about who was in charge of the scene from the time of his arrival until his departure, including the time he treated victims. He believed that after the breach, everyone's mindset was focused on identifying who needed medical attention and then treating them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he knew a lot of responding law enforcement officers brought out deceased children to the CCP, but in hindsight, he questioned those decisions. The CCP was established prior to the breach because it was believed the area was safe, provided cover, and was open to treat victims. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled an unknown person saying the CCP would be set-up near the restrooms and remembered repeating it to other unknown medics as he was emptying medical supplies from his medical kit.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the situation as "chaos" inside the building. He said it took him a while to realize that what people were thinking inside the building was different from what people were thinking outside the building (timestamp 01:43:36).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the chaos was entirely due to a poor communications system. He said that at some point during the incident, prior to the breach, an unknown law enforcement officer prevented additional officers from entering the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall any communication between the north side of the building and the south side of the building (timestamp 01:46:47).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he became an EMT in November 2019. He was trained by instructors from the college in Uvalde, a paramedic from the Eagle Pass Fire Department, and USBP instructors. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated to become an EMT, there was a solicitation for interest. Sometimes there was a test or interview, but in the end, the PAIC decided who went to the training. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) class was in Eagle Pass. The training was eight or nine weeks including clinical training. Mass casualty incidents (MCI), incident command, and triage during an MCI were all covered in the training. After completing the class, a skills test and ride-alongs with an ambulance crew were required. Then, the National Registry of EMTs exam was completed. If a student passed the National Registry of EMTs exam, the student became an EMT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he felt his station supported his continued training, and he had the



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opportunity to attend numerous classes. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) scope of practice was determined by Doctor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Medical Director. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed the National Registry of EMTs gave EMTs the permission to practice as an EMT. EMTs received CPR training every year along with a 40-hour refresher training. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said non-EMT BPAs did not get CPR training each year despite it being a requirement. Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it had been a couple of years since Individual First Aid Kit training was provided to non-EMT BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that in hindsight, he would have triaged the victims in the classroom, as there was no need to move them once the classroom was clear (timestamp 01:59:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not know verbatim USBP’s authority to respond to an incident like the shooting at Robb Elementary School. His understanding was that BPAs were immigration officers, but they were also law enforcement officers, and it was their duty to respond and act on the training they had received. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not believe he held peace officer status in Texas (timestamp 02:06:02).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided by CBP OPR interviewers (Attachment 2). Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown six screenshots from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body-worn camera and identified himself and others in the images (Attachment 3).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Screenshots from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body-worn camera labeled 1-6 reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 8, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and AD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and the recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he worked the day shift and was assigned to BRA. While working on a computer issue, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a CBP air unit in the area advise over the radio of a school shooting (timestamp 00:13:10). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately called the duty SBPA to get more information. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised the school shooting was in Uvalde, TX. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, of the situation. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he contacted the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) to ask if they needed additional Border Patrol agent (BPA) emergency medical technicians (EMT). There was no management available to speak to at UVA so SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed an unknown BPA that BRA would send BPA EMTs. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dispatched BRA BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:14:38). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a field training officer at the time and responded to Robb Elementary School with two BRA BPA trainees (BPA-Ts) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he grabbed his gear, including an M-4 rifle and departed for Robb Elementary School in a marked USBP government vehicle with his lights and sirens activated. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he arrived on scene just before 12:49 p.m. based on a “pin drop” he had on his cell phone (timestamp 01:04:28). When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived on scene, he parked near FM 1435 and Geraldine St. and immediately looked for a command post, but no one knew where it was (timestamp 00:18:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later recalled speaking with Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, who said the command post was at Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home (timestamp 00:35:57).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he approached the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home area, an unknown local law enforcement officer (LEO) asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he could assist with keeping parents back from the funeral home (timestamp 00:18:12). Shortly after, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist EMTs at Robb Elementary School and instructed BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to stay and assist him in the funeral home area (timestamp 00:18:33). When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived, he noticed someone on a stretcher near the school attended by unknown EMTs or LEOs (timestamp 00:33:56). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the parents were irate as he, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other law enforcement entities attempted to keep them back (timestamp 00:18:54). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified he, BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other LEOs attempted to slowly move the parents back by forming a line of LEOs (timestamp 00:38:12). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated there were 30 to 50 parents and 15 to 20 LEOs. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while on scene, he heard someone refer to the shooter as a barricaded subject (timestamp 00:55:30). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall if he heard someone say it while on scene or if he heard it via his service radio. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing a SWAT (special weapons and tactics) team from San Antonio was on the way to Robb Elementary School. While still assisting at the funeral home, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw what he assumed to be the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) BPAs running towards Robb Elementary (timestamp 00:20:03). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed they were BORTAC due to their multi-camouflage uniform.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear gunfire but recalled hearing the “shooter was down” via his service radio (timestamp 00:41:08). At approximately 12:50 p.m., SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent a text message to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informing him the shooter was down (timestamp 01:04:40). A short time after, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw an injured BORTAC BPA in plain clothes exiting the school. He saw uninjured children running from Robb Elementary School covered in blood (timestamp 00:20:25). The children were taken directly to a school bus near SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) location. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and additional LEOs made a path for the children to the school bus while keeping parents away. As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to help keep parents back, he witnessed unknown Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) troopers fighting with a large male (timestamp 00:21:09). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated TXDPS slammed the large male into a vehicle and then onto the ground. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further explained that when he saw TXDPS fighting with the large male, he was 5 to 10 feet away, and turned his back to the situation to make sure the children could get on the bus safely (timestamp 02:12:30). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was the only physical interaction he witnessed between any LEOs and civilians (timestamp 00:39:37). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not witness BPA-T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) have any physical interactions with civilians





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(timestamp 02:11:26). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) denied having any physical interactions with any civilians (timestamp 02:11:39).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after successfully loading the children onto the bus, he went to a building on the east side of Robb Elementary School to assist with evacuating children (timestamp 00:22:30). After evacuating children on the east side of Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked in with his personnel to make sure they were okay. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then instructed his personnel to meet at UVA for a briefing (timestamp 00:24:07). Unknown local LEOs advised SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of a possible second threat (timestamp 00:24:57). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed Robb Elementary School and heard conflicting information regarding the second threat and quickly figured out it was incorrect information. He then went to UVA for the briefing and stayed for about an hour.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know of a specific authority that allowed USBP to respond to the incident but said if a felony was committed, USBP could act upon it (timestamp 00:53:29). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt that USBP had a responsibility to respond but in a support role.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he became a certified active shooter instructor with USBP in early 2017 (timestamp 00:56:11). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the training taught that if someone was actively shooting, the priority was to go and stop the threat. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall his initial training covering a barricaded subject. Since the incident at Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has attended additional active shooter training. In those trainings, he was taught that if a subject was barricaded and did not have access to anyone, then law enforcement officers had time. If a subject had access to people, then law enforcement would need to do what was necessary to stop the threat. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the active shooter training did not cover how to deal with parents (timestamp 00:59:45).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2) (timestamp 00:26:57). These maps were labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled to Robb Elementary on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from Brackettville, TX on Highway 90 into Uvalde and straight to Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled from BRA to Uvalde. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where he parked his vehicle close to Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his foot route from his vehicle to Robb Elementary School. He also marked the area he assisted local LEOs keep parents back near Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home, the locations where he assisted load kids onto a bus. On the map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the location where assisted evacuating children from the east side of Robb Elementary School. All other maps were not applicable.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided two separate text strings from his personal cell phone containing conversations with various BRA personnel from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 3).



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- Text String 1 included the following: PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- Text String 2 included BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Text message conversations.

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 149**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 8, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to BORSTAR, USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), was on duty, and was (b) (7)(E) located between Uvalde and Eagle Pass, Texas. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall which ranch he was located on at the time of the incident.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORSTAR, DRT, over the signal application on his government issued cell phone at 11:39 a.m. The message advised there was radio traffic of a shooting at the Robb Elementary School (timestamp 13:28:20).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he spoke with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they decided to self-deploy to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 13:29:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he informed both Acting Patrol Agent in Charge ([A]PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Directorate (SOD), DRT, and Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, of the situation and remained in contact with them throughout the day.

At 11:44 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORSTAR, DRT, was on light duty at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) when he messaged on his chat string that he heard the shooting was inside the school.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) messaged his BORSTAR team at 11:46 a.m., requesting everyone who was free to respond to Robb Elementary School and for those not free to respond when available. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he did not know the location of Robb Elementary School and asked for someone to drop a pin on the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) phone application. At 11:49 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dropped a red dot on ATAK, marking the location of the school.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have a clear understanding of the situation and believed that by the time he arrived on scene, in approximately 30-40 minutes, he would be assisting with perimeter security (timestamp 13:33:00).

At 11:56 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORSTAR, DRT, messaged on the chat string to scan Uvalde radio (b) (7)(E) for updates.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated after he began driving, he switched to the Uvalde radio channel where communications were bad. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that people were relaying misinformation about the incident and transmitting on the radio simultaneously causing the communications to be incomprehensible. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued driving with the vehicle emergency equipment activated to get there and provide security (timestamp 13:33:30).

At 12:18 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) messaged that he heard from UVA that two police officers were shot, and the shooter ran inside the school.

At 12:19 p.m., SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) messaged the team that he was on scene. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was not actually at the school at 12:19 p.m. because he parked approximately two blocks away on Geraldine Street and got out on foot due to the large number of law enforcement and civilian vehicles gridlocking the street.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) messaged the team at 12:26 p.m. that he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORSTAR, DRT, were in the building with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), DRT. At that time, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised his team it was an active shooter and to bring hand throw gas and medical equipment. Additionally, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised his team that multiple gunshot wounds were possible.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked to clarify what he meant by multiple gunshot wounds possible. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assumed because the shooter was in a school building, it was possible there would be multiple gunshot wounds and he wanted his team to be medically prepared.

At 12:31 p.m., DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) messaged on the chat string that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mic was hot.

[Agent's note: A hot mic is when a radio is transmitting continuously without the operator's awareness.]

At 1:02 p.m., (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) messaged the team asking if a landing zone (LZ) had been established. There were no responses on the chat string confirming if an LZ had been established.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated as he approached the school on foot, he encountered two local law enforcement officers and asked them where the Incident Command (IC) was located, but they appeared confused by his question. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued walking and then encountered a UVA Watch Commander (WC) but could not recall his name. The WC informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was already inside the school building (timestamp 13:49:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered Robb Elementary School through the west entrance and observed law enforcement officers from different agencies hanging around in the hallway. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that his impression, based on the officers' demeanors, was that the situation did not seem urgent (timestamp 13:53:47).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled speaking with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and informing him he was on scene to assist, and his team was on the way. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked him to get the guys there and bring medical gear and tear gas (timestamp 13:55:27).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived on scene five or ten minutes before him and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) appeared to be in the process of gathering information. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was under the impression the subject was barricaded and law enforcement officers in the building were looking to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to take over (timestamp 14:00:17).

After speaking with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went back to his vehicle and grabbed hand thrown gas and medical equipment (timestamp 14:02:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled having a conversation with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other USBP paramedics about setting up a casualty collection point (CCP) in the north hallway between the school restrooms. They then began stripping down and staging the medical gear (timestamp 14:13:23).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his thought process for setting up the CCP was that the subject was barricaded. At some point, law enforcement was going to make entry and the subject and possibly law enforcement personnel were going to get shot (timestamp 14:18:33). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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explained, based on his training, it was helpful to have a clearly defined space where everyone knew medical would be established.

After setting up the medical gear, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it felt like it became a waiting game, and he was only focused on the medical effort. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that at some point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT, arrived on scene and began looking for a space in the courtyard to set up the sniper rifle (timestamp 14:23:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) busy with conversations about which room the shooter was in and busy formulating a plan to make entry. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also heard someone say the doors were locked and it appeared someone was looking for keys (timestamp 14:25:10).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he believed he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were the highest level of care in the building at the time. He further believed his role from the time of arriving on scene was medical support. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing BORTAC members BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, in the building at some point during the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated he believed the situation was a barricaded subject (timestamp 14:26:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not feel that anyone was taking command or leading the situation at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he deferred to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the tactical supervisor and was available to assist with whatever SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed (timestamp 14:39:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe anyone giving orders or instructions to law enforcement personnel on scene. He did not feel that any of the other law enforcement agencies on scene were in control of the situation. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he did not even know who was in the south hall of the building or if anyone was giving directions at that location (timestamp 14:47:40).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled someone found a set of keys that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tested on a utility closet which he believed opened the door. At around the same time, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed someone passing a huge ballistic shield up to the front of the stack to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was with other BPAs and a Zavala County Deputy Sheriff. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained BORTAC members BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, arrived just before the entry and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the shield from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 14:49:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled within a short time of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) joining the stack, entry was made into the classroom. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard gun shots as soon as the door opened and ducked down low to the ground (timestamp 14:55:10).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described that after the breach, it was chaos as law enforcement personnel rushed into the room. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that his mind went blurry and blank for a second until law enforcement personnel began bringing out kids (timestamp 15:17:40).



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he was recalling events out of order but remembered someone dragging a child by their leg and pulling the child toward the paramedics. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) handing him a child with a gunshot wound to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He described seeing a lot of blood and as he braced the back of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with his hand, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately realized his makeshift CCP was not going to be enough, and a higher level of care would be needed. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered seeing Emergency Medical Services (EMS) outside the building. He and others carried the child outside and handed the child over to EMS (timestamp 15:18:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that paramedics must triage and treat what they can and be able to move past what they can't treat, which is tough to do when kids are involved (timestamp 15:29:12).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went back inside the building and described law enforcement personnel flooding out of the rooms with kids, bringing them to the CCP. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were so many kids in the hallway that triage became ineffective (timestamp 15:32:12).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) bringing him a female child. He said she was the first child he saw that he believed they could help. They put her in the hallway and began treating her. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she was looking at him and blinking and she appeared to be (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) age. At that moment, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he got tunnel vision and was determined to save the little girl.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was very difficult moving on to another child after seeing so many kids he couldn't help due to their injuries. After stabilizing the little girl, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took her outside to EMS. Once they were in the ambulance they lost her pulse, and he was not sure if her pulse came back. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was pretty messed up due to the ordeal (timestamp 15:33:00).

As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked back toward the building, he observed a teacher being treated with cardiopulmonary resuscitation. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he tried to assist but he did not think she survived. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he did not go back inside the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he believes other things happened, but everything is a blur to him. He indicated he has worked very hard to block out everything from the incident (timestamp 15:37:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed he assessed five or six children, checking for obvious life-threatening injuries before moving on to the next child.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he observed law enforcement personnel moving injured kids in ways that were probably more harmful. He explained law enforcement personnel did not know any better and were just trying to do their best to help. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was difficult to categorize patients because as soon as he turned around another child had been dropped off (timestamp 15:43:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembers USBP personnel were told to meet with Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, on the north side of the school. CPA Owens conveyed some encouraging words and directed everyone to report to UVA (timestamp 16:17:20).





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At UVA, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned about another possible threat concerning the shooter's girlfriend. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed to Dalton Elementary School with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) where they patrolled the school perimeter and assisted the school with taking children from the classrooms to their parents. At 6:33 p.m., SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) messaged his team to depart from Dalton Elementary School.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's role at the incident was to be there as first responders and it was his impression USBP had the largest law enforcement presence at the scene (timestamp 15:02:40).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of any written legal authority for USBP to respond to an active shooter situation. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt that if there was an existing threat to the public USBP, as law enforcement officers, had the right to respond to prevent members of the public from being injured (timestamp 15:04:08).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP had a responsibility to respond to the incident at Robb Elementary School as law enforcement officers and human beings (timestamp 15:06:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was assigned a body worn camera but did not have it on his gear at the time of the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did he produce any reports concerning the incident.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a map package and labeled his movements and location during the Robb Elementary School shooting incident (Attachment 2).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided two separate text strings from his government cell phone with various BORTAC and BORSTAR members and supervisors from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 3). Special Agent (SA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, then entered the interview room and recorded SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Signal chat strings using his CBP issued iPhone (timestamp 17:51:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received his paramedic training in 2012 at the Val Verde Regional Medical Hospital in Del Rio and graduated in 2013. SPBA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) medical training was approximately 9-months in length and consisted of classroom instruction and clinical rotations with EMS and in the Emergency Room.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is registered with the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians and licensed with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he does not hold a medical license with any state.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Office of the Chief Medical Officer, Washington, D.C., is the medical director at the CBP level and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DHS Office of Health Security, Washington, D.C., is the medical director at the DHS level.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Recorded videos 1-2 of the text message strings on SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government cell phone.

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 150**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 8, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on-duty and in rough duty uniform responding to a suspected alien smuggling event (b) (7)(E) just outside of Uvalde. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed that the Kenny County Sheriff's Office intercepted the smuggling attempt. Shortly thereafter, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard BPA-Intelligence (BPA-I) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Sector Intelligence Unit report over the radio, "Active shooter, Robb Elementary" (timestamp 08:59:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled USBP dispatch asked BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to repeat the transmission, so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) repeated the information and began responding to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 08:32:40). While en route to Robb Elementary School, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called out over the radio, "Shots fired, get as many agents as possible to Robb Elementary" (timestamp 08:59:15).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when the call initially came across the radio from BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he assumed it was another failure to yield. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, in the past, there had been several failure to yield incidents and bailout type (suspects abandoning smuggling vehicles and fleeing) incidents that prompted schools to go into lock down (timestamp 09:56:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove directly to Robb Elementary School and parked in front of the funeral home on the north side of the school. Upon arrival, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several ambulances staged in the neighborhood near the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) talked to a local law enforcement officer (LEO) near the funeral home and inquired as to the shooter's location. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed the shooter was on the other side of the school. Using cover, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made his way to the area just outside the west hallway door near classroom 132. There, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several Uvalde Police Department (UPD) officers, both in uniform and in plain clothes, including Lieutenant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 08:33:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he also observed an officer in a pastel-colored dress shirt and tie, later identified as Chief Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UPD, walking around and talking on both a radio and cellular phone. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed that Chief Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in command of the scene based on the way he was dressed (timestamp 09:54:16).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed the gate in which he had entered the school was the only unlocked gate. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to open the vehicle gate for first responders on the north side of the school off Geraldine Street. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) discovered the gate was locked, he attempted to break it open without success. At that time, a civilian approached and handed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a set of keys with a dark colored paracord lanyard. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to use the keys; however, they did not work, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) placed the keys in his cargo pants pocket. Eventually, someone produced bolt cutters and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to open the gate. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while walking back towards the west hallway he encountered a pedestrian gate and utilized the keys he was given to gain access (timestamp 08:36:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he returned to the west hallway, he observed numerous LEOs on scene, including the Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) and other BPAs. Shortly thereafter, BPAs began breaking out the windows of classrooms 102 to 106 and evacuating students and faculty. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began assisting with the evacuation and observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, assisting a wounded teacher out of one of the windows. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, assisted the teacher to an ambulance and turned her over to medical personnel. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned and continued assisting with the evacuation by carrying students to awaiting buses near Geraldine Street (timestamp 08:38:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the last student he evacuated had blood on their clothes, so he took the student immediately to the ambulance and left the student with medical personnel (timestamp 10:07:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the evacuation, he recalled seeing off-duty BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in plain clothes and carried a shotgun. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall what BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was doing nor whether BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was wearing a ballistic vest (timestamp 10:12:20).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he returned to the west hallway and encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, setting up a medical triage area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was instructed to gather medical supplies and bring them to the triage area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) briefed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and others on the triage procedures including how to color code victims. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that orange indicated the victim was injured but did not need immediate medical attention, red indicated the victim was injured and needed immediate medical care, and black indicated the victim was deceased (timestamp 08:42:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then began staging ambulances along Geraldine Street close to the school to allow for quicker medical access to victims. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed that BORSTAR and BPA emergency medical technicians (EMTs) had taken charge of the triage area (timestamp 09:33:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, park on the north side of the school along Geraldine Street. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall any direct contact with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 09:30:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was interviewed by Texas Rangers on two separate occasions; the first within a few days of the incident, and the second approximately in November 2022. During the second interview, Texas Rangers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a video from the hallway at the T-intersection where BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) threw the keys that he had obtained earlier in the incident to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that prior to seeing the T-intersection video shown to him by Texas Rangers, he did not recall this occurring. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the video showed him testing the keys on a classroom door, possibly classroom 132, before throwing the keys to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he asked the Texas Ranger during the second interview if the keys he threw to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked on classroom 111. The Texas Ranger responded, "We will never know" (timestamp 10:09:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it seemed that shortly after throwing the keys to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the breach occurred, and victims started to be brought out. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall hearing the actual breach occur (timestamp 08:45:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard approximately eight to ten gunshots at some point before the breach. Shortly after the gunshots, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard an unknown LEO say the shots were due to LEOs approaching the classroom (timestamp 09:28:03). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he observed the first victim being carried down the hallway towards the west hallway exit, it was clear that the victim had suffered severe trauma to the head and was deceased. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several deceased victims brought into the T-intersection hallway and placed on the ground near classroom 132. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard someone yelling at the first responders to check the victim's vitals before bringing them out of the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed LEOs eventually move deceased victims from the hallway to inside classroom 132 to keep the hallway clear. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the hallway was just "chaos" (timestamp 08:48:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed an unknown BPA EMT and BPA EMT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, providing medical care to a young female victim outside the west hallway and eventually placing her into an ambulance (timestamp 08:51:15).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and several BPAs were covered in blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) eventually gathered with other BPAs near a tree on the north side of the school where they were addressed by USBP leadership and instructed to return to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to his USBP vehicle and while en route to UVA, he heard over the radio there was a threat to Uvalde High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to continue to UVA to provide peer support to BPAs in need and return home (timestamp 08:53:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any negative contact with the public (timestamp 10:06:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he attended active shooter training within the last ten years (timestamp 10:13:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was his perception that USBP was on scene in a support role for local law enforcement (timestamp 10:21:40).

CBP OPR interviewers showed video clips from three videos to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The first video was from the funeral home across the street from Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself arriving at 11:48 a.m. The second video was from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body worn camera outside the west hallway; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself at 12:11 p.m. (Attachment 3). The third video was the hallway camera at the T-intersection (Attachment 4). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself at approximately 12:23:10 in the T-intersection video, testing the keys on classroom 132 and then throwing the keys to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (according to the video, this occurred after the gunshots at 12:21 p.m. and approximately 28 minutes before the breach at 12:49 p.m.). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in his second interview with Texas Rangers, the video he was shown by them was from a different angle in the T-intersection (timestamp 13:06:21).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Funeral home video footage.
3	Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body worn camera video.
4	T-Intersection security camera video.

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 151**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 9, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he arrived at USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) at approximately (b) (7)(E) and worked the day shift as an administrative supervisor. At approximately 10:00 a.m., SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Comstock Station, TX, to discuss his performance during a recent interview for a promotion. During the meeting, Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, entered the office where SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were meeting and informed them about an active shooter in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed the keys to the SOD warehouse from the office and left toward the warehouse. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is on numerous law enforcement task forces and believes he was notified about the shooting from one of the task forces.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	09/18/2023
Approved by:		Date:	

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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he left the office, ran to his vehicle, and began to put on his gear. During this time, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, to drive the USBP Bearcat tactical vehicle to Uvalde and get there as soon as possible (timestamp 00:13:40). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left DRT and drove from Dotson to Avenue F to Highway 90. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove on Highway 90 straight to Uvalde, following BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove with his emergency lights on and drove at a speed of 90 to 95 miles per hour (mph). As he drove to Uvalde, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt they would receive a “stand down” order because an active shooter situation usually ends quickly. As he continued to drive, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the incident may be a barricaded subject since the incident was taking so long to resolve. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never heard anyone mention barricaded subject.

As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to Uvalde, he received text messages but did not read them all. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also listened to the radio communications and remembered someone had an open microphone for a prolonged period where information was being transmitted. During the open microphone, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard numerous commands being given and personnel speculating where the suspect may be. Based on the information he heard over the radio, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt the personnel at Robb Elementary School did not know the location of the suspect. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), and asked who was in charge at Robb Elementary School. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, was in charge (timestamp 00:17:17). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to have WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) call him, but WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never called SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, did send a text that he was on scene at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated at one point he heard they were going to gas the classroom and he thought they should not do that because it would make the situation worse. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall how he heard about the gas.

As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached Evans St at the cemetery in Uvalde, he heard law enforcement officers (LEO) were about to make entry into the classroom. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived and met with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get a breaching charge and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if the breaching charge was for a wood or metal door (timestamp 00:26:04). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not respond to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and walked away. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and headed toward the school on foot. As he approached the school, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the scene as chaotic, and it did not appear anyone was in command of the scene (timestamp 00:27:05). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were parents screaming and LEOs just standing around looking away from the school.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper (TRP) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walking with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had blood on his face and appeared to be out of it. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he was good, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said something angrily but looked to be good to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described seeing numerous children and people exiting the building as he approached the doors. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR), DRT, and asked him if he needed help with anything. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not respond to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and just continued giving instructions to other Emergency Medical



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Technicians (EMT) on scene. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to move through the school, following the blood stains on the floor. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a female child with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) being dragged by her arms and described her face as having a grey color to it.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to move toward the classroom door. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered classroom 112 and saw an EMT with a black shirt who told him there was nothing they could do for the kids and that everyone was code “Black” (a medical code to explain someone is deceased). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned and entered classroom 111 and saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) where he needed him. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded that he did not know and then said the suspect was on the ground. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked down and saw the suspect lying on the ground. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the Texas Rangers entered the room and told everyone the scene was a crime scene and instructed everyone to exit so they could secure it (timestamp 00:33:08). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then exited the school.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went back to his vehicle to drop off his gear and grab his medical gear. When he returned to the school, he stated they were not permitted to enter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated all USBP personnel gathered by the tree in front of the school, and he began checking on his teammates. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and told him they took BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the hospital. He stated he was going to leave to go check on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to go, so he left for the hospital.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at the at the hospital and met with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to leave and go to the hospital in Kerrville, TX, but SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him he could not leave. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated as he sat with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT, arrived at the hospital. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his DRT BORTAC command staff inquired about BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised he was with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and that he was doing good (timestamp 00:37:25).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he was waiting with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hospital staff approached him and asked if he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could assist them with escorting parents to identify children (timestamp 00:37:45). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he left BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist with the request. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he walked into the hospital lobby, he observed it was chaotic. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they paired up with a nurse and they escorted a woman through access doors and brought her to a big operating room. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they went into the operating room, and he observed a covered body with writing on the cover. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the writing said the time of death was “1:13”. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the nurse pulled back the sheet and the woman said it was not (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) The woman said she recognized the girl from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) class. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they escorted the woman to another room and proceeded to escort another set of parents to the room.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated other family members were with the parents, but the only people allowed to go to the operating room were parents. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the other family members became aggressive and wanted to go as well. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the family members banged on the access doors and yelled. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the nurse asked the parents if they had a



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picture of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the parents said they did. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the parents showed the nurse the picture and she began crying, at which time the parents realized (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was deceased. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the parents began to cry and the family members saw the parents crying through the windows of the access doors. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the family members became more aggressive and broke through the access doors. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they had to stop the family from continuing down the hall and asked them to wait. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told them he would come back and get them once the parents identified the child with the nurse. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they went into the operating room, the nurse pulled back the sheet, and the parents identified the body as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remembered the father mentioned that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt so cold. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that they could not keep (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) families because it was not their job. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he got the other family members he had asked to wait and reunited them with the parents. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then left, got BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and brought her back to his room. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they stayed at the hospital until approximately 7:00 p.m. and then left to go home.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never got into a physical confrontation with any parents or children.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were all issued Body Worn Cameras (BWC), but they were on their main field kits (body armor and carrier with attachments worn by BPAs). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they did not have the ability to quickly move the camera to and from their different kits at the time. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they now have the ability to change the camera out from one kit to the next.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he took an internal USBP active shooter class around 2010 or 2011 (timestamp 00:56:25).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP does not have Peace Officer status in Texas.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map the route he took to Uvalde (Attachment 2).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) showed text messages on his cellular phone from the date of the incident. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recorded the text messages displayed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 3).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not remember the exact times associated with his response to this incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Recording of text messages from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) phone.

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 152**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 9, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code is (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was a member of the Special Operations Detachment (SOD), Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR), and was assigned to the Incident Command Post at USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dressed in a combat duty USBP uniform and was assigned an unmarked USBP Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) described as a silver Chevrolet Tahoe (timestamp 00:19:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became aware of a possible active shooter in Uvalde through his agency-issued Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) cellular telephone Signal Chat text thread between BORSTAR members (timestamp 00:44:59). Following the text thread, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) briefly spoke with Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Nogales Station, Arizona, about the possible active shooter and they both elected to respond. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the information had not been corroborated and no one directed him to respond, but he made the decision to respond because he had already received information that BORSTAR agents were responding and were en route (timestamp 00:21:41).

Prior to responding, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put on his combat tactical shirt and body armor plates, gathered his agency radio and rifle, and traveled alone to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled eastbound on Highway 90 and listened to radio communications for updates. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the radio communications were somewhat of a mess due to other law enforcement agencies being patched into the channel.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing the following radio communications as he was en route, “Shooter is dead; shooter on the roof; I have eyes on the roof and no one is up here; is there someone inside; and the shooter is down” (timestamp 00:23:51). The radio communications were broadcasted by different individuals and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only recognized the voices of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), DRT, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT (timestamp 00:50:28). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled reading a text that said, “shooter is down”, but was unable to confirm who sent that text message (timestamp 00:47:29).

Upon arriving at Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a law enforcement officer (LEO) directing traffic and stated law enforcement vehicles were unable to access the road into the school (timestamp 00:54:40). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were many law enforcement vehicles present and they were all parking in the neighborhood. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived on scene at the same time that the USBP armored vehicle “BearCat” and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT, arrived (timestamp 00:55:04). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall the driver of the BearCat and said neither of them had any updated information regarding the active shooter (timestamp 00:56:40). According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he looked at the ATAK cellular telephone and pinpointed that BORSTAR members were located near the entrance of the school (timestamp 00:56:45). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who told him that the situation was over and that they were meeting by a tree outside the school.

As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked towards the school, he noticed a vehicle in a ditch in a concrete canal and later found out that it was the shooter’s truck (timestamp 00:39:20). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described that aside from ambulance sirens, it seemed eerily quiet (timestamp 01:13:10).

As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached Robb Elementary School, he noticed USBP Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, was present but did not speak to him (timestamp 01:01:57). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) congregated with BORSTAR BPAs who were gathered under a tree by the school (timestamp 01:02:52). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the BORSTAR members as SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; BPA



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT; and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT (01:04:10).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was briefed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who informed him BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was one of the BPAs who engaged the shooter (timestamp 01:14:08). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to keep an eye on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:05:31). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to approach BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who appeared to be distraught, and consoled him. At the tree, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed all BPAs to report to USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) to be addressed by Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT (timestamp 01:08:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hand over his rifle to relieve the weight he was carrying, escorted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to his GOV, and helped him secure the rifle (01:05:40). After SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) secured BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rifle they drove independently to UVA.

As CPA Owens addressed everyone at the muster room, SOD received a message that the girlfriend of the shooter threatened to finish what the shooter had started at another school (timestamp 00:28:35). BORTAC and BORSTAR immediately deployed to different schools around Uvalde.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to a middle school, possibly Dalton Middle School, but could not confirm with certainty. At the school, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with setting the perimeter security and established the perimeter. This provided a 360-degree view of who entered the school grounds and a safe zone to evacuate students (timestamp 00:29:25).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that as he performed perimeter security, he recalled hearing a radio transmission broadcast "Shots fired"; however, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear gunfire. Soon after another radio transmission broadcast "No shots fired, everything is under control, no shooting". According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he stayed at the school with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. He stated they stayed at the school for a few hours until all the students at the school were evacuated. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned he observed the blood on some of the BPA's uniforms while at the school.

At one point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing that LEOs had spoken to the girlfriend, and she denied having any intention to continue what the shooter had started. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to specify which law enforcement agency contacted the girlfriend and was unable to recall who relayed the information to him (timestamp 00:36:16).

From SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) perspective, when he arrived at Robb Elementary School no one seemed to know what was going on and no one appeared to be in command or control of the situation (timestamp 01:14:53). According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP's role in the incident was to respond in a support role. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP is trained to respond to active shooter situations. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that he is aware that USBP does not have state or local peace officer authority; however, in the active shooter training, he was taught that in an active shooter situation that does not matter. In the training it is implied that a LEO has an obligation to respond and stop the shooter (timestamp 01:20:55). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that in an active





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shooter situation, the priorities are to engage the subject, stop the carnage, and treat the wounded (timestamp 01:18:50).

When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked if he ever heard the situation change from an active shooter to a barricaded subject, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged that while he traveled to Uvalde, he heard a radio broadcast stating there was a barricaded subject. He stated that law enforcement was attempting to contact the grandfather or grandmother of the shooter, in an effort to get them to speak with him because he was barricaded (timestamp 01:31:06).

Following the incident, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed the BORTAC members to report to UVA for a debrief (timestamp 01:35:45).

While outside the Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not render medical aid to anyone. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was uncertain if he wore a body camera on May 24, 2022. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also uncertain if he assisted with drafting the Situational Report (SITREP), or if he sent any e-mails regarding the incident at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to follow-up with CBP OPR to confirm if he wrote a report, sent any e-mails or if he had body worn camera footage regarding the incident (timestamp 01:51:33).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he is a certified Emergency Medical Technician (EMT). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was first certified as an EMT for USBP in 2013 at USBP Rio Grande Valley Sector. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also trained in Combat Tactical Casualty Training. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had knowledge of how to treat gunshot wounds and massive hemorrhaging. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is registered with the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is not licensed with the State of Texas; however, he is affiliated with the Department of Homeland Security. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed Chief Medical Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC, was the medical director overseeing the medical protocols for USBP. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described his knowledge of how to handle a mass casualty incident as follows: triage by identifying the walking wounded, those that need immediate care, and those who are deceased.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned he was interviewed telephonically by the Texas Department of Public Safety Rangers regarding the Robb Elementary School incident.

During the interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-8a, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the route he traveled on US 90 east to Uvalde. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make indications or marks. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make indications or marks. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he possibly responded to Dalton Elementary School. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any indications or marks. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any indications or marks. On the map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center, Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any indications or marks. On the map labeled



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7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, SBPA [REDACTED] did not make any indications or marks. On the map labeled 8.a Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, SBPA [REDACTED] indicated the pathway he walked to get to the school and where he met with BORSTAR and BORTAC.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA [REDACTED]
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA [REDACTED]

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 10, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he began work at approximately (b) (7)(E) and was assigned to a CAR permanent tactical checkpoint located on Farm to Market Road 2644 approximately one mile west of Hamilton Road. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was an emergency medical technician (EMT) and the EMT coordinator for CAR and arrived at the checkpoint at approximately 7:00 a.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working with CAR BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove his vehicle towards BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked him to handle vehicle primary since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were at a school involving an active shooter incident. After BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called CAR. Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that CAR BPAs were not responding to the shooting.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he subsequently received a phone call from a radio operator instructing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio communications instructing CAR EMTs to respond to Robb Elementary School, so he departed the checkpoint and headed alone to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated his vehicle emergency equipment during his travel to Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while driving to Uvalde, he listened to radio communications and heard officers were at the door prepared to breach the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard, "Breach, breach, breach," and then a few seconds later, he heard someone say they should not breach because a SWAT team (special weapons and tactics) from San Antonio, Texas was 20 minutes away (timestamp 00:39:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who said the classroom should not be breached, but he recalled it was a female voice on the radio.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived near Robb Elementary School, he parked in the yard of a residence. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took his EMT bag and moved towards the school. As he walked towards the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should go to her. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told they were not going inside the school and everything was done.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he did not medically assess or provide medical treatment to anyone and did not move any deceased students or teachers. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in charge of the response to the active shooter at Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled seeing someone being treated in an ambulance and saw two helicopters land near the school (timestamp 00:47:49).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later said he was certain there was one helicopter that landed near the school but there may have been two helicopters (timestamp 01:22:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he briefly spoke with a couple of BPAs he encountered at Robb Elementary School, returned to his vehicle, and traveled to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). While at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was off from work when his girlfriend, who is a nurse, received instruction to report to the hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then responded to Robb Elementary School and assisted with evacuating students. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned being in a hallway at the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was allowing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to speak because BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was emotionally exhausted.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at UVA, he attended a brief meeting with Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said members of the Peer Support and Chaplain programs were at UVA. Following the meeting with CPA Owens, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who advised there was a second threat (timestamp 00:47:15).



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he should provide security at the hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard radio communications concerning shots fired at Uvalde High School. Approximately one minute later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio communications that no shots were fired at the high school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received a second call from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who instructed him to provide security at the Uvalde Civic Center. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the Civic Center, he parked his vehicle blocking an entrance to the Civic Center and exited his vehicle with his rifle (timestamp 00:49:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the Civic Center, he had the emergency lights activated on his vehicle and parked blocking one of the vehicle entrances to the Civic Center parking lot. While at the Civic Center [which served as a polling place], BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told individuals arriving to vote that voting was stopped. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he told individuals wanting to vote that it was stopped because he believed it was more important to secure the Civic Center due to the threat. Later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned individuals would be allowed to park in a certain area for voting (timestamp 01:34:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while providing perimeter security at the Civic Center, he encountered parents returning from the hospital seeking information concerning their children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) allowed these parents to enter the Civic Center parking lot, and they were then escorted inside the Civic Center (timestamp 01:37:22).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when media arrived at the Uvalde Civic Center, he instructed them to park in the nearby Walgreen's parking lot because he determined it was important to ensure only individuals "with a purpose" were allowed to enter the Civic Center due to the second threat (timestamp 01:38:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at the Civic Center, he did not have any confrontations with parents or others seeking access to the Civic Center. Additionally, while providing perimeter security at the Civic Center, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not use force against anyone, and he did not detain or restrain anyone (timestamp 01:44:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at the Civic Center, he worked with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who parked his vehicle blocking another vehicle entrance to the Civic Center parking lot. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he was relieved and departed the Civic Center between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was relieved at the Civic Center by CAR BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as well as other CAR BPAs whose names BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not remember. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained three or four CAR BPAs arrived at the Civic Center to relieve him.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was an EMT and received training in 2017 at CAR (timestamp 02:18:01). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was registered with the National Registry of EMTs, credentialed to serve as an EMT with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and practice as an EMT under DHS



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medical protocols. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was not licensed as an EMT in Texas since he was registered with the National Registry of EMTs and employed by DHS. The medical director overseeing DRT medical protocols was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) San Antonio, who was affiliated with University of Texas, Health (timestamp 02:28:32).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was previously the CAR EMT coordinator in 2020, and since August 2022, he has served as the DRT EMT coordinator. Since the Robb Elementary School shooting, DRT added additional EMT coordinators. As a DRT EMT coordinator, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was primarily responsible for EMT training (timestamp 02:35:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained a mass causality incident involved more patients than available resources. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as an EMT responding to a mass causality incident, he would be responsible for conducting medical triage using the established color-coded system. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when an EMT provided medical treatment, the EMT was required to submit a written report concerning provided medical treatment (timestamp 02:46:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know if EMTs who responded to the Robb Elementary School shooting submitted reports concerning provided medical treatment. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opined that the medical incident commander would be able to provide additional information concerning reports submitted by BPA EMTs who responded to the school shooting (timestamp 02:51:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said USBP responded to the Robb Elementary School shooting to assist other law enforcement agencies, including local law enforcement partners. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he believed USBP had a duty to act and respond to the school shooting because USBP was a law enforcement organization responsible for protecting the public (timestamp 03:05:18).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; and Uvalde schools, including Robb Elementary School and Uvalde High School. These maps were labeled one through nine, respectively (timestamp 01:52:15) (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated map one of north of Uvalde was not applicable. On map two of south of Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated his route of travel on May 24, 2022, from Carrizo Springs to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated map three of the city of Uvalde was not applicable. On map four of Uvalde schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that on May 24, 2022, he went to Robb Elementary School and the Uvalde Civic Center. On map five of Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that on May 24, 2022, he did not enter the school, did not provide medical treatment to anyone, and did not move any deceased students or teachers. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also indicated where he parked and where saw the ambulance and helicopter. On map five(a) of Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that on May 24, 2022, he did not go to the funeral home and indicated where he spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated map six of Robb Elementary School and the Uvalde Civic Center was not applicable. On map seven of Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his route of travel from UVA to the civic center as well as the Walgreens near the civic center where he directed media to park.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated maps eight(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of Robb Elementary School layout and map nine of the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home were not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 154**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 9, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working the day shift from (b) (7)(E) at the CAR processing center. At approximately 10:00 a.m. or 11:00 a.m., he heard other BPAs talking about a possible shooting somewhere in Uvalde (timestamp 00:18:25). He then went to the processing control room where processing supervisor, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and other BPAs were listening to a police scanner. The CAR leadership said CAR was not going to send anybody to Uvalde (timestamp 00:19:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know if there was an active shooter or if shots had been fired.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at an unknown time, was later advised to direct CAR EMTs to Uvalde to assist with medical care. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded as a USBP EMT to Uvalde in his assigned vehicle by himself. While enroute, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard on the radio that law enforcement officers (LEOs) were breaching the classroom, and moments later, he heard that the shooter was “down” (timestamp 00:24:13). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall how far from Uvalde he was when he heard the radio transmissions. At 12:51 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a text message to tell her there was a school shooting in Uvalde and that he was responding (timestamp 00:21:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall if he sent the text prior to leaving CAR or while enroute to Uvalde.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when he arrived in Uvalde, he had trouble getting to Robb Elementary School due to police barricades and traffic. When he asked a police officer where were EMTs needed, the officer told him EMTs were located where the helicopters were landing (timestamp 00:25:43). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he eventually parked in a neighborhood close to the school and walked the rest of the way to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he arrived at Robb Elementary School between 1:00 p.m. and 1:30 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at Robb Elementary School, he was told by BPAs at the scene that the victims who needed medical care were evacuated from the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also told BPAs were meeting at a rally point. When he arrived at the rally point, he met with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR (timestamp 00:26:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw several members of the USBP Search, Trauma and Rescue Unit and the USBP Tactical Unit at the rally point and learned from the conversations around him that they were involved in the breach. He provided some of the agents ice packs and water with a liquid intravenous supplement that he added. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the rally point for about half an hour before the agents were told to report to another rally point, which he believed was at UVA because there was no further need for USBP at the scene (timestamp 00:28:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Brackettville Station, Texas, as the supervisor directing the agents at the rally point.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him that he was going to stay and see if the EMTs remaining on scene needed assistance. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he had taken BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) paramedic course in Uvalde and knew a lot of the EMTs on scene. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him he was going to see if they needed help with the electrocardiogram strips on the remaining victims to confirm whether there was a heartbeat. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was going to stay and help (timestamp 00:29:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he were offering EMTs their assistance, he saw LEOs from different agencies around a couple of long rectangular buildings. One of the LEOs yelled there were still some kids in one of the classrooms (timestamp 00:30:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) joined other LEOs and cleared 5 or 6 classrooms in that building. Of the classrooms cleared, only one had students inside and they were evacuated with another group of people leading them away from the school.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that part of the group clearing the classrooms was CBP Aviation Enforcement Agent (AEA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Air Branch, Texas, who appeared to be leading the group. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the San Antonio Police Department SWAT (special weapons and tactics) was already at the school, and they were going to conduct a sweep of the school and that they needed to leave the building (timestamp 00:33:26). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then met with another group of BPAs and was told they needed to go to the Uvalde civic center due to a threat made on social media. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall who told him about the social media threat.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was told to provide perimeter security of the civic center and to not allow anyone in or out of the area that did not need to be there (timestamp 00:36:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the civic center was used as a polling place and that he turned people away who claimed they were there to vote. He did not recall how many people they turned away from voting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any confrontations with the people turned away from voting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that approximately an hour later, an unidentified female from the civic center told him that people could enter the civic center to vote and to not turn people who wanted to vote away (timestamp 00:37:56). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the civic center for approximately three hours and departed when he was relieved by other agents from CAR at approximately 5:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a text message at 6:00 p.m. to tell her he was in the commuter van heading home (timestamp 00:41:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not know who oversaw the scene at Robb Elementary School; he was given directions from other BPAs at the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not believe anyone from the USBP oversaw the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in command at the civic center. He believed it was probably someone inside the civic center.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not impede the movement of anyone while at Robb Elementary School nor did he administer any first aid or provide medical treatment.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had understood he was directed to Robb Elementary School in a medical capacity as an EMT (timestamp 01:56:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed there might have been BPAs with designated peace officer status but knew that he did not have peace officer status. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know under what authority USBP must respond to incidents like the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 01:58:37).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his highest level of EMT training was that of an EMT Basic which he attained in 2015. As a USBP EMT, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had certain capabilities that were beyond the scope of an EMT Basic, such as administering intravenous fluids and injections (timestamp 02:04:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not licensed with any state, only with the Department of Homeland Security. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the medical director overseeing his protocols.

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary



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School. These maps were labeled 1-5, respectively (Attachment 2). On the map labeled 2, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from Carrizo Springs, Texas, Highway 83 into Uvalde. On map labeled 5, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) circled where he believed he parked his vehicle before walking to the school. On the map labeled 8.a., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to recall exactly where on the school grounds he was nor which classrooms he helped to clear.

At the conclusion of the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) consented to allow CBP Office of Information Technology to take pictures of the text messages he had exchanged with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 3).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Photos of text messages between BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 9, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, were working at a ranch in Eagle Pass, TX, when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him, “Get your stuff, we gotta go” (timestamp 00:16:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BORTAC agents consolidated into government owned vehicles and drove to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) his K9, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rode with him. While enroute, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard a radio transmission indicating there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School.

At approximately 12:40 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they arrived at the corner of Nicolas St. and Geraldine St. As they ran down the street towards the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, at the back of his vehicle, near the funeral home, preparing his explosive charges for a breach (timestamp 00:19:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go ahead and informed him that he would catch up (timestamp 00:20:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he neared the west entrance of the school, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, with his arm around an unidentified person. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who appeared shocked, told him to go find SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC (timestamp 01:03:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he entered the west entrance, turned left at the t-intersection and walked down the hallway to classroom 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described classroom 112 as very bloody and saw children being carried out of the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was informed by an unidentified Texas ranger that the classroom was now considered a crime scene, and everyone had to leave (timestamp 01:06:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he never heard whether classrooms 111 and 112 had been locked (timestamp 01:23:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who directed him to go and find BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was worried because BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the first agent to enter classroom 112 and when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned to engage the shooter, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shield and weapon on the ground near a pool of blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that they later found out BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) weapon malfunctioned, and he transitioned to his M-4 rifle and cleared classroom 111.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he left classroom 112, he heard the other classrooms down the hallway had not been cleared. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other unidentified agents cleared classrooms 103, 104, and 109. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added an unidentified person advised him, over his radio, to exit the school and meet at the tree at the north end of the school. Once the classrooms were cleared and rendered safe, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the building through the south entrance and met with the other BPAs by the tree. During the muster, they were ordered to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he did not render aid to anyone at the scene (timestamp 01:45:54).

Once at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him of the threat of a second shooter. BORTAC agents decided to deploy to the area schools to assist with security and crowd control. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to Morales Junior High School to assist with security and crowd control along Struden Street. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were no confrontations with the public.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when state and local law enforcement agencies see BORTAC agents, in their multicam uniforms, at the scene of a high threat situation, it is assumed that BORTAC will handle the situation (timestamp 01:34:33). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that, while he did not feel BORTAC was in charge the day of the incident, when BORTAC arrived at the scene they entered the classroom and took care of the situation (timestamp 01:42:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained USBP has the authority to respond to these types of events when there is a felony being committed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that as first responders, it is the right thing to do (timestamp 01:44:06).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had a memorandum from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) containing a timeline of events at Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed the memorandum to SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





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He added that he had a map of the school, with a timeline of events for when he arrived (Attachment 3). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed the map to SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that he had a text message string between the BORTAC agents and outside agencies. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recorded a video of the text message string from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government issued cell phone (Attachment 4).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 5). These maps are labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde was not applicable. On the map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route from Eagle Pass, TX into Uvalde, TX. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where he was located at Morales Junior High School. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving to the school, followed by the route he took to the funeral home. The map labeled 5.a. was not applicable. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. On the map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled where he entered the west entrance of the school, where he was located inside of the school, as well as the rooms he assisted in clearing.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	BORTAC Memorandum from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Map containing timeline of events at Robb Elementary School.
4	Video of text string and recipients from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government issued cell phone.
5	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 9, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was a USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) operator for DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was selected for BORTAC in 2018 and was certified as a “Level II Breacher.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to a plain clothes operation involving stash houses for approximately 18 months. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responsibilities included conducting surveillance and enforcement actions of the stash houses for investigative purposes (timestamp 00:25:00). On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was conducting a (b) (7)(E)

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 11:45 a.m., he learned about the shooting at Robb Elementary School through the stash house operation group chat text message he shared with other agents and officers from various agencies. The initial text notification stated there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde which was still ongoing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he attempted to validate the information because in his experience, there were instances where the threat of an active shooter was declared, but it was later determined to be unfounded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently contacted BPAs from USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) who confirmed the active shooter situation and stated they were preparing to respond (timestamp 00:27:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he normally kept certain breaching tools in his assigned government vehicle, but on May 24, 2022, he had a scheduled appointment for the vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that he transferred the equipment and tools to a storage location at DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he returned to DRT to obtain his breaching tools and equipment before he proceeded to Uvalde to assist (timestamp 00:28:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was enroute to DRT from the field to obtain his equipment with the intent to deploy to Uvalde, he received text messages from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, instructing him to deploy (timestamp 00:58:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once he obtained his equipment and “build bag” from DRT, he drove directly to Uvalde via Highway 90 in his unmarked government vehicle with his lights and sirens activated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed his frustration as he saw other law enforcement vehicles speed past him knowing they were responding to the same location and incident.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while enroute to Uvalde, he contemplated different scenarios and considered different charges he could use depending on the scenario he would be presented with. Some of the text messages indicated the subject was barricaded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then considered his options for addressing the barricaded subject. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called another breacher he had previously trained with to discuss different options and scenarios (timestamp 00:32:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unsure how he was able to navigate through traffic, but he was able to maneuver his way to the funeral home to park his vehicle (timestamp 00:34:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he arrived at the funeral home at approximately 12:47 p.m. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there were lines of cars in the neighborhood and members of the public in the streets. After he parked, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began filling the plastic modular cases with water for his pre-built omnibottle charge. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that although the charge was already pre-built, he typically did not complete the last step of filling the cases with water until it was needed for actual use. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveling with the plastic modular cases already filled. (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (timestamp 00:32:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he was filling the cases with water, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, approached him



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while walking toward Robb Elementary School from their vehicles that were parked much further away. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to grab his charge and walk with them toward the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed them to proceed without him and that he would follow behind them as soon as he was done. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted the direction of travel as they made their way toward the school (timestamp 00:36:25). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was nearly done filling the cases, he heard screaming from the surrounding bystanders in the area (timestamp 00:37:00). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the bystanders were screaming from shock and fear as they saw children coming out of the school (timestamp 01:10:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) finished filling the cases and ran to the west entrance of building 100.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he approached the building, he saw people were already emerging from the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing a person (unknown if child or adult) on a gurney outside the door with someone administering chest compression. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed there were a lot of people running around, but he still did not know the status of the situation, or if the shooter was already down. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there was a person at the west entrance door who informed him not to enter, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded with the thought there was still an active threat. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered building 100 through the west entrance and made his way down the hallway toward classrooms 111 and 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described there was a lot of blood on the floor, and he saw two people carrying a girl out of the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reached classroom 112 where he was informed the shooter had already been stopped. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not enter classroom 111 or 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked what needed to be done at this point, to which he was requested to assist with clearing other classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted with clearing classrooms 102, 103, and 104 with other BORTAC BPAs BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and law enforcement officers from other agencies. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they used a key to access the classrooms because they were locked (timestamp 00:40:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an unknown Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) trooper made an announcement that if all the rooms were cleared, those who were not actively working on someone needed to depart the building. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he could feel the shift of the atmosphere to that of scene preservation and scene integrity. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently exited the building via the south entrance. Upon exiting the building, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a helicopter in the adjacent field and a large amount of uniformed law enforcement officers in the vicinity. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked northbound on the west side of the building and met with the other BPAs at a tree near the front of the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the purpose of the meeting at the tree was to account for personnel on site. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled checking other BPAs for injuries and gear during which one of the BORTAC members recalled a Halligan tool (tool used for prying, twisting, punching, or striking) was left inside the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he accompanied his BORTAC team member to the west entrance to gain access into the building to retrieve the Halligan tool. At the door, however, a TXDPS trooper denied their entry into the building explaining that the tool would need to be left at the scene as evidence (timestamp 01:39:00). The BPAs were all instructed to meet at UVA for a debrief (timestamp 00:43:00).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at UVA, a secondary threat was announced regarding the shooter's girlfriend who had threatened some type of retaliation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then deployed to the high school with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, where he assisted with perimeter security and the release of the students to their parents (timestamp 00:45:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were no incidents with parents during the time he was there (timestamp 01:42:30). After assisting at the high school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to UVA before returning to Del Rio.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that since he was conducting plain clothes operations and surveillance, he (b) (7)(E) Subsequently, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear the radio communications while he was driving from Del Rio to Uvalde. Additionally, upon arrival at Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had his handheld radio on his person, but was unsure if the radio was set to the correct channel to receive information about the shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear anything on the radio related to keys for the classroom doors (timestamp 01:26:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in command and control on May 24, 2022, at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there were multiple law enforcement agencies onsite to include USBP, the police department, and TXDPS, among others (timestamp 01:27:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unsure who was in command on behalf of USBP. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he simply knew he was reporting to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was the team lead. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) receiving orders from any specific person and explained Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, was over Special Operations Directorate at the time of the shooting.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's authority to respond to the shooting at Robb Elementary School was related to that of any law enforcement entity responding to an active shooter or a felony being committed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not specifically name a policy, but explained it was almost expected to react as a first responder (timestamp 01:34:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided information related to his BORTAC specialty as a Level II Breacher (timestamp 00:50:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received his Level I certification in January 2020 and Level II certification in September 2020. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) his explosive charges were

(b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained his goal was (b) (7)(E) and simply open the door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) likened the intent of the charges was the same as a ram, (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he usually had pre-built, general-purpose charges ready and staged, to include the omni-bottle charge he was filling with water on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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(b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)  
 (b) (7)(E) On May 24, 2022, he had (b) (7)(E)  
 (b) (7)(E) on his  
 person. In addition to (b) (7)(E)  
 (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also had a small, battery-  
 powered circular saw, a ram, and a Halligan tool in his government vehicle (timestamp  
 03:05:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was not wearing a body worn camera on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not  
 produce a written statement or memorandum related to his involvement at Robb Elementary  
 School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided CBP OPR with his personal cellular phone to electronically  
 capture the text message strings from various group chats which contained correspondence  
 related to the shooting at Robb Elementary School: (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 2),  
 BORTAC Field Guys (Attachment 3), Admin iPhones (Attachment 4).

CBP OPR interviewers provided BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with a map package which he utilized to mark his  
 routes of travel and significant areas where he was throughout the day (Attachment 5):

- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 1 – North of Uvalde, TX to indicate his route of travel to  
 from Del Rio to Uvalde.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 5 – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate where  
 he parked upon arrival and where bystanders were located.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate his  
 arrival on foot from his parking location, classrooms he assisted clearing, the location  
 of an ambulance, and the rally point for USBP.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	BORTAC Field Guys text message string (3 photographs)
3	(b) (7)(E) (4 photographs and 1 video)
4	Admin iPhones (1 video)
5	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 157**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 9, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on-duty near the east (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) north of Eagle Pass, Texas, working with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he and the other BORTAC BPAs were notified via radio by the CBP Air and Marine operations crew of a shooting at a school. The crew was assisting the BPAs in tracking and apprehending a group of suspected undocumented noncitizens. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was notified at approximately 11:37 a.m. (timestamp 00:17:30).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that almost simultaneously, he received a text message from an unknown number that read, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shooting at Robb” and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it’s me, shooting at Robb.” He explained this text message was from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School and was using a student’s cellphone to text him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) classroom was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which is in the same building as classrooms 111 and 112, but on the opposite side of the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he also received a text message from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, notifying him to respond to Robb Elementary School due to a shooting (timestamp 00:19:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that the text messages regarding this incident were received on his personal cellphone and were no longer retrievable because he obtained a new personal cellphone.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that once he learned of the possible shooting at Robb Elementary School, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got into his government owned vehicle (GOV) and started driving to the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rode with him because BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GOV was 30 to 40 minutes away from their location and they did not want to take the extra time to retrieve it (timestamp 00:19:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at Robb Elementary School, he parked southbound on Grove St. just north of Geraldine St. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he grabbed his assigned sniper rifle and gave BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) his M-4 rifle, body armor, and helmet because BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gear was in his GOV. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after grabbing his sniper rifle, he ran east on Geraldine St. and entered the school at the west entrance door.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he entered the school, he encountered SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who instructed him to “go outside, find him, and shoot him.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which classroom the shooter was in, and he replied, “The one with lasers on it.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked down the hall and encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR), who asked him if he needed any help to which BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied, “Yes.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as soon as he found out which classroom the shooter was in, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the school using the east entrance door near the T-intersection (timestamp 00:37:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he went to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because he was his chain of command; however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not feel SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in charge (timestamp 02:17:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he never knew who was in command or control of the incident.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the school, he positioned himself near a tree, north of classroom 32. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) helped BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) set his radio to the channel that BORTAC was using and helped him set up his tripod and sniper rifle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that after helping him set up, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then observed three Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) officers to the west of him and he asked them which window he should reference for the shooter’s position inside the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he moved to the northwest corner of classroom 34 (timestamp 00:37:10).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he relayed on the radio that he was set and that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked, “Can you see anything?” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied, “No, they still have the blinds in the window” (timestamp 00:47:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he recalled seeing a bullet hole in the window of classroom 111. He stated he then heard over his radio, “We’re going in” followed by “Subject down” (timestamp 00:49:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear any shots fired during the breach because a helicopter was flying above.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the breach, he reentered the school through the east entrance door near the T-intersection. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he saw people bringing bodies out into the T-intersection and added he observed a child sitting up and crying and a teacher lying in the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he saw bodies of children lying in the hallway and told law enforcement officers to move the bodies aside so he could get through (timestamp 00:56:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not provide any medical aid or assistance because it was not his job. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he continued south of the T-intersection and attempted to enter classroom 111, however, Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS, told him that he could not enter the classroom (timestamp 00:57:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, in the hallway and they started clearing other classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he believed they cleared classrooms 106 to 102. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after clearing the classrooms, he was told to meet outside for a muster. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, showing up to the muster and saying to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for a briefing (timestamp 01:07:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that while at UVA, he was informed of a possible second shooter who was going to “finish the job.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported to Morales Jr. High School and provided security by sitting on the roof with his sniper rifle until all the students had been released. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he did not physically restrain anyone at either Robb Elementary School or Morales Jr. High School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after assisting with security at the Morales Jr. High School, he traveled back to UVA with his BORTAC colleagues for the briefing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that during the briefing there was no discussion of the breach at Robb Elementary School, and he did not recall any discussion regarding classrooms 111 and 112 being locked (timestamp 01:12:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know the scope of USBP’s authority to respond to an active shooter, however, he added it was his duty to act and “our job is to stop bad people doing bad things to other people” (timestamp 01:15:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he knew the incident was a school shooting, he did not know if the situation involved an active shooter or a barricaded subject. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the incident he never heard any conversation about needing keys to enter the classroom and was informed after the incident the doors were locked (timestamp 01:38:30).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde was not applicable.



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The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, was not applicable. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving to the school followed by location of the initial contact with the Uvalde County Sheriff's Office/Uvalde Police Department. The map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX was not applicable. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route of travel from UVA to Robb Elementary. On the map labeled 8a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the location of the medical triage area. On the map labeled 8b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his location at the south entrance and listed other law enforcement officers present at the south door. On the map labeled 8c. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his direction of travel in the hallway and classroom 132, where he assisted placing deceased children. On the map labeled 8d. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his location when he saw BORSTAR agents providing medical care to victims. The map labeled 8e. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 158**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to UVA and was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was utilizing a small office in the USBP mechanic shop when he heard some of the USBP mechanics talking about a possible shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described witnessing several BPAs leaving UVA in a hurry. After obtaining more information from the mechanics, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to respond to Robb Elementary School to provide assistance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was a trained USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) agent and thought his medical training would be needed at the school.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he utilized his government vehicle and drove to the school. While en route, he heard over the radio the “shooter was down” (timestamp 01:09:24). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when he arrived, he was unable to park close to the school due to the considerable number of law enforcement vehicles parked on the streets leading up to the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked at the funeral home, grabbed his medical equipment, and began walking in the direction of Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he approached the school, he saw unknown BPAs providing medical care to a woman just outside the west entrance (timestamp 01:25:11). He offered assistance to the BPAs, however, the BPAs were busy and did not respond to his offer. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then observed the woman being loaded into an ambulance.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went to the front of the school and met with a large group of unknown BPAs gathering near a large tree to meet with Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw BORSTAR agents as well as several other BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was at the tree for approximately 20 minutes before returning to UVA.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once he was back at UVA, he was instructed to go to local schools to provide security assistance due to reports of a potential new threat. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he provided security at Dalton Elementary School before returning to UVA.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized two area maps to annotate the location where he parked his vehicle as well as the route he walked to the school (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to BPA field training and was partnered with fellow trainee BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, who was serving as their field training officer. They were interdicting a group of migrants in the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) area along with CBP air support. At an unknown time, CBP air support informed them they had received an urgent request for assistance and were departing the area; however, no additional information was provided. After approximately 30 minutes, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to return to BRA because they no longer had air support. Before departing the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) area, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) poke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, who informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about a shooting happening in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have much information, however, he informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the situation was big and a school was involved.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to return to BRA to verify the situation and drove back with him and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:30:25). Upon arriving at BRA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BPAs grabbing equipment and rushing to leave. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was a shooting at Robb Elementary School and they needed to respond (timestamp 00:32:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) towards the school in a USBP marked government owned vehicle, with lights and sirens activated, on Highway U.S. 90. While en route, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get on the Uvalde radio channel. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing sporadic information, a “hot mic” incident where a male voice said, “She’s shot” (timestamp 01:14:41).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival to the school, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) followed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lead, as they were trainees. As they approached the entrance of the school, they were stopped by law enforcement officers who informed them that only emergency medical technicians (EMT) and paramedics were needed inside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he previously was a medic and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was an EMT, therefore, they proceeded to enter the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide security outside of the school as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have medical experience (timestamp 00:36:06).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded towards the west entrance of the school, he informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he did not have a medical bag. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an unknown officer overheard and told him, “Take mine, you need this more than I do.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the medical bag from the officer and proceeded to enter the building through the west entrance door (timestamp 00:37:48).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he entered the building, it was very quiet with several officers positioned by the T-intersection (timestamp 01:18:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked an unknown officer how he could assist. The officer informed him they were setting up a medical triage area by the bathrooms and water fountain, east of the T-intersection. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began prepping medical materials in the triage area, he stated he heard a “flash bang” followed by gunfire. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described being startled and stated he was never informed the scene was still active and had assumed the shooter was either deceased or in custody (timestamp 00:38:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the gunfire ceased, he followed other officers headed towards classrooms 111 and 112. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) neared the classrooms, he observed an unknown officer carrying a deceased male child (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the officer as being in shock and hurriedly carrying the child towards the west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he attempted to stop the officer to prevent the child from being seen by onlookers outside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he grabbed the child by the foot, however, the officer continued and placed the child on a stretcher located outside of the west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) covered the child with a blanket and asked Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department, who was standing by the west entrance, to assist him with moving the child back inside the school (timestamp 00:41:14).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he then observed a male teacher with a gunshot wound (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and applied a tourniquet (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He continued to assess the teacher and observed a gunshot wound (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as well. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall whether he placed a chest seal on the gunshot wound. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked two unknown officers to take the teacher to an ambulance for further medical attention (timestamp 01:35:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he moved towards the triage area and observed officers bringing deceased children out to the T-intersection. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the number of deceased children was piling up, so he and a few other officers moved the deceased children into classroom 132 (timestamp 01:50:49).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered classroom 111 where he observed deceased children huddled together along the side of the room and a deceased adult with long dark hair and a black vest lying face down. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he assumed the deceased adult was the shooter (timestamp 01:24:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he needed air and went outside where he observed officers providing medical attention to a male child in the parking lot area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with chest compressions until emergency medical services took over. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a teacher on a stretcher who he recognized as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted the officers providing her medical aid and began giving her chest compressions as she was carried to an ambulance. After arriving at the ambulance, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed by a paramedic that the teacher was deceased (timestamp 01:44:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he met back with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was gathered by a tree with other BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the scene to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for a debriefing. Afterwards, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove back to BRA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall the specific time, but he believed he returned to his residence in Uvalde between 5:30-6:00 p.m. (timestamp 02:04:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at Robb Elementary School, he did not know who was in command of the incident (timestamp 01:23:50). CBP OPR interviewers asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about CBP's legal authority to respond to the incident, to which he responded, "there was a threat to human life" (timestamp 02:10:55).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the map labeled 1- North of Uvalde, TX, 3- Uvalde, TX, 5- Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, 5.a.- Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, and 8.a.- Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde TX. On maps 1 and 3, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route from BRA. On maps 5 and 5.a., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his parking location at Robb Elementary School. On map 8.a., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his location at Robb Elementary School. All other maps were not applicable (timestamp 02:16:55).



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CBP OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Robb Elementary School hallway camera footage from May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself entering the west entrance of the building at 12:56:58 (overlay time). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also presented with an audio clip of radio transmission beginning at 00:47:53 and ending at 00:48:27 which he recognized as the “hot mic” incident he overheard on the radio on his way to the school.

[Agent Note: Hallway camera footage and audio clips were held on CBP OPR laptops and were not attached to this report.]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received medical training around 2020 with the Texas Commission of Law Enforcement. He was a trained first responder with addition tactical combat medical training. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not a registered EMT (timestamp 02:14:44).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 160**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to observe low-light qualifications at the USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) as part of a policy review being conducted by LESC. His attire for the day was the LESC training uniform consisting of a black CBP polo shirt and khaki pants. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) day began at (b) (7)(E) for the low-light firearms qualification which ended at approximately 11:30 a.m. Also present at the training was Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Fort Brown Station (whom SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) referred to as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Gulfport Station (whom SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) referred to as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Comstock Station, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) LESC, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) LESC, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while cleaning up at approximately 11:30 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he heard about a possible “bail out” in Uvalde over the radio (the term “bail out” refers to occupants abandoning a vehicle and fleeing following a police pursuit or vehicle stop). When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard there were shots fired, they grabbed M-4 rifles from the DRT armory and decided to travel to Uvalde to assist. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove together in a separate vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove the range truck, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sat in the front passenger seat, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sat in the back seat loading magazines. The range truck was not equipped with lights, sirens, nor a service radio. During the drive, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) unsuccessfully attempted to obtain additional information via a handheld radio and text messages. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) captured a video of law enforcement vehicles with his cell phone while driving near Brackettville, Texas, at 12:31 p.m. (Attachment 2). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that as they got closer to Uvalde, the radios were “patched” since he heard voices on the handheld radio he did not recognize as BPAs.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived in Uvalde and took Farm to Market Road (FM) 1435 south attempting to avoid the congestion. Over the radio, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard conflicting radio traffic including talk about an active shooter, discussion about the shooter being on the roof, and information about the shooter specifically targeting BPAs. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also believed he heard an argument over the radio concerning whether the team should breach or not. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked at the corner of FM 1435 and Geraldine Street. As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited his vehicle, he heard gunshots over the radio. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and those in his vehicle met with the others in the vehicle driven by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and made their way to Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran with the group towards Robb Elementary School. Noticing the clogged roads, SBPA captured a video of the vehicle congestion near Robb Elementary School at 1:01 p.m. using his cell phone (Attachment 3).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he approached Robb Elementary School and noticed a significant number of law enforcement officers standing around the school. As the group approached the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was going to break off from the group and check in at the funeral home, which the group believed to be the incident command center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as prior emergency medical technicians (EMT), went to the busiest area they saw and attempted to make entry into the school to assist with the medical treatment of patients. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were denied entry into the school by an unknown Texas Ranger despite identifying themselves as medics and seeing multiple patients receiving care in the hallway. One of the medics providing care when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted entry was BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw an unattended weapon loaded with a (b) (7)(E) round (CS gas) and decided to unload the weapon. After clearing the weapon, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a lady on a gurney who was being transported. An EMT wearing a white shirt and blue pants from one of the ambulance services removed the tourniquet on the lady’s arm, which caused blood to gush. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) quickly applied pressure to the arm while the EMT struggled to apply a new tourniquet. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with the application of a second tourniquet. After assisting, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned and helped transfer an unknown male juvenile from one



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gurney to another. At this point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw other BPAs look distraught and began providing comfort and support to them, including BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (SBPA did not identify a first name or station), BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said all BPAs gathered around a tree on the north side of the building and Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, spoke to the group. CPA Owens instructed USBP personnel to gather at UVA. At UVA, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was speaking to other agents present when he learned about an alleged second threat at Uvalde High School allegedly made by the shooter's girlfriend. He did not believe he was at UVA for more than ten minutes. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the UVA armory to get a rifle and went to Uvalde High School.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at Uvalde High School with BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT (whom SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) referred to as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)). At some point during the group's time at Uvalde High School, a press photographer captured a photograph of some members of the group. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a copy of the picture to CBP OPR interviewers and identified the agents in the photograph (Attachment 4). The group was first at the school and met the school security guard at the door. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the security guard to lock the door and only allow law enforcement officers to enter the school. The group began clearing the school, encountering an SA from the Drug Enforcement Administration and an officer from the Uvalde Police Department as they made their way through the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the radio communications he heard contradicting what he was seeing in the Uvalde High School. In one instance, the radio said shots were fired in the high school, but SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his group did not hear any gunfire. In another instance, the radio said the female suspect was allegedly in classroom 138 in the high school while SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in front of classroom 138 and did not see anyone in the classroom (timestamp 01:12:17).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once he and his group exited the school, they were met by a significant number of law enforcement personnel. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered an unknown Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) trooper yelling at the group, stating they should have been in the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the trooper the school was cleared but the school next door, Morales Jr. High School, still needed to be cleared. As a group of law enforcement officers was forming to clear Morales Jr. High School, the decision was made to clear all area schools. Down Studer Street was Flores Elementary School, and although the school was not locked down, parents began swarming the school to pick up their children. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the TXDPS troopers at Flores Elementary School to get information on the status of the school. While SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at Flores Elementary School, the other BPAs went to Sacred Heart School.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that a plan was formulated to reunite all the parents with their children. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) handled the traffic flow towards the school while the trooper ran back and forth from the school to the pick-up line to positively match each child with the correct parent. Meanwhile, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed traffic away from the school, ensuring the flow of traffic could exit the school after reunification. While handling traffic flow, all three law enforcement officers





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were looking for four females in a black sedan, which was broadcast over the radio as being a threat to schools. As children were dismissed from Flores Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw Watch Commander (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after all the children were dismissed from Flores Elementary School, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to Uvalde High School to assist with the reunification of children with parents. Once completed, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA. After returning his rifle to the DRT armory, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the firing range in Del Rio to pick up his personal gear before going to his hotel room.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided by CBP OPR interviewers (Attachment 5). In the collection, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traced his route to Robb Elementary School and his approach to the school. Additionally, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map to explain his actions while at Robb Elementary School.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was previously certified as an EMT, but his certification lapsed in 2014. He was trained at a local community college in New Mexico and attended the training on his own outside of USBP. However, he was an active EMT with the USBP when he was assigned to USBP Deming Station, New Mexico, until his certification lapsed. His medical director as a USBP EMT at the time was an El Paso-based doctor whose name SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall his last cardiopulmonary resuscitation class. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) taught individual first aid kit classes with other instructors as part of the Firearms Instructor Training Program at CBP's Advanced Training Center, West Virginia.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not believe anyone was in charge at the scene at Robb Elementary School and believed there was a lack of command and control throughout the entire situation (timestamp 02:15:27). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized he did not have peace officer status in Texas. He believed he had a responsibility to respond to the incident and stop kids from dying. He believed he had the same authority to use deadly force in this situation as he did other times to prevent the loss of life. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed it was USBP's responsibility as law enforcement to stop the killing and stop the dying.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Video recorded by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of law enforcement vehicles passing near Brackettville.
3	Video recorded by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of vehicle congestion near Robb Elementary School.
4	Picture provided by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identifying personnel at Uvalde High School.
5	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 161**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to watch duties at the Dimmit Regional Hospital in Carrizo Springs. At 11:52 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, informing him of a shooting at an Uvalde elementary school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a certified emergency medical technician (EMT), contacted the Operations Center at CAR to inquire about responding to the school. Initially, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told to stand by as information was gathered. Approximately 30 minutes later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called back and was told that an unnamed BPA was en route to relieve him so he could respond to the school. At 12:55 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was relieved at the hospital and departed for Uvalde in his government owned vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized the vehicle's emergency lights and sirens and he arrived at Robb Elementary School around 1:30 p.m.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked his vehicle on Geraldine St. between Nicolas St. and Evans St. After grabbing his EMT bag, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) jogged towards the school and saw an unknown BPA approaching him. The BPA informed him Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, met with BPAs on scene and told them to meet at USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) at 2:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to his vehicle and departed for UVA.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after arriving at UVA, he spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an emergency room nurse, had called from the Uvalde hospital and requested security assistance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed for the hospital in BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that upon arrival, it was apparent to them there was ample security in the emergency room area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he saw Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, speaking with several people including a boy with a bloodied shirt. After several minutes, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to the civic center to provide assistance.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the civic center was chaotic with parents, media, and law enforcement personnel. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted several parents reunify with their children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, at the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not observe any USBP personnel impeding the movement of the public (timestamp 01:35:37). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed, dropped BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) off at his vehicle at UVA, and returned home.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not aware of a legal authority to respond to an incident such as the Robb Elementary School shooting; however, he believed it was USBP’s responsibility to respond and to assist in a backup capacity (timestamp 01:06:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he has been a certified EMT since 2021 and added he was on the national registry of EMTs but was not state certified.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have a copy of the text message from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had replaced his cell phone.

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the routes he traveled on May 24, 2022, using map 2-South of Uvalde, Texas, map 4-Uvalde, TX Schools, map 5-Robb Elementary School, and map 7-Robb Elementary School Uvalde, TX.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 162**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 10, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and the recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity R report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he and his partner BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, were on-duty in a government owned vehicle (GOV) working as ranch liaisons. At 11:49 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stating, “Hey, did you hear anything about a shooting at Robb?” (Attachment B). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed at the time; the text referred to a failure to yield incident because schools in the area go on lockdown when those events happen. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a certified emergency medical technician (EMT), returned to BRA to determine what had happened. Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, said that EMTs were needed at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, initially, he was told by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to wait at the Uvalde USBP checkpoint until they were needed due to the abundance of law enforcement officers (LEO) already on scene (timestamp 00:16:47). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked near South Park Street and Geraldine Street and walked to the funeral home across the street from Robb Elementary School where he met SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that LEOs were about to make entry.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that prior to entering the west side of the school, there were numerous LEOs lined up outside of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he was accompanied by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA. Once they made entry into the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately heard gunshots. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked a LEO in the west hallway what happened and was informed the shooter had been stopped (timestamp 00:34:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no sense of command and control while he was inside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that Program Manager (PM) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Station, Texas was attempting to make room for the LEOs evacuating children (timestamp 00:37:22). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was not certified as an EMT and did not render any medical aid. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he helped to evacuate children and clear the area for LEOs to move around (timestamp 00:38:45).

CBP OPR interviewers showed a video to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself in the video (timestamp 00:56:51) and stated he positioned himself at the “mouth” of the T-intersection, and that across from the T-intersection towards the east side of the school, EMTs set up a medical triage area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown the T-intersection video and he identified PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was providing direction to LEOs and EMTs in the hallway (timestamp 00:54:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted with the evacuation of an injured child and handed the child to an LEO outside of the west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added there were children lying on the floor in the T-intersection, which was covered in blood.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted other LEOs who were moving deceased children to classrooms 131 and 132. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that children were moved to make room for LEOs and EMTs evacuating injured children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he moved three to four children into classrooms 131 and 132 and knelt beside them and prayed (timestamp 01:00:59).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after moving the children, he walked down the hallway towards classrooms 111 and 112, as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a student at the school, and he wanted to determine if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was still in his classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he was not aware his son’s classroom had already been evacuated (timestamp 01:05:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he peered into classroom 111 and saw the shooter on the ground in the left corner of the classroom and identified him by his long black hair. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he was then informed everyone had to leave because the area was a crime scene (timestamp 01:06:53). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he exited through the west entrance of the school and saw children receiving medical care from EMTs.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he walked across Geraldine St. and began conducting crowd and traffic control. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that ambulances and school buses were unable to enter the area and he placed cones on the ground and pushed the perimeter north along Perez St. to make room for them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he was informed BPAs were mustering by a tree at the north end of the school. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at that location, he was informed that children on the west side of the school were evacuated to the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went to the funeral home, found (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to inform (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was safe.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked a LEO at the funeral home if BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could take home BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and a female student who was a friend of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Upon receiving approval, they loaded into BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GOV and dropped the female student off at BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) residence and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Walgreens where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was waiting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then drove to USBP Uvalde Station. Afterwards, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove back to BRA.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that because he worked for a law enforcement agency and had received active shooter training, he had a responsibility to respond to the incident as a part of his official duties (timestamp 01:26:54).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 3). These maps were labeled 1-8 respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his route from Robb Elementary School to BRA and labeled the Uvalde checkpoint. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, was not applicable. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving at the school, the route he took to the funeral home, and the west entrance of Robb Elementary School. The map labeled 5.a. was not applicable. The map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX was not applicable. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled where he entered the west entrance to the school, the classrooms where the deceased children were placed, and where he was positioned in the t-intersection. On the map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route to classroom 111, the area where he performed traffic control, the muster location at the north end of the school, and the funeral home where he located (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Text message string from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 163**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with the form titled Your Required Appearance and Sworn Testimony and Administrative Warning Acknowledgement for Non-Bargaining Unit Employees, which he signed acknowledging he understood his right and obligations (Attachment 1). The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 2).

This Report of Investigation does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, at approximately 12:00 p.m., BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on-duty and in plain clothes at the SIU office when BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SIU, informed him of an incident at Robb Elementary School. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the incident as a bailout where a subject ran into the school. At approximately 12:15 p.m., BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from his supervisor who was looking for BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SIU. Assuming BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was already on scene at Robb Elementary School, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) headed to the school and called BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) several times in route with no answer (timestamp 12:18:20).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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Upon arriving at Robb Elementary School, at approximately 12:30 p.m., BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a significant law enforcement (LE) presence on scene. After parking his GOV on Grove Street, just north of the funeral home, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a radio transmission broadcast “Breaching”, followed immediately by “Don’t breach” (timestamp 12:41:25).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked his government owned vehicle (GOV) a few blocks away and walked to the funeral home across the street from Robb Elementary School. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a loose perimeter set up by local LE attempting to keep parents and other civilians away from the school. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with the loose perimeter (timestamp 12:19:40).

Throughout his time on scene, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was never able to identify anyone that was in command nor an established command post. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when he asked a local law enforcement officer (LEO) how he could assist, the LEO did not seem to know what to do (timestamp 12:54:50).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a civilian speaking to a local female detective inside the established perimeter. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the civilian, possibly named (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) claimed to be the aunt of the shooter and stated numerous times that it was not the shooter fault because he was abused by his mother (timestamp 12:21:05, 13:07:10).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then walked closer to the school, but never entered the building. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he was still unsure of the situation because there were no updates transmitted over the radio. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was not until BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, broke down and told him what transpired inside the school, that he fully understood the severity of the incident (timestamp 12:21:40).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BORSTAR, and several other BPAs exiting the west hallway near classroom 132. Aside from an unknown BORSTAR BPA and civilian paramedic providing medical care to a student, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall witnessing any other medical care being administered (timestamp 12:32:30).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, near the west hallway, he was joined by BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Supervisory Border Patrol Agent Intelligence (SBPA-I) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SIU. SBPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to return to UVA.

Upon returning to UVA, BPAs gathered in the muster room, where Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens addressed the BPAs regarding the incident; however, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall what CPA Owens relayed. During the muster, information was received indicating there was another threat at the Uvalde High School. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to the school, where they stood perimeter for approximately two hours without incident. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the SIU office to finish his regularly scheduled shift and went home at approximately 10:00 p.m. (timestamp 12:23:25).



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BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is unaware of a specific authority to respond to an active shooter incident. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he has a responsibility, as a BPA, to respond to these types of incidents. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received active shooter training in approximately 2014 or 2015. During that training, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall any scenarios where he encountered a locked or barricaded door. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unaware that CBP had an official active shooter policy (timestamp 12:50:30).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, up to the point he witnessed victims removed from the school, he was under the impression the situation was a bailout, where the subject entered the school and became a barricaded subject (timestamp 12:56:50).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, while on scene, he was unaware of the status of the doors to classroom 111 and 112 (timestamp 12:59:25).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Warning and Assurances to Employee Required to Provide
2	StarWitness interview of BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 164**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 10, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was previously assigned to the Uvalde Station (UVA) until his transfer to USBP International Falls Station, Minnesota. The interviews were audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recordings were uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1) and (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachments 2).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), began his shift at approximately (b) (7)(E) and was providing less lethal instruction to UVA BPAs. During a break, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, entered the training room and notified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was a shooting at a local school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember at what time he was notified of the school shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs, went to the armory, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retrieved his rifle, and keys to a marked USBP vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went to his personal vehicle, put on his duty belt with his handgun, body armor, and retrieved his EMT bag, which he subsequently placed in his USBP vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the EMT bag as a walking ambulance (Attachment 1, timestamp 00:31:20).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his EMT bag, which he took to Robb Elementary, contained an oxygen tank, splints, oral pharyngeal airway, nasal pharyngeal airway, air bags, intravenous bag, needles, over the counter medications, epinephrine, Narcan, trauma stuff-bandages, a kit to assist in childbirth, pulse oximeter, and stethoscope. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that nothing from his EMT bag was used to treat anyone at the Robb Elementary School shooting (Attachment 1, timestamp 01:49:50).

When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left UVA, he did not know where the shooting occurred but heard radio communications that the shooting was at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to follow SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, when he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) driving a USBP vehicle with his emergency equipment activated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to pull up next to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to ask where the school was located because BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued driving and saw the shooter's wrecked truck. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that it took him approximately 10 minutes to arrive at Robb Elementary School after he was notified of the shooting.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked his USBP vehicle at the intersection of South Groves Street and Geraldine Street. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with his rifle, went into the ditch where the shooter's wrecked truck was located. Near the wrecked truck, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and learned the vehicle contained a lot of ammunition and the shooter was in the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he would remain with the truck and secure it as evidence (Attachment 1, timestamp 00:33:21).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to his vehicle, retrieved his EMT bag, his rifle, and walked towards the school. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the school, he left his EMT bag near a Dodge Charger. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that approximately five minutes passed from the time he spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) near the wrecked truck until he was at the Dodge Charger. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached a group of law enforcement officers near a green power transformer located north of the west entrance to the school (Attachment 1, timestamp 00:35:38). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing a UVA Intelligence Unit BPA whose last name is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) near the power transfer. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first name.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned the shooter was in the school and he noticed bullet holes in the windows. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw Police Officers and an Intelligence Unit BPA who since transferred to Homeland Security Investigations, evacuating students and teachers from classroom windows on the west side of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with evacuating students and teachers through the classroom windows (Attachment 1, timestamp 00:36:24). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that Uvalde Police Officers, Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Troopers and BPA's evacuated students from these classrooms on the west side of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, was also involved in evacuating children from the classrooms on the west side of the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went to the south entrance of the building where he saw several law enforcement officers, including an Uvalde Police Officer with a ballistic shield. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked into the school and saw several law enforcement officers and, which he later learned,



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Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD) Chief Pete Arredondo. At the time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed Chief Arredondo was using a radio, but later learned Chief Arredondo was using a cell phone. During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified this individual, who he saw in the south hallway from a photo as UCISDPD Chief Pete Arredondo (Attachment 4).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he was outside the south door for approximately five minutes trying to determine what was happening before entering the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the Uvalde Police Officer with the ballistic shield he needed to be inside and then told a TXDPS Trooper to accompany him inside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Uvalde Police Officer with the ballistic shield and the TXDPS Trooper entered through the south entrance.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) positioned himself behind the Uvalde Police Officer with the shield on the west side of the hallway. The TXDPS Trooper who entered with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was positioned behind him. After entering the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard four shots fired. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pushed the Uvalde Police Officer with the ballistic shield forward further into the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the Uvalde Officer, and Trooper moved past others, including two law enforcement officers laying on the floor and positioned themselves inside a recessed area near a classroom door on the west side of the south hallway. A Deputy United States Marshal with a ballistic shield subsequently arrived and positioned himself near BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the Uvalde Police Officer (Attachment 1, timestamp 00:40:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated it was approximately two minutes from the time he entered the south door until he heard the four shots fired.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know there where children in the classrooms with the shooter until he entered the classroom following the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) breach during which shooter was fatally shot. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard the shots fired while he was in the south hallway, he believed the shooter was firing at law enforcement (Attachment 1, timestamp 03:04:30).

While in the south hallway prior to the classroom breach, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned students were being evacuated from classrooms on the eastside of the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard someone say a door was locked and there might be people inside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard windows being broken so these classrooms could be evaluated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that students were evacuated from the classroom furthest south on the east side of the building (Attachment 1, timestamp 02:53:04).

While in the hallway, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked Chief Arredondo if there was a sniper available and Chief Arredondo responded they had not had a sniper in years. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that although he did not see Chief Arredondo speaking, he recognized his voice from hearing him speak earlier in the south hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked about using a BearCat to enter the classroom and someone replied they did not have one. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio communications which indicated eight or nine students being in the classroom with the shooter. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear anything from the classroom at the north end of the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unsure if the information was accurate, and he could not verify it.





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a male from behind him in the south hallway say that nobody should do anything until BORTAC arrived (Attachment 1, timestamp 00:47:40).

While in the south hallway, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard Chief Arredondo speaking about needing to find keys for the classroom because the keys they had were not working. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he heard Chief Arredondo comment the master key he had was not working and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought to himself that if it is not working then it is not a master key. When asked if he heard Arredondo comment on the status of the lock on the classroom door where the shooter was located, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he heard Chief Arredondo say the door was locked. While in the south hallway, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard Chief Arredondo attempt to communicate with the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that essentially Chief Arredondo said students were removed from the classrooms, so you are not getting any more than you have in there. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if students were in the classroom with the shooter and nobody responded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was attempting to determine if students were in the classroom with the shooter because he believed the shooter had earlier fired at law enforcement.

When asked if he heard Chief Arredondo make statements concerning BORTAC, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he heard Chief Arredondo yelling down the hallway that BORTAC was moving up to the door, BORTAC is moving towards the door, BORTAC's at the door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he heard Chief Arredondo make these statements as BORTAC approached the classroom and prepared to enter (Attachment 1, timestamp 01:17:58).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that while in the south hallway after the four shots were fired, but prior to the breach of the classroom, he heard Chief Arredondo attempting to communicate with the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that Chief Arredondo essentially said, we do not want anyone to get hurt. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked Chief Arredondo if he had a key and Chief Arredondo replied they were trying to get it because the master keys were not working (Attachment 1, timestamp 01:29:39).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after hearing the four shots fired inside the school, he did not see anyone in the south hallway move towards the classroom, so he pushed the Uvalde Police Officer with the ballistic shield forward and moved forward behind the officer to a recessed area in the south hallway near two classroom doors. Following the four shots, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a group of law enforcement officers on the northside of the hallway move forward towards the classroom where the shooter was and then stop. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know why the group of law enforcement officers on the northside stopped (Attachment 1, timestamp 02:55:59).

When asked to clarify the statements he heard about eight or nine students being in the classroom with the shooter, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he asked if students were in the classroom with the shooter and someone said they did not know. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) commented, so then the information is not reliable, and someone responded they did not know (Attachment 1, timestamp 01:24:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw that BORTAC arrive and believed they were formulating a plan. As BORTAC began moving down the hallway, Chief Arredondo yelled down the hallway that



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BORTAC was there. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told Chief Arredondo to shut up and Chief Arredondo announced that BORTAC was at the classroom door (Attachment 1, timestamp 00:50:35).

After BORTAC approached the classroom door, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw the classroom door open and heard shots fired. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and others in the south hallway moved towards the classroom and he approached the classroom door. At the entrance to the classroom, UVA BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed the group to stop. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stopped at the entrance to the classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then directed the group to enter the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered and saw the shooter on the floor. A police officer grabbed a female student and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to assist with evacuating the student. The police officer then left and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued struggling to remove the female student from the classroom. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) struggled to move the female student and entered the hallway, he saw law enforcement officers in the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned this female student's first name was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and she was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of a BPA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called for assistance and other law enforcement officers helped move (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside the south entrance (Attachment 1, timestamp 03:00:29).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knelt and began assessing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with a Brackettville Station (BRA) BPA he identified from a photo as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who is also an EMT (Attachment 4). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) placed his finger on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) neck and his face near (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) face and determined she did not have a pulse and was not breathing so he began chest compressions. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then realized (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been shot (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) placed his hand on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for a moment, laid his rifle near the south door and reentered the school (Attachment 1, timestamp 03:08:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned inside the classroom where he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio Station USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) looking at a male student near a wall. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and knelt near the male student. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed this student was shot (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if the student was deceased and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded yes. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved to a female student near this male student. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) determined this female student was shot (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved towards a pile of students where a BPA EMT from Del Rio Sector (DRT) was standing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified this DRT BPA EMT from a photo as DRT BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 4). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told those who were not EMTs to leave the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assessed eight or nine students who suffered gun shots (Attachment 1, timestamp 03:05:19).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stood and asked if everyone in the classroom was assessed and if they were all deceased. Someone replied yes and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked if it was a crime scene and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said yes. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then left the classroom and reentered the hallway (Attachment 1, timestamp 03:15:40).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the students he examined and determine to be deceased had clearly fatal gunshot wounds. If BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not identify fatal gunshot wounds, he checked for a pulse and breathing before determining someone was deceased (Attachment 1, timestamp 03:41:30).

After entering the hallway and walking north, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, providing medical treatment to a male student who was breathing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned this male student's first name was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see any visible injuries, but recognized (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not well. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed to be taken outside because a medical evacuation helicopter was on the way. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was taken outside through the west entrance and moved south towards where it was believed the helicopter would land. As they waited for the helicopter (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) breathing slowed, and he started to collapse. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA EMT, asked if he should start compressions and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied yes. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working to open (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) airway and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used bag valve mask to provide air, but the air was not entering (Attachment 1, timestamp 03:18:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to open (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) airway and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not respond. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he need to be switched out and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded yes. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide the group instruction, and someone replaced BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who replaced BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued trying to provide air to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but he was unsuccessful. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then used a nasal pharyngeal airway and a bag valve mask, but it did not work, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) still could not be provided air. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they needed a supraglottic airway device. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then inserted the supraglottic airway device and someone asked if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then realized (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Attachment 1, timestamp 03:20:57).

Someone said it was taking too long and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should be taken to an ambulance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and others began moving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) toward an ambulance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the supraglottic airway device worked after he repositioned it following the initial insertion and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided air on the way to the ambulance. While (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was moved to the ambulance a BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on the gurney providing chest compression. As they approached the ambulance with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the EMT from the ambulance took over chest compressions while loading (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) into the ambulance. The ambulance then departed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that shortly after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed in the ambulance the medical evacuation helicopter arrived at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) died on the way to the hospital (Attachment 1, timestamp 03:23:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was near the southside of the school for approximately 10 minutes before being taken to the ambulance (Attachment 1, timestamp 04:03:20). While treating (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) removed his black tactical gloves and replaced them with blue examination gloves to improve his dexterity. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left these black gloves at Robb Elementary School.

After the ambulance departed, Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, approached BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he wanted everyone to gather at UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retrieved his rifle from the southside of the building and noticed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was covered with a blanket. BPA



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to his vehicle and departed with his rifle and EMT bag. Rather than return to UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to assist at the Uvalde Memorial Hospital.

At Uvalde Memorial Hospital, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the emergency room and told a nurse that he was an EMT and asked where he could assist. The nurse told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to follow her, and they entered the emergency room. The nurse subsequently pointed to a doctor and told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to follow the doctor.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the doctor who said they expected the arrival of 14 children with minor injuries and she wanted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to handle the initial assessments. The doctor and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked outside the emergency room where there were 14 wheelchairs and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) awaited arrival of the children.

After waiting for a while, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio communications concerning a social media threat from the purported girlfriend of the shooter who claimed she was going to finish the job. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the emergency room and drove to Uvalde High School (Attachment 2, timestamp 00:16:40). While at Uvalde Memorial Hospital, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not conduct any medical assessments or provided medical treatment to anyone.

When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the high school, he parked near the front of the school, and encountered a Deputy U.S. Marshal, Drug Enforcement Administration SA, and a Deputy Sheriff and the group agreed they would enter and search the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the names of any Law enforcement officer who entered the school with him.

As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the group approached the front of the school, a security officer opened the door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered with the others and announced everyone should get into a room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the others entered further into the school. The group moved down the hallway, searched bathrooms and continued down the hallway checking classroom doors as they went. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they did not encounter any unlocked classroom doors while searching the school (Attachment 2, timestamp 00:24:38)

While searching the high school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio communications concerning shots fired in room 606 at the high school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized they were near room 606 and had not heard any shots. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the group continued searching, they encounter two Uvalde Police Officers. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the others located classroom 606 and found the door was locked. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) radioed asking how the students would be handled; would they be evaluated or shelter in place. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard radio communication directing all law enforcement officers inside the school to exit since BORTAC arrived and would search the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then exited the school, returned to his vehicle, and went to UVA (Attachment 2, timestamp 00:27:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he was inside the high school for approximately 40 minutes before exiting after the arrival of BORTAC. While at the high school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not use force against anyone, and he did not detain or restrain anyone.



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When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at UVA he unloaded and secured his equipment, obtained a clean uniform, and changed from his bloody and dirty uniform. After changing his uniform, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took a photo of his uniform pants and boots. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided these photos, which are attached to this Report of Investigation (Attachment 5). After changing his uniform and speaking with others at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to his residence (Attachment 2, timestamp 00:38:54). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he departed UVA at approximately 6:00 p.m.

During the interview BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed photos for law enforcement officers involved in the May 24, 2022, response to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified several BPA who he saw at the school, including BPAs who were in the classrooms where deceased students were located, as well as BPAs who provided medical treatment (Attachment 2, timestamp 04:06:27). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made handwritten notes related to his identifications. These photos reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) are attached to this report (Attachment 4).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School, and Uvalde High School (Attachment 2, timestamp 00:58:31). These maps are labeled 1-9, respectively and attached to this Report of Investigation (Attachment 6). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the routes he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the maps labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas Schools; 5. Robb Elementary School; 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; 8.a, 8.b., 8.c. and 8.d labeled Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas; as well as additional maps 8.d.2, 8.b.2, 8.c.2, 8.d.3 labeled, Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas.

On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled approximately where he parked at Robb Elementary School, Uvalde Memorial Hospital and Uvalde High School. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled approximately there he parked at Robb Elementary School, left his EMT bag near the Dodge Charger and the green power transformer where he initially went after arriving at the school.

On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled Uvalde Memorial Hospital indicating he went to the hospital on May 24, 2022. On the map labeled 8.a Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the classroom where he assisted with evacuating students through the windows, where he encountered the Uvalde Police Officer with the ballistic shield and where he observed Chief Arredondo. On the map labeled 8.b Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled where he moved in the south hallway after hearing the four shots fired inside the school.

On the map labeled 8.c. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled where he moved and which classroom he initially entered following the BORTAC breach of the classroom. On the map labeled 8.d. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled where he initially encountered (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) where he provided her medical treatment and where BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left his rifle.



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On the map labeled 8.b.2, Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled approximately where he initially encountered (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was moved and provided medical treatment, where the ambulance was located that transported (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and where two helicopters landed after as he was departing Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 8.c.2 Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, labeled approximately where he retrieved his rifle and EMT bag before departing Robb Elementary School.

Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a map of the Uvalde High School on which he labeled approximately where he parked, where he entered and exited the school and where he went inside the school while searching it (Exhibit 7).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has a basic EMT certification with some advanced skills and received his EMT training in April 2021, in Del Rio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is registered with the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians and is licensed with the Department of Homeland Security. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as an EMT he was required complete initial training, and continuing education. As part of his continuing education, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed several trainings, including tactical combat casualty care training. If BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) need to perform a procedure beyond established protocols, he is required to contact the medical director for assistance and he has three phone numbers to contact for authorization and assistance.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if there was anyone in charge of medical treatment prior to the BORTAC classroom breach. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that following the breach, medical treatment involved dynamic leadership with the most knowledgeable individual making decisions.

When asked to explain his understanding of a mass casualty incident and triage, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that during a mass casualty incident required resources should be obtained, required care should be determined, and medical treatment should be prioritized based upon need. Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that during a mass casualty incident a color-coded system is used to perform medical triage (Attachment 2, timestamp 02:32:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he responded to Robb Elementary School because it was a violent felony, which required numerous agencies to respond. While at the USBP Academy, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told that during a school shooting BPAs might be most well-trained responders. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it was a federal crime to shoot someone that if they could assist local agencies they should assist. Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio communication concerning the shooting at Robb Elementary including the location of the school (Attachment 2, timestamp 01:01:52). Later during the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he felt like he was directed to respond, but nobody specifically directed him to respond to the school shooting (Attachment 2, timestamp 02:29:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of USBP legal authority to respond to the Robb Elementary School shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that based on the active shooter training he received, when an active shooter incident occurs, BPAs are expected to respond with their firearms and body armor.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed Chief Arredondo should have been in command-and-control during the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not identify who was in command and control at any time during the event. During the response to the shooting at Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe any USBP personnel in a command-and-control position (Attachment 2, timestamp 02:30:59).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received active shooter training while employed by the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and while in the USBP Academy in 2019 or 2020. Additionally, November 2021, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received Tactical Combat Casualty Care training.

During the interview BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown portions of video from the May 24, 2022, response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself in the videos and explained what he remembered after watching the videos. The OPR Threat Mitigation and Analysis Division (TMAD) documented the videos shown to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as well as information BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided concerning the videos he viewed (Attachment 8).

## ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Part 1.
2	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Part 2.
3	Photos of law enforcement officers at Robb Elementary School reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4	Photos of CBP employees at Robb Elementary School reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
5	Photos for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) uniform pants and boots.
6	Maps labeled 1-9 reviewed and labeled by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
7	Map labeled Uvalde High School labeled by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
8	TMAD report detailing display video and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) statements

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 165**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y





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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of CPA Jason Owens		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 13, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed CPA Owens concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	09/18/2023
Approved by:		Date:	

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CPA Owens stated he was on duty on May 24, 2022, and was in a weekly videoconference with USBP headquarters via Microsoft Teams around 11:00 a.m. Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, came into his office and informed him there was a report of an active shooter in Uvalde. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told CPA Owens he was going to respond. CPA Owens said he texted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the third highest ranking officer at USBP, Chief Tony Barker, Washington, D.C., and told him about the situation and that he was going to leave the videoconference. Chief Barker acknowledged CPA Owens' text and CPA Owens left the videoconference. CPA Owens stated he told Acting Division Chief of Operations (DC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to stay at DRT and monitor communications and notifications. CPA Owens stated he wanted all communications between DRT and USBP headquarters to go through DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CPA Owens grabbed Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and they left in an unmarked government Chevrolet Tahoe. CPA Owens stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove the Tahoe while he made phone calls. CPA Owens told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to drive "code" (lights and sirens) but to drive safely. CPA Owens said DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, rode in another vehicle and left approximately five minutes before him.

CPA Owens stated his radio was on, but the radio traffic was difficult to understand. He said there was an open mic at one point and other times the radio traffic sounded muffled. CPA Owens said he heard someone ask for emergency medical services (EMS) but could not ascertain where they were needing EMS. CPA Owens stated that while they were driving to Uvalde, he contacted Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Regional Commander (RC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and apprised him of the situation. RC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed CPA Owens that he had just heard about the situation and was responding to Robb Elementary School as well. CPA Owens stated he talked to DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to make sure all notifications of the incident were going to the chain of command and to activate the call tree. He instructed DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to contact the CBP Office of Field Operations and CBP Air and Marine Operations to let them know of the situation and to get information on any of their personnel who responded or were involved. CPA Owens told DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to make sure to get as many people to Uvalde as needed to help and to activate peer support as well. CPA Owens said he spoke with Chief of the USBP Raul Ortiz, Washington, D.C., and told him he was heading to Robb Elementary School. Chief Ortiz told CPA Owens to tell Border Patrol agents (BPA) to do what they needed to do and to not wait (timestamp 00:11:57). CPA Owens stated he relayed that information to DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CPA Owens stated that while he was en route to Robb Elementary School, he did not know who was on scene or if anyone had established an incident command. Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in charge of USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) so he assumed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be overseeing the USBP operations on scene.

CPA Owens stated he arrived right after law enforcement officers had "neutralized" the shooter. CPA Owens observed the scene was very chaotic and vehicles were parked everywhere. He stated they parked their vehicle about one to two blocks away and walked toward the school. CPA Owens stated he observed civilians who were angry and yelling. He also observed an ambulance with people working on someone inside of it. CPA Owens stated DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived before he did so he met with him to discuss what needed to get done. CPA Owens told



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DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to make sure they accounted for BPAs and to make sure they took care of their personnel. CPA Owens stated there was a tree by the school where the USBP personnel had rallied. CPA Owens stated he observed BPAs with their uniforms saturated in blood and they appeared to be in shock, just staring blankly and crying. CPA Owens said he realized it was a crime scene at this point, so he made the decision to have all USBP personnel move to UVA (timestamp 00:17:54).

CPA Owens stated he instructed USBP medical personnel to finish helping at the school and then return to UVA. He instructed DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get fresh uniforms and peer support ready at UVA. CPA Owens said he realized UVA would be shut down and USBP personnel would need time to recover, so he contacted USBP headquarters to plan with other USBP sectors to keep operations running in Uvalde.

CPA Owens stated that before leaving the scene, he met with RC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and advised him of his plan to move his personnel to UVA. CPA Owens told RC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he needed anything or if they needed to talk to any USBP personnel, to contact him. DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told CPA Owens there was mention of additional threats on social media. CPA Owens instructed DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to send BPAs wherever they could help.

CPA Owens stated that when they were at UVA, he decided to give all personnel involved two days of administrative leave to decompress and talk with peer support. CPA Owens stated he coordinated moving personnel from Laredo and other areas to help cover the UVA area of responsibility during this time. CPA Owens stated he spoke with the Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and CBP Commissioner Chris Magnus and advised them of the situation. CPA Owens stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who stepped in for PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got the names and contact information of everyone involved so DRT management could keep checking on them after they left UVA.

CPA Owens stated they spent most of the time at the muster station at UVA. The TXDPS Texas Rangers came to the station and spoke with the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR) personnel involved and conducted a round count and weapons inventory (timestamp 00:24:05). CPA Owens stated he released everyone once they had their contact information, and the Rangers were done talking with them.

CPA Owens stated he was a former BORTAC and BORSTAR unit member. He said they both fell under the DRT Special Operations Division (SOD). He said SOD had a PAIC and Deputy PAIC. Each team had a commander and first line supervisors for specific elements of each team. CPA Owens stated that for the day of the incident, the PAIC for SOD was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and the acting deputy PAIC was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. He said he did not know who the BORSTAR commander was that day but believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, was the BORTAC commander.

CPA Owens stated BORTAC was a tactical unit similar to military special operations. BORTAC conducted operations outside the continental United States, rural interdictions, and warrants.



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BORSTAR was exclusively for search and rescue, urban search and rescue, and medical and trauma support. He said both had a selection course and both trained in navigation, communications, and operations planning. BORTAC trained more in tactical patrolling and close combat while BORSTAR trained in rescue, tactical rescue, and extraction. CPA Owens said their missions overlapped so BORSTAR augmented BORTAC during missions and they also conducted cross-training.

CPA Owens stated that when any incident like an active shooter took place, USBP partnered with the local law enforcement or a first responder agency within that jurisdiction. He advised the first responder agency took command and USBP was there in a support role. He said the PAIC for the affected area of responsibility would become the deputy incident commander just to coordinate USBP assets. CPA Owens stated he responded to the Robb Elementary School shooting because of the severity of the incident. CPA Owens stated he would normally stay at DRT and obtain information from the PAIC. CPA Owens stated it was the responsibility of the local PAIC to respond if an incident occurred in the PAIC's area.

CPA Owens stated he did not remember initially hearing the Uvalde situation was a barricaded subject and he was never told who asked for USBP's help.

CPA Owens stated that for the Robb Elementary School shooting incident, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would have been their main contact on the ground. CPA Owens stated that ideally, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would have been in radio communication with DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requesting assets and relaying information about the incident. DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would then disseminate the information to whoever needed it. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be in communication with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). If a local agency was present, they would be in charge and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would get direction from the local agency incident commander. CPA Owens stated that he later found out Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department Chief Pete Arredondo was the incident commander but did not know if SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was getting any direction from Chief Arredondo. CPA Owens stated that if SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had no incident commander there or if no one was making decisions, then SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would make a command decision, which was not ideal. CPA Owens stated that without an incident commander, each agency on scene would make its own decisions and cause more chaos. CPA Owens stated that normally, USBP would not oversee a school shooting situation and local police or TXDPS would be in charge.

CPA Owens stated USBP will assist other law enforcement agencies but only in a support role and it must have prior approval and a border nexus. CPA Owens stated USBP will act under exigent circumstances, like a school shooting, without prior approval. CPA Owens stated USBP cannot enforce state laws.

During the interview, CPA Owens drew on a map the route he took to Uvalde (Attachment 2).

CPA Owens stated he has replaced his work cell phone since the Robb Elementary School shooting and did not retain any of the texts.



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CPA Owens stated he did not remember the exact times associated with his response to the incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of CPA Owens.
2	Maps reviewed by CPA Owens.

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 166**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 13, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he began his shift at the USBP Del Rio Sector Headquarters (DRT). While eating lunch inside his government owned vehicle (GOV), PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received notification, either via a phone call from Acting PAIC ([A]PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Division or via the GOV service radio, that there was a shooting in Uvalde.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he notified (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was going to respond to Uvalde to assist, and (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to stay back at DRT and assist with USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) assets and deployment from his location at DRT.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he traveled towards Uvalde along U.S. Highway 90 in an unmarked GOV with his emergency equipment activated and followed directly behind a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) vehicle. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed the DPS vehicle was going to the same scene in Uvalde. While driving, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not call any BORTAC members working in the desert supporting USBP field operations, as he knew that once his BORTAC teams learned of the situation, they would self-deploy to the location. Additionally, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew that Acting Incident Commander ([A]IC), Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC, who was off duty that day, would be notified and would likely respond to the school, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he called SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approximately twice during his drive to Uvalde. During his first phone call to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was preparing to immediately deploy to Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would most likely be the first BPA on scene because of his proximity to the school. He told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he had authorization to make all tactical decisions necessary, and that he had a “greenlight to do what he needed to do.” The first phone call lasted only a few minutes. At an unknown time during PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drive, he received a phone call from Acting Deputy Chief Patrol Agent ([A]DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who told him that he knew BORTAC was heading to the scene and that they had authorization from Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, to do whatever they needed to do on scene and that they had a “greenlight to take care of business.” PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he appreciated the phone call from (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but he did not need it, in his mind, he had provided the greenlight to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also believed his BORTAC teams knew what to do and would respond using proper tactics and training.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his second phone call to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shorter in length and was to ask SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for a status update, but SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was busy, unable to talk, told PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was trying to figure things out, and hung up the phone. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not call SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again, as he did not want to overwhelm him and wanted SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to be the (A)IC on scene and make the necessary decisions without being bothered. While driving, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a substantial amount of text messages from different group chats from other USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) and BORTAC BPAs on his personal cell phone (Attachment 2). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not reply to the messages, as he was driving, but was trying to gather information from the texts, as well as the service radio in his GOV. He stated he received a lot of misinformation and conflicting information. He was not sure what to believe and was not certain if it was an active shooter or barricaded subject. He recalled hearing radio traffic or receiving text messages about BPAs on scene searching for door keys to open a locked door, but he did not have any other information regarding the keys or doors. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated it took him approximately 50 minutes to arrive at Robb Elementary School.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived on scene at approximately 12:50 PM and parked his GOV on Grove Street near the intersection of Geraldine Street. After donning his body armor, he moved towards the northwest gate of Robb Elementary School. He immediately observed a lot of chaos and law enforcement agencies present, but he did not notice any of them displaying a sense of





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urgency. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unaware if the situation changed from active shooter to barricaded subject but based on the actions of other law enforcement officers (LEOs) on scene, he did not believe the situation was an active shooter. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear any gunfire and did not know of anyone being injured.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when entering the school grounds, his goal was to locate SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as he believed he had the most knowledge and information on scene. He did not search for an incident command post and never located one throughout his time on the school grounds. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as the PAIC of BORTAC, his responsibility was to his agents and he wanted to make sure his agents were ok, which is why he searched for SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know of any state or local LEOs in charge on scene and did not observe anyone from USBP in charge.

After entering the school grounds, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the west entrance and witnessed BPAs exiting the west entrance with wounded. He observed a female on a hospital gurney being treated with life-saving medical care by BPAs and BORSTAR agents. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned from an unknown source that the “bad guy was down.” While standing near the west entrance, he also saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, walking towards him with an unknown LEO and could tell BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was wounded. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and shortly thereafter saw CPA Owens and (A)DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on scene.

CPA Owens told PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he wanted to have a meeting with all the BPAs not actively involved in something near the northside of the school building. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked around gathering all the BORSTAR and BORTAC BPAs he could locate. He observed many of the BORSTAR and BORTAC BPAs were shaken up and were covered in blood. After addressing all the BPAs, CPA Owens asked for all BPAs to return to USBP Uvalde Station (UVA).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that before leaving the school, he noted that some of the BORTAC and BORSTAR BPAs left some of their gear inside the school, but they were all denied entry to retrieve their gear because it was controlled by the Texas Rangers as a crime scene. They were told they would have to return later to retrieve their gear, but PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall what items were left at the scene.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not have any interactions with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station, while on-site at Robb Elementary School, and he could not recall if he saw him at UVA or at the school at some point but remembered seeing him briefly that day somewhere.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never provided any medical care to anyone, never entered the school building, and never had any interaction with the public or parents.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he left Robb Elementary School and traveled to UVA and assisted with arriving agents changing out of their bloody uniforms and assisted with supporting the BORTAC members returning from the scene. While at UVA, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received notification from an unknown source that there was a potential second shooter at the Uvalde (Morales) Junior High



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and Uvalde High School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed the BORTAC and BORSTAR teams to the local schools to provide security. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove his GOV to the school and helped with perimeter security while ensuring all BORSTAR and BORTAC BPAs were ok.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at the high school, he did not have any interactions with the public or any parents. He departed the high school and returned to UVA at an unknown time and then traveled to the Uvalde Regional Medical Center (URMC) to visit with BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). While at the URMC, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obtained several photographs on his personal cell phone of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) injury to his head, as well as a photograph of the baseball hat he was wearing when he was shot. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed at the hospital until BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was discharged and then drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) nearby who then took BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) home.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after leaving the URMC, he drove back to DRT before leaving for home for the night. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall the exact time he departed DRT, but he knew it was late and dark outside.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further elaborated that when he gave SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the greenlight to do whatever he felt needed to be done, he wanted to convey the meaning that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could make decisions on anything he encountered on scene, not just tactical matters, but any decisions regarding any matter he would encounter on scene.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that a few days after the incident, at an unknown date and time, he spoke to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who said he never checked the door handle of the classrooms prior to breaching the door. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he trusted what the state and local LEOs told him when he arrived, which was that the doors were locked. Additionally, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that when he obtained keys to the classroom door, he did not check the door handle first and then insert the key but used the key to turn the lock and used the handle to open the door.

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School, and Uvalde High School (3:26:00) (Attachment 3). The maps were labeled 1-9, respectively. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the maps labeled 1-North of Uvalde, TX, map 4-Uvalde, TX, Schools, and map 5-Robb Elementary School. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled from DRT to Robb Elementary School, then to UVA. After leaving UVA, he traveled to the Uvalde High School, then back to UVA. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to the URMC and then back to DRT before departing for his residence.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided three separate text strings from his personal cell phone containing conversations with various BORTAC members from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 4).

- Text String One, on iMessage – Admin iPhones. The string included the following:  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Eagle Pass Station.



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- Text String Two, on iMessage – Untitled. The string included (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT.
- Text String Three, on iMessage – Untitled. The string included CPA Jason Owens.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed frustration that BORTAC and BORSTAR teams were deployed to the field and remote locations to apprehend undocumented migrants instead of training for mass-casualty or critical incidents. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) like the Robb Elementary School shooting.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated that BORTAC as a unit never arrived on scene. Several members of BORTAC were there, but an actual, single, cohesive, team-unit, never arrived. He believed that if a cohesive, entire BORTAC unit would have arrived, the situation would have probably been much different. He stated that if he had arrived a few minutes earlier, he would have asked about the incident command (IC), who was in charge, and if no one answered, he would have taken charge. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that BORTAC and BORSTAR are not trained to take over scenes from state and local LEOs but assist in a secondary role. If a situation occurred without an IC, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he and his BORTAC team would have taken charge, cleared the LEOs standing around in the hallways, and breached the door sooner. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned BORTAC operates in a tight group and makes decisions.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that BORTACs normal response to incidents, when requested by state and local LEOs, was in a secondary role and they do not take charge at scenes. They defer to the state and local LEOs to take charge who then ask for assistance when needed.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that if he or another BORTAC PAIC was on scene, they would operate in a close-knit tactical environment and would operate independently from what other USBP managers may want or direct. If someone from USBP had given SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructions, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would have called PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for advisement. BORTAC is trained to operate in their sphere of tactical knowledge and if they were at a scene for an incident, they would not obey commands from someone without tactical and technical expertise and training.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that overall, he was glad BORTAC agents ended the situation and felt that without BORTAC on scene, the number of deaths would have likely been much worse.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was not aware of his legal authority to respond to the Robb Elementary School incident but mentioned that if there was a “bad guy” with a “gun,” then “good guys” with guns” should assist.

Agent note: Prior to uploading the footage to CBP’s cloud-based storage, CBP OPR verified the video and audio recorded properly. The recording was then deleted from the StarWitness equipment. Subsequently, when reviewing the video, the audio stopped working approximately



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2 seconds into the recording. Neither the StarWitness helpdesk nor CBP OPR's Cyber Investigations unit was able to retrieve the audio portion of the file. Therefore, timestamps were not added to this report.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Videos depicting the text strings from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal cell phone.
3	Maps reviewed by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4	Recorded videos 1-3 of the text message strings on PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal cell phone.

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 167**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 13, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness. The Authentication Code was (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was the Acting Commander for the DRT USBP Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) team and was in his office conducting administrative duties when he received a call from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, at 11:47 a.m., advising him that there was an active shooter in Uvalde, and they were getting ready to deploy (timestamp 00:13:29). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concurred and directed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to deploy to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then advised Acting Patrol Agent in Charge ([A]PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment (SOD), and Acting Deputy Agent in Charge ([A]DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD, regarding the report of an active shooter in Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gathered his gear and deployed to Uvalde at approximately 11:55 a.m. While enroute, he heard on the radio that the shooter was stopped (timestamp 00:15:06). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard on the radio that the shooter was not stopped. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was included in a group text message with all SOD supervisors and was getting updates as he traveled to Uvalde. From the group text, he learned the location of the shooting was at 715 Old Carrizo Rd., Uvalde, at 12:05 p.m. At 12:09 p.m., SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent a text message saying he was about 40 minutes away. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the scene at approximately the same time, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he was 40 minutes from the scene at 12:09 p.m. (timestamp 00:37:03). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, took a video of the group text referenced by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:12:10) (Attachment 2).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival at the scene, he was approximately 150 yards from the school when he heard on the radio they were breaching. As he entered the school grounds, he saw agents carrying out injured children and a female teacher from the west door. He began to help render aid to the teacher by rotating in with the other agents and performing chest compressions and rescue breaths until she was transferred to an ambulance where Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) continued the chest compressions (timestamp 00:44:30). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not enter a school building, nor did he hear any shots. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not know what time he arrived at Robb Elementary School.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rallied at a tree with other BPAs for a debrief with Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, who directed the agents to meet at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for further debriefing. While at UVA, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of another threat made on social media and responded to a junior high school in Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also went to the junior high school. They provided perimeter security while the students were released to their families. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA for further debriefing and went home for the day.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who had command and control of the scene nor did he give any directions to other law enforcement officers. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not render aid to any member of the public or detained or impeded the movement of bystanders at Robb Elementary School or the junior high school.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) highest level of medical training is an EMT Basic, which he received training and certification through USBP at El Paso, TX in 2008.

During the interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:12:10) (Attachment 3). The maps are labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled from Del Rio, Texas, on Highway 90 into Uvalde. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again marked where he parked his vehicle and how he approached Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 8.d. Robb Elementary



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School, Uvalde, Texas, marked where he helped with medical treatment and where the rally point occurred with CPA Owens.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Text strands on SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) telephone.
3	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 13, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the day shift and was performing line operations on U.S. Highway 57 (US 57) and Farm to Market Road 481 (FM 481) with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR. Between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a group text message from Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, stating there was an active shooter at an elementary school in Uvalde and a subsequent message ordering those in the group text to respond. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed towards Uvalde on US 57 in their respective unmarked government owned vehicle.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while en route, he was listening to radio traffic and recalled a prolonged “hot mic” moment and the voice of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall the content of all the radio transmissions, but remembered hearing someone ask if there were kids inside and that the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) had arrived (timestamp 00:44:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival at Robb Elementary School, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked on Geraldine Street between Nicholas and Evans Streets (timestamp 00:52:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put on his gear and ran towards the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had his gun belt with his handgun and loaded magazines, his M-4 rifle, plates, black medical bag, a trauma kit waist pack, and helmet. He was dressed in standard issued SOD multi-camouflage uniform (timestamp 00:48:54).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he ran towards the school, he dropped his radio. He ran back to his vehicle to retrieve his radio and returned to the school. When he arrived, he entered the west entrance and heard BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, discuss the medical plan. The plan was to designate a casualty collection point in classrooms 130 and 132 as well as a triage area with medical equipment in the hallway’s T-intersection. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were certified paramedics (timestamp 00:55:28). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing a discussion about keys to open the classroom door but could not recall additional details (timestamp 01:03:12).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then observed two stacks of law enforcement officers in the hallway, one outside of classroom 112 lined up parallel to the wall and the other stack perpendicular to the wall next to classroom 111. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, in the stack next to classroom 111. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) open the door to classroom 111. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled a chair being pushed into the classroom once the door was opened and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pulling the door to prevent it from closing (timestamp 01:03:12).

[Agent Note: A stack is a term for a formation used in law enforcement when a team forms up single file along the entrance or doorway to a room where they believe a threat is located.]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tell the stack, “Remember this guy wants to die by cop.” Shortly after, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, outside of classroom 112 and called him to join the end of the stack next to classroom 111. Immediately following, the stack with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered classroom 111 (timestamp 01:05:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard gunfire; however, he could not recall exactly how many shots were fired. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the hallway filled with smoke from the gunfire causing low visibility. After the gunfire ended, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, come out of classroom 111 with a deceased female child (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the child from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and with the help of another unidentified officer, carried the body into the casualty collection room (timestamp 01:06:06). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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then entered classroom 111 where he saw a pile of dead children with a teacher outstretched over them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it looked like the children had been huddled together. Two unknown officers removed the body of the teacher off the pile and attempted to render aid, however, the teacher did not show any signs of life. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then grabbed a deceased male child who (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and carried him to the casualty collection point (timestamp 01:11:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that by the time he entered classrooms 111 and 112, all the children appeared to have bled out as their skin felt waxy and looked pale and ashy (timestamp 01:15:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled approximately ten children in the casualty collection room, and he confirmed they were deceased by checking for a carotid artery pulse. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not treat any victims and only moved casualties to the collection point. Eventually, officers from the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) ordered everyone to exit the school to preserve the crime scene (timestamp 01:16:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he exited the school through the west entrance where he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) providing medical treatment to a child. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to report to the tree north of the building for a muster where Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, instructed the BPAs to meet at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) in 30 minutes (timestamp 01:22:35). When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at UVA, he was informed about a second threat and decided along with other DRT SOD members to go to Morales Jr. High School to provide security around the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the school until everyone was evacuated and then returned to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) changed out of his uniform and went home (timestamp 00:38:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at Robb Elementary School, he thought TXDPS was in charge based on the number of officers outside of the school perimeter (timestamp 01:27:53). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not feel USBP was in charge of the incident, however, he stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) led the stack that made entry into classroom 111 (timestamp 01:27:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in an active shooter event, his role was to stop the threat and support his team and other agencies. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what USBP's legal authority to respond was but knew BPAs did not have peace officer status in Texas (timestamp 01:47:40).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the map labeled 2- South of Uvalde, TX, 4-Uvalde, Texas Schools, 5.a.- Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, and 8.a.- Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde TX. On map 2, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route from DRT. On map 4, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the Uvalde schools where he responded to assist with evacuations. On map 5.a., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his parking location at Robb Elementary School. Lastly, on map 8.a., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his location at Robb Elementary School and the positions of the stacks on classroom 111 and 112. All other maps were not applicable (timestamp 01:53:55).



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CBP OPR interviewers showed Robb Elementary School hallway camera video to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself entering the west entrance of the building at 12:46 p.m. (timestamp 02:50:37).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was unable to provide a copy of the group texts received on May 24, 2022, because the texts were lost during updates to his government issued cellphone.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he became an emergency medical technician (EMT) in October or November of 2020 through a USBP training course at DRT. He became a nationally registered EMT by passing the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians exam.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 13, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for the Mission Support Unit as a juvenile coordinator. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing the radio or dispatch put out information about a shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:31:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) team stayed back at UVA because they were still processing juveniles; however, Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, ordered all remaining agents at the station to gather as much water as they could and bring it to Robb Elementary School for the law enforcement officers (LEOs).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:50 p.m. and parked on South Park Street, located two blocks from the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he walked toward the funeral home located across the street from the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the Incident Command Post was set up at the funeral home; however, he did not know for sure. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the scene as a Hollywood movie with all the lights and chaos. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that local law enforcement had control of the streets surrounding the school (timestamp 00:39:37).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Emergency Medical Services was bringing stretchers to the school to prepare for the children exiting from the west entrance of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that many of the children were screaming for their parents, some were limping, and he observed holes in their clothing (timestamp 00:42:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated school buses were positioned outside of the school to receive the children as they exited. As the children were boarding the school buses, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained parents became argumentative with the LEOs and attempted to get their children before they were bused to the Civic Center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that no one was restrained, and the parents became cooperative after the LEOs spoke with them.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an adult female covered in blood was brought out of the west entrance of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the female could not breath and appeared to be gasping for air. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added the female appeared to succumb to her injuries (timestamp 00:44:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recorded part of the scene with his personal cellular phone; however, he did not remember if it was intentional or not. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent the recording to SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via text message and stated that he knew there would be an investigation and wanted to be truthful (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided a Litigation Hold for U.S. Customs and Border Protection Employees form, which he initialed (Attachment 3).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he approached the west entrance of the school, he noticed co-workers crying and blood everywhere. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he entered the school, he observed children lying motionless in the hallway, which was covered in blood (timestamp 00:52:08). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed children laying inside of classrooms 131 and 132. He stated there was blood all over the floor and what he believed were rounds that had impacted their bodies (timestamp 00:52:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wore gloves and attempted to assist in any way he could; however, an unidentified person inside of the school directed all non-emergency medical personnel to leave the school (timestamp 00:54:38). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he exited the west entrance of the school and stated that he did not provide any medical aid while at the scene (timestamp 01:15:33).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), conducted a muster by a tree at the north end of the school, where he thanked USBP employees for their help at the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was ordered to return to UVA for a briefing;





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however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled telling his supervisor, identified as Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, that he had to go home due to what he witnessed at the scene.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 4). These maps are labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde was not applicable. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, was not applicable. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving at the school, followed by the route he took to the funeral home. The map labeled 5.a. was not applicable. On the map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the path he took into the school through the west entrance, as well as the large tree on the north end of the school where the muster occurred.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Text message of video from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Litigation Hold for U.S. Customs and Border Protection Employees, initialed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4	Maps labeled 1-8 and reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 170**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 13, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned as a member of BORTAC and working on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) in Eagle Pass, Texas. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was attempting to locate a group of undocumented immigrants and got his government vehicle, a Chevrolet Suburban, stuck in the mud.

While attempting to free his vehicle, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio traffic from the Air and Marine Operations helicopter pilot, providing aerial support, of an active shooter situation in Uvalde, Texas (timestamp 10:43:35).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, arrived and helped pull his vehicle out of the mud. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then drove to pick up BORTAC Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, and BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, who's government vehicles were also stuck in the mud.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove towards Uvalde while SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sat in the front passenger seat and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) K-9, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sat in the back seat. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove on Texas Highway 131 to Farm-to-Market Road 1572, which intersects with U.S. Highway 90, which they used to get to Uvalde.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove with lights and sirens activated and estimated it took approximately 30 minutes to get from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) to U.S. Highway 90. He recalled while on U.S. Highway 90, he was passed by other law enforcement vehicles, possibly the Sheriff's Office and the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that while in route to Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was relaying information to him and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in reference to the shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered hearing information that the suspect was shooting through walls or doors at law enforcement personnel. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later stated during the interview that before they arrived at Robb Elementary School, they received information that the subject was barricaded.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was forced to park a distance away from the school because the street was very congested with first responder and civilian vehicles. He stated that after parking, he, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed their gear and ran toward Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dressed in a multi camouflage Border Patrol (BP) uniform identified with police wording, a BP patch on his left sleeve, and a DHS patch on his right sleeve. He was wearing his plate carrier and BP issued Kevlar helmet with earmuffs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also wearing his duty belt with a Glock 47 pistol and extra pistol and rifle magazines. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also wearing his radio (timestamp 11:33:27). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later stated he was also wearing his body camera and a flashbang (timestamp 11:54:26).

While running to Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, on the side of the street prepping an explosive charge. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was prepping the charge in case it was needed to breach the classroom door (timestamp 10:48:35 and 11:55:59).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that upon arriving at Robb Elementary School, he saw people running in different directions and victims being treated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the scene as mass chaos (timestamp 11:20:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was at about this time when he learned the shooter had been "neutralized".



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear any shots being fired when he arrived at Robb Elementary School and further explained he was wearing hearing protection and there was also helicopter overhead (timestamp 12:29:58).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described approaching the west entrance of Robb Elementary School where he encountered BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, who appeared to be limping. After confirming that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was ok, he continued into the school to locate and check on his BORTAC teammates.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when he entered the building, he looked for gaps to fill where he could be used to fill a role or to assist (timestamp 11:36:14). He stated he saw a BPA carrying a victim out of the classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered the classroom 112, where saw law enforcement personnel and multiple deceased victims to include a teacher (timestamp 12:02:20). He and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to classroom 111, where he observed BORTAC SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, standing near the shooter.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unsure how much time elapsed from the time of the breach until he arrived on scene but stated it could not have been long because smoke from the gunfire remained in the classrooms.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he overheard one of the Texas Rangers, either (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) telling law enforcement personnel to exit the classrooms because the area was a crime scene.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the classroom and entered the hallway where Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD) Chief of Police Pete Arredondo was requesting for law enforcement personnel from various agencies to clear a particular set of classrooms (timestamp 11:46:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP UVA, obtained keys to the locked classrooms and they worked together to clear several classrooms. Afterward, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs exited Robb Elementary School through the south entrance (timestamp 12:04:17).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he then participated in a briefing held by Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP DRT, under a shade tree on the northside of Robb Elementary School. The briefing included a quick assessment of USBP personnel, gear checks and a directive for all USBP personnel to report to UVA.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly after arriving at UVA, Special Operations Division (SOD) Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP DRT, informed him of a secondary threat at the High School/Junior High campus and asked him to deploy (timestamp 11:42:49). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and other BPAs grabbed their gear and responded to the High School/Junior High campus.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was instructed to establish an exterior post to scan for additional threats at the Junior High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not enter the Junior High School (timestamp 11:42:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the Uvalde Police Department or TXDPS was in charge at the Junior High School concerning the safe release of the students to their parents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not involved with the release of the students (timestamp 12:36:02).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he later learned the secondary threat was nonexistent and they were released from their duty at the High School/Junior High School campus.

After departing the Junior High School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA, ended his shift, and drove home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall at what time his day ended.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not take any photographs on the day of the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:44:22).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did have a group text string concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting on his personal phone (timestamp 10:58:48 and 11:44:36).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not send emails regarding the Robb Elementary School shooting but did produce a report at the request of the Texas Rangers concerning his involvement at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed it was stored on the CBP share drive (timestamp 12:31:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall the presence of a command post or anyone giving any sort of directions to others at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:29:38).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he did not recognize and was unaware if anyone was in charge at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:30:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when he arrived, he was focused on entering the school and did not stop to take the time to notice or observe anyone in charge.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that if someone from USBP was in charge at Robb Elementary School, he never received the information (timestamp 11:32:38).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not render first aid to anyone or physically assist in evacuating any victims while at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:37:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not physically restrain, hold anyone back or use force at either Robb Elementary School or the Junior High School. He indicated he did communicate with some civilians at the Junior High School to let them know the school was secured (timestamp 11:14:38).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not directed to deploy to Robb Elementary School. He explained when he learned of the active shooter in Uvalde, he knew that was where they were going to go (timestamp 11:07:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did request when someone got un-stuck, to load up everyone in that vehicle and respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 11:07:51).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the initial information received related to an active shooter, but enroute to Robb Elementary School, he learned the situation had shifted to a barricaded subject. He stated they were receiving conflicting information (timestamp 12:18:34).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) defined an active shooter as an ongoing situation, in which someone is actively shooting, actively killing, and actively firing shots. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) defined a barricaded subject as a person who has barricaded themselves, has stopped shooting and has stopped or paused the killing people. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an active shooter can become a barricaded subject and vice versa (timestamp 12:19:57).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP's role in the incident at Robb Elementary School was to be there as a support element for state and local law enforcement. It is his belief BORTAC is better equipped to address a barricaded subject and more than willing to help in those situations (timestamp 12:17:18).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not sure what authority USBP had to respond to the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 12:21:30). He further stated it was USBP's responsibility to respond to the situation at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 12:37:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP has a duty to respond to an incident like the Robb Elementary School shooting to stop any further loss of life (timestamp 12:21:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of any Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) between BORTAC and any state and local agencies. He explained BORTAC has supported or assisted state and local agencies with various operations in the past, but prior approval through the USBP chain of command is required (timestamp 12:27:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was put on a lunch break and the video was stopped (timestamp 13:28:30).

On March 13, 2023, at approximately 2:24 p.m., SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resumed the interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the USBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a text string called "Admin iPhone" from his personal cell phone with various BORTAC members and supervisors from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 3).



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At approximately 2:30 p.m., Special Agent (SA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Cyber Division, recorded BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Signal chat strings using his CBP issued iPhone.

At approximately 2:39 p.m., Investigative Analyst (IA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Threat Mitigation and Analysis Division, showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) two video clips captured by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body worn camera on May 24, 2022, at Robb Elementary School (Attachment 4).

Video clip, timestamp 17:50:53 to timestamp 17:51:20, was shown to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who identified the clip as video recorded by his body worn camera on May 24, 2022, at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the two USBP personnel captured in the video standing with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the west entrance of Robb Elementary School.

Video clip, timestamp 17:59:58 to timestamp 18:00:06, was shown to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who identified the clip as video recorded by his body worn camera on May 24, 2022, at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the recording was of him exiting Robb Elementary School after he cleared classrooms. From the clip, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) standing in the hallway inside Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated once he exited Robb Elementary School, he did not reenter the building.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown pictures of Police Chief Arredondo (Attachment 5). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked if he could identify the individual who requested help from law enforcement personnel to clear classrooms after the breach. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified Chief Arredondo as the individual in the hallway (timestamp 14:53:47).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a map package and labeled his movements and location during the Rob Elementary School shooting incident. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed the notes section in the map package (Attachment 6).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Part 1.
2	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Part 2.
3	Recorded video of text message string on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal cell phone.
4	Video clips from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body worn camera.
5	Picture of UCISDPD Police Chief Pete Arredondo.
6	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)





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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Additional Information Provided by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 14, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received an email with an attachment from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Attachment 1).

The attachment was a Word document with a narrative written by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he had provided to the Texas Department of Public Safety. The Word document was not signed or dated.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated in the document that on May 24, 2022, the helicopter pilot assisting him and other agents informed him of an active shooter in Uvalde. After BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got his vehicle out of the mud, he picked up Supervisory BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, and drove to Uvalde. When they arrived, they had to park a few blocks from Robb Elementary School because of the substantial number of vehicles in the area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) along with other agents, ran to where he described as the entry point to Robb Elementary School. During this time, he heard radio traffic stating the threat was “neutralized.”

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated they entered a building and located other BORTAC teammates in a nearby classroom. Shortly after arriving, someone said the rest of the building needed to be cleared for other potential threats. After the building was secured, they exited through the south door of the building. BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> then met with other agents and a supervisor on the north side of the building. A short time later, they were told to go to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for a briefing. During the briefing at UVA, BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> and other agents were told there was another possible threat at a nearby school. BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> and other agents responded to Uvalde High School. After they determined there was no threat to the school, agents left the area.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	Email with attachment from BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> dated March 14, 2023.

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 13, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a member of the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) since 2004.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was off-duty (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in Concan, TX. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was about to depart his home in Uvalde, he received a text message from BORTAC Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, stating there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:18:40). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) text message also asked who was available to respond to the school. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the text message was a group message sent to other BORTAC members (timestamp 00:34:28).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to call SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but was unable. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cancelled his personal plans and put on his multi-camouflage uniform, body armor plates, gun belt, pistol, two pistol magazines, M4 rifle, and his individual first aid kit (timestamp 00:35:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed his home in his assigned unmarked USBP vehicle, at approximately 12:00 p.m., and travelled to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:40:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not activate his emergency lights and sirens on his way to Robb Elementary School and said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:36:55).

Upon arriving within a couple of blocks of Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove down Geraldine Street and saw a lot of law enforcement officers (LEO) on scene, including USBP, Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) troopers, County Sheriffs, and Uvalde Police Department Officers (timestamp 00:40:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to drive to the east side of the school and met up with LEOs from different agencies as he gathered the last pieces of his USBP issued gear (timestamp 00:21:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again tried to communicate with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via text message, to inform him that he was on scene, but said his texts were not going through.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ended up parking on west Cargile Street and saw a lot of people in the area and described the scene as chaotic (timestamp 00:42:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a marked USBP vehicle in the area and briefly spoke with the BPA who told him the subject was barricaded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to relay the information to his BORTAC teammates through a cellular text message (timestamp 00:21:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to identify the BPA (timestamp 00:43:36).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to walk towards the southeast side of the school and commented that there was no incident command or sense of direction and described the scene as the most chaotic he has ever experienced (timestamp 00:22:42). While on the east side of the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a group of kids being evacuated and guided to safety. There were no buses present, so the kids were given to other LEOs (timestamp 00:22:58). Shortly thereafter, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a group of LEOs including USBP, TXDPS, and County Sheriff's officers running towards a certain building when he decided to go with them (timestamp 00:53:18). When they arrived at the building, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told that the subject was barricaded in the building and located within a room that was the seventh window from the left. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed the information to his BORTAC team members via a cellular text message (timestamp 00:23:50). At the time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had not heard any gunshots (timestamp 00:23:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no incident command and was still hearing it was a barricaded subject (timestamp 00:24:19). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard the phrase "barricaded subject" five times or more (timestamp 00:57:59). At one point he heard the shooter was on the roof (timestamp 00:24:28). Radio traffic was limited. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he usually worked on (b) (7)(E) but could not recall which channel he scanned (timestamp 01:01:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed LEOs break the windows of some classrooms and evacuated children from either classroom 108 or 109 and took them outside of the building (timestamp 00:25:10).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated communication was lacking and he tried to send a cellular text message to BORTAC, and it appeared the text message was not going through. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said reception was bad that day (timestamp 00:25:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then saw BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, set up his rifle and tripod on the east side of the building (timestamp 00:25:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a sniper assigned to BORTAC (timestamp 01:07:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, accompanied BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as he set up and at that moment was when he realized there were more Special Operations Detachment (SOD) agents on scene (timestamp 01:14:49). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a volley of gunshots and ran toward the south entrance of the school (timestamp 01:09:26). As he entered the south entrance of Robb Elementary School, he saw a TXDPS trooper coming out with BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was holding his head and the TXDPS trooper said, "I got him" (timestamp 01:16:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) not to go in the building; however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard constant yelling and proceeded to go toward the entrance (timestamp 00:26:13). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the entrance, he saw a group of BPAs working on a female child on the southside of the building, who appeared to be lifeless (timestamp 01:16:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then entered the building and saw a pile of deceased children (timestamp 00:26:53). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he froze when he saw the deceased children.

After entering the building, he heard one of the LEOs say all the kids were code black, meaning they were deceased (timestamp 00:28:08). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he felt bad for the children and wanted to grab them and take them out, but he knew they were deceased and there was nothing he could do for them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw the teacher on top of the deceased children and later learned that it was his former classmate (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:19:59).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently met up with other BORTAC BPAs by a tree in front of the school where they held an after action meeting with Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT (timestamp 00:28:59). While there, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go to the Uvalde hospital to check on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). At the hospital, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met up with SBPA BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT.

While at the hospital, a staff member recognized BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked him if he could escort the parents to help identify some of the deceased children (timestamp 00:30:17). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the purpose for him and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to be present was to provide security and help contain the parents as they identified their child (timestamp 00:30:37). The first mother who was escorted to a room at the hospital fell to her knees when the sheet was lifted and she saw that it was not her child (timestamp 00:31:00). Another set of parents were in the process of being escorted when other family members followed, but only the parents were allowed to go in to positively identify the child. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had to explain to one of the males that only the parents were allowed to go inside. After escorting the parents, the mother identified her child and as expected she was emotionally distraught (timestamp 00:31:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) escorted another set of parents to identify their child and after that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he could not continue to see 17 more parents go through the emotional distress of identifying their deceased child (timestamp 00:32:04). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) suggested that the hospital find assistance from experienced personnel that are trained to assist



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the parents in these situations. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went back to stay with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) until he was discharged from the hospital (timestamp 00:32:51). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed the hospital at approximately 7:00 p.m. and went home (timestamp 00:33:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that the cellular text messages that he received and sent were from his personal telephone and he was not sure if he had the text thread (timestamp 00:38:51).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained his knowledge of the difference between an active shooter and a barricaded subject. A barricaded subject is someone who does not want to come out and when dealing with a barricaded subject, the response to a building entry is different (timestamp 00:55:37). It becomes a negotiation situation, and a negotiator is introduced and if the subject does not want to come out, then other options are sought such as gas or revert to other means until the subject comes out (timestamp 00:55:55). In an active shooter situation, there is no waiting, the protocol is to address the threat (timestamp 00:57:15).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) presented BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with four cellular text message thread screen shots obtained from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Tucson Sector, Arizona, from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed that the messages were from the BORTAC cellular text thread, where he received and sent text messages on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 01:31:34). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the information he relayed was information that had been relayed to him and not firsthand knowledge (timestamp 01:01:21).

After reviewing the cellular text message thread screen shots, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that on May 24, 2022, his agency issued Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) cellular telephone was not working properly. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said another BPA, who was dressed in a blue polo shirt and khaki cargo pants, had his ATAK cellular telephone and was able to provide BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exact location. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then texted SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and informed him that they were located at opposing locations of one another (timestamp 01:05:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that the only gunshots he heard on May 24, 2022, were the gunshots from the breach (timestamp 00:1:04:05).

According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as he drove to Robb Elementary School, he was thinking that the incident would be resolved by the time he arrived (timestamp 01:25:05). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumptions were based on past experiences. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) typically USBP's role in responding to requests for assistance was to be in a support role if there was no nexus to an immigration matter or nexus to the border. As a law enforcement officer, it is an obligation to respond to an active shooter situation (timestamp 01:27:07).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not render any medical aid to anyone. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not impede anyone's movement. On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not wearing a body camera and he did not draft any reports or emails concerning the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 1:30:42).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned he was interviewed twice telephonically by the TXDPS Rangers regarding the Robb Elementary School incident (timestamp 01:32:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he deployed to the incident as a BORTAC response.

During the interview, OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 3). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he parked his vehicle on Cargile St (timestamp 00:47:11). On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the spot where the kids were exiting the school and he directed them to other LEOs. On the map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 8.a Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated assisting with the evacuation of rooms 108 and 109. On the map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Cellular screen shots of the message thread between BORTAC members dated May 24, 2022.
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 172**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 13, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to USBP Carrizo Springs Station (CAR) as a canine handler and that he was off duty when he learned about the incident at Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned about the incident at Robb Elementary School from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Texas Parks and Wildlife (timestamp 00:25:45). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is his neighbor. On the date of the incident, Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at his home in East Uvalde with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could watch them. Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then explained there was a shooting at Robb Elementary School and asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to obtain his gear and respond with him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently changed into a pair of green USBP uniform pants, put on his duty belt, and drove to Robb Elementary School in his unmarked USBP canine truck. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained (b) (7)(E)

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he followed Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) toward Robb Elementary School on Highway 90 and they both had lights and sirens activated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained they were unable to drive all the way to the school because there were vehicles blocking the road (timestamp 00:28:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked his vehicle on Old Carrizo Road between West Daughty Street and Geraldine Street and ran toward the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were already people lined up across from the school along Geraldine Street. Near the intersection of Old Carrizo Road and Geraldine Street, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who was directing traffic and “shuffling” kids. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the situation and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pointed toward building 100. He explained the activity was at that location.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was then waved down by Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was now accompanied by Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Troopers and other uniformed personnel from an unknown agency (timestamp 00:29:45). Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had information about the activity on campus. Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) led them to an area BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described as being in the middle of the school heading toward the area where the shooter was located. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could see law enforcement personnel staged at the end of the hallway of the building.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached a female TXDPS Trooper who was positioned on the southeast corner of the library and asked about the situation (timestamp 00:31:00). According to the TXDPS Trooper, the situation was that of a barricaded shooter in one of the classrooms. The TXDPS Trooper pointed toward the east side of building 100 and directed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to a set of windows that were shot out. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed that halfway down the side of the building there was a window with a bullet hole.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an unknown law enforcement officer (LEO) came out of the building via the northeast door, advised them that they were getting kids out of the adjacent classrooms, and requested assistance (timestamp 00:32:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained on the outside of the building and circled to the west side of building 100 via the north end. Upon arriving at the northwest side of the building, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed children and teachers within the adjacent classrooms beating on the windows. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) some LEOs started on the southwest corner of the building while he and other LEOs started on the northwest corner at classroom 106. He began breaking windows with his baton and pulling children from the classrooms. After evacuating classroom 106, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with evacuating classroom 105. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), assisted with directing the children who were being taken out of the classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he sustained cuts to his arms from the broken glass (timestamp 01:57:40).

Following the evacuations, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached TXDPS Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked what was needed or where he could assist (timestamp 00:34:45). Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there were personnel stacked within the hallway inside. Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also confirmed the situation was that of a barricaded shooter. At approximately the same time, Sheriff Ruben Nolasco, Uvalde County Sheriff’s Office (UCSO), arrived on scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained Sheriff



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Nolasco was also his neighbor and subsequently approached him to discuss the situation and what he could assist with. According to Sheriff Nolasco, Chief Pete Arredondo, Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD), was in charge and he was going to consult with Chief Arredondo (timestamp 00:35:30).

At approximately the same time, Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Detachment (SOD), Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), Del Rio Sector (DRT), also arrived on scene (timestamp 00:35:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he had previous tactical training experience, and offered to assist and supplement his team, if needed. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained his team was approximately 30 to 45 minutes away. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approach Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ask about the situation. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Sheriff Nolasco, Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Chief Arredondo briefed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regarding the situation and informed him it was a barricaded shooter located in one of the classrooms. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently entered the building.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered the building via the west entrance and observed LEOs staged on the north end of the hallway (timestamp 00:37:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a TXDPS Trooper with a shield; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, also with a shield; a Zavala County Police Officer; and another unidentified BPA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the group from behind and began assessing the situation. Among the topics discussed were if the door was unlocked, if there were breaching tools, and if there were flashbangs.

According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an unnamed Officer from the Uvalde Police Department (UPD) stated he had gas and flashbangs in a vehicle outside (timestamp 00:39:00). The UPD Officer subsequently brought in munitions in a milk crate and presented them in the hallway. There was discussion of gassing the classroom because it was a barricaded shooter situation and gas masks were distributed amongst the LEOs. While the LEOs were readying with the gas masks, someone arrived and informed them there was a boy calling from inside the classroom (timestamp 00:39:45). The idea to gas the classroom was subsequently dropped and flashbangs were considered instead. Ultimately, no flashbangs were found in the crate and therefore not available for use .

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a period of time when they were simply waiting around, and he asked the other BPAs what was going on and what they were going to do. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was looking at SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for direction at that moment because SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a USBP member, a supervisor, a BORTAC operator, and was likely the most highly trained LEO on site (timestamp 00:40:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) go in and out of the building, assessing the situation.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) specifically recalled discussions about the status of the classroom door (timestamp 00:41:45). When discussing if the door was locked, everyone in the vicinity confirmed the door was locked. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if anyone had a Halligan tool, but they did not have one. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had one in his truck. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall who retrieved the tool from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) truck.



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At approximately the same time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard gunshots coming from the classroom (timestamp 00:42:30). According to the LEOs holding the shields, the shots were being fired toward them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained everyone got “amped up,” believing it was “go time.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they started moving south, down the hallway. When they arrived at the double door area of the hallway, the group started questioning how they were going to get into the classroom door. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Chief Arredondo, who kept coming in to talk to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed them that the doors were locked and said to wait for the master key (timestamp 00:43:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a group of LEOs on the south end of the hallway also moved north toward classroom 111. They were positioned against the west wall of the hallway adjacent to room 104. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled, at one point during the time in the hallway, an unknown LEO in a suit approached from the south end of the hallway and attempted to negotiate with the shooter (timestamp 03:10:00). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the negotiator called out to the shooter by name and made attempts to contact the shooter in both the English and Spanish languages. The shooter never responded to these attempts.

As they waited in the hallway, the group checked the doors around them (timestamp 00:43:55). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the door to the janitor’s closet and another door directly across from the closet were both locked. The group was trying to find any way they could to gain access to the classroom. At one point, Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived in the hallway with a map of the building (timestamp 00:44:30). It was then that they learned classrooms 111 and 112 were adjoined. They knew the shooter was in the farthest of the two classroom doors, but they were unaware the two classrooms were connected.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the discussion about how to enter the classroom continued as they continued waiting for the key (timestamp 00:44:50). The Halligan tool was retrieved and brought in; however, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) commented it would be of no use without a sledgehammer because the seams between the door and jamb were too tight. Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had a sledgehammer in his vehicle and someone was subsequently sent to retrieve it.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated someone eventually arrived with a set of keys (timestamp 00:46:00). The keys were tested on the janitor’s closet, which was successfully opened. However, when the keys were tested on an adjacent classroom, they were unable to open the door and they determined they had the wrong set of keys.

According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by this time additional personnel started arriving (timestamp 00:47:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated approximately 20 LEOs were in the hallway at one point. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) arrived and set up a triage area on the north side of the hallway. Additional BORTAC BPAs arrived and joined the group in the hallway. They began making plans for two stacks of LEOs to enter the two classrooms.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as they were waiting in the hallway, he and some of the other LEOs around him grew impatient (timestamp 00:48:00). Although they did not have keys, there was a mechanical way to breach the classroom door with the Halligan tool and sledgehammer, which arrived after the first set of keys. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continually thought, “We need to go, we need to go.” However, according to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they were being told to hold off breaching and wait for the keys. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the general atmosphere and felt that those who were in charge were very insistent that they use a master key (timestamp 02:40:00).

During this approximate time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered there was talk of the shooter being on the roof (timestamp 02:42:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC sniper, USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), was previously provided maps of the school and was set up outside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed via radio that he did not see the shooter on the roof. Air support also confirmed via radio that the shooter was not located on the roof.

Eventually, another set of keys were brought over, and this set worked (timestamp 00:48:30). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Chief Arredondo and Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continuously advised them that San Antonio or Bexar County Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) was approximately 20 minutes away (timestamp 00:49:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall if they were explicitly told to wait on the Bexar County personnel or if it was simply implied, but he felt as if Chief Arredondo and Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted the group to wait.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the group had two pistol-rated ballistic shields, but eventually a rifle-rated shield was brought in by a Deputy U.S. Marshal. Shortly afterward, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard another set of gunshots consisting of two to three rounds (timestamp 00:50:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled someone stating they were shot at but did not see any shrapnel or subsequent damage from the shots. After hearing the last string of gunshots, the group decided it was time to go in. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard a transmission over the radio requesting radio silence as the team was preparing to breach.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the formation of personnel prior to breaching the classroom (timestamp 00:51:40). He stated the team on the south side of the classroom doors consisted of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT; an unknown BORTAC operator; SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) another unknown BORTAC operator; and a young unknown BPA from UVA. The team on the north side of the classroom doors consisted of Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

When the teams were ready to breach, the unknown BORTAC operator behind BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the keys to unlock the door to classroom 111 and then threw the door open (timestamp 00:53:15). As the door was closing, a school chair was thrown into the doorway to prop it open. The south team then commenced a slow peek into the classroom. At the same time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, arrived and subsequently took the place of the unknown BPA from UVA at the end of the south team.

The south team then made their way into room 111 (timestamp 00:55:45). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only three members of the south team made their way into the classroom before



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gunshots erupted. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the gunfire as a “massive” string of shots. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated approximately 60 to 70 rounds were exchanged, possibly upwards of up to 80 rounds (timestamp 03:33:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was kneeling in the doorway returning fire when BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was “stuck” or “frozen” in the door.

As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the north team were readying to enter, they were instructed to wait (timestamp 00:57:25). He stated a member from the south team held up a fist instructing the north team to hold their entry into the classroom, but he could not recall who specifically made this gesture. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the south team was securing the shooter and preliminarily clearing classroom 112 prior to others entering. Eventually, there was a call for everyone to come into the classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the room was smoky with a lot of dirt on the floor (timestamp 03:36:30). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the floor looked almost black. Upon entering classroom 111, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed children under the windows along the east wall and a row of children’s bodies stacked under the tables against the west wall of the classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued scanning the room but did not observe any movement until he came upon a male teacher, who was attempting to get up (timestamp 01:00:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed that the teacher had a gunshot in his arm. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if he was able to get up, the teacher did not answer. The teacher, possibly unaware of the extent of his injury, was unable to get up on his own. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently assisted the teacher by dragging him from the classroom to the triage area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the teacher as a large man and explained he was struggling while dragging him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he got to the classroom door and made his way into the hallway with the teacher, he noticed several LEOs standing in the hallway in a state of shock. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yelled at the LEOs to snap them out of their state of shock and instructed them to assist him with carrying the teacher to the triage area. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) someone grabbed the teacher by the legs while BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held on to his upper body. Just before reaching the triage area, an unknown LEO touched him on the back and took the teacher from him.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the classrooms and entered via the door to classroom 112 (timestamp 01:02:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed an unknown BPA carrying a female teacher. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed her legs and they both carried her outside, via the west entrance, and laid her on the sidewalk. Paramedics immediately tended to her, including an unknown BORSTAR operator. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained they took the teacher outside because the triage area at the north end of the hallway was full.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went back into the building and returned to classroom 112 (timestamp 01:03:55). In the classroom, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a LEO carrying a girl in a “bearhug” manner. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the girl had already passed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the girl by the legs, and they carried her to the north end of the hallway, where they were instructed to lay her on the ground.



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When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the classroom, an unknown, non-uniformed person without a weapon instructed everyone to get out of the classroom (timestamp 01:04:20). Sheriff Nolasco, who was also in the classroom, also instructed everyone to leave the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently departed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not provide medical attention to any of the victims (timestamp 04:06:45).

When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stepped into the hallway, he saw BORTAC operators BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who requested he assist with clearing the adjacent classrooms (timestamp 01:04:55). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there were reports of an additional shooter and the rest of the building needed to be cleared. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with clearing classrooms 104 and 105. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled they had to use the keys to access the classrooms they were clearing.

After clearing the remaining classrooms, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the building via the south entrance (timestamp 01:07:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he needed fresh air as the smell inside was starting to bother him. Upon exiting, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered a TXDPS commander who requested that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) secure the south entrance to the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was relieved less than one minute later by an unknown TXDPS Trooper, who then initiated a log for personnel who were accessing the building.

Outside, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and assisted with comforting him. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were talking under the trees, a BORTAC operator approached and asked them who was in the stack that entered the classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed they were part of the entry team, and they were subsequently instructed to report to the front of the school.

At the meeting location, Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, and Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, addressed the group and held a debrief (timestamp 01:09:00). The BPAs were then instructed to meet at UVA at 2:00 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he lingered at Robb Elementary School and did not depart immediately. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met and spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to make sure they were doing okay before departing.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his shoes, vest, and hands were all covered in blood, so he decided to go home (timestamp 01:10:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went home, changed his clothes, and then reported to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were a lot of personnel at UVA, but once they began talking, he decided the forum wasn't for him and left. As he was departing UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BORTAC operators departing. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got home, he received a call from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a threat of another shooter, identified as the girlfriend of the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered to respond and assist if he was needed.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed UCISDPD Chief Arredondo was in command and control of the incident (timestamp 02:05:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also assisting in





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some way with decision making. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he observed that both Chief Arredondo and Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were constantly in and out of the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed there was a group of others who were also part of the command and control of the incident (timestamp 06:40:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided photographs of various LEOs on scene and identified Uvalde County Chief Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde County Constable Emanuel Zamora, and UPD Acting Police Chief Mariano Pargas as part of the group of personnel in charge (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not see anything set up in the traditional sense with an incident commander, who was usually distanced from the scene.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP had the authority to respond to incidents such as the one at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 04:08:15). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP has the duty to respond and preserve life. Although BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide a specific authority, he believed USBP had the authority to prevent immediate loss of life. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's response to such incidents was in a supporting role. Specific to the incident at Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his response was to support UCISDPD. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was never briefed or provided with standard operating procedures related to USBP's role for these types of situations.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided information about an issue that was brought to his attention related to the CAR Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) response to the Robb Elementary School incident (timestamp 04:14:00). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he is a union steward and EMTs informed him about the initial instructions they received on the date of the incident. From the information that was brought to his attention, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned the EMTs at CAR asked to deploy after hearing about the incident over the radio but were instructed not to go by Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR. According to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT staff informed him that CAR EMTs should not deploy because the situation was still unknown. Eventually, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, informed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that it was up to the station to decide if their EMTs should deploy and the EMTs were subsequently given the okay to respond to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, both of whom are EMTs, arrived at Robb Elementary School well after the incident was over. He stated they were arriving as he was leaving, after he lingered in the area for an extended amount of time after the meeting with CPA Owens.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he always had an interest in tactical gear and tactical training (timestamp 01:50:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated some of the gear he had with him, including the ballistic helmet and hearing protection, he acquired on his own. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personally paid for trainings, such as active shooter training, and shot competitively for the last 15 years.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not wearing a body worn camera on the date of the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not asked to produce any written statement or memorandum related to his involvement at Robb Elementary School but did independently compose an email to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regarding the previously mentioned topic about the EMT response (Attachment 3).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a Map Package which was utilized to mark his routes of travel and significant areas where he was throughout the day (Attachment 4):

- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 4 – Uvalde, TX Schools to indicate his route of travel from his home to the school
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 5a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate where he parked upon arrival
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8 – Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, to indicate his route through the school

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with lined scratch paper to sketch various details related to his response to Robb Elementary School (Attachment 5). In one sketch, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided details related to what he saw when he entered the classroom and indicated where he went upon entering. In the second sketch, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided details related to the activity in the hallway outside the classrooms.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was presented with the May 24, 2022, video footage from the camera at the intersection of the north hallway of building 100 at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 06:36:45). The hallway camera had an inlay of the body worn camera footage from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself in the body worn camera footage at approximately 12:20:07 (overlay time). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself in the hallway camera footage at approximately 12:20:26 (overlay time).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was presented with separate video footage from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body worn camera from May 24, 2022 (timestamp 08:16:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself in the footage at approximately 10:54:01 (overlay time). At approximately 11:12:36 (overlay time), BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself in the footage and noted the group of LEOs gathered behind him, who he believed were the personnel in command and control of the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he believed one of the LEOs in the group was UCISDPD Chief Arredondo.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was again presented with the May 24, 2022, video footage from the camera at the intersection of the north hallway of building 100 at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 08:19:30). The hallway camera had an inlay of the body worn camera footage from Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from May 24, 2022. At approximately 12:20:54 (overlay time), BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified UPD Acting Police Chief Pargas. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that, on the date of the incident, he believed Chief Pargas was UCISDPD Chief Arredondo. At approximately 12:53:53 (overlay time), BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified when he heard the second set of gunshots and noted the reaction of the LEOs in the hallway at the time of the shots.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Law Enforcement Officer Photographic Identifications.
3	Email String RE: Carrizo Springs EMT Response.
4	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
5	Sketches by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 173**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 14, 2023, SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) Incident Command Post where he served as the deputy incident commander. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was responsible for managing logistics and assets associated with the ongoing migrant surge.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he initially learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Detachment (SOD), DRT, as he walked in the conference room. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised of a potential active shooter at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he, Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, and Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, began the collection and coordination of SOD assets and personnel that would be responding to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:20:59). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and APAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were calling SOD personnel and instructing them to respond to Robb Elementary School. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed concern regarding USBP overcrowding the scene with too many personnel (timestamp 00:21:31). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if the scene was live or if the situation was a false call but treated the matter as a potential active shooter situation.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SOD personnel were responding to the potential active shooter situation at Robb Elementary School as an assisting agency providing any support requested. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained USBP always assisted state and local law enforcement when requested to do so, but only acted in a secondary capacity (timestamp 00:36:50).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after a period of approximately 45 minutes, he and APAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to relocate to the DRT Border Intelligence Center (BIC) to centralize all information gathering. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised he would respond to Robb Elementary School, however, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and APAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt the BIC should have an SOD presence and remained behind (timestamp 00:21:55).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival to the BIC, he continued to collect data related to assets, logistics and manpower responding to Robb Elementary School. The information was displayed on a glass partition wall located with the DRT BIC using a dry erase marker. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, kept a timeline of events. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he began to call all USBP stations within the DRT to collect information as to what personnel and what assets were being deployed to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:24:51). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) avoided calling SOD personnel on scene at Robb Elementary School to not overwhelm them (timestamp 00:38:23).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was not aware of the command structure for the USBP at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:49:05). WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he did not know who made the request nor did he know who approved the patching of the USBP radios with the Uvalde Police Department radios. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not use his cell phone throughout the incident as he was busy keeping track of personnel and logistics.

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, Division Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Executive Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, were among the USBP personnel at the DRT Border Intelligence Center. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was not aware with whom these individuals were communicating throughout the incident.



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WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained USBP personnel did not have authority to take control of an active shooter situation but have a duty as federal agents to respond and assist.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 174**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y





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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 14, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and AD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the USBP Strategic Communications Branch at DRT. While traveling back from a temporary duty assignment in Carrizo Springs, Texas, Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, notified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his partner BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, of an active shooter at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently deployed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at approximately 2:30 p.m., the scene was no longer active (timestamp 00:14:49). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked law enforcement personnel where he could assist and was advised that everyone who needed medical assistance had already been transported to the hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in charge of the scene and received no instruction when he arrived (timestamp 00:23:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained on scene at Robb Elementary School and took a few photos of the suspect's truck which was still in the culvert. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was on scene for approximately one hour when he heard a radio transmission indicating a second threat at Uvalde High School (timestamp 00:15:28). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately headed towards Uvalde High School. While en route, they heard another radio transmission indicating there was no active shooter at the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who advised them to return to Robb Elementary School because Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, was planning to brief the media (timestamp 00:16:05). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived and proceeded to the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Public Affairs Officer (PAO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, went inside the funeral home where ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received instructions to deploy to the civic center to provide security during the media brief. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who gave ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructions to respond to the civic center (timestamp 00:25:49).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed to the civic center and provided security as instructed. While at the civic center, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have nor witness any physical interactions with civilians (timestamp 00:28:14). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained it did not appear anyone was in charge at the civic center (timestamp 00:29:13). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he did not observe any interaction between law enforcement and families awaiting their children (timestamp 00:29:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the civic center for approximately two hours. Once the media brief ended, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to return to DRT.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was certified as an emergency medical technician in 2021 by the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians. He maintained his certification by participating in a 40-hours continuing education refresher training every two years. In addition, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was trained in advanced skills and had attended trainings covering low-light intravenous therapy, cadaver lab, and tactical combat casualty care.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know of a specific authority that allowed USBP to respond to the incident; however, he stated that as public servants and law enforcement officers, USBP had a duty to protect and serve the community (timestamp 00:33:41).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2) (timestamp 00:33:37). These maps were labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled to Uvalde on May



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24, 2022, and indicated he traveled on Highway 90 into Uvalde and straight to Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he took Farm-to-Market road (FM) 1435 and parked his vehicle on FM 1435 and Geraldine Street. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his foot route from his vehicle to Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he drove from FM 1435 to the Civic Center. All other maps were not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y**

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EXHIBIT 175**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 14, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working at BRA, processing a seizure he recovered earlier in the day when he received a call from Watch Commander (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, to go towards (b) (7)(E) because of shots being fired. Believing it was sheriff's deputy who he previously saw pulling someone over on (b) (7)(E) he drove towards this location. While on (b) (7)(E) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, redirecting him towards Uvalde. During the call, he was not told anything about the incident, but was informed they needed Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT). While driving towards Uvalde on (b) (7)(E) he received a text message indicating his destination would be Robb Elementary School. After receiving the text message, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for further details. On this call, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told there was a shooting at the school (timestamp 00:22:46). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not think there would be children at the school since the schools in Del Rio were dismissed for the summer.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived near Robb Elementary School, a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper was controlling the flow of traffic near the funeral home. He asked the TXDPS Trooper what was going on. The Trooper's response was, "I don't know." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked the TXDPS Trooper who was in charge. The Trooper's response was, "I don't know. You want to do it" (timestamp 00:23:33). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was responding as an EMT and parked in the funeral home's parking lot. After grabbing his medical bag, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran towards the school. On his way to the school, he saw a heavy-set woman with blood on her being loaded into an ambulance. Feeling the woman had enough people caring for her, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued towards the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked into the west entrance of Robb Elementary School and saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio Sector (DRT) Special Operations Detachment, whom he recognized as a BORSTAR paramedic. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they were still figuring out the situation. Recognizing there were many officers with rifles, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided he needed to focus on the medical response, so he went back to his vehicle and collected as many medical supplies as he could carry. With all the equipment he brought, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) set up a triage area in the hallway near the restrooms. When he returned with the equipment, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told by an unknown person there were still children in the classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved to the south entrance with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, in case children in the classroom were evacuated towards an entrance other than where the triage area was established. After preparing medical equipment near the south entrance of the building, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) enters the building from the south door and joins other law enforcement officers in the hallway south of Rooms 111 and 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained in the hallway until the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) made entry into Room 111. Just prior to entry, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled an unknown law enforcement officer approaching the door of Room 111 with keys.

After the BORTAC team made entry, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the classroom through the same door as the entry team. He picked up the first child he came to, later identified by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) whom he called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew it was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because she was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of a BPA in BRA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) brought (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the south entrance and, with another unknown EMT, began compressions and trying to establish an airway. Once an airway was established, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began a head-to-toe rapid trauma assessment. As soon as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt the back of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) head, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) The extent of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) injuries, coupled with her lack of a pulse or breathing, led BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to terminate patient care.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the classroom to assist other victims but ended up assisting with the treatment of another child in the triage area of the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalls that while assisting the victim, some children were running down the hallway towards the west door. Although he could not recall if it was a male or female child, the child's wounds included a gunshot wound (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a gunshot wound (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and a gunshot wound (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Although the child was not bleeding much, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) covered (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wound with a chest seal before realizing there were no signs of life in the victim, so he



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terminated care on this patient. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the classroom to assist other victims, but was told by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, all the victims in the classroom were “black,” meaning they were deceased.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the building through the west door and saw various medical personnel including SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, treating an unknown patient outside the door. He assisted with medical treatment by performing one cycle of cardiopulmonary resuscitation and helped transport the patient to an ambulance. Upon returning to the building, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the building with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and another unknown medic to check the deceased victims one final time for signs of life.

After checking approximately 14 victims, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited and joined other BPAs near a tree outside the building. Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, spoke to the group near the tree. Afterwards, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told Chief Owens that several of the BPAs on-site would need Peer Support. Following Chief Owens’ direction, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) next went to USBP Uvalde Station (UVA).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing about a second threat while at UVA. As he arrived, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPAs leaving the station heading to Uvalde High School to respond to a second threat. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believes the second threat was quickly dismissed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalls seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the station. After talking with BPAs at the station, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left and drove to BRA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) changed clothes, threw away his bloody clothes, and went home.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided (Attachment 2). In the collection, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traced his route to Robb Elementary School and his approach to the school. Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map to explain his actions while at Robb Elementary School. While going through the map, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) showed an image of surveillance video in Robb Elementary School he saw on YouTube and took a screenshot. The screenshot was sent via text message to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which is SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government cellular phone number (Attachment 3).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became an EMT in 2006 through a community college, separate from USBP, however, he let his certification lapse (timestamp 1:48:15). Approximately five years ago, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went through the EMT training at the Sierra Blanca Station while assigned to the Big Bend Sector. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believes he is covered nationwide, and his medical director is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it did not seem like anyone was in charge of the overall incident, beginning when he arrived at the funeral home and the TXDPS Trooper didn’t know where an incident command post was located or who was in charge (timestamp 1:55:45). For the medical response, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were in charge of the medical response as they established and communicated a plan prior to the BORTACT team making entry (timestamp 1:34:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown video footage from the file titled, (b) (7)(E)



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(b) (7)(E) at an elapsed time of 1:11:51 into the video (Attachment 4). At an elapsed time of 1:12:13 into the video, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identifies himself as the individual who walked through west door.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Picture provided by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identifying personnel from a YouTube video related to the CBP response to a shooting at Robb
4	Disk containing the video titled (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)



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**EXHIBIT 176**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 14, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, were on-duty assigned to the ranch liaison detail. He and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were having lunch at Julies Restaurant in Brackettville, TX, when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) texted him there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a student at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after receiving the information from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to BRA and advised Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, about the possible active shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated it took him five minutes to drive from Julies Restaurant to BRA (timestamp 00:14:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after notifying SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the possible active shooter and advising him that they were going to respond, he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed BRA and started driving to Uvalde. He explained that while driving, radio communications advised all emergency medical technicians (EMTs) to rally at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) checkpoint, but shortly after this transmission, the radio advised all EMTs to go directly to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:15:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:40 p.m. and parked near the intersection of Geraldine St. and S. Park St. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after parking, he ran westbound to the school and saw law enforcement officers (LEOs) near the west entrance door including an LEO with a shield. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an LEO at the west entrance directed medics to locations to set up triage and directed other LEOs to set up a medical team on the east side of the T-intersection near the restrooms for triage (timestamp 00:38:00).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) viewed a video recording presented to him by CBP OPR interviewers. He identified himself on the T-intersection camera timestamped at approximately 12:57 p.m. on the video. The timestamp on the video was noted as seven minutes ahead of the actual time of 12:50 pm (timestamp 02:57:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never knew who was in command of the incident and never heard discussions regarding breaching the classroom door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that within seconds of entering the school through the west entrance door, he heard gunshots (timestamp 00:42:13). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the hallway as loud and remembered hearing people saying, "Come over here, hey I'm right here." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after entering the school, he looked for other LEOs with medical bags, but he never made it to the triage area on the east side of the T-intersection (timestamp 00:43:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the triage area as set up into hot, warm, and cold zones. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the hot zone was an area where there was active shooting and where tourniquets would be provided for medical aid. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the warm zone would be just outside of the hot zone and would provide protection from active shooting or danger, and where medical aid including chest seals, would be provided for airway obstructions, massive bleeds, and hypothermia. The cold zone would be an area completely free of danger from the incident where comprehensive medical aid would be provided (timestamp 00:55:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw two LEOs carrying a child's body towards the T-intersection and the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:59:00). He said the LEOs placed the child's body near the north side doors on the west side of the T-intersection. He explained that a second child was brought out by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR), Special Operations Detachment. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described seeing bullet holes (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the child, the clothes soaked in blood, and the child's pale complexion. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) check for a pulse on the child's right arm, however, there were no observable signs of respiration (timestamp 01:02:00).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed numerous LEOs escorting children from classrooms 111 and 112. BPA (b) (6) explained he got behind a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) girl with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was wearing pants and a t-shirt. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not see any injuries on her and wanted to get her away from the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained she was talking to him as he performed a visual scan of her body looking for injuries. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not observe any bullet holes through her clothing, however, her clothes had blood on them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked her if she was hurt and she said, “No, no, no, I just want my mom and dad” (timestamp 01:04:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he took the girl to a school bus and followed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was walking with another child that was being evacuated from the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) placed the children on the bus and ran back into the school (timestamp 01:12:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he followed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because he assumed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew where he was going with the child he was escorting.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) helped move deceased children that were in the hallway to classrooms 131 and 132. He explained that someone who was near classrooms 131 and 132 provided instruction to move the deceased children into the classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the signs the children were deceased included massive bleeding, paleness in the face, blueness in the lips, not breathing, and limpness (timestamp 01:14:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after assisting other LEOs moving deceased children into the classrooms, a Texas Department of Public Safety officer told them to clear out of the school due to it being a crime scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that upon leaving the school, he saw LEOs providing medical treatment to a female teacher outside the west door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were enough medical personnel providing care to the teacher, so he only assisted by handing them medical supplies including chest seals (timestamp 01:17:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, providing the female teacher with cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, assisting with medical treatment. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed the female teacher transported to an ambulance.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after assisting medical personnel with the female teacher, he was told to meet at UVA for a muster. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he did not change out of his rough duty uniform which had blood on it. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he was at UVA for one hour before he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left and drove back to BRA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on his way back to BRA and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove him home after returning to BRA.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that his highest level of medical training was a basic EMT that he received on June 11, 2021, through USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was not licensed through the State of Texas and was unsure whether he was required to be licensed through the State of Texas. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his instructors for EMT training were BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Rocksprings Station, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and former employee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:31:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the medical director for the DRT was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the DRT EMT coordinator was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he had advanced skills training including placing intravenous lines (IV), low light IV, needle decompressions, cadaver training, and tactical combat casualty care. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in a situation such as the Robb Elementary School shooting, USBP would “assist in any way possible.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the first person on scene would be the person or agency in charge (timestamp 01:48:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he did not hear any conversations regarding doors being locked or needing keys to unlock them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he did not know the location of BORSTAR or the USBP Tactical Unit other than seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-9 respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route of travel from BRA to Uvalde, TX and indicated he traveled on Highway 90 to Uvalde. The map labeled 2. South Uvalde, TX was not applicable. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route of travel and again indicated he traveled on Highway 90 to Uvalde.

On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route into Uvalde. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving to the school followed by location where he entered the school. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the location he saw the female teacher and ambulance, and the location of the school bus he placed the female child on. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX was not applicable. On the map labeled 8a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his movements inside the school, the triage area, marked with a T, and the rally point outside of the school. On the map labeled 8b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the location of the victims in the hallway that he helped move into classrooms 131 and 132. The map labeled 8c. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX was not applicable. The map labeled 8d. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX was not applicable. The map labeled 8e. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX was not applicable. On the map labeled 9. Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the location of parents near the funeral home.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he did not have a body worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have text messages, pictures, or emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) produce any reports concerning the incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 177**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 13, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) south of Uvalde conducting maintenance on cameras. At approximately 11:35 a.m., a call over the radio requested all available agents to respond to Robb Elementary School for shots fired (timestamp 00:29:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed the ranch and headed towards Uvalde on Highway 481.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at Robb Elementary School and parked his government vehicle on the west side of the school alongside a concrete ditch next to a truck in the ditch. He observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, standing next to the truck (timestamp 00:36:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put on his body armor and approached BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to ask him what was going on. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him there was a shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a rifle and bag with ammunition next to the passenger side of the truck. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was standing guard by the vehicle because of the rifle and ammunition. During the conversation, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed law enforcement officers around the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the school and encountered Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department, exiting the west entrance door. Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they needed to keep people back because ambulances were headed to the school (timestamp 00:39:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned and directed the crowd of onlookers to stay back and make a path for the ambulances.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed members of the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) arrive on scene and enter the school building (timestamp 00:40:00). A short time later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed people coming out of the school carrying injured children and he ran towards them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who was carrying a little girl in his arms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) how he could help. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied there were a lot of victims inside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a female teacher on a stretcher and an unknown BPA performing chest compressions; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described her as being in bad shape.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he entered the school, he observed two deceased children lying on the floor and with agents and police officers running around the hallway treating victims. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if he could help, and realizing he was in the way, he exited the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled handing out bottles of water to BPAs and other law enforcement officials. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that USBP backed off from the scene and rallied around a tree where Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), was planning to brief the BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Special Operations Detachment, discussing the incident with his BORTAC and USBP Search, Trauma and Rescue Unit teams (timestamp 00:48:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned that CPA Owens wanted all BPAs to report to UVA for further debriefing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to his vehicle and suspected the truck that he had parked next to belonged to the shooter. Once at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several agents with blood on their uniforms. CPA Owens briefed the muster and told BPAs that peer support was available and that clinicians were on their way to provide support.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that around 3:15 p.m., a call over the radio said there was a threat made against Uvalde High School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he had already turned in his government vehicle and prepared to travel home in a commuter van with other BPAs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he lived in San Antonio, Texas. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the other BPAs in the commuter van with him as BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BPAs, except for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had assisted with the evacuations at





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Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to the checkpoint and did not respond to the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who had command of the scene at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he did not render aid to anyone, nor did he detain or impede the movement of bystanders.

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:19:25) (Attachment 2). The maps were labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 2., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where he parked his vehicle and how he approached Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, marked his movements at Robb Elementary School.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 178**



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 14, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty, in plain clothes, and scheduled to conduct use of force training when it was broadcasted over the UVA intercom there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School and for BPAs to grab their gear and respond. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, grabbed their ballistic vests and M-4 rifles and responded to Robb Elementary School in a government owned vehicle (timestamp 11:20:36). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon his arrival, the path to the school was blocked by numerous law enforcement vehicles, forcing him to park a few blocks away on Geraldine Street between Old Carrizo Road and S. Park Street. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued on foot along Geraldine Street to the school taking cover behind a telephone pole north of classroom 129. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed 15 to 20 law enforcement officers outside the west hallway entrance near classroom 132. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a large group of parents and civilians gathered on the north side of Geraldine Street (timestamp 11:21:10).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that due to the large presence of law enforcement officers near the west hallway entrance, he decided to move to the east side of the school, moving along the breezeways, clearing two restrooms, and ended up near the school cafeteria. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered a female Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD) officer. The officer informed him the shooter had fired at her position. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated all the windows in that area seemed intact and he did not see any evidence of gunfire. The UCISDPD officer further told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the police chief was inside the school with the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood that meant the police chief was in the same room as the shooter (timestamp 11:21:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that an unknown school administrator informed him there were still students in some of the nearby classrooms (timestamp 11:22:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he provided cover while a few other unknown BPAs, and possibly an unknown sheriff's deputy, cleared and evacuated students from classrooms 13 to 18 and 31 to 34 (timestamp 11:35:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that approximately 20 minutes later, he heard "shooter down" over the radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the north side of the school where he observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment (SOD), injured and being assisted away from the school by an unknown BPA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) emergency medical technician (EMT) and instructed the TXDPS EMT to assist BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the TXDPS EMT that he was fine and to go help inside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or the TXDPS EMT again (timestamp 11:22:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not enter the school to assist (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (timestamp 11:22:49).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he gathered with the other BPAs near the tree on the north side of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, addressed the group of agents and ordered all BPAs to return to UVA. After spending approximately 30 minutes in traffic, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended a muster at UVA where CPA Owens spoke again; however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall what was said. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he worked out for an hour to relieve stress, and as it was a training day, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went home (timestamp 11:23:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not issued a body worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood the announcement made over the UVA intercom as directing him to respond to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall any radio traffic while en route to the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arrival at the school, he could not identify who, if anyone, was in command of the incident, nor did he receive any guidance or instructions. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any interaction with the public, nor did he provide medical aid during the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear any gunfire throughout the incident (timestamp 11:24:37).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that throughout the incident, he was under the impression the incident was an active shooter situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not witness any medical aid being rendered. During the incident, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear anything related to the status of the classroom doors;



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however, after the incident, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard that the door to the classrooms were locked and a key was needed (timestamp 11:43:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of a specific statutory authority allowing BPAs to respond to an incident like an active shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt it was his responsibility as a BPA to respond and assist. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had never received official training on active shooter response; however, he did participate in simulator training that included an active shooter scenario (timestamp 11:46:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any text messages or emails related to the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in the days following the incident, he was instructed by an unknown supervisor to fill out a map indicating his movement and location during the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what was done with the map after it was turned in (timestamp 11:50:25).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 179**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 15, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned as the XO for Law Enforcement Operations at DRT. He stated he was about to have lunch with his supervisor, acting Division Chief (DC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when he received a call from acting Patrol Agent In Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Special Operations Detachment (SOD), DRT. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him of an active shooter at or near a school in Uvalde (timestamp 08:18:36).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him they were deploying to Uvalde. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he gave the authority to shift USBP Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and USBP Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) unit personnel to respond and support local law enforcement (timestamp 08:16:48).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated shortly thereafter, acting PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP, Carrizo Springs Station (CAR), called or texted him to provide information concerning a shooter with a long arm near a school in Uvalde; and that a local law enforcement agency was requesting support. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall which local law enforcement agency requested support (timestamp 08:19:52).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to DRT and began establishing communications with various USBP programs and resources to support any requested assistance in the USBP response to Uvalde. (timestamp 08:17:00).

Upon arriving at DRT, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and informed him there was a suspected active shooter near a school in Uvalde. He added BORTAC, BORSTAR, and UVA personnel were deployed to the scene to support local law enforcement (timestamp 08:22:35).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him he was going to respond to the scene. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also believed Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, accompanied DCPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 08:24:40).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he reported to the Border Intelligence Center (BIC), DRT. He explained the BIC is a hub center for coordinating intelligence and dispatch; and acts as an intelligence reservoir.

At the BIC, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had several USBP personnel employed in various tasks, to include serving as a scribe, creating timelines, (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) monitoring media outlets, dispatching, and handling resource and medical equipment deployments (timestamp 08:27:13).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the incident, he remained in contact with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the BIC and was his direct link to SOD personnel (timestamp 08:33:08).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated he was the conduit for information flow to USBP Headquarters (HQ), Washington D.C., and was communicating with Assistant Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP HQ, Law Enforcement Operations Division, East and Central Sectors, and Acting Associate Chief ([A]AC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP HQ, Law Enforcement Operations Division, East and Central Sectors. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that during this time, (A)AC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was detailed from the USBP Rio Grande Valley Sector in Texas (timestamp 08:35:55).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed a rally point was established at the funeral home for all responding law enforcement personnel. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when someone determined PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a child at Robb Elementary School, they decided PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRS, was going to relieve PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as acting PAIC of UVA (timestamp 08:41:30).





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XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not say who made the decision to have PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relieve PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained on scene until the arrival of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he initially understood the situation to be an active shooter, but it later changed to a barricaded subject. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the information related to a barricaded subject was received by on scene USBP personnel as relayed to them by the local police department (timestamp 08:44:30).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him BORTAC and BORSTAR personnel were on scene, to include Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT (timestamp 08:46:35).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not believe he was in direct communication with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 08:48:48).

At some point, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he obtained information that steps were being taken to prepare for a breach of the classroom, but he could not recall whether PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him of the steps (timestamp 08:50:16).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of conversations concerning permission for BORTAC to conduct a breach and stated the highest-ranking USBP person on scene could have provided the order to breach (timestamp 08:51:35). XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who gave BORTAC the order to breach the classroom (timestamp 08:52:52).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood the command structure on scene consisted of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) serving as the incident commander until he was relieved by PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Additionally, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would assume command and control of BORTAC personnel upon his arrival. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) should have been coordinating their efforts with local and state law enforcement (timestamp 08:53:41).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORSTAR, DRT, was on scene at Robb Elementary School to coordinate life saving measures and medical services as needed. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not in communication with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 08:55:50).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to recall if he received confirmations of deaths prior to the breach of the classroom but recalled hearing the shooter had shot his grandmother in the face, fled in a vehicle, crashed, and ran toward the school (timestamp 08:58:45).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the breach, he learned of the fatalities and was updated on the ongoing medical support and life saving measures being provided to the victims (timestamp 09:00:00).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated additional medical support was requested, but he could not recall whether it was before or after the breach. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not elaborate on how he received



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updates on victims or medical treatment provided to victims, but he said he believed BORSTAR and USBP Emergency Medical Technicians provided treatment to victims.

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled requests for life flights were received after the breach but did not know if any life flights arrived on the scene (timestamp 09:01:38).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know how the second threat allegedly made by the shooter's girlfriend on social media to finish what he started was received. However, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed it was via social media and related to the social media account of the shooter's girlfriend (timestamp 09:07:20).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he relayed the information to (A)AC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall whether he or DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) authorized the deployment of USBP personnel to other schools to provide support (timestamp 09:17:10).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not aware of any law enforcement personnel that responded to the shooter's girlfriend's residence. He assumed the BIC had obtained her residential address and passed along the information (timestamp 09:16:22).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any knowledge of USBP personnel using force or restraining any members of the public, to include parents, during the Robb Elementary School shooting incident (timestamp 09:13:04).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing information regarding the local police department pursuing the subject prior to him entering the school. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP was not involved in a pursuit of the subject and said he heard non-confirmed reports of the pursuit (timestamp 09:14:55).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not explain how he received the information concerning the pursuit of the shooter by the local police department other than he received the information during initial reporting.

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the BIC helped coordinate Peer Support Member responses to UVA and stated the DRT Mission Readiness Operation Division obtained and sent uniforms to UVA (timestamp 09:19:15).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the supervisors in charge of USBP assets at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 09:22:50).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall if he provided orders or guidance to USBP personnel on scene at Robb Elementary School, but he did recall emailing USBP Station PAICs regarding weapon accountability, agent safety, peer support, and uniforms (timestamp 09:23:35).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's role in the Robb Elementary School shooting incident was to provide support to local law enforcement agencies (timestamp 09:26:50).



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XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP’s authority to respond to an active shooter incident is that if there is an ongoing threat to the public, USBP is going to respond. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emphasized if a felony is committed in the presence of a federal law enforcement officer, it is incumbent on the officer to act to prevent further loss of life (timestamp 09:27:05).

It is XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) belief that USBP has a responsibility to protect the public (timestamp 09:27:50).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not author any reports related to the Robb Elementary School shooting incident (timestamp 09:28:45).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing the status of the incident was a barricaded subject, and there were ongoing attempts to locate a key to the classroom door. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he heard the information from DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) timestamp 10:36:36).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he no longer had the government cell phone he used to communicate during the Robb Elementary School shooting and did not archive any text messages or call logs. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he returned his government-issued cell phone when he was issued a new one (timestamp 08:29:00).

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned the emails related to the Robb Elementary School shooting should be in his inbox, as he had not deleted any emails. He stated he would try to locate the emails and forward them to SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 08:29:43).

On March 21, 2023, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with ten emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. The emails received from XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) are addressed in a separate report.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Receipt of Emails from XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 15, 2023, SSAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. During the interview, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked if he sent or received any emails related to the Robb Elementary School shooting. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he sent and received emails and stated that upon returning to his office, he would send copies of those emails to SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

On March 18, 2023, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided copies of the emails to SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which are summarized below:

On May 24, 2022, at 12:24:10 p.m., XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) authored an email he sent to (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) and copied (b) (7)(E) and (b) (7)(E).

In the email, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified the recipients that a single male actor carrying a rifle and two backpacks fired shots inside Robb Elementary School and had barricaded himself inside the elementary school. Initial reports indicated multiple injuries with unknown severity. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORTAC [USBP Tactical Unit]/BORSTAR [USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit] and USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) leadership/agents were on scene and DRT command staff was enroute (Attachment 1).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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On May 24, 2022, at 12:42 p.m., Acting Division Chief (ADC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied to XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) and copied (b) (7)(E) staff and (b) (7)(E) and provided the following information:

An AR-15 style rifle was reported to have been used by the subject, whose condition was unknown. Confirmation was received indicating multiple victims at Robb Elementary School, where DRT BORTAC was on scene and inside the school.

ADC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that all available ground and air ambulance services and EMTs from multiple DRT stations were enroute or were already on scene (Attachment 2).

On May 24, 2022, at 12:51 p.m., XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied all and stated the San Antonio Police Department, Bexar County SWAT (special weapons and tactics), USBP Carrizo Springs Station BPA EMTs were enroute, ICP stood up at Hillcrest Funeral Home. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the UVA POC and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the POC for SOD (Attachment 3).

On May 24, 2022, at 1:12 p.m., XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied to all and reported that at least 20 children were shot/injured and the shooter was in custody. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added SOD Operator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was grazed by a bullet in the leg, walked out of the elementary school and was receiving medical attention. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Strategic Communications were enroute for media control, "TTIMB" was responding with Peer Support and Chaplains and the injured and victims were currently exiting the school (Attachment 4).

On May 24, 2022, at 1:32 p.m., XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied to all and reported DRT SOD BORTAC took out the shooter, who was confirmed deceased. Casualties and injured continue to be evacuated and DRT was mobilizing/activating all Peer Support/Chaplaincy Support USBP Laredo Sector (LRT) and USBP Big Bend Sector (BBT) notified for Peer Support/Chaplaincy Support. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted SOD Operator (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was being transported to Uvalde Memorial Hospital with non-life-threatening injuries (Attachment 5).

On May 24, 2022, at 1:46 p.m., XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied to all and stated initial reporting by Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) confirmed 14 deceased plus the shooter and an unknown total number of injured at the time. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added BBT was mobilizing available Peer Support/Chaplaincy support (Attachment 6).

On May 24, 2022, at 3:02 p.m., XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied to all and noted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was "drafting IP for B1, B2, B3." XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated DRT SOD BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shot in the head, no entrance, possible gunshot wound to his right foot and a left shin injury. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated DRT SOD BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at Uvalde Memorial Hospital in good overall condition in the company of DRT SOD DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated LRT and BBT were each mobilizing 4 agents for Peer Support/Chaplaincy and UVA initiated phone tree system. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added the Uvalde School District would be launching a press conference (Attachment 7).



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On May 24, 2022, at 4:26 PM, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed ADC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and copied (b) (7)(E) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) was confirming agents were not involved in any type of pursuit prior to the suspect making entry into the school and DRT agents responded after local law enforcement requested support for an active shooter incident (Attachment 8).

On May 24, 2022, at 6:43 PM, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed ADC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and copied (b) (7)(E) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated investigative reports from TXDPS indicated there were 18 deceased child victims (16 inside the school / 2 at the hospital), 2 deceased adult victims (1 inside the school / 1 in an ambulance on scene), 1 suspect, armed, wearing body armor with an AR rifle and numerous magazines of ammunition. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added an additional AR rifle was found in the vehicle the shooter had crashed prior to entering the school (Attachment 9).

On May 24, 2022, at 8:35 PM, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed ADC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and copied (b) (7)(E) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to inform them that at approximately 8 p.m. DRT SOD BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was released from the hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received 4 staples to his head for the gunshot wound (Attachment 10).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 12:24 PM
2	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 12:42 PM
3	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 12:51 PM
4	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 1:12 PM
5	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 1:32 PM
6	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 1:46 PM
7	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 3:02 PM
8	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 4:26 PM
9	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 6:43 PM
10	Email Dated May 24, 2022, at 8:35 PM



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Receipt of Additional Emails from XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On April 4, 2023, Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, requested XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), provide an email he mentioned during his March 15, 2023, interview with CBP OPR. The email requested was one he sent to Patrol Agents in Charge (PAICs) concerning weapon accountability, agent safety, peer support and uniforms. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided two emails on April 4, 2023, in response to ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) request, including one he sent on May 24, 2022, (Attachment 1) and one sent by Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, on May 24, 2022, (Attachment 2).

A review of XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) email revealed it was sent to DRT PAICs and others, instructing them to ensure that all Border Patrol Agents who responded to the active shooter in Uvalde, Texas, were accounted for and had left the scene. XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also instructed that all rifles and sensitive items should be inventoried to ensure they are accounted for, any rifles belonging to other agencies were returned, and the DRT Border Intelligence Center was notified of rifles in USBP possession that belonged to other agencies.

A review of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) email revealed it was sent to DRT PAICs and others and requested rosters of all USBP staff who responded to the active shooter, including those who responded off-duty, to ensure that USBP staff were offered services through the Employee Assistance Program, Peer Support, and the Chaplain Program.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Email dated May 24, 2022, sent by XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Email dated May 24, 2022, sent by ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 180**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 15, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was dressed in his full rough duty USBP uniform and was assigned as a DPAIC for the DRT Border Intelligence Center (BIC). As a DPAIC for the BIC, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had oversight of the development of intelligence. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the BIC as the central repository for information (timestamp 01:21:32). The BIC typically was staffed with (b) (7)(E) Border Patrol agents (BPA) spread among (b) (7)(E) and assigned to do intelligence work. Everyone assigned to the BIC was a CBP employee; however, across the hall from the BIC, USBP housed the Joint Operations Intelligence Center (JOIC) which included Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) personnel (timestamp 01:25:55). The BIC received information from a variety of sources such as local and federal partners, other USBP stations, and sources of information (timestamp 01:24:05). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that in critical incidents, the BIC and the (b) (7)(E) become the central communications center. The BIC was designed to receive all incoming information and to disseminate the information to the field (timestamp 00:18:08).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was with Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, in the prosecutions building when he received a text message from Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, regarding a possible active shooter at Robb Elementary School. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) showed the text message to SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:17:25). A few minutes later, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received another text message confirming the active shooter situation. Upon receiving the text messages, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the BIC. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he became aware of the incident sometime after 11:00 a.m. (timestamp 01:43:30). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have the text messages because he had obtained a new cellular telephone and he did not save the messages (timestamp 01:41:03).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arriving at the BIC, he walked to the radio room and saw Acting Division Chief ([A]DC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Operations Division, and Executive Officer (XO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, were already present (timestamp 00:18:24). At that point, the BIC became the Incident Command Center (ICC). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he knew he was responsible for ensuring all recordings were captured, that a timeline was initiated and maintained, and that he accounted for all his staff at the BIC and his BPAs assigned to Uvalde and other USBP stations (timestamp 00:18:45). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that DRT command staff gathered in the radio room to have a better understanding of the incident. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Acting Patrol Agent in Charge ([A]PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment (SOD), Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Supervisory Law Enforcement Information System Specialist (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, were present either in the BIC or in the radio room. Because (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the highest ranking USBP official at the BIC, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) viewed him as the incident commander. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no one in command of the USBP personnel at the scene (timestamp 02:02:20). At the BIC, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) considered himself part of the command staff in charge of what was being coordinated at the BIC and radio room (timestamp 02:04:07). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not direct him in any way on the day of the incident (timestamp 03:16:03).



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DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the lead in organizing the responses, identifying what was needed, and keeping track of everything by writing it on a whiteboard. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was trained in the Incident Command System (ICS) (timestamp 01:53:50). The ICS was known to be a standardized approach to the command, control, and coordination of emergency response providing a common hierarchy within which responders from multiple agencies could be effective. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was aware there were various levels of required trainings for supervisory versus non-supervisory personnel in relation to ICS training; however, he received ICS training a few years earlier (timestamp 02:34:10). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not sure if there had been a lead field coordinator (LFC) assigned on May 24, 2022; however, he identified WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as being the designated LFC in prior incidents when the ICS was activated. WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was present at the ICC on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 02:35:20).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he alternated between the BIC and radio room and ensured the timeline was maintained with incoming information from the scene (timestamp 00:22:54). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated DRT standard protocol in a critical incident situation was to immediately stand up an ICC. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled that TXDPS troopers requested BORTAC to respond, but he was unsure whether he heard it through a radio transmission or if he heard it through a conversation between (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC and the Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) teams were always ready to support state and local law enforcement agencies (timestamp 02:28:30). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of a specific CBP policy that allowed BORTAC to assist state, locals, and other federal agencies (timestamp 02:52:45). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that emergency medical technicians (EMT) were assigned to every USBP station and said they responded to critical incidents whenever their assistance was requested (timestamp 02:29:57). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled asking (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if BORTAC was responding to Robb Elementary School and recalled (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) telling him BORTAC was approximately 30 minutes away (timestamp 00:32:30). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also heard they did not need BORTAC because the San Antonio SWAT (special weapons and tactics) had been dispatched to Robb Elementary School and they would be there in an hour (timestamp 00:32:35).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assigned Law Enforcement Information System Specialist (LEISS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, as the scribe to record the timeline of events (timestamp 00:19:28). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested to patch the USBP radio communications with the police department and other agencies they could patch with (timestamp 00:20:07). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled specifically patching with Uvalde County Sheriff's Office and TXDPS troopers (timestamp 01:38:02). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that external speakers were connected allowing everyone in the radio room to hear live broadcasts (timestamp 02:11:00).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he self-initiated the assignment of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Eagle Pass Station, Texas, to conduct research on the shooter (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) to obtain as much information as possible (timestamp 00:23:20). The BIC also monitored the live news feed (timestamp 02:14:52).



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DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in the BIC and radio room, there was a sense of disbelief with what was going on in the small town of Uvalde (timestamp 00:20:28). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the radio room started to hear 911 calls of kids calling saying, “Please help us” (timestamp 00:25:46). One call stood out to him; it was a voice of a little girl that called and asked for help. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that up until that point, no one realized there were children inside (timestamp 00:20:55). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated their initial thought was to question who the onsite incident commander was, but no one was able to provide an answer (timestamp 00:21:09). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after hearing the young female voice asking for help, the sense of urgency was magnified and said it was the first time command staff heard a young female say that her teacher was dead (timestamp 3:07:45). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated everyone in the radio room had a look of disbelief and questioned if they all heard the same message. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described a call from a child to 911 that said, “Please help us” and a caller identifying themselves as calling from classroom 111 (timestamp 02:06:44). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated those in the radio room first realized there were casualties at Robb Elementary School during the 911 calls (timestamp 00:25:42). According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when the BIC listened to the live 911 calls, BORTAC had not yet arrived at the scene (timestamp 00:26:03). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that information was not broadcast over the radio; it was disseminated to command staff to distribute independently to their staff and to those at the scene (timestamp 02:07:31).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled a “hot mic” interfered with radio communications and asked if the radio room could identify the source of the hot mic so the BIC could relay the information to the source. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also asked LEISS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if she had the ability to override the hot mic, but she was unable. However, someone at the radio room identified the source of the hot mic and (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed to an unspecified BORTAC member at the scene to look for the BPA and make him aware of the hot mic. The hot mic issue was subsequently resolved (timestamp 00:29:34). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he also heard who he believed to be a local law enforcement officer broadcast over the radio the shooter was barricaded in a room (timestamp 01:42:36).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BIC received information that parents at Robb Elementary School wanted to enter the school and BPAs were assisting with crowd control (timestamp 00:26:06). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was chaotic managing the information and misinformation received at the BIC (timestamp 00:28:49). At some point, there was conflicting threat and no threat information from the Sheriff’s dispatchers (timestamp 00:30:40). As the information was received, the radio room and the BIC tried to decipher and validate the information (timestamp 02:09:26). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BIC also had to verify the information that circulated on social media platforms regarding USBP being in pursuit of the shooter prior to the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:53:15). According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) bail outs and failure to yields were occurring almost daily in that area making the information that was circulating something that needed to be verified (timestamp 02:50:35).

[Agent Note: The term “bail out” refers to occupants abandoning a vehicle and fleeing following a police pursuit or vehicle stop.]



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DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BIC personnel experienced some challenges but could not remember if it was with Uvalde High School staff or the school district administrative staff when they attempted to corroborate the shooter's biographical and previous enrollment information (timestamp 03:11:04). Initially, the BIC was provided with the shooter's incorrect date of birth (timestamp 00:27:38). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the school staff would not release information because the staff believed the shooter was a minor and there was a privacy concern with releasing information. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) once the BIC identified the shooter, the BIC created a "lookout" with the information and photograph of the shooter, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and disseminated the lookout to the field and to USBP at the scene. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to provide the name or the agency that first identified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the shooter to the BIC (timestamp 01:11:20).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BIC continuously received information such as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had shot his grandmother in the face prior to going to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:28:16) and information about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) girlfriend posing a second threat (timestamp 00:24:20). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when the information related to the second threat was relayed to the BIC, the information was broadcast over the radio to make everyone aware. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed information had come from the Sheriff's dispatcher. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the information was received prior to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) being killed (timestamp 01:14:24). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the details received were (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had communicated with a female and told her, "I'll be right back, I'm gonna go shoot up a school" (timestamp 00:25:09). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BIC reviewed the female's social media accounts and suspected the female was actively involved because in the messages, the female laughed at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) statements and did not take the threats seriously (timestamp 00:27:03).

According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the BIC shared the information they had about the female with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Supervisory SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) San Antonio, Texas (timestamp 01:13:21). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the female's identity and location was identified, but he did not recall who identified her and did not know what her name was. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did recall the FBI team in California responded to the female's residence and spoke with her (timestamp 00:29:09).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had communicated with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC, while SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the scene, because at one-point, DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stood beside him in the radio room and he overheard them speaking.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received updates via radio, text messages, and verbally as the incident unfolded. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he did not have the text messages because he changed his cellular telephone and the messages were not stored (timestamp 03:01:50).

According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he believed the BORTAC commander on May 24, 2022, was (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 02:53:29). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the BORTAC SBPA at the scene and part of the entry team (timestamp 02:53 45). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he was in communication with (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and possibly with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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(timestamp 02:56:31). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled he heard a radio broadcast stating the breach was about to occur when it was followed by another broadcast from a TXDPS captain who identified himself by name and ordered to halt the breach. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall the name of the captain who broadcast to halt the breach, but stated his name was documented in the timeline that he would provide to CBP OPR (timestamp 02:54:17). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled he and (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked at each other and questioned who requested the halt to the breach and why (timestamp 00:21:57). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the breaching team did not hear the radio transmission because a few seconds later, he heard another transmission the shooter was down (timestamp 02:58:48). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed that either SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made the decision himself to breach or could have received direction from (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not speak with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the day of the incident and he had not spoken to him since (timestamp 03:32:55). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not communicate directly with anyone from the scene (timestamp 03:06:18). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled he heard a radio broadcast that at the scene they were looking for keys to the door. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall when he heard the transmission and stated it was possible he learned about looking for keys after the incident when he viewed video footage (timestamp 03:53:30).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was killed, he was made aware that at the scene, efforts to keep parents away were underway because some of the victims were unrecognizable (timestamp 00:35:30).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the incident was over, they had to shift focus to USBP personnel involved in the incident (timestamp 03:20:03). USBP leadership gathered USBP uniforms to make available to the BPAs who had soiled uniforms (timestamp 00:40:35).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the request for DNA kits was forwarded to the BIC, but he was unable to recall who specifically made the request and if the request was made through a telephone call or an email. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unsure whether USBP provided the DNA kits (timestamp 03:17:05).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opined the biggest failure was the absence of a central commander on the ground. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed a central commander could have been the gatekeeper of information that was going in and out (timestamp 00:31:05). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed feeling a sense of guilt and stated he constantly thought of what could have been done differently (timestamp 00:34:20).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that on May 24, 2022, he was made aware that his subordinate employee, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, had requested to be off on that day to attend his child's award ceremony at Robb Elementary School. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed that BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had responded to Robb Elementary School when he became aware of the active shooter situation. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later found out that BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was heavily involved in the incident (timestamp 00:26:25). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) how BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became aware of the incident and believed another BPA-I had informed him (timestamp



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02:22:35). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not speak directly to BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the day of the incident; however, he did speak to him afterwards, but the focus of the conversation was to check on BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) well-being.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that DRT had memorandums of understandings (MOUs) with the following federal agencies: Homeland Security Investigations, Drug Enforcement Administration, and FBI. DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not believe there were any written MOUs with state and local law enforcement agencies (timestamp 01:27:01). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained his understanding of USBP's authority and responsibility to respond to such an incident was that USBP's past practice was to respond in a support role and assist unless told otherwise (timestamp 01:49:28). According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) prior to and after the Robb Elementary School incident, Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, had conveyed to DRT personnel that USBP would assist state and locals in a secondary role (timestamp 02:30:06). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not aware if there was a statutory authority that allowed USBP to respond to an active shooter (timestamp 01:52:30).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had received active shooter training. Based on the active shooter training, he understood that if USBP responded and arrived first on scene, USBP must engage the active shooter to stop the killing and then treat the injured to stop the dying (timestamp 01:53:00). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the difference between a barricaded subject and an active shooter. According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a barricaded subject was someone who positioned himself in a place with cover all around and who refused commands to come out. An active shooter was someone actively engaged in killing human beings (timestamp 03:25:04).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he did not deny any BPA from responding to the incident at Robb Elementary School; however, he did relay to his staff not to send everyone to Robb Elementary School because resources needed to be managed to address and respond to incoming information (timestamp 02:18:48).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he did not have oversight over personnel assigned to BORTAC, BORSTAR, medical, traffic control, or public affairs.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as the incident unfolded, he and command staff at the BIC questioned who was in charge at the scene, but no one was able to identify a specific person or agency (timestamp 02:45:15). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from the information gathered at the BIC, he surmised no one seemed to be in command of the situation at a local or state level (timestamp 02:41:35).

According to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after the fact, there was additional information discovered that described (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as being a "weird" person and as someone who had previously used the moniker "school shooter" (timestamp 03:20:40).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that following the incident, the incident command leadership had an after-action discussion and those in attendance were (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT





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Programs, XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Mission Readiness Operations, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Acting ACPA ([A]ACPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, (A)ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT (timestamp 00:37:23). During the discussion, CPA Owens assigned all DRT stations to generate an action plan for an active shooter response to schools in the area. Initially, the command staff just sat there quietly for a few minutes as they processed what had just happened and then they started to talk about what they could have done better (timestamp 03:03:32).

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided CBP OPR the following documentation: a copy of the after-action hot wash dated May 24, 2022 (Attachment 2); a copy of an email string that originated with Assistant Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS Ranger, which provided Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS Ranger, a preliminary update and advising him that the preliminary investigation was underway. The email was forward to Deputy Director (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS who forwarded the email to CPA Owens who subsequently forwarded to (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 3); a copy of the DRT Active Shooter Briefing issue paper (Attachment 4); Intelligence Brief related to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the female that was identified in communication with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 5). DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to forward to CBP OPR the timeline generated on May 24, 2022.

DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had not been interviewed by TXDPS and had not been interviewed by another agency.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	After Action Hot Wash, dated May 24, 2022.
3	Email string initiated by Assistant Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS
4	DRT Active Shooter Briefing issue paper dated May 24, 2022.
5	Intelligence Brief related to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 181**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 15, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working at the DRT range providing active shooter training when, shortly past 11:00 a.m., he heard someone say there was an active shooter situation in Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked to his training partner, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Law Enforcement Safety and Compliance (LESC) Directorate, and asked if he wanted to respond. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "Yes," so they grabbed equipment and headed towards Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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On the way to Uvalde, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called the Brackettville training team, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (LESC) and Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and found out they were on their way. As an active shooter instructor, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began explaining to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what to expect when he arrived at the scene. He said to expect an incident command inside the location, a larger incident command outside the location, a staging area for Emergency Medical Service (EMS) personnel, a staging area for law enforcement personnel, and clear roads to allow EMS to respond. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to check in with incident command for direction.

When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the scene, there was no incident command. He took a picture of a whiteboard inside the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home with phone numbers and points of contact on it and sent a copy of the picture to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The picture was sent via text message to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which is SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government cellular phone number (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the situation to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and went to assist with traffic control.

As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the area near Robb Elementary School, he heard talk about hostage negotiation over the radio and thought too much time had passed since the original call about an active shooter. After parking his vehicle a few blocks away, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed vehicles everywhere blocking the roads. He also saw law enforcement officers from multiple agencies wearing helmets and carrying M4 rifles standing around. Seeing the lack of an incident command, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made his way closer to Robb Elementary School since he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were both former Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the west door of the school and noticed more law enforcement officers wearing helmets and carrying M4 rifles lining the area, standing around. He also saw a group of law enforcement officers off to the side of the group staring at a backpack outside the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then recalls entering the building just a few steps, seeing either bodies or EMT bags. SBPA said he is unsure of what he saw inside the building because his sight was transitioning from being outside in the bright sun to going inside.

Although SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they assisted with two patients, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only recalls one patient. He remembers an EMT doing compressions on the unknown patient, but SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not recall his actions or the patient except that the gurney was moved towards an ambulance.

After the gurney got to the ambulance, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment (SOD) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew both SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) paramedics. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as looking “crushed.” SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) “Whatever you do, don’t go in there” (timestamp 00:49:02). Hearing a call for EMTs, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went back to the west door of the school but was hit in his plate carrier by an unknown Texas Ranger who denied him entry into the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the unknown Texas Ranger he’d take care of the request, which was to check for vital signs one last time on the deceased victims.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started talking to and consoling BPAs outside the school since he knew some of them from previous experiences. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), was the first person SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembers speaking with outside the school. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) kept repeating, “I fucked up, I should have done more” (timestamp 00:51:55). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) next spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Brackettville Station, who kept saying, “I tried to do it but couldn’t” and “everyone was black” (timestamp 00:52:20). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Brackettville Station and tried to comfort him.

Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, gathered all BPAs around a tree and addressed the group. Afterwards, he instructed them to go to UVA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimates he spent approximately an hour at the scene. As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was checking on BPAs, he recognized some of them were in no condition to drive a vehicle, so he started coordinating with other BPAs to find rides back to UVA for everyone. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalls that around this time, law enforcement officers from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) arrived asking what they could do to assist. When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the HSI group there was nothing left to do at the school and directed them to the hospital to assist with security, they ignored him and walked away. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also noticed several civilians gathered looking at law enforcement with disdain. At the time, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not understand why, but after watching news reports, he believes it was due to the length of time it took law enforcement to resolve the situation.

After arriving back at UVA, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, saying a prayer and CPA Owens talking to the group. While at UVA, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, when they learned about a possible threat at Uvalde High School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on his own initiative, went with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the high school to assist. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalls there being no communications over the radio and thought this was because SOD operates on a different channel on the radio.

At the high school, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw an older man whom he believed to be the security guard. When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if everything was OK, the older man responded, “Yeah, shots fired” (timestamp 00:59:03). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he thinks the older man may not have understood English well. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the description he remembers about the second threat was a female, approximately five feet, one inch tall, wearing a black tank top. With that description, SBPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) along with other unknown BPAs began clearing the school. While clearing the school, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembers enveloping DEA agents and Uvalde Police Officers into his team as he came across them.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalls assisting with the reunification of parents and students at other schools, including Morales Junior High School, Flores Elementary School, and Dalton Elementary School, but he does not recall the order. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) only recalls two details during this time period. The first was that he came across an unknown Border Patrol Watch Commander whose (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was inside one of the schools. The other detail was how he and a singular Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper had to deescalate a crowd of angry parents at one of the schools. Although the parents were angry, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not touch any parents and was



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able to deescalate the situation verbally. After his activities at the school, SBPA recalls returning to UVA, eating pizza, and driving back to Del Rio around 9:00 p.m.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he went “rogue” by taking his team to the high school without being told to do so by someone in charge, however, he believed it was important to put law enforcement in the best position to make good decisions on scene and felt it was not being done (timestamp 1:10:50). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in charge of the situation at Robb Elementary School. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was a man, whom he believed was possibly the mayor, who was making phone calls and was more concerned about a press release than running the operation. Tactically, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there was nothing left to be done tactically to know if someone was in charge. Regarding medical treatment, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he only saw USBP helping and believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) might have been in charge of the medical response. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear anyone yelling commands or seem like they were in charge. Overall, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt like they were operating in a vacuum, primarily due to the lack of communications or an incident command.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understands USBP’s authority to respond to an active shooter scenario is questionable. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said USBP is not supposed to ever be the lead agency on-site. In Texas, DPS Troopers or Texas Rangers regularly take over scenes, but even though state and locals are in charge, USBP is still going to respond. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believes Border Patrol should respond in these circumstances. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understands BPAs are not granted peace officer status in the State of Texas, but believes he’s covered under Good Samaritan laws.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided (Attachment 3). In the collection, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traced his route to Robb Elementary School and his approach to the school. Additionally, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map to explain his actions at Robb Elementary School.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became an EMT in 2009 or 2010 when he was assigned to USBP Kingsville Station. Training was conducted by USBP for six weeks. Once the training was completed, students took the National Registry exam and participated in ride a long programs with an ambulance crew. Additional training is offered in intravenous line initiation and intubation. When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) transferred from the Rio Grande Valley Sector to DRT, all he had to do was request a change in affiliation through the National Registry. There was no formal process to switch sectors.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Picture provided by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the whiteboard inside Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home with names and phone numbers of agency points of contact related to the CBP response to a shooting at Robb Elementary School.
3	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 15, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning her involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she was a supervisor at CAR with the general responsibilities of overseeing daily operations to include scheduling and reviewing files. In addition, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was an emergency medical technician (EMT), a peer support member, and assisted with morale, welfare, and recreation activities. On May 24, 2022, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned as the duty supervisor and was at CAR when she learned about the incident. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she was in the CAR duty supervisor office at approximately 11:00 a.m. when she heard a radio transmission over the county radio related to a crash. Attempting to obtain additional details, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted Dimmit County officials who stated they did not have any information.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly afterwards, she received a call from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) school was on lockdown due to an active shooter and he was going to leave work. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, then came into the office stating there was an active shooter in Uvalde County and inquired as to which school because his child attended school in Uvalde County. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) to obtain additional information. The desk officer at UVA stated the location of the incident was Robb Elementary School but did not provide additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as information came in, she stayed in the duty supervisor office with Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and Deputy PAIC (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, were off-site at a meeting and notified them of the situation via a text message to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she received a reply that the incident was not in their area of responsibility (AOR). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied that although the situation was not within their AOR, it would affect them because many BPAs lived in Uvalde and were leaving work to take care of their families. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was instructed to standby and keep them updated (timestamp 00:21:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she remained in the duty supervisor office listening for additional information and updates when she received a telephone call from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, who informed her he was off duty, but near Robb Elementary School, and was going to grab his vest and respond to the location. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) updated WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regarding BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to field additional telephone calls from other BPAs who were trying to obtain information about the situation. Although some radio transmissions were not clear, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard information indicating ambulances were dispatched. Since SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was an EMT, other BPAs designated as EMTs, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, and certified paramedic, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, asked her if they could deploy. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she still had not received official notification that CAR personnel could deploy and instructed them to standby. Soon after, a dispatcher relayed over the radio they had received a 911 call from a child in classroom 112 at Robb Elementary School and there were victims. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) texted DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who authorized her request for EMTs to deploy (timestamp 00:22:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she broadcast over the radio for all available EMTs to respond to Robb Elementary School, grabbed her EMT bag, and departed for Uvalde with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a government owned vehicle retrofitted for medical emergencies which was the vehicle they used to deploy.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while en route to Uvalde, she and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) listened to radio traffic for additional updates regarding the situation. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at some point the radios were patched which allowed USBP, local law enforcement, and the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) to communicate on a single channel. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard information that people were entering the school and parents were attempting to get inside. While SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was driving, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in the back of the vehicle preparing the medical equipment prior to their arrival.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as they were nearing Crystal City, Texas, she informed the Crystal City Sheriff's Office of the situation and requested assistance to clear the roads to allow a quick pass through the town for the EMTs en route. The Sheriff's Office provided assistance and followed them to Uvalde.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon reaching La Pryor, Texas, she heard radio transmissions indicating there were many injuries inside and the active shooter was still in the building. Before reaching Uvalde, they heard information indicating the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) was on scene and was preparing to breach. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she heard who she assumed was a BORTAC agent state on the radio, "Prepare to breach" to which she looked at SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to indicate they needed to hurry so they could enter as soon as possible after the breach. Shortly afterwards, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a transmission from Captain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS, with a stern instruction to "Stand down" (timestamp 00:52:45). Immediately following, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard, "Breach, breach, breach." After the breach, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard kids crying and screaming due to someone's radio microphone remaining on (timestamp 00:25:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they arrived in Uvalde and tried to get to Robb Elementary School, however, the roads were blocked. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked the vehicle in front of a residence when they heard a call over the radio for all available EMS to respond. They grabbed whatever medical equipment they could and ran towards the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described there were ambulances and a heavy presence of law enforcement officers, including TXDPS troopers, as she approached the perimeter fence near the west entrance. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as she was about to enter the school, USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) agents BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and others were exiting (time stamp 01:02:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described they were covered in blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stopped SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and told her not to enter. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they had already done everything they could do and there was no need for her to go inside to see the horrific scene (timestamp 00:27:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she was informed USBP personnel were going to gather near a tree to await Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she switched from EMT to peer support mode and started checking on BPAs. At the tree, there were 50 to 60 BPAs, many of whom SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described as being very emotional. After CPA Owens addressed the BPAs, they were instructed to report to UVA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rode with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR, to UVA as SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tayed behind at Robb Elementary School.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at UVA, she continued her duties as a peer support member. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was approached by CPA Owens' adjutant, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who requested SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide support to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who was at the hospital. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, transported SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Uvalde Hospital to visit BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) At the hospital, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to visit with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) due to a restriction on the number of visitors allowed per patient. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supervisors and family were already there with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and explained she was sent to check on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided her



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business card to DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to pass on to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his family in case they required peer support services (timestamp 01:17:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 2:30 p.m., while she and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were at the hospital, a lockdown was in place due to the threat of a second shooter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were subsequently required to remain on site for the duration of the lockdown. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that she and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained in a waiting room adjacent to the hospital emergency room where a young boy struck a conversation with them. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the boy had a bloody handprint on his shirt. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the boy initiated contact when he noticed their equipment and stated he also had a family member in law enforcement. At one point during their conversation, the boy began talking about his experience while in the classroom with the shooter (timestamp 00:31:30). The boy stated the shooter came in the classroom and told him he was going to kill him and his friends. The boy also noted the shooter was playing “weird” music. The boy explained he had learned from watching a movie that he was supposed to hide, so the boy hid under a blanket. The boy stated his friend died while he and his friend were embracing and explained the handprint on his shirt was from his friend. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked with a nurse to obtain a change of clothing for the boy (timestamp 01:19:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained it appeared as if the boy was obviously unaware as to the gravity and trauma of the circumstances he had endured. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the boy was talking openly and seemed nonchalant. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled a specific moment when a man passed them in the waiting area. The boy recognized the man as the father of one of his classmates and stated aloud the man’s daughter, his classmate, had also died (timestamp 0:1:25:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained she spent 20 to 30 minutes speaking with the boy and noticed he was by himself. When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was getting ready to depart, she looked for someone to remain with the boy. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed the boy’s mother was in the room but was preoccupied on her cellphone attempting to locate (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was at the high school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the mother with a business card and offered to assist the boy with support services. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the family did not contact her.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after departing the hospital, she and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the civic center. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the civic center was a rally point for any BPAs still in the area. At the civic center, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with security and crowd control as parents and media outlets were arriving with questions. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she did not engage in or witness any physical interactions or confrontations with parents or the media. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the civic center until they were relieved by the oncoming shift of BPAs. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently rode with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back to CAR.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she could not tell who was in command and control at Robb Elementary School on the date of the incident. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the only time she perceived that someone was in command was when she heard TXDPS Captain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) give the order to stand down over the radio. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the remaining radio chatter as “complete



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chaos” (timestamp 01:32:45). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she heard information on the radio indicating the funeral home was supposed to be a command center, however, when she passed the funeral home en route to Robb Elementary School, it appeared as if there were only civilians in the area (timestamp 01:32:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that although she reported to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they were not in command because they were not onsite. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed her role when responding to Robb Elementary School was to stop the threat and provide medical services as an EMT. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed BPAs had responded with the same intention of stopping the threat. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the primary responsibility to stop the threat was with the first law enforcement agency that arrived on scene (timestamp 01:36:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that although USBP’s authority was related to immigration, USBP employees were still public servants with a responsibility to protect (timestamp 01:37:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained she had completed active shooter training and stated CAR incorporated county law enforcement and TXDPS during the training. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated they went onto an old school campus during the training to conduct scenarios with classrooms, hallways, and cafeterias, similar to what she believed happened on the date of the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:37:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she received her peer support certification in 2015 and EMT certification in 2017. Prior to entering on duty with USBP, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended school to obtain her licensed vocational nurse certification. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as an EMT for USBP, her medical director was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed she did not provide any medical care on the date of the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 02:04:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she was not wearing a body worn camera on the date of the incident nor did she produce any written statement or memorandum related to her involvement at Robb Elementary School. At the time of the interview, SCBPO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have her government phone with her so she was unable to provide the text messages to and from DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she was interviewed by TXDPS Rangers in the days following the incident.

CBP OPR interviewers provided photographs of children who were rescued from classrooms 111 and 112 to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 2). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the boy she spoke to in the hospital waiting room (timestamp 03:01:00).

CBP OPR interviewers provided a map package to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to mark her route of travel and significant areas where she was throughout the day (Attachment 3).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 2 – South of Uvalde, TX to indicate her route of travel from CAR to Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 5a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the location where she and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked upon arrival at the vicinity of the school and the route they took when they walked from the vehicle to the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 7 – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the route to Uvalde Medical



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Center from UVA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the route of travel on foot to the school and significant items to note regarding the scene upon arrival at the school.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Photographs of victims.
3	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Additional Information Provided by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On April 8, 2023, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent an email to SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) providing three separate items related to her EMT certification:

- National Registry Emergency Medical Technicians Certificate (Attachment 1)
- National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians Certification Card (Attachment 2)
- Screen photograph of Agency Affiliation (Attachment 3)

Within the same email, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also provided a screen photograph of the email she received from Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CAR (Attachment 4).

Review of the National Emergency Medical Technicians Certificate indicated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was certified as an Emergency Medical Technician on August 13, 2017, under Registry Number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Review of the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians Certification Card indicated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obtained National EMS Certification as an EMS Professional at the EMT Provider Level under Registry Number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with an expiration date of March 31, 2024.

Review of the screen photograph of Agency Affiliation indicated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is affiliated under the agency of USBP Del Rio Sector, Texas.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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Review of the screen photograph of the email SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received from PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) revealed the following: PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent the email to the CAR-SUPS mailbox and stated that Sector leadership had instructed all station PAICs not to send BPAs to the incident unless directed by them.

On April 26, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent a follow-up email to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asking if she had additional emails or text messages related to instructions provided to EMTs on the date of the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she did not have any additional information to provide.

According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she believed she was telephonically notified that EMTs could deploy, instead of by text message she mentioned during her March 15, 2023, interview. She believed it was a telephonic notification because she did not find the text message.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	National Registry Emergency Medical Technicians Certificate.
2	National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians Certification Card.
3	Screen photograph of Agency Affiliation.
4	Screen photograph of email from Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 183**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 15, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on March 24, 2022, he was conducting use of force training at UVA when he received a phone call that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. He went to the armory, scanned his key fob, and started handing out M4 rifles, magazines, and keys to vehicles to the agents who were in the training. He then drove to the school with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who was working as the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for UVA.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he approached Robb Elementary School, he dropped off BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on West Cargile Street. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he parked near the cafeteria on the east side of the school and had to jump the fence because the gate was locked. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then met an unidentified Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD) officer at the fence and asked him what was going on. The officer responded, “I don’t know, Pete (referencing UCISDPD Chief Pete Arredondo) is in there with them” (timestamp 00:23:57). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he believed Chief Arredondo was the overall incident commander and based on his conversation with the UCISDPD officer, he thought that Chief Arredondo was possibly negotiating with the shooter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he used a walkway between the two southern most classroom buildings and proceeded west at the end of the classroom 18 building, however, he had no idea where the shooter was located. He explained he was making sure the classroom doors were locked and students were safe.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered the cafeteria where he saw several school workers inside. He added that the cafeteria building was a cafeteria and an auditorium. He told the workers to go to the kitchen and stay there until he returned. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed a teacher and students in the auditorium huddled behind a curtain and told them to stay. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he went back to the two most southern classroom buildings and saw children exiting the southern-most building. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he oriented his weapon to the west where he thought the shooter was to provide cover for the children and teachers.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after the children were evacuated, he went back into the cafeteria and started evacuating workers, children, and teachers east towards Old Carrizo Road. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went back outside to the northern two classroom buildings where he and an unknown sheriff’s deputy attempted to clear classrooms 7 through 12. He stated those rooms were empty so there was no one to evacuate. From there, he went to the northern most building containing classrooms 1-6 where Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) troopers were clearing the classrooms. He stood at the southwest corner of classroom 6 to provide security and was still unaware of the shooter’s exact location.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he proceeded south down a walkway and entered the east door of the school. At approximately 12:42 p.m., he arrived at the T-intersection inside of the school. He noticed the TXDPS troopers had a triage location set up outside of the restrooms (timestamp 00:50:43). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) and USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) agents arriving. He remembered seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC, Emergency Medical Technician BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered that at the triage point, he heard the terms “black” for deceased victims and “green” for living victims. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed there was a plan for how to triage the victims who were evacuated from their classrooms. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing that medical personnel were going to use classrooms 131 and 132 as triage locations (one for children that survived and one for deceased victims). There was a partition open between 131 and 132, however, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not believe the medical personnel knew that at the time. SBPA



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated surviving victims were not directed into the two rooms to avoid them see the bodies.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he took up a position at the T-intersection looking south when he heard the breaching gunfire at 12:50 p.m., however, at first, he believed it was a flash bang grenade (timestamp 00:56:05). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was moving south down the hall when he saw victims being dragged out of the classrooms, including the first victim with a traumatic head injury, which troubled him (timestamp 00:57:08). He also recalled the floors turned red from the blood. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated medical personnel began to triage the children using the terms “green” and “black.” SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted carrying five to six deceased children into classrooms 131 and 132.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he began helping one male juvenile victim who was walking on his own. He conducted a rapid check on the boy and noticed he was limping but did not see any obvious gunshot injuries. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he reassured the boy by saying he would be fine and escorted him outside the west door and directed the boy towards medical personnel who were located on the sidewalk next to the parking lot (timestamp 00:59:18). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he witnessed another young boy being carried out (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He remembered he felt it was disrespectful to drag the children down the hallway, so he decided to assist with carrying the children.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the flow of victims slowed down, he heard an unknown Texas ranger say the school building was now a crime scene, and everyone should exit the building (timestamp 01:10:10). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited through the west door and noticed a TXDPS trooper with a sign-in/out sheet controlling and recording the flow of personnel. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that when he was outside, he saw an adult female teacher on the ground being worked on by medical personnel. He remembered wondering why they were working on her at the school and thought she should have been immediately moved to the ambulance for transportation.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went to a large tree at the north end of the school where USBP personnel were meeting. He was upset that he was told to go there because he felt there was more work to be done inside. After the meeting, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to his vehicle and saw Acting Patrol Agent in Charge ([A]PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, looking for his child. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they swapped vehicles because (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vehicle was blocked in by responding law enforcement officers’ (LEO) vehicles.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, on Old Carrizo Road with a transport van to help transport children who were being evacuated to the civic center (timestamp 01:16:40). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added there was a home on the corner of West Cargile and Old Carrizo that was taking kids in and keeping them safe and letting them use the bathroom prior to being transported to the civic center. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he located (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vehicle, drove it to the civic center where he stayed for about an hour, and recalled seeing (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when he found his child. They swapped vehicles again. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when a possible second threat was relayed, he decided to stay at the civic center and



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instructed people outside the civic center to move inside for safety reasons. He believed the second shooter was possibly targeting the civic center. After an hour at the civic center, he returned to UVA.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP was going to secure the perimeter around the school and assist local LEOs. He stated he understood USBP did not have peace officer status in Texas and USBP had responded in a support role for local LEOs. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not provide medical aid to anyone. He transported, escorted, and directed surviving children and teachers.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had taken pictures and video of the incident on his personal cellular phone. During the CBP OPR interview, he forwarded the pictures and the videos via text message to SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) government cellular phone. The pictures displayed the surrounding area around the school campus, students and teachers evacuating, the triage area near the T-intersections, and a picture looking down the hallway towards classrooms 111 and 112 (Attachment 2). The videos displayed students and teachers evacuating from the southernmost classrooms (19-23), and a video displaying SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position near a trash can at the corner of classroom 6 (north end) (Attachment 3).

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 4). These maps were labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde was not applicable. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, was not applicable.

The map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX - SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving to the school followed by where the route he took to the locked gate. He also labeled where he dropped off BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) The map labeled 5.a. was not applicable. The map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable.

The map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled where he parked near the cafeteria, routes around the school campus, which buildings he assisted clearing, entrance into east side of the school, triage location, rooms where dead bodies were housed, exit from the west entrance of the school, where he evacuated a male student and saw a female teacher being worked on, and the muster location on the north end of the school.

The map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the locations in which he provided pictures of the incident.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Pictures provided by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the Robb Elementary School grounds.
3	Videos provided by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the Robb Elementary School grounds.
4	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 184**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 15, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the midnight shift. On his way home, he took a coffee to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went home and went to bed (timestamp 13:16:25).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he woke up to approximately 20 missed calls and text messages from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicating there had been shots fired at Robb Elementary School. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and she informed him that law enforcement officers (LEO) had been in and out of her classroom (timestamp 13:25:15). At approximately 12:15 p.m., BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned on his service radio and government issued cellphone. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the radio traffic as “chaos” (timestamp 13:20:02).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based on his training and experience, he initially believed the active shooter had been stopped and that he was hearing the aftermath of the incident on his service radio. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the active shooter training he had received involved locating and addressing the threat immediately (timestamp 13:22:45).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he sent a text message from his personal phone to Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment, inquiring about the situation and offering assistance. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that Special Operations Detachment personnel were en route and that BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could report to the civic center to assist. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based on the requests for assistance school that he heard over the radio, he decided to respond to Robb Elementary School. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put on his government issued body armor and responded to the school in his personal vehicle (timestamp 13:23:20).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that either at his house or en route to Robb Elementary School, he heard a radio report of a 911 call coming from inside the classroom. Based on the report, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to determine who, if anyone, was in command of the incident (timestamp 13:43:10). BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he responded to the school and parked at the corner of South Grove Street and Villa Street. Upon arrival, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed the threat had been stopped and proceeded on foot to the funeral home on Geraldine Street. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that local LEOs had established a perimeter and were attempting to keep parents and other civilians away from the school. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall any specific incidents between law enforcement and parents or civilians (timestamp 13:55:15).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unable to identify who or what agency was in command of the incident and attempted to assist where he could (timestamp 13:44:35). After approximately five minutes, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed LEOs flooding out of the west hallway with victims. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to the west hallway to provide assistance. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while in the U.S. Army, he received care under combat medical training (timestamp 13:27:40).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered the west hallway and immediately observed a mortally wounded student on the ground and blood on the floor throughout the hallway. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw an unknown member of the Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) providing medical aid to a male student. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the BORSTAR agent shouting, "I've got him back, I've got him back, I've got a pulse." BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he immediately went to assist the agent, however, another medic arrived to help (timestamp 13:30:56).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that an unknown LEO requested assistance in clearing the remainder of the classrooms in the building. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the medical triage area and proceeded to assist other LEOs in clearing the rest of the building. Based on the maps of the school provide by CBP OPR during the interview, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he had assisted in clearing classrooms 110, 109, and 102. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly after clearing the classrooms, a Texas Ranger and Chief Pete Arredondo, Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department,





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instructed him to exit the building as it had been declared a crime scene. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never entered classrooms 111 and 112 (timestamp 13:32:00).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon exiting the building from the south hallway door, he observed a young male victim taken out on a stretcher. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed this victim was transported on a Life Flight helicopter to receive medical attention (timestamp 13:40:25).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he proceeded to the large tree on the north side of the school where all BPAs were instructed to meet. Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, addressed the BPAs and instructed them to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (timestamp 13:42:20).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly after arriving at USBP Uvalde Station, there was a report of a possible threat at another school in the area. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to Dalton Elementary School where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a student. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted in providing security at Dalton Elementary School until approximately 6:00 p.m. without incident. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) eventually retrieved (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and returned home (timestamp 13:45:40).

During the CBP OPR interview, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself on the T-intersection hallway camera video shown to him (Attachment 2). In the video, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the west hallway door at 1:01 p.m. according to the timestamp on the video (the timestamp on the video was incorrect; the actual time was approximately 12:54 p.m.). He entered the west hallway doors after the breach and did not recall hearing any gunfire throughout the incident.

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of a specific statutory authority permitting BPAs to respond in an official capacity to an incident like an active shooter. However, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt it was his responsibility as a federal agent to respond (timestamp 14:06:30).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School, he was familiar with how the doors worked in the school. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the doors were only able to be locked from the outside. BPA-I stated the doors were old and “shitty.” After the incident, BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard from several BPAs that they were waiting on keys and the door to the classroom was locked (timestamp 14:11:30).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he completed the CBP three-day active shooter training and described the training as one day of lectures and two days of scenario-based training. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that none of the scenarios involved encountering a locked door or having to breach a door for entry (timestamp 14:04:00).

BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tenure at Robb Elementary School, she had voiced concerns to school administrators about the lack of security at the school. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that school officials dismissed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerns because Uvalde was a small town with little crime (timestamp 14:18:35).



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BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at no point did he see BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station, on scene at Robb Elementary School. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he thought BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was “full of shit,” and that he and other BPAs were not happy with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviews following the incident. BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the incident on May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was observed driving around in a new vehicle, started a GoFundMe page, and was awarded a dog by a local dog kennel due to his “actions” that day (timestamp 14:28:50). BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that since the shooting incident, he has replaced his cell phone with a new one and did not retain any texts.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 15, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a member of the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), stated that on May 24, 2022, he started his shift at approximately (b) (7)(E) at USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). He then drove towards (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) and arrived there at approximately 6:00 a.m. At approximately 7:00 a.m., other BORTAC BPAs and an Air and Marine Operations (AMO) helicopter arrived and assisted with tracking a group of undocumented migrants. The BPAs worked in the area for some time. Shortly after the arrest of the group of undocumented migrants, the BPAs received a radio transmission from the AMO pilot who stated he was leaving the area due to a shooting at an elementary school in Uvalde, Texas. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Detachment (SOD), BORTAC, DRT, were tracking a different group of migrants near (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when they entered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Government owned vehicle (GOV) and drove towards Uvalde. While in the GOV, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, directing everyone on the group text string to go to the active shooter scene at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also received a text message from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary School, stating, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) please save us.”

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that his vest with armored plates, helmet, rifle magazines, and his rifle were in his GOV approximately 30 minutes away. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had his CBP-issued pistol and a chest rig that held his Body Worn Camera (BWC). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rode in the passenger seat as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove the unmarked GOV with emergency equipment activated along Highway 131 North towards Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then entered (b) (7)(E) Highway 1572 to U.S. Highway 90 to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that traffic was hectic, and Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) officers passed them throughout the drive. While en route, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided navigation assistance to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he also read aloud the texts strings on his personal cell phone from the iMessage chat string titled Admin iPhone. The text string involved all DRT BORTAC BPAs. The texts stated the situation involved a shooter at the school and that the shooter was a barricaded subject (timestamp 00:52:00).

Initially the text messages stated that there were no injuries but at 12:29 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, sent a text to the group stating a child was shot (Attachment F). There were texts mentioning the potential use of Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile (CS) Gas, but the BPAs questioned using CS because of the children who may be in the classrooms (timestamp 00:53:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) listened to the GOV service radio, but the information was contradictory, confusing, and chaotic. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered someone inadvertently pressed and held the “Push to Talk” button on their radio, which caused a “hot microphone” and prevented others from communicating on the radio for a long time. The hot microphone caused a lot of chaos on the radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was following the location of the other BORTAC BPAs along the drive using the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) feature on their government cell phones. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that ATAK showed there were four or five Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR) BPAs, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the scene.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that BORSTAR has more advanced tactical training than average BPAs, but they are not BORTAC members. They are experienced paramedics but are not as well trained and experienced as BORTAC regarding tactics and close-quarter-combat (CQC) (timestamp 02:08:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) handled communications during the drive and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concentrated on the drive. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not develop any sort of game-plan for their arrival, due to the conflicting information on the radio and text message strings. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were not sure what they were going to find once they arrived at the Robb Elementary



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School. Additionally, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed the incident would be over by the time they arrived. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) perceived the situation was probably still a barricaded subject, because an active shooter would have been handled quicker. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was confident that if it was a barricaded subject, they could handle the situation. He stated that they trained for similar situations and have protocols for handling those situations, to include calling the subject out or deploying CS.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed they arrived at Robb Elementary School within an hour, at approximately 12:35 p.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not familiar with Robb Elementary School, but knew he needed to locate SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to see how he could assist. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked a few blocks away due to traffic on the roadways. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gave BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) his own armored plates, helmet, rifle, and rifle magazines. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to remove his BWC from his field gear and transfer it to the borrowed tactical vest, but he could not remove the mounts and transfer it quickly to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) borrowed kit, so he left the BWC in the GOV (timestamp 00:46:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed his Precision Marksman rifle and tripod, and they ran together towards Robb Elementary School.

While running towards Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear or see anything other than a lot of Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) and other people standing around on the lawn near the school entrances. While running, an unknown LEO shouted at BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inside!" The statement informed and confirmed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was inside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt after his arrival that other LEOs looked to them to solve the situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attributed the perception to his different uniform and his perceived training and skill set.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he watched all available BWC footage, all news reports, as well as the video from the hallway at the "T-Intersection" prior to his interview. The hallway video was not available to him prior to his statement to the TXDPS Rangers, which he provided a few days after the incident, but he knew since seeing the videos that there were non-substantive and various timeline discrepancies between his statement and the videos. Based on watching the videos, he knew he arrived approximately 10 minutes before they breached classroom 111 but felt he was on scene for only five minutes before they entered the classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered Robb Elementary School through the west entrance and immediately saw LEOs lined up on the walls at the "T-intersection" of the hallway. He did not hear any children making any noise, but figured children were in the classrooms. He turned down the hallway and saw approximately 25 LEOs wearing tactical gear. He observed several BPAs, including one in a red firearms instructor shirt. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw their faces and thought in his head, "We're fucked" due to their fear and defeated facial expressions. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed he should have removed those LEOS from the hallway and out of the building (timestamp 02:05:00). He explained there was a mixture of different LEOs and saw BORSTAR BPAs in the hallway. He felt that everyone within the hallway was a liability and not an asset regarding his safety and the potential of being shot (timestamp 02:10:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved around the corner of the T-intersection with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and talked to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go outside and find a position with a view



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into the window. He instructed him to set-up a Precision Marksman Observer (PMO) position on the eastside of the school to see in the windows of classrooms 111 and 112.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited Robb Elementary School and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) talked to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about trying to figure out the location of the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a bullet hole at approximately the height of his hip in the wall near the janitor's closet. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew the LEOs should have positioned differently within the hallway because the wall in the hallway would not provide proper cover if the shooter fired more rounds at the LEOs (timestamp 02:03:48).

An unknown person told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the shooter was in classroom 111, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed based on his cursory observation of the bullet trajectories in the wall next to the janitor's closet, that the shots appeared to have originated from classroom 112. Due to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assessment, he questioned SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on if the shooter was actually in classroom 111.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled conversations with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regarding him obtaining several sets of Master Keys but did not recall any discussions with him or anyone else about breaching the room using tools like a Halligan, Ram, Breaching Charges, or any other means.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed other LEOs in the hallway searching for direction and guidance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a lot of LEOs at the south end of the hallway, but he did not recognize anyone and never received any instructions from anyone on the south side of the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall anyone from the south side of the hallway making decisions or taking charge of the situation (timestamp 01:59:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) portable service radio in a pouch on his armored plate carrier while inside Robb Elementary School, but he did not have an earpiece and could not hear anything being broadcasted. At some point while inside Robb Elementary School, the portable service radio fell out of the carrier, and it was not retrieved until a few days after the shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall if SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) communicated with anyone outside of Robb Elementary School, but assumed that if he did, it was with Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated while he was in the hallway with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he did not observe him on the phone or radio.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved closer to classrooms 111 and 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no formal discussion or plan about needing to breach the classrooms, and no one told them to breach or not to breach the classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed all the inaction led to a need for action. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought to himself that they needed to go. He did not recall discussing action with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but they both subconsciously communicated to each other that it was time to act (timestamp 02:21:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORTAC responds and if something needs to be done, they will act and deal with consequences later (timestamp 04:01:40).



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While standing in the hallway, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORSTAR, DRT, standing along the hallway holding a ballistic shield. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had the impression BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not all there, as he had a blank look and did not seem to respond to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) very well. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to give the shield to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because they needed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to perform paramedic duties. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that because he believed that when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the room, they were going to be shot by the barricaded subject. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not believe SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) statement was related to the possibility there were injured children in the classroom. An unknown LEO asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if the shield was rifle rated, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know as it wasn't his shield. Additionally, BORTAC did not train with shields, so he was unfamiliar with their use and rating levels.

As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached to make entry, a United States Marshals Service (USMS) rifle-rated shield appeared from an unknown LEO in the hallway near the "T-Intersection." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took possession and handled it like he would a riot shield, which he was trained to use during Mobile Field Force (MFF) training. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held the shield with his support arm, not his dominant pistol-firing hand, parallel to the ground. He learned after the incident that the shields were designed to be held with the support arm upright and perpendicular to the ground. The shield had a sling attached so it could be placed and draped around the neck. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) donned the shield over his neck and in front of his body with the rifle he borrowed from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) slung and hanging behind the shield.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to breach classrooms 111 and 112 at the same time but was not confident in the abilities of the LEOs in the second group who lined the hallway on the east wall and facing south. The LEOs in the second group were looking at BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for guidance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged to himself internally that he was probably going to be shot by one of the individuals in the hallway who were not as experienced or trained but possessed a lot of tactical gear (timestamp 01:54:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the classroom door to room 111. He was not aware if anyone ever tried to turn the handle to verify if it was locked (timestamp 01:51:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held the shield and moved into a position to provide cover for SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as he unlocked the classroom door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held the shield in a kneeling position behind and to the right of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The door opened outward towards the right where they were positioned. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved the shield in front of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide him added protection as the door opened, but quickly decided it was not effective.

With the door wide open, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) let go of the classroom door and it started to close due to the automatic closer attached to the frame of the door and the door itself (timestamp 01:52:07).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked someone in the second group along the east wall, north of classroom 112, to push a nearby chair over to hold the door open, but the weight of the door pushed the chair out





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of the way and the door closed again. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed the door and held it open while SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) transitioned behind BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Prior to entry, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted his tunnel vision started, and he was not thinking clearly. He mentioned that he should have used the key and opened the door because he had the shield. He also noted that the positions they used with the shield and opening the door were awkward and not tactically sound (timestamp 01:53:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed inside classroom 111 and called out what he saw to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the classroom was large and there was an adjoining door to the left into the next classroom. TXDPS Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was part of the second group along the east wall and asked if BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted a drone in the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) repeated the question verbally and asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he wanted a drone, but quickly realized that was foolish and they were wasting time when they needed to enter the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard an unknown LEO in the hallway shout that the shooter was in the ceiling or on the roof. Hearing that, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started visually scanning the roof tiles and quickly realized that was also foolish (timestamp 02:38:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that they remained at the threshold with the door open for what he believed was approximately 90 seconds.

He said there was a lot going on and they waited longer than they should have to enter the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they let the room breathe for too long with the door open prior to making entry. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted when the door was opened, the classroom was silent. There were no sounds of gunfire and no sounds from children or the shooter (timestamp 01:59:20).

While the door was open, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, enter the hallway and motioned for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to join them in the primary entry group. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) crossed in front of the open door and got behind SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was behind BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but heard SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) call for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately felt relief since there were three BORTAC teammates on scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was more confident with the situation and with entering classroom 111 and believed everything would have been okay regarding their entry even if only the three of them entered the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not request anyone else to join them in the stack to enter classroom 111.

Since classroom 111 was dark, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) unholstered his CBP-issued firearm and activated the pistol-mounted light (timestamp 01:58:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled thinking to himself, "Well fuck, this is it. Don't shoot any kids." He accepted they were entering the room and still believed that if there were any children in the classroom they were uninjured. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mind raced as he thought about whether he should go to the left or right upon entering the classroom because he was the only one with the rifle rated shield. He also recalled when training with his BORTAC teammates using marking cartridges, he was often shot during the training exercises near his femoral artery, and he did not want that to happen during the breach with real bullets.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) squeezed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shoulder to indicate the group was ready to enter. Once the squeeze was released, the primary group entered the classroom (timestamp 04:03:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rose to his feet and while slightly crouched, crossed the threshold into classroom 111. He moved to the left, which was straight along the wall with the door connecting room 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he believed if the shooter was in a hard corner and fired at him, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would handle it and shoot the individual before BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be shot. While in classroom 111, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed bullet holes in the adjoining wall, but it was still quiet and the adjoining classroom door to classroom 112 was open. Classroom 112 was also quiet.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cleared his corner and set up for entry into the adjoining classroom rather than focusing on the closed closet doors because open doors are the priority during dynamic breaching and entries. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was approximately 10 feet away from the closet in front of him in the corner of classroom 111, he was caught off guard when the closet door was kicked open from the inside (timestamp 04:05:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took a step backwards and slipped and fell onto his rear-end. While falling, he observed the shooter's black hair and recognized bright muzzle flashes at his eye level. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard the noise of the gun shots and immediately felt the shield receiving impacts. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned fire with three rounds, later confirmed to be four, before he felt the pistol become inoperable. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unsure if it was because of the shield or if he caused the stovepipe malfunction within the ejection port of the pistol. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) landed on his rear-end and bounced up still holding the shield. The shooting ceased, and he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) one step over to the right and up closer to the closet. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided contact over the deceased shooter and cover for the group. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) threw his CBP issued pistol on the ground after the stovepipe malfunction and transitioned to his borrowed rifle in preparation for clearing the adjoining room, classroom 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if anyone else entered classroom 111 besides him and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

While standing near the threshold of the adjoining classroom door, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt a hand on his shoulder, but he didn't feel a squeeze. He stated he did not know who the person was but knew it was not someone from his team. He then entered classroom 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved to the left and the far corner of the room and followed the wall heading north within the classroom. He observed two little boys with their arms raised up from under a sheet hanging from the shelf against the wall. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed the two boys by their arms, pulled them out, and sent them out of the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then noticed two teachers, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on top of a little girl and it appeared she was covering her, trying to save her and the other children (timestamp 04:10:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never fired any rounds from his rifle.



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Other LEOs entered the room and were immediately emotional. He stated they were screaming, crying, and seemed to be emotionally shutting down. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yelled at them to regain their composure because he believed that mentality would become contagious (timestamp 04:11:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) announced they needed Emergency Medical Services (EMS) in the room, but an unknown LEO stated to get the injured out of the classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) disagreed with moving people out of the classroom, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also unaware if there was a triage plan. After the shooting, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORSTAR, DRT, who stated they had a plan for triage, but everyone rushed into the classrooms and started doing their own thing. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed triage should have occurred, but instead LEOs took deceased children out of the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed an unidentified individual grab a deceased little girl by the ankle and drag her across the floor outside of the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after the breach, everything became massively chaotic (timestamp 04:12:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not check (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vitals, but observed she appeared to be losing consciousness. Her eyes repeatedly opened and then slowly closed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) removed the shield from around his neck and threw it. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and another unknown LEO grabbed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by her legs, and they carried her out the west entrance and placed her on the ground to the left of the door (timestamp 04:13:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put pressure on one of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) bullet wounds while SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, prepared a chest seal. The seal did not stick, and it was either because of all the blood or because it lost its stickiness. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was told by a BORSTAR member that the medical equipment, including the chest seals, were stored within bags and containers and exposed to extreme Texas heat. Once there were enough Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) working on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went back inside the building through the west entrance (timestamp 04:13:40).

After reentering the building, he heard a LEO say the shooter also had a pistol and showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a picture of the pistol. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized the pistol as the one he threw in classroom 111 after the pistol stopped working. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to classroom 111 and said an unidentified BPA handed him his pistol. The unidentified BPA told him to holster the pistol and not to remove the stovepipe malfunction. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) joined a group of other unknown LEOs and cleared some of the classrooms along the south hallway on the west side of the building using BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) borrowed rifle.

After clearing the classrooms, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the rest of the BPAs met outside at the tree to the north of the building. While at the tree, someone provided BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) water, and he washed the blood from his hands and arms. After about 10 minutes, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told them to go to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not reenter Robb Elementary School after this meeting. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put their gear away in BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GOV, they were stopped and questioned by a



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person BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned from media appearances that the person was BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station (CAR). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said neither he nor BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) any information, but it seemed like BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was fishing for information.

Upon arrival at UVA, Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, and Peer Support members talked to everyone in the muster room. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took pictures of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in his gear for the TXDPS Rangers. While there, the BORTAC BPAs learned that the shooter's girlfriend was going to carry out a shooting at the junior high school or high school. In response, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his team to Uvalde Junior High School and Uvalde High School. They were outside one of the entrances with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, for about five minutes, when an unknown BPA supervisor in a clean and pressed uniform exited the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the unknown BPA supervisor spoke to them like they were lazy, and that they should have been clearing classrooms from other schools. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) became frustrated because the unknown BPA supervisor could see they were all covered in blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he was at the schools for approximately 15 minutes.

At an unknown time, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked if he was available to go with him to the Uvalde Police Department Station (UPD) to take photographs of their uniforms for the TXDPS Rangers, as the photographs SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took were not sufficient. At this time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned the threat at the high school was not credible. While at the UPD, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and told him CPA Owens wanted the pictures taken at UVA. They returned to UVA and walked walk across the muster room in front of all the other BPAs while wearing their bloody uniforms. The Uvalde Police Officer took photographs of their uniforms and performed a round count of their bullets. Prior to deploying to the high school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cleared the stove pipe from the pistol in case he needed to use it again.

After taking photographs, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gathered with the other BORTAC members in the parking lot of UVA and received a new BORTAC uniform and set of boots from one of the team members. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he threw away his bloody uniform and boots in the dumpster at UVA.

After leaving UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back to his vehicle at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) and then BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove home. Two days later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a statement to the TXDPS Ranger, which in hindsight he believed was a bad idea and he should have taken more time to decompress from the incident.

Overall, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see anyone in command or control of the scene. The entire time he was in the hallway, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe anyone in charge. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew he needed to speak to his team leader, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the only individual doing anything. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a lot of USBP upper management but did not feel the Government Schedule (GS) 14s and above (supervisory level employees) or those with Incident Command (IC) training did anything pre-breach or post-breach. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear anyone give them the authority to handle the situation, but felt it was implied based on their



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uniforms, training, and experience as BORTAC members. In addition to tactical command, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed someone outside the school with a bigger perspective should have coordinated resources. He mentioned that the entire incident should not have fallen on his and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shoulders, rather it should have fallen on the shoulders of the initial responding LEOs. He mentioned that he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were in a tough situation with how to breach classroom 111. If they would have used a Halligan tool or some other breaching device instead of a key to open the door, it may have resulted in more LEOs getting shot in the doorway, and then BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would have had to figure out how to deal with the bodies piling up in front of the classroom door.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed that those tactically trained needed to get to the front of the line, as that is what their training expects. He believed their authority to respond to Robb Elementary School was due to USBP being the largest uniformed law enforcement presence in the area. He mentioned that USBP is often called to scenes to assist, and the lines of authority are often blurred when they are the most plentiful resource with the assets to help. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of USBP's peace officer status within Texas.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed that BORTAC is familiar with barricaded shooter protocols, which typically involved waiting-out the individuals, utilizing call-out methods, or deploying CS Gas. He added this is typically in a support role to state and local LEOs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also understood the active shooter response to stop the threat but did not believe this was an active shooter situation. Since the shooting, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended additional active shooter and breaching while utilizing shield trainings. Additionally, since the incident, BORTAC members within DRT are all issued and trained on breaching tools. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also obtained his level I Breacher Certificate.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (05:42:27). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the maps labeled 2-South of Uvalde, 3-Uvalde, 5-Robb Elementary School, 8-Robb Elementary School Layout, and 8.g1 and 8.g2-Robb Elementary School Layout. On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled from DRT to Robb Elementary School, then to UVA. After leaving UVA he drove to the Uvalde Junior High School and Uvalde High School. After leaving Uvalde High School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to the UPD Station, then back to UVA. He departed UVA to retrieve his vehicle from the desert and then drove to his residence. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he arrived at his residence at approximately 9:00 p.m. or 10:00 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received three photographs of sets of keys that were located at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to identify if any of the keys were the keys that were used to open the door to classroom 111 (Attachment 3) (timestamp 06:15:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a packet of photographs which identified other LEOs on scene that day. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not identify any of the LEOs as individuals with whom he had significant



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contact or conversations with while at the school. He could not identify any of the LEOs as someone in charge or command of the scene (Attachment 4) (timestamp 06:19:20).

During the interview, Management Program Analyst (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, entered the interview room suite and showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) video footage which she compiled showing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inside Robb Elementary School on March 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) watched the video footage and identified himself entering the west entrance of the school (Attachment 5) (timestamp 06:58:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided two separate text strings from his personal cell phone containing conversations with various BORTAC members and other LEOs on May 24, 2022 (Attachment 6).

- Text String One, on iMessage – Admin iPhones. The string included the following SOD DRT BPAs: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- Text String Two, on Signal Application – Del Rio Stash House Op. The string included unknown members of various local law enforcement agencies who exchange stash house information.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that sometime after the Robb Elementary School shooting event, the BORTAC BPAs discussed and wondered why the AMO pilot working at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) with them never landed and transported one or two of the BPAs to the Robb Elementary School shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the AMO pilot was in an A-Star aircraft, which is a smaller aircraft than the Black Hawk, but could have transported approximately two BPAs with their gear to Robb Elementary School.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Photographs of keys located on scene at Robb Elementary School.
4	Photographs of other Law Enforcement Officers on scene at Robb Elementary School.
5	Video footage of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entering Robb Elementary School.
6	Recorded videos 1-3 of the text message strings on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal cell phone.

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 16, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) audio and video recorded the interview using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified with Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	09/18/2023
Approved by:		Date:	

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AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he worked at AMO, Uvalde, and was a member of their peer support team. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on the day of the incident, he had gone into the office briefly and returned home. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had recently returned from an assignment in Puerto Rico a few days earlier and had all his gear with him at his residence. As he was sitting at home, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got a notification about an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the notification was through Facebook or maybe text but was unsure. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not remember what time she got the notification. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he initially thought the incident was a bailout. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that a bailout was when law enforcement attempts to pullover a vehicle and the occupants jump out of the vehicle and run. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got another notification about five minutes later at which time he figured it was a legitimate ent. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know which AMO air assets were flying but he knew he could help with communications with the air unit. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he planned to go to the Robb Elementary School command center and help coordinate communications to give the air units real time information since his radio was able to communicate directly with AMO aircraft. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was also an emergency medical technician (EMT) so he could assist with any casualty evacuations or triage if needed.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he grabbed his gear which included his tan rough-duty pants, tan AMO ball cap, body armor, and black shirt with a badge emblem. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had to go back to his office to grab his radio, his medic kit, and rifle. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it took him approximately ten minutes to get to his office. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once he arrived, he grabbed his radio, rifle, and medic kit, and asked if anyone had any updated information on the incident. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated AMO Supervisory Air Interdiction Agent (SAIA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde, told him the latest information was there was a barricaded subject at the school. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he left the office and went to the school driving a CBP vehicle with no lights or sirens. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it took him 10-15 minutes to get to the school.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he drove to the school, he heard on the radio that law enforcement officers were making entry and then he heard the “shooter was down.” AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after hearing this information, he figured he would not be needed at the command center to help with air communications. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard over the radio a request for medics, so he continued to the school to assist. Upon arriving, he had to park down the street because of the traffic. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he ran toward the school and saw some Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) troopers and asked them where he was needed. They told him to head toward the entrance of the school. He approached the school by the front fence when someone handed him a female child on a backboard. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who handed the child to him and described the child as Hispanic with long dark hair. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he placed her down on the sidewalk and did not see any massive bleeding or trauma on the child. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he checked for a pulse and did not find one on the child. He checked for a pulse again and did not feel a pulse but knew they needed to get the child out of view from the public. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he was tending to the child, a male civilian began running towards them while screaming. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated some people grabbed the male before he could reach them. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who grabbed the male. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the scene was chaotic and he did not know if the male knew the female child. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he knew he had to focus on



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helping patients, so he helped load the female patient into an ambulance. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed some BORSTAR (USBP Search, Rescue, Trauma Unit) EMTs working on a child on a gurney by the air conditioning unit outside the school on the northside. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recognized one of the BORSTAR EMTs, Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), Texas, and asked him what they needed or how he could help. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to just find something to help with.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered the school by the west entrance and observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, along with other BORTAC personnel inside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they were still clearing the building. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard someone say not to go into one classroom because “they were all code black.” AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he knew code black was a designation for patients who were deceased. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he exited the school from the south door to get out of the way and saw BORSTAR BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and other personnel providing medical treatment on a child outside. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked if they needed help. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe the child having major trauma but noticed the child needed an open airway. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inserted a nasopharyngeal airway into the child to open the airway and told everyone there were ambulances by the front of the school. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not sure they knew ambulances had arrived. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) helped get the child on a gurney and moved to the ambulance. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted getting the child into an ambulance, looked around, and saw EMTs lined up outside the school. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a TXDPS trooper was posted outside the entrance preventing anyone from entering.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was waiting around, he saw Uvalde Police Department Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked him if he was ok. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was good and that he got a call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saying there were children still locked inside classrooms. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) so he followed Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) toward the portable classrooms. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted in helping evacuate the children from the portable classrooms and took them to a collection point on the far east side of the school. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was just hanging around after that to see if he could assist in any other way when an officer in a black uniform came up and said there was another threat on Facebook from the suspect’s girlfriend that she was “going to finish the job.” AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who the officer was or which law enforcement agency he was with. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed the information to Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who told him they needed help with security at the convention center. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went with Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go help there. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he communicated with the AMO aircraft and relayed the latest information to them.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after arriving at the convention center, he noticed BPAs on the outside perimeter, and it looked like TXDPS was in charge. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see any children at the convention center but did see families, parents, and faculty looking for their children and trying to unite children with families. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at some point, while they were at the convention center, they were informed there was no additional threat. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not remember how they received the information. A school administrator met with Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and handed him some papers and asked him to deliver them to the command center at Robb Elementary School, which was located at the funeral home across the street from the school.



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AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they went back to Robb Elementary School and Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went inside the command center. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized he was no longer needed so he went to his office to drop off his gear and then went home between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he talked a few times with SAIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and AMO Director of Air Operations (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio, on his personal phone while at the civic center.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was certified as a basic EMT and received his training through USBP in July 2014. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was nationally registered and licensed through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember who the medical director was for DHS. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that to keep his license, he needed to complete 40 hours of refresher training every two years.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he has been through active shooter training through CBP in 2021.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he knew he did not have peace officer status in Texas.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map the route and movements he took to Uvalde (Attachment 2).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not remember the exact times associated with his response to the incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**EXHIBIT 187**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 16, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) south of Uvalde, with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, as part of the UVA brush crew unit. At approximately 12:00 p.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were working a group in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) when BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who has a child at Robb Elementary School, received a text from his spouse who asked what was going on at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his supervisor, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, instructed him to respond to Robb Elementary School (Timestamp 00:24:39).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated while he was driving to Robb Elementary School with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they were redirected to the Civic Center in Uvalde. During the drive, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a radio communication of a 9-1-1 call from inside the classroom and that a child was providing information there were 8-9 victims in her classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he heard sporadic communication over his radio due to another agency being “patched in” and to the best of his knowledge, also heard “they” were going in. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never heard anyone say to not breach or to stand down. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he also heard over the radio; the subject was down prior to him arriving at the Civic Center (Timestamp 00:36:33).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 1:00 p.m., he arrived at the Civic Center. When he arrived, he described the atmosphere as chaotic and people panicking. He also said law enforcement officers formed a line to safely offload children from buses. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were no confrontations with parents or the public. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke to a Department of Public Safety Investigator who informed him there was information about a second shooter and their target was the Civic Center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he remained at the Civic Center to provide security and assist with crowd control. After the children were safely returned to their parents, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the UVA and then went home.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there was no command and control at the Civic Center and law enforcement officers were self-initiating work to control the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he only heard something about keys or status of the doors to classrooms 111 and 112 in documentaries after the incident. Regarding authority to respond, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said all LEOs should respond to these types of incidents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew he did not have peace officer status in Texas and could not cite a specific authority to respond (Timestamp 00:41:10).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-8 respectively. The map labeled 1. North Uvalde was not applicable. The map labeled 2. South of Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the approximate location of where he was working on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) and his route into Uvalde, TX. The map labeled 3. Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route into Uvalde, TX. The map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, was not applicable. The map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 5.a. was not applicable. The map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde TX was not applicable. The map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable. The map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, was not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 16, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning her involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, she reported for duty at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) wearing her USBP rough duty uniform. On said date, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed during the UVA muster that USBP personnel were involved in a school shooting incident.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the mood of the room at muster as somber and stated the BPAs present at muster appeared to be disheveled and despondent (timestamp 00:16:43). USBP Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), addressed the BPAs who were involved in the incident and told them they did what they needed to do.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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At the conclusion of the muster, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went outside and saw BPAs distraught and crying. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) specifically recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who was dressed in a red polo shirt and khaki cargo pants. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she noticed blood stains on his pants (timestamp 00:20:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she did not ask any questions and just made herself available to provide moral support.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received information that the girlfriend of the Robb Elementary School shooter was going to finish the job the shooter started and was instructed by a Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) to respond to Dalton Elementary School in Uvalde, TX. She added she could not recall the SBPA's name. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated the travel time from UVA to Dalton Elementary School was approximately eight minutes. Upon arriving at the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered a uniformed law enforcement officer (LEO) and told him she was there to assist. The LEO directed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) where to park and told her to provide perimeter security and to assist with traffic control. While on scene at the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not render any medical aid (timestamp 00:37:38).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that it was common for local law enforcement agencies to reach out to USBP for assistance and said USBP usually responds in a secondary role.

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). The maps are labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route she traveled from her residence into Uvalde on May 24, 2022. She indicated she traveled from Texas State Highway 173, then on Highway 57 to Highway 140, and then to Highway 117 into Uvalde. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified Dalton Elementary School, where she responded on May 24, 2022. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have a body worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not have any text messages or emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) produce any reports concerning the incident (timestamp 00:37:50).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 189**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 16, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was off duty on personal leave at his residence when he received a telephone call from Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), at approximately 11:45 a.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him about a shooting or shooter at Robb Elementary School and asked if he was responding. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that all UVA BPAs were instructed to respond to the school.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was Acting BORTAC Commander at the time, therefore he sent a text message to BORTAC Supervisors SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT; and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, notifying them to respond to the incident (timestamp 00:29:37). In addition, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent a text message through a BORTAC text group, which included all DRT BORTAC members, ordering them to respond (timestamp 01:31:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received notification from his team that they would be there as soon as possible as they were in the field near Eagle Pass, Texas, with a group of apprehended undocumented non-citizens. In addition, their government owned vehicles (GOV) were stuck in mud.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that because the situation involved a weapon at school and other agents were responding, he knew he needed to respond (timestamp 01:00:24). As a result, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to come back on duty and respond to the school. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was getting ready to respond, Acting Patrol Agent in Charge ((A)PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, called him, but before (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said "I'm way ahead of you, I already have the BORTAC guys heading that way." He continued to notify (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was going to return to duty and was responding to the school to see if he could get more information about the situation. (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decision.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed his residence in his unmarked GOV, and it took SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approximately 30 minutes to get to the school from the moment he was notified. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the roads were congested between his home and Robb Elementary School due to lunch time congestion and the amount of law enforcement responding to the school. The radios were patched between Uvalde Police Department and the USBP network and he described the amount of radio traffic as chaotic. He stated he approached Robb Elementary School from the south on Old Carrizo Road and stopped next to a police vehicle that was blocking Old Carrizo Road on the corner of West Cargile St. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know which agency the vehicle belonged to or who the officer was. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked the officer what the situation was and where the Incident Command Post (ICP) was located. The officer did not have any information and directed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) towards Geraldine Street. He headed that way and parked on the north side of Geraldine St and the corner of Perez St, directly in front of the west entrance of the school.

Upon arrival, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) priorities were to determine who was in command of the incident and to gather enough information to identify how he could help. He stated he was taken aback by how calm it seemed when he arrived at Robb Elementary School. He introduced himself to multiple groups of officers and felt there was a low sense of urgency outside of the building. He felt as though each group of officers would redirect him to a different group of officers and no one had any information (timestamp 00:34:04). As he walked towards the west entrance of the building, he came across one officer who told him: "This guy just shot at the school, he ran inside, they got him pinned in" (timestamp 00:34:06). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first thought based upon the information he received was to implement a gas plan, a tactic where tear gas would be used to force the subject out of the room.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the building through the west entrance and, once inside, he saw multiple officers positioned with weapons pointed down the hallway. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that was the moment he realized he was walking into an active scene. He immediately decided to return to his vehicle and put on his Kevlar helmet and then returned inside the building to obtain information. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he went back in the building “there was no stimulus, there’s nothing really going on.” The information he received was fragmented and conflicting at times. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing the following statements: “the guy shot at the room”; “we only have pistol shields”; “we tried to get him, but he shot at us through the door”; “the door is locked”; “you can only get in there with a key”; “he’s by himself”; “he’s dead”; “he’s got hostages”; and “he killed kids” (timestamp 00:35:12). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the information he was receiving as fragmented and contradictory.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at some point he ran into Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who briefed him on the situation as a possible barricaded subject. He informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he will help him as much as possible and to do whatever he needs to do. TXDPS Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the building to gather more information. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based upon TXDPS Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) statement, he understood that he had his support to help in whatever way possible (timestamp 00:35:58).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed that the shooter was in classroom 111, as the door to that room had bullet holes and that was where other law enforcement officers (LEOs) were saying the shooter was located. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was handed a ring of keys and immediately went towards the door to try to open it; however, before he got to the door an officer suggested he test the key on a different door first. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought that it was a good suggestion. He proceeded to test the keys on the janitor closet door and found that the keys did not open the door.

While SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was testing the keys to open classroom 111, he saw a group of unknown officers to the south of classroom 111 closer to the door than he was. He felt the group was trying to speak to or negotiate with the shooter to get him to surrender because they appeared to be talking to the door. He did not remember what was being said but remembered hearing something about coming out or to stop. He did not know who was speaking to the door. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no communication between the groups to the south of the classroom and the group gathered by the T-intersection of the hallway. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in charge or what their plan was. He added he did not tell anyone that he was looking for ways to open the door and just acted. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what the group of officers located south of the classroom were planning or what was stopping them from doing anything, so he continued developing his plan on how to get the classroom door open. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it seemed like the group of officers on the south side of the hallway were attempting to deescalate the situation while himself along with others on the north side were attempting to get through the door (timestamp 02:35:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he learned the keys did not work, he began to consider a breach of the door using tools. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed BORTAC Level 1 Breacher Basic training in September 2014 and is qualified on all BORTAC non-explosive breaching tactics (timestamp



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08:23:35). The only breaching tool SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had in his vehicle was a Halligan Bar, which is like a pry bar, and is deployed by placing one end between a door and the door jamb, using a sledgehammer or a ram to drive the pry side into the gap, and leveraging the door open. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have a hammer or ram to use with the Halligan bar, but decided to attempt it as it was possible to breach a door with just the bar.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retrieved the Halligan tool from his vehicle and tried to open the janitor closet door with it. He determined it would take too long to open the door without a ram or hammer. He asked for a sledgehammer from the assembled officers, but none was available. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that if he had tried to open the door with just the Halligan tool and the shooter shot through the door again, it could have resulted in a situation where a LEO was injured without any progress on stopping the shooter.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered that Texas Park and Wildlife Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a map of the school that he described as rudimentary. He stated the map did not show details of the classroom and did not include the fact that classrooms 111 and 112 had a connecting door inside. The map was essentially a printed rectangular box with labeled printed squares containing numbers indicating the classrooms. The map may have included the restrooms, as well. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other officers assembled near the T-Intersection of the hallway but could not determine where the subject was located, or if there would be children in classroom 111 based on the map. Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the map he had was the only one he knew of.

It was apparent to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the problem he needed to solve was the locked door, as it seemed to be what was preventing the gathered LEOs from acting. Once SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) determined the locked door to classroom 111 was the problem, he fixated on getting it opened.

Initially, the information he had led SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to believe that the subject was barricaded in the room, so he developed a gas plan. However, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized that if there were casualties or wounded, gas was not a viable tactic to use (timestamp 02:59:33). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed more information about the interior of classroom 111 and told officers gathered at the T-intersection of the hallway to breach the windows to the classroom; however, he felt as no one was responding to him.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not feel he was in charge nor that his word had “weight” with the officers inside the building. Even so, he knew he was going to “do something” to put an end to the situation. Although SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew he was not in charge, he felt that because the keys were given to him, it was expected for him to act (timestamp 02:14:20). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt frustration that his suggestions were not being acted upon by the officers in the area. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he needed information about the interior room, as that would dictate the acceptable risk for his response.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was by the west entrance of the building on the phone with an unrecalled agent when all the sudden he either heard something or saw that the officers inside the



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building reacted to a stimulus and immediately made his way towards the hallway. The group of officers on the south side of classroom 111 said the subject was shooting at them through the door. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that the bullets were going straight through the walls, and he thought the shooter was enticing them to enter an ambush (timestamp 02:46:56). He felt the shooter wanted the police to come to the door. Not knowing there were children in the classroom, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not want to spend time at the door “wiggling it with the Halligan tool and exposing people to be killed without opening the door.” SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear the shots (timestamp 00:42:45).

Meanwhile, BPAs from Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) arrived, and he remembered instructing them to develop a plan for triage and treatment of wounded. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the BORSTAR BPAs they were to act in their capacity as paramedics during the response and knew they had developed a triage plan on how to respond before he breached classroom 111. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware the paramedics had a plan in place, although he did not know the specific details. He knew the plan included a system of where to bring the injured to be treated and a place to bring any deceased victims. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing agents from SOD, BORSTAR, DRT and identified them as SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Shortly after, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a second set of keys on a lanyard from whom he believed to be TXDPS Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He tested the keys on the janitor’s closet door and they successfully open the door. When the door to the closet was opened, he looked in and saw another door in the closet and bullet holes in the wall.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that SOD, BORTAC, DRT BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at some point while he was testing the second set of keys. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a BORTAC Sniper and had his sniper rifle with him. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go to the east side of the building and set up a shot into classroom 111. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gave BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approximately 10 to 15 minutes to find a vantage point that would allow him to see into the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) over the radio that the windows to room 111 were tinted and the blinds were closed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took three different positions and could not gain a visual into the classroom. In addition, a TXDPS Trooper deployed a drone outside of the building hoping to obtain a visual inside classroom 111; however, the drone was not able to see into the room either. At this point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to breach.

As SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) waited for the results of the drone reconnaissance, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached him with a rifle-rated ballistic shield. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to take the shield and line up in a stack to enter the room. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lined up behind BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Zavala County Sheriff’s Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was behind him. He did not know who else was in the stack or if there were additional officers. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, other than SOD BPAs, he did not order any other LEO to take part in the stack (timestamp 02:15:47).

The stack then moved to the door and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the key to open the door to classroom 111. He pushed the door open but it had an auto closer, so the door started to close.



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) leaned into the room, outside of the shield protection, and grabbed the lanyard on the key ring and pulled the door open again. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to use a chair to block it open. Somebody put a chair in front of the door. The door continued to close so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held the shield and propped the door open. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that normally, the BORTAC entry tactic would be to open the door and move in quickly to surprise the subject. However, because SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew the shooter was aware of their presence, he paused to assess the room. This is when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned that classrooms 111 and 112 were connected. At this time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in front of the door but behind the ballistic shield, holding the door open and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was looking over BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shoulder. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard an unidentified person say something about the shooter being on the roof, causing him to quickly pause and look up at the ceiling.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated classroom 111 was dark, the lights were off, and the blinds were closed. He could not make out any details of the room. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see light coming into the room from the connecting doors to classroom 112. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed the shooter was either in the blind corner of classroom 111 or in the adjoining room. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, and called for him to join the stack. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran across the door opening to join the stack and as he passed the opening, he said, "We are going in there?" SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was directly behind him, but later learned that Zavala County Sheriff's Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed behind him.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) squeezed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shoulder to initiate the movement inside the room. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if any other officers followed into the room behind him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved straight forward and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved to the right to cover the right corner. As he cleared the right corner of the room, he saw a pile of what appeared to be deceased people. As he turned to rejoin BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and enter classroom 112, he heard a sound. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the door to the closet in classroom 111 was kicked open by the shooter and he simultaneously saw the muzzle flash from the shooter's weapon. He returned fire while moving toward the shooter, passing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He remembered seeing the shooter, who he described as tall and slender, coming out of the closet in a fighting stance while shooting. He was wearing all black and a plate carrier, but SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unaware if the carrier had plates inside. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the shooter's hair swaying back and forth as rounds struck him. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the shooter shot a significant number of rounds. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he aimed at the upper chest area of the shooter and continued to fire at him until he dropped to the floor. As he dropped to the floor, his weapon fell away from him.

Once the shooter was down, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stood over the shooter and held his position to protect the scene. He did not feel a need to handcuff the shooter as there was a lot of damage to the torso. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was confident the shooter was dead (timestamp 03:39:07). While he was standing over the shooter he heard officers flooding the room. He also heard officers screaming and losing their composure. He kept his back to the room most of the time as his focus was on the shooter.





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During the shooting, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lost track of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and assumed he had been either wounded or killed and evacuated from the room. Later he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who told him that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was helping evacuate children and that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been hit and was in the hospital.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that officers were trying to help inside the classrooms with the victims; however, they were not giving the paramedics time to assess victims. He saw officers carrying and dragging victims outside to the hallway. He also saw officers moving the children in the piles searching for children with signs of life. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see any medical treatment but saw activities that appeared to be triage. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a woman with signs of life being carried out of the room as well as children walking out of the classroom (timestamp 04:52:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed in the classroom over the subject until TXDPS ordered all non-paramedics to exit the building. He left through the west door and remembered seeing a victim on the sidewalk outside being worked on.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, DRT, outside the west door and PIAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to gather with his team by a tree north of the building. At the tree, BPAs mustered with Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told his team to conduct a partner check for injuries and to meet at UVA. Once at UVA, the team learned about a second shooter in the area and deployed to provide security. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were called by the TXDPS Troopers to return to the station to take pictures for evidence. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the station and later returned home, arriving at his house at approximately 8:00 p.m.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORTAC is the highest trained tactical team in the Del Rio area and all law enforcement agencies in the Del Rio Sector know "BORTAC solves the problems that regular law enforcement cannot solve". SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORTAC members are trained to respond to calls that regular officers normally do not respond to. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the example of BORTAC helping to track fugitives, serving warrants with Sherriff's offices, or responding to subjects with weapons. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that in situations where the scene is not border related, BORTAC will usually receive a request for assistance (timestamp 01:05:01).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that BORTAC responds to situations where other law enforcement agencies do not have the training or equipment needed to respond. BORTAC will respond to a situation, determine which agency is in control of the situation, and explain what capabilities BORTAC can provide to help the agency. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see any indications that there was a chain of command or anyone in charge of the scene during the incident at Robb Elementary School. The only senior officer that he met was TXDPS Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who told him to let him know what he needed. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he felt TXDPS Ranger (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was telling him to take care of the situation (timestamp 02:19:37).



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had the support from his SOD, DRT chain of command. He stated he was in constant communication with PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he had “top cover”. Based upon this, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood that his actions were authorized by BORTAC leadership (timestamp 02:25:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, the BORTAC team did not deploy as a team. He explained that BORSTAR, the medical team for SOD, DRT, wears the same uniform as BORTAC, which could have caused the confusion of the belief that a BORTAC team was on site when it was just himself. BORSTAR’s role that day was to establish a medical triage and provide medical aid to the wounded (timestamp 02:39:30). Further, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the situation was not a USBP led incident. He stated there were many other agencies and none were in communication with one another, causing confusion and a lack of information (timestamp 02:40:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was acting under the assumption that his mission was to get the door to classroom 111 open (timestamp 01:37:35). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated “The only thing keeping me from acting was the locked door... it seemed to be the one thing keeping everyone from getting through... I was fixated on how to defeat that door” (timestamp 02:18:29).

Once SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was handed the first set of keys, he felt that it was expected he take charge of the situation. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never asked for the keys, and it seemed to him that they just showed up. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall who gave him the sets of keys (timestamp 02:31:57).

At one point, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard there was a female student calling 911 from inside the school. He stated he asked if there were children with the shooter, but he did not get a response. He stated he was unable to determine if there were people in the classroom but thought, if the student was inside the room, was she calling because the shooter was dead, or was the shooter allowing the calls to be made? He stated that it was later confirmed that the student on the phone with 911 was in classroom 112 and he recalled looking at the map of the school and thinking that she was not in the same classroom as the shooter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he did not have knowledge at that time that classrooms 111 and 112 were joined on the inside (timestamp 04:31:05).

From the moment SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived on scene, he was receiving “random” information and there were many different conversations happening at once about what was going on (timestamp 02:40:43). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that an empty classroom would not be worth the risk of LEOs being injured or killed, while it would be if there were children in need of saving. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt he was faced with deciding what action to take amidst a lack of reliable and “official information” (timestamp 02:40:43).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, having had the proper resources, he could have managed the door on his own and made entry into the room. He explained he was not going to wait for BORTAC to show up to breach the room. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once the door was opened, he would have



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made entry regardless of who was making entry with him because the situation needed to be ended (timestamp 02:51:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he only used his radio to communicate with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when he was in the exterior of the building, to announce he was going to breach classroom 111, and to announce the threat was down (timestamp 03:21:10).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware that shots fired by the shooter were passing through the walls and doors and he was aware of the concern for line of fire. However, it was a risk that needed to be taken to stop the situation. At the time, with the information and assets that he had, it was the only course of action that he could come up with (timestamp 04:28:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not see any organized treatment of the victims. Once the room was cleared, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see any one person in charge of performing triage and providing care for victims.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from the moment he arrived at the school until he entered the classroom, he never saw any children. He further explained that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) are enrolled in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) schools, and they were already out of school for the year. Therefore, he assumed that there were no children in the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed there were children in the classrooms upon entering classroom 111, when he saw the pile of children with the teacher in the corner of room (timestamp 04:33:58).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 05:21:28). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively (Attachment 2). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his movements on May 24, 2022, using the map labeled 2- South of Uvalde, TX; 4-Uvalde, Texas Schools; 5- Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX; 7- Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX; and 8.a./8.f.- Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde TX. On map 2, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the location of the BORTAC team when he notified them. On map 4, he labeled the Uvalde Schools which he responded to. On maps 5 and 7, he labeled his route and parking location at Robb Elementary School. Lastly, on map 8.a./8.f./8.g., he labeled his location at Robb Elementary School. All other maps were not applicable.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the text string he sent to the BORTAC Supervisors on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 05:56:26). The text string was video recorded during the interview by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR Cyber Investigations. During the interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a memorandum titled Litigation Hold Notice for U.S. Customs and Border Protection Employees. The Subject of the memorandum stated Litigation Hold Notice for Administrative Federal Tort Claims Act Claims Concerning Robb Elementary School Shooting in Uvalde, Texas, on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 09:18:35).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was the person who instructed DRT BORTAC agents to respond to Robb Elementary School. He added that in emergency situations such as the



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one at Robb Elementary School, verbal authorization can be given for BORTAC to assist. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know CBP’s policy concerning BORTAC’s response to mass shootings, hostage situations or barricaded subjects; however, he stated that there was a moral obligation as LEOs to respond and assist at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 06:59:59). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he communicated with his chain of command, who he identified as (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as soon as he was notified about the incident. He stated he was given authorization to figure out what the situation was at the school and act as he saw necessary. He also stated he was the person who initiated and authorized the breach of classroom 111 (timestamp 07:02:40). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is aware he does not have Texas Peace Officer status (timestamp 07:05:10).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body worn camera (BWC) footage from May 24, 2022 (timestamp 07:24:58). The run time shown to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began at 11:09:47 and ended at 11:09:52. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to identify himself walking into the school on the BWC footage.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his opinion of an active shooter is someone who is roaming free or in an area shooting at people. A barricaded subject is someone behind a barricade such as a wall or in a room. A barricaded subject can be an active shooter if they are in the room or behind the wall with people they have shot, injured, or they have hostages. With the information SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had available on the day of the incident, his understanding was that there was a subject who shot at people near a school and then ran into a room or office. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if it was an active shooter or a barricaded subject, and stated the issue to him was to defeat the obstacle of the barricade. He never knew there were victims until he entered the room and saw the victims (timestamp 08:27:40).

Lastly, based on the information he had at the time the door to classroom 111 was locked. However, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that he never saw anyone touch the door before he entered. He added he did not personally check the door to verify it was locked (timestamp 08:32:11).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On February 13, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on his way to work at DRS when he received a phone call from Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRS, at approximately 1:45 p.m. (timestamp 14:27:35).

WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he was willing to travel to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) as a Peer Support Member to assist agents who were already on scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when he arrived at DRS, he retrieved an unmarked patrol vehicle and left Del Rio at approximately 2:15 p.m. (timestamp 14:30:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he traveled alone to Uvalde and did not activate the vehicle's overhead lights and siren while enroute. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled via U.S. Highway 90 eastbound directly to Uvalde (timestamp 14:30:50).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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While enroute, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear any communications transmitted via radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at approximately 3:15 p.m., he arrived at UVA (timestamp 14:31:18). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked to the front office to find out where he needed to go and was directed to go to the muster room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he spoke to an unknown USBP supervisor in the muster room and was told to standby and assist other BPAs who were arriving at the station from Robb Elementary School. The supervisor asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to wait for BPAs to approach him for assistance rather than to seek them out. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that as BPAs were coming into the station, none of them appeared to be in the mood to talk at the time, and he was not approached for peer support assistance. Later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, USBP, Del Rio Sector (DRT), who thanked him for his assistance.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that after activity had subsided at UVA, he called DRS and asked if it was okay for him to leave Uvalde and return to Del Rio. After being granted permission to leave, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left Uvalde between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. (timestamp 14:36:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not come into contact or render any aid to the public while in Uvalde. BPA stated he believed USBP's role during the incident was to respond and provide assistance.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 191**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 17, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was dressed in his full rough duty USBP uniform and was assigned to the UVA Planning Team. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing a call regarding an active shooter at Robb Elementary School broadcast over the radio as he was placing his lunch in a microwave at approximately 11:45 a.m. (timestamp 00:20:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initial thought was the incident was probably related to a bail out (“bail out” refers to occupants fleeing from a vehicle following a police pursuit or vehicle stop) and would be quickly resolved (timestamp 00:25:24).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon hearing the radio transmission, he ran to the armory and saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, inside the armory. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed an M-4 rifle and several magazines. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have a USBP vehicle, so he asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he could ride with him (timestamp 00:26:44). While en route, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called UVA to get clarification on the school and the location. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated they arrived at Robb Elementary School approximately ten minutes after the call. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) loaded both rifles.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arriving near the school, they approached a stop sign and parked in the middle of the road. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being in a rush and ended up leaving his cellphone in the car. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed people running towards the far west side of the school and noticed a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) trooper in the corner near the east side of the west building (timestamp 00:30:43). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked towards the school, he heard someone say, “Be careful” because the shooter was shooting out of a window in the direction of a book bag that was on the ground. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked for the book bag, but did not see it (timestamp 00:31:14). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled running with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who was to his right. As they were running, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) magazine fell out of his M-4 because he had not seated it correctly, so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to secure his “shit.”

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that up until that point, he had not heard that the shooter had shot or killed children (timestamp 00:32:14). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran towards the west side of the school, near the funeral home, he saw a parent running towards the school and realized the situation was not related to a bail out. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the school through the west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled pausing outside the doorway for approximately a minute to provide cover prior to making entry with them (timestamp 00:33:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he entered the school, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, standing in the middle of the doorway, Uvalde Police Department (UPD) Sergeant (Sgt.) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) kneeling, and another officer behind Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:34:16). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recognized him to be a police officer because of the uniform (timestamp 01:25:55). BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were behind the officers trying to ascertain details of what was going on and where they were needed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was positioned in a fatal funnel (“fatal funnel” refers to doorways where one can easily be seen but difficult to move out in case of incoming fire) without a long arm rifle nor a ballistic vest. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get a vest and a long arm. Before BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed the area, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked him where the gunman was and if he knew what was going on. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him he did not know what was going on and said that nobody was saying anything. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he noticed blood on Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ear (timestamp 00:36:11).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked law enforcement officers (LEO) who were in the hallway if they knew in which classroom the shooter was located and if they had cleared the classroom but he did not get a response. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that because he was not getting a response from



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the other LEOs, he asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what was going on. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him they said it was a barricaded subject situation (barricaded subject is a term generally meaning a person, believed to be armed, who has taken a position in a physical location that does not allow police access and is refusing police orders to exit). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to identify who told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the situation was a barricaded subject (timestamp 01:28:23). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that because they had called the situation a barricaded subject, no one was moving. At the time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt the standdown posture and the blood on the officer's ear did not add up and he did not feel right about the situation (timestamp 00:38:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him it was a barricaded subject and the Federal Bureau of Investigation from San Antonio, Texas, was en route and said, "It's going to be a long day, boys." Based on all the information relayed to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed those relaying the information knew what was going on and that the subject was possibly in a classroom by himself or with a teacher or a student (timestamp 00:39:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at the time, he questioned and tried to make sense as to why they were getting SWAT (special weapons and tactics) and a negotiator from San Antonio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked again if anyone had cleared the classroom, but did not get a response and from that point the situation turned into a waiting game (timestamp 00:39:32).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that in an active shooter situation, the main priority is to stop the killing and stop the threat. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was taught in active shooter training that whoever arrived first should take whoever was in uniform, create a team, and address the situation (timestamp 00:37:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) come back without a vest and told him he could not be there without a vest. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then left and came back shortly thereafter with a vest. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was attempting to put on his vest when they heard the windows of the classroom being broken to evacuate the children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from where he stood, he could hear as the windows were broken (timestamp 01:30:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned around and as he went outside, the vest flapped up like a cape, which made BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) chuckle (timestamp 00:40:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the comment was far from the truth and explained that his monicker at the UVA was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that everyone seemed to think he never had a bad day; that was where the moniker came from (timestamp 02:41:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed Constable Johnny Fields, Uvalde County, had command and control inside the school (timestamp 01:28:39). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described that Constable Fields wore a polo shirt and possibly khaki pants. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed Constable Fields walk back and forth from the T-intersection and heard him talking on his phone about getting a SWAT team and negotiator (timestamp 00:42:21). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Constable Fields directed everyone to turn off their radios and told a TXDPS trooper not to stand in the westside of the middle of the hallway near the fatal funnel (timestamp 01:31:15). Constable Fields told a



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TXDPS trooper that he could not be there, it was too loud, and the TXDPS trooper responded to Constable Fields, “We are clearing classrooms, you’re not the boss of me.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that approximately 15 minutes after arrival, he asked again about the clearing of the classrooms because he saw LEOs had removed someone from the classrooms across the other side. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knocked on the door and no one answered. Another LEO knocked on the door and announced himself and a teacher came out of the classroom (timestamp 00:45:10). During this time, a LEO brought a riot shield into the building (timestamp 00:45:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) still had not heard any noise indicative of an active shooter; no gunshots fired nor children screaming or pleading for help (timestamp 00:46:49). Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) bloody ear was the only indication that something had happened. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked him about his ear and Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him the shooter shot through the door and grazed him (timestamp 00:47:08). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he noticed a SWAT pin on Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) uniform (timestamp 00:47:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know about the large presence of LEOs outside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that while he was inside the school, his world revolved around the seven or eight people in the hallway with him (timestamp 00:48:08) including BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Constable Field (timestamp 02:05:43). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) everyone had their radios off, and he heard some screaming but was unable to tell where it was coming from (timestamp 00:48:18). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he knew the shooter was down the hallway but did not know if he was inside classroom 111 or 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it was hard to get information from the local LEOs and felt they were not forthcoming (timestamp 00:48:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that 10 to 15 minutes later, when Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC), entered the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) still did not know the shooter had shot children. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrival took a huge weight off BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shoulders because he knew if anyone was going to be able to take over the situation it was going to be SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was confident in SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a BORTAC member and a supervisor (timestamp 00:50:09). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he told and signaled SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to talk to Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because he had a graze on his ear. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the shooter had shot through the classroom door (timestamp 00:51:05). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, “If there are shots fired, then it’s go time.” SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told them that his team was not there and asked those around him if they were willing to go in. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) every BPA said yes (timestamp:00:51:25), UPD Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said no (timestamp 01:40:28). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that at that very moment, another LEO entered the area and relayed there was a female child who called 911 stating there were multiple injuries and deceased children inside (timestamp 00:51:40). UPD Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he had bangs and gas (timestamp 00:51:57). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him, “OK, great, we can use them.” UPD Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then realized the bangs were training bangs, so he told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that all he had was gas. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if he had gas masks. UPD Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked Uvalde County Sheriff’s Office (UCSO) Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he replied he thought they had some gas masks outside and went to retrieve the masks (timestamp 00:52:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no specific



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plan of action discussed with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 02:05:11). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that as they donned the masks, another report of a 911 call came through saying there was a girl still alive and she was talking when suddenly they heard three or four shots (timestamp 00:52:58). After they heard the shots, they moved in towards the classroom, but someone from the rear called and stopped SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:53:13). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they all stopped to wait for SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not sure exactly where the shots came from, but he knew it came from down the hall toward the classrooms (timestamp 01:42:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the shots were loud. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw other LEOs on the south end of the hallway and believed Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department, Chief Pete Arredondo was located there (timestamp 00:53:26). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the time of the incident, he did not know Chief Arredondo.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they formed two entry stacks and said SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in the middle of the stack. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an unspecified LEO asked if the door was open or closed and asked if they had a breaching tool (timestamp 00:54:03). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked over to the side of a wall, removed his gas mask, and hung it on a door handle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed another door on his left side that had bullet holes and he then realized they were standing in the fatal funnel. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he heard they needed keys to open the doors, so he asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if they could get the keys to open the door next to him in case they needed a place to retreat (timestamp 02:07:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said someone brought keys; however, the keys did not open the door and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he hung the keys on the doorknob (timestamp 00:55:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the only keys he held were the keys that did not work (timestamp 02:19:48). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know where the keys came from. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not sure if all the keys were tried; he only tried one key on the key ring (timestamp 05:08:12).

[Agent Note: “stack” is a term for a formation used in law enforcement when a team forms a single file along the entrance or doorway to a room where they believe a threat is located.]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that a breaching tool was brought to them, but they were unable to use it because the doorframe was too slim and it opened inward. Because of this, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they also needed a sledgehammer to drive in the breaching tool to pry the door open (timestamp 00:55:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing someone say to give them a minute because they were trying to locate the master key. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then saw an unspecified LEO try a key on the door to what he thought was the electrical room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to describe the key. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know why the stack stopped short of classrooms 111 and 112 (timestamp 01:41:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see anyone try to open the doors and understood wiggling the doorknobs would prevent the element of surprise (timestamp 03:04:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were preparing for “go time” when he heard a TXDPS trooper tell SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to hold up and first look at the schematic of the classrooms for “a visual” (timestamp 00:56:31).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated other BORTAC and USBP Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) members started to arrive, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, carrying a ballistic shield (timestamp 00:57:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked him if he knew what was going on and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him he did not know much, but apparently there were kids inside. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that since he was a BORSTAR member, to give up the shield so his medical skills could be used. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gave the shield to another BPA (timestamp 01:01:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as the entry teams prepared to attempt entry, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was stopped by a TXDPS trooper who told him to hold on and asked if SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would allow them time to fly a drone into the classroom (timestamp 00:58:21). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, then arrived with his sniper rifle and told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to give him time to set up outside and to see if he could get a visual into the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that if he could get a clear shot, he would take it (timestamp 00:58:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that each time SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got stopped, it delayed the entry process by five to ten minutes.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they again formed two entry stacks with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) positioned at the front with more BORTAC members on his stack (timestamp 00:59:24). At the time, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was wearing a radio earpiece, but some information was not getting through over the radio because of a hot mic. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard the shooter wanted "suicide by cop" (time stamp 1:00:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that it was the shooter's choice, there were children hurt, "so fuck him." The stack then prepared to make entry. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he then heard a guy, later identified as Chief Arredondo, say, "BORTAC moving into place, BORTAC is lining up." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the time, he wondered who was the guy giving a play-by-play of what they were doing (timestamp 01:01:30). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called out to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC, who took position behind SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) followed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:02:24). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as lining up with the primary entry stack, but was unable to identify their positions within the stack. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said his entry stack consisted of Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) positioned first, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) positioned second, followed by a LEO dressed in shorts and a tactical vest, and a UPD SWAT officer (timestamp 01:04:21). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they opened the door to classroom 111 and the door started to slide closed; SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said "get the door." The entry teams then announced their presence and started to move in (timestamp 01:04:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood the plan was for his entry stack to enter classroom 111 and for SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entry stack to enter classroom 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said things did not go as planned because the shooter emerged from a closet, so the second stack merged with the first. Upon entry, shots were fired, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he dropped to the ground and lay flat on his back but immediately flipped to a prone position and pointed his rifle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw the team in the classroom and knew it was not safe to shoot. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stood back up, and noticed he was almost the last man in the stack. Once most of the stack entered, someone yelled, "Halt!" BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP International Falls Station, Minnesota, yell, "Halt!" heard screaming, and he too yelled, "Halt!"



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said someone noticed a teacher and kids on the floor, ran towards them, then BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard someone announce it was clear (timestamp 01:07:11). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the classroom as dark with a smell of gunpowder and said he felt his ears ringing (timestamp 01:07:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed they were trying to pull the teacher out, so he moved a table and saw kids piled in a corner (timestamp 01:08:37). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said all the agents rushed in and were grabbing kids, but they were struggling because the children were slipping due to the presence of blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started to walk towards the other classroom but stopped because he saw the shooter and noticed that a UPD lieutenant had entered the classroom and pointed his gun at the shooter while he blurted out, "Mother fucker look at you now." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he felt the UPD lieutenant was going to shoot him again, but he saw the UPD lieutenant walk out of the classroom (timestamp 01:09:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the UPD lieutenant did not touch the shooter; he only pointed his gun at him (timestamp 02:11:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then walked towards the other side and came across a gun on the floor which he initially thought was the shooter's gun. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he later found out the gun belonged to the BORTAC BPA who was holding the ballistic shield. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned the gun had hit the shield and jammed during the gunfire exchange, so the BPA dropped the gun and held on to the shield (timestamp 01:10:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went back to where the pile of kids were and observed only two kids were left. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had already moved some of the deceased kids from the classroom to the designated triage area (timestamp 02:13:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the kids were deceased because there was so much blood like a pool of blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) trying to lift a kid, but his M-4 rifle was in the way so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to allow him to help him. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned the child, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "My (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is dead." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the boy looked just like (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he lost his composure. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) kicked the table he moved earlier and said he smelled blood and said it was slippery. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked out of the classroom and went outside because he felt he could not be in there. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the south door, he saw a deceased girl (timestamp 01:11:04). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the girl was covered with a blanket (timestamp 02:15:23). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that he had been in combat in Bosnia, that he served as a contractor in Iraq, so seeing deceased people was not new to him, but he explained that seeing deceased children was something different and the way the shooter shot the children was the hardest to see because they were all in a corner huddled together and it was a scene that he would never forget (timestamp 03:09:28)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that Acting Patrol Agent in Charge ([A]PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, asked him if he was okay. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him no and that the shooter had killed all the children (timestamp 01:13:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he later learned (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Robb Elementary and often thought what he must have felt when BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the shooter killed all the children.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that when he first went outside, the image of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) carrying a female child was on his mind, so he felt the need to look for him and be with him. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked outside, he saw a teacher, Mrs. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) receiving medical treatment



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outside the west door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed LEOs providing chest compressions (timestamp 02:16:27). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also saw people running with stretchers and noticed lots of vehicles and ambulances. At that moment, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized the full scale of the incident (timestamp 01:14:18).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they instructed all the USBP personnel to meet under a tree but was unable to recall who gave the instruction. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPAs being drenched in blood and said they had skin stuck to their uniforms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had never seen so much blood.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not render medical aid to anyone (timestamp 02:18:54). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned he assisted one teacher inside the classroom when they were clearing the classrooms (timestamp 02:19:02).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were told to go back to UVA for a briefing with Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT (timestamp 01:15:24). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who served as the chaplain, drove him back to the station. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the station, USBP personnel were informed they were going to receive services, to expect things were going to get chaotic with reporters, and they were granted two days of administrative leave (timestamp 01:17:54). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he departed UVA at approximately 2:00 p.m. when he received information regarding the shooter's girlfriend making a threat, but he did not respond.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the only instruction he received while he was in the school was from Constable Fields who told him to turn off his radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated that Constable Fields was in command and control inside the school (timestamp 02:27:26:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not identify who was in command and control for the USBP personnel (timestamp 02:27:07). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took control of the situation (timestamp 02:37:04). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not directed to respond to Robb Elementary School and he was never directed in any way by anyone inside the school (timestamp 01:47:29). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he had no peace officer authority in Texas and did not know if he had the authority to respond (timestamp 02:26:25). However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he had been with USBP for 18 years and had a duty to respond (timestamp 02:22:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed if USBP had been the first agency that arrived at Robb Elementary School, then they would have entered the classroom, but because they were not first, USBP fell into a support role (timestamp 02:35:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the poor communication negatively affected command and control. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that calling it a barricaded subject set the tone for how the incident was handled (timestamp 02:22:42). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that approximately five months after the incident when Chief Arredondo's interview was broadcast was when he realized it was Chief Arredondo who initially called it a barricaded subject (timestamp 01:38:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had not realized the incident had taken seventy-seven minutes because to him it appeared that everything had happened so fast (timestamp 01:18:39).





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he believed USBP and he were not trained on how to take over an incident from another agency (timestamp 02:25:33). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that another mishap was when USBP, Uvalde County Sheriff's Office, Kinney County, and UPD patched their radios. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that because each agency used different verbiage and communication methods, the lack of communication impacted officer safety, and it resulted in LEOs turning their radios down or off (timestamp 02:29:36).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not wear a body camera on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 02:59:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not send any e-mails, text cellular messages or write a report regarding the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 02:59:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned he was interviewed by the TXDPS Rangers and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding the Robb Elementary School incident (timestamp 03:00:11). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he felt obligated to speak to the TXDPS Rangers, but he felt the need to speak to DOJ because they were considered the subject matter experts regarding active shooter incidents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the interview with DOJ as a panel interview.

CBP OPR interviewers provided BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated his travel route from UVA Station to Robb Elementary. On the map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the area where they parked the vehicle and indicated where he saw the TXDPS trooper and lastly, where he entered the school. On the map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the area they were posted and the path as they approached the classrooms (timestamp 01:54:24).

CBP OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) still shot images depicting the LEOs in various stages of the May 24, 2022, incident (Attachment 3). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified Sgt (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the one with the blood on his ear, Lieutenant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the LEO who was pointing the gun at the shooter when he was deceased, Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the person who provided the gas masks, and Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as being in the stack with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified Constable Fields as the LEO that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized as being in command inside, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as possibly being the TXDPS trooper that told Constable Fields he was not in charge of him, and Chief Arredondo as the person who broadcast the play by play before the breach (timestamp 01:34:04).



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CBP OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) photographs depicting separate sets of keys. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to identify between the photographs which set of keys he tried on the door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it was possible it could have been either the one that the TXDPS Ranger was holding in the photograph (timestamp 05:08:25) or the one that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used to open the door on the photograph (timestamp 05:35:58) (Attachment 4).

CBP OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a schematic of the T-intersection which also included the layout of the classrooms (timestamp 02:53:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where they were stacked prior to the breach. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also marked in the schematic how everything looked and where the decedents were after the breach (Attachment 5).

Investigative Analyst, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, assisted CBP OPR interviewers by presenting BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with video footage from the hallway camera of Robb Elementary School from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 6). The video presented to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ranged from approximately start lapse time 32:05 to end lapse time 32:55 (timestamp 05:05:01). During review of the video footage, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself at lapse time of 32:15 and identified BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UPD Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Constable Fields.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Photos of law enforcement officers at Robb Elementary School reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
4	Photos of keys reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
5	Schematic labeled Robb Elementary reviewed and labeled by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
6	Robb Elementary School hallway video footage from May 24, 2022.

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 192**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 17, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) wearing his USBP training uniform for a scheduled use of force training day when he initially received information about an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. During a training break, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard over the radio that local law enforcement officers (LEOs) were requesting assistance at a local school for a school shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he immediately went to the UVA armory and grabbed a rifle and hard plate body armor. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, took a marked Government owned vehicle (GOV) and responded to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 08:21:25). While enroute, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) communicated with USBP dispatch and confirmed that the school in question was Robb Elementary School (timestamp 08:30:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated no one ordered him to respond to Robb Elementary School and he decided to respond on his own (timestamp 10:58:40).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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Upon arrival, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked at the northeast corner of the school off Geraldine Street. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs on scene ran through the front yards of the homes along the northside of Geraldine Street, utilizing parked vehicles as cover, and made their way to the west entrance near classroom 132. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed Sergeant (SGT) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS), operating a handheld radio and cell phone and believed he was in charge. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it seemed like SGT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what was going on or what to do (timestamp 08:31:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs entered the west entrance and encountered several local LEOs at the T-Intersection looking down the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after a few minutes, he inquired with the local LEOs about the situation; however, several of the local LEOs did not seem to know what was going on or what to do. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, eventually, one local LEO pointed down the hallway and identified the classroom where the shooter was possibly located. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed by the local LEOs that when they initially arrived, the shooter fired upon them (timestamp 08:34:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was further told that it was a barricaded subject situation (timestamp 08:41:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inquired if there were students or teachers in the surrounding classrooms, to which he did not receive a definitive answer from the local LEOs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and other BPAs took it upon themselves to begin evacuating classrooms near the west entrance, to include classrooms 131 and 132 (timestamp 08:36:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled someone providing a large key ring, allowing him to enter classrooms 131 and 132, which were locked (timestamp 09:03:55). During the evacuation, two teachers were located but there were no children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then believed there was a possibility that there were no students in the classroom with the barricaded subject (timestamp 08:41:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was informed by an unknown LEO that the door to the classroom with the barricaded subject was locked and could only be locked or unlocked from the outside (timestamp 09:08:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) along with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, relieved the local LEO who was covering the door to the classroom with the barricaded subject. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and additional BPAs at the T-Intersection began to discuss a plan for if or when they heard active shooting from within the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed that if the shooter began firing, they would go in. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed by a local LEO that a hostage negotiator was on the way and to stand by (timestamp 08:39:50). Based on this information, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that the local LEOs were now in command of the scene and BPAs were there to assist (timestamp 08:42:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was at the T-Intersection for approximately 30 minutes (timestamp 08:53:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the negotiator arriving and entering through the south entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the negotiator attempted to communicate with the shooter; however, he did not recall the shooter ever responding. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the negotiator appeared to use the shooter's name in the communication attempts. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall the name of the negotiator and stated the attempted negotiations lasted a few minutes (timestamp 08:54:55).



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After the negotiator left, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), Del Rio Sector (DRT), arrived on scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) briefed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the information they knew at the time. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) overheard SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tell a local LEO that he and the other BPAs could attempt to make entry into the classroom if the local LEO wanted. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall the name of the local LEO, nor did he hear him respond to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) talking to at least two local LEOs, which led BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to believe that the two local LEOs were in charge of the scene (timestamp 08:56:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated local LEOs brought in tear gas, gas masks, and a pistol rated ballistic shield. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered BPAs attempting to “problem solve” the situation, as they believed the doors to the classrooms were locked.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing approximately four gunshots, prompting him, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the other local LEOs to advance down the hallway towards the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled someone supplying a working key for the classroom doors and stated that a plan was quickly developed. The plan was for SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to use the key to open one classroom door, give the key to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to open the other classroom door, and make a simultaneous entry into classrooms 111 and 112. During the planning, a LEO cleared the janitor closet near classrooms 111 and 112 and noticed bullet holes through the wall. The LEO warned everyone that the shooter had at some point already fired through the walls (timestamp 09:04:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at some point after the four shots and prior to the breach, he recalled that someone mentioned there were reports of a 911 call coming from inside one of the classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated this was his first indication that there were victims in the room with the shooter. The caller indicated that there were victims in the classroom that were shot and needed medical attention (timestamp 10:35:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that, just before they made entry, someone provided an outdated map of the classrooms, which BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed did not show the connecting door between classrooms 111 and 112 (timestamp 10:38:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opened the door to classroom 111 and looked inside; however, there was no immediate response by the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that someone tossed him the set of keys; however, by the time he found the right key, he was told to disregard the initial plan and that they were all going to make entry through classroom 111. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then threw the keys aside and the teams prepared to make entry through one classroom. Shortly after making entry, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated “all hell broke loose.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a barrage of gunfire and dropped to the floor in the hallway. By the time he got to his feet, the shooting was over, and he entered the classroom to assist with victims (timestamp 09:06:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the classroom as being dark, with the smell of blood and gunpowder in the air (timestamp 10:47:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed victims and took them to the medical triage area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall what others were doing in the classroom but



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described the scene as “mayhem.” At the medical triage area, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to assist BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) who was providing medical aid to a female victim with multiple gunshot wounds. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were able to regain a pulse on the victim, prompting them move her to an ambulance outside for additional medical care (timestamp 09:11:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reentered the school and assisted other LEOs with clearing the rest of the building and did not find any additional victims or subjects. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited at the south entrance door, where he observed, additional medical aid being administered to victims. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the EMTs needed additional medical supplies, so he ran back to the triage area, gathered the requested medical supplies, and delivered them to the EMTs (timestamp 09:16:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the medical triage area to assist; however, there was no additional assistance needed. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was then informed the school was a crime scene and no one was allowed to enter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was instructed to muster at a large tree on the north side of the school. Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, addressed the group of BPAs and instructed them to report to UVA (timestamp 09:23:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, upon returning to UVA, BPAs mustered and were once again addressed by CPA Owens. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) changed out of his uniform, which was covered with blood, and sent text messages to his family and friends to let them know he was okay. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) overheard a report indicating the shooter’s girlfriend made additional threats at other local schools, prompting BPAs to respond; however, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at UVA and then went home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated UVA management created a list of all BPAs that were on scene at Robb Elementary School and provided the BPAs with access to peer support (timestamp 09:27:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of a specific statutory authority allowing BPAs the ability to respond to this type of incident in an official capacity. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he felt that it was his duty as a BPA to respond and assist. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he attended a CBP three-day active shooter training but did not recall any scenarios that involved locked or barricaded doors. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was his opinion that BPAs responded to Robb Elementary School in a support role to assist local LEOs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any negative contact with the public while on scene (timestamp 11:02:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown two video clips from the T-Intersection hallway camera (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself entering the west hallway door and again at the T-Intersection when the four shots were fired from within the classroom (timestamp 12:16:55).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Un-sanitized T-Intersection hallway video.

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 17, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The Authentication Code was (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned day shift and transport duties. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had responded to a possible vehicle containing migrants off Highway 55 when he heard over the UVA radio there was a possible active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to Robb Elementary School utilizing emergency lights and sirens by following directions from his cell phone. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall what information was relayed over the radio.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked his vehicle near the funeral home located on the south side of Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he put on his ballistic vest and walked towards the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a truck had crashed into a ditch near the school which he described be a wrecked truck with the door open. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see anyone near the vehicle (timestamp 01:04:01).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he approached a group of civilians near the funeral home area, an unidentified male stated, “You better get in the school and do something. If you don’t have the balls to do something, give me your fucken gun and I will take care of it.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained to the unidentified male that law enforcement would take care of the situation and that he should not enter the school (timestamp 01:07:11). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to walk towards the west entrance of Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he entered the west entrance of Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, at the “T” intersection of the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing the BPAs pointing rifles down the hall (timestamp 01:11:33). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited Robb Elementary School through the west entrance and made his way to the south side of the school to the south entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing Texas Department of Public Safety troopers and Uvalde Police Department (UPD) officers standing near the south entrance.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he then went to the west entrance of the school and entered. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being just inside the school at the west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the scene as chaotic and with no one in charge. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated too many BPAs responded to the scene contributing to the chaotic situation.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that while positioned within Robb Elementary School near the west entrance, he told a UPD officer that he was there to assist in any manner. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the UPD officer he would go with them in the event they decided to make entry into the classroom (timestamp 01:18:16). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the UPD officer asked how much longer before the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) team arrived on scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised the officer the BORTAC team should arrive within 30 minutes. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he felt officers and agents would die if they attempted to enter the room because they did not have the proper equipment to do so.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of any children being in any of the school classrooms (time stamp 01:23:23). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not assist with the evacuation, nor did he witness the evacuation of any children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not witness any supervisors from any agency enter the west entrance to provide guidance or direction. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled telling BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, to leave the school because he was not wearing a ballistic vest. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, was present and witnessed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entering the school without a ballistic vest.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled three shots were fired from the classroom. When these shots were fired, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the shooter must have killed himself. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described a line of officers and BPAs were lined up to make entry into the room. Shortly thereafter, no one entered the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know why entry into the room was not made. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear nor was he told why entry was not made (timestamp 02:17:13). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall who was in the line of officers and BPAs.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that an unknown individual handed him a set of keys. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the ring of keys to open classrooms 131 and 132. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the same key to open both classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gave the keys to an unknown officer (timestamp 02:24:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed the unknown officer walk out of the west entrance with the set of keys.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he witnessed several members of the BORTAC unit show up at the school and preparing to make entry into the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORTAC was in charge of the scene (timestamp 02:29:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he witnessed BORTAC BPAs enter classroom 111. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard shots fired. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered classroom 111, he saw the shooter lying on the floor. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then turned to the right and described seeing several desks against the wall with numerous children lying under the desks (timestamp 02:35:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got on their knees to start taking children from under the desks. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled taking approximately 4 children and passing them to other BPAs in the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated one of the children, a girl, made a sound, therefore he told others in the room the girl might be alive. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said all the other children did not show any signs of life. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled exiting classroom 111 and walking towards the "T" intersection. Upon arriving at the "T" intersection, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, provide aid to a male child. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by getting him needed supplies (timestamp 02:42:01).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he exited Robb Elementary School through the west entrance. Upon doing so, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed BPAs providing medical aid to a female teacher. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing many officers standing around watching the BPAs providing aid to the female teacher.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was told to muster near a big tree located near the front of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw many BPAs who were upset. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, said a few words and instructed all BPAs to report to UVA. At UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told to remove his uniform due to the large amount of blood on the clothing and was provided a new uniform.

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers showed parts of the video labeled (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself near the west entrance door at the 10 minutes 29 seconds mark of the video. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself again on the video using the keys to unlock classroom doors 131 and 132 at the 13 minutes 39 seconds mark.

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting Robb Elementary School, Robb Elementary School Layout and Robb Elementary School Layout (Attachment 3). The maps were labeled 5, 8a and 8g, respectively. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the location where he parked his USBP vehicle, the locations he interacted with members of the public prior to arriving to the west entrance and the shooter crashed vehicle. On the map labeled as 8a Robb Elementary School Layout, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted the west entrance, the location within the hallway where he and other BPAs



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stacked prior to entering classroom 111 and classroom 112. On the map labeled 8g Robb Elementary School Layout, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted his movements within classroom 111, the location of the shooter and the location of children.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that on May 24, 2022, he did not have a body worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any text messages or emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) produce any reports concerning the incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Video reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 194**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 18, 2023, Special Agent (SA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, interviewed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde, TX. At the time of this interview (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was employed with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and in training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA. Immigration and Customs Enforcement OPR SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was present for the interview. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working as a Border Patrol Agent-Intelligence (BPA-I) at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) on day shift which started at (b) (7)(E). At around 11:30 a.m., SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) vehicle drive past him near Uvalde High School at a high rate of speed with all emergency equipment activated. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the trooper responding was Sgt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TXDPS, who was best friends with Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD) (timestamp 01:37:30).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
Approved by:		Date:	

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SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he followed the vehicle due to his duties in intelligence and eventually ended up near the intersection of Grove St. and Geraldine St. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited his unmarked government owned vehicle and spoke with an unknown plain clothes TXDPS trooper at the intersection who stated there was a shooter in the school and asked him to call for assistance. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made a call to UVA to ask for assistance and stated, “There is a shooter at the Robb School; all units respond.” (timestamp 00:22:40).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he donned his vest, and he only had a Glock 26 handgun with 11 rounds. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran towards the school and entered the west door of the west wing of the school. As he walked inside, he noticed several officers in the hallway who had just taken fire from the shooter. He recognized Staff Sergeant (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department (UPD), Lieutenant (Lt.) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UPD, and Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Lt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he thought he had been shot and was bleeding, which was later determined to be a shrapnel wound. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard two shots fired while taking cover in the hallway (timestamp 00:36:22).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked where the shooter was located and was told he was down the hallway on the right. There was a chair near the door. Lt. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, “We need to go back in there. There are kids in there” (timestamp 00:30:00).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he verbalized he was “with them to go in,” and they started moving towards the classroom. An unknown person in the hallway told everyone to “hold up” and make a plan prior to making entry (timestamp 00:30:38).

During the interview, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made several attempts to identify the unknown person that said to hold up, including reviewing pictures and video of the officers in the hallway, but no positive identification could be made.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated more law enforcement officers from a variety of agencies began to show up. Two individuals known to SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde County Sheriff’s Office (UCSO), entered the hallway. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the two UCSO deputies left the hallway and moved to the south doorway of the school building to provide coverage and ensure the shooter did not exit those doors. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed from the west door through the parking lot. While he walked past the outside of the school building, he saw a bag of ammunition and magazines on the ground.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after arriving at the south side of the building, he covered the hallway door and the southeast corner of the building at approximately 11:48 a.m. At some point, he was alerted that kids were going to be evacuated through the windows on the west side of the school building. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran to the first window of classroom 102 and assisted in getting the children and teachers out through the window. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved to the next window north of him, broke the windows, and assisted in the evacuation of children and teachers.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that between 12:15 p.m. and 12:50 p.m., he was alerted to an unknown injured person in the parking lot area. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a certified emergency medical technician



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(EMT), went to his vehicle and retrieved his EMT bag. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he placed his EMT bag on the ground near the parking lot so others could use it, but he never rendered any aid at that point in time.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he moved back to the south side and covered the east side of the school building. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed several other law enforcement officers near another school building on the southern area of the school campus. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran to the first set of classrooms, 19 to 23, and assisted in evacuating individuals. After evacuating the classrooms, he moved north to the next row of classrooms, 13 to 18, and assisted in the evacuation of individuals. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went to the cafeteria near the front of the school and assisted in evacuating 30 to 50 students from the cafeteria. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) eventually moved back towards the south doorway of the building. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was told by unknown officers, "The Chief is talking to him." After the incident, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood "Chief" to be Chief Pete Arredondo, UCISDPD (timestamp 01:02:40). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during the incident, he assumed that command and control of the incident was under Chief Arredondo or that the USBP Tactical Unit was talking to the shooter.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he moved towards the door, he heard several gun shots, which he assumed to be a breach of the classroom. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the hallway from the south doorway and moved north towards the classroom at approximately 12:50 p.m. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw a plain clothes Border Patrol agent (BPA) stumbling in the hallway and two other individuals helping him up and moving him towards the south doorway. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were a lot of law enforcement officers in the hallway against the wall as he walked past them towards the first classroom that was breached, classroom 111. As he approached the classroom door, he saw (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a teacher, carried out of classroom 112 (timestamp 01:05:00).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon entry into the classroom, he saw the shooter directly in front of him in a closet. He walked over and saw he was deceased and then assisted in getting child victims out of the classroom (timestamp 03:06:00).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no one in the classroom directing anyone on who to carry and in what priority. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) carried a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and a second (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall the order in which he carried them out of the classroom. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the three victims to the north intersection in the hallway but was unaware of any medical triage area set up. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was no one person directing where to place the victims.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he walked into classroom 112 and saw a teacher lying on top of six to eight children. From his viewpoint, the adult was lying on the children to shield them from the shooter (timestamp 01:08:30).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a BPA in green uniform yelled that if you were not an EMT, to get out of the classroom (timestamp 03:18:00).





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SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went into the hallway near the north intersection. He spoke to Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who asked for his assistance in moving the deceased children from the hallway into classrooms 130 and 131. He stated they picked up each child and placed them on the ground in the classroom. He tried to find something in the classrooms to cover them. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he moved eight to ten victims into the classrooms (timestamp 03:22:00).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the west doorway and saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, also an EMT, perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and chest compressions on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) appeared tired. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he took over and assisted with CPR compressions, placed her on a stretcher, and loaded her into the ambulance. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed she had already passed away when she was being placed in the ambulance (timestamp 01:15:40).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was an acting SBPA with DRT at that time, arriving at the scene and checked in with them. He retrieved his EMT bag from the parking lot and brought it back to his vehicle.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was told that Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, was going to address all USBP personnel at a tree on the north side of the building. CPA Owens spoke briefly to everyone and asked them all to meet at UVA at 2:00 p.m. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to his vehicle and departed the incident scene by himself.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went to UVA for the muster called by Chief Owens. He said he did not recall what was said at the muster. At some point, a report came out there was another possible shooter at the high school. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were at the high school, so he responded with another BPA to the high school. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted in the evacuation of children at the high school until 5:30 p.m. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the threat proved to be not true.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he was departing the school, he noticed a UPD officer was dehydrated, so he rendered aid until an ambulance arrived. After the ambulance departed, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA, retrieved his vehicle, and went to his residence.

Interviewers provided maps to SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde, south of Uvalde, the City of Uvalde, Uvalde schools, and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:44:00) (Attachment 2). The maps were labeled one through eight, respectively. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using map four of Uvalde schools, map five of Robb Elementary School, and map eight of Robb Elementary School layout.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not identify who was in command and control at any time. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed Chief Arredondo was the only person he remembered being



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mentioned that could have been in charge. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember any active command and control being initiated.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's role in the incident was to be in a backup capacity, and USBP had a responsibility to respond (timestamp 04:14:00).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was certified as an EMT in 2018. He was only certified nationally and not with the State of Texas but believed he could render aid as an EMT in Texas with no issues (timestamp 04:13:00).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 20, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is a member of the DRT Special Operations Detachment (SOD) USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) and was assigned to administrative functions at DRT on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 00:12:56). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dressed in a multi-camouflage combat duty USBP uniform and was assigned a USBP unmarked brown Ford F-150, government owned vehicle (GOV).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was advised of a possible active shooter at Robb Elementary School either verbally or via a cellular text message (timestamp 00:13:36). Following the advisement, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) briefly spoke with Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, about the possible active shooter and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to respond (timestamp 00:23:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the exact time that he deployed to Robb Elementary School but said it was late in the morning.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) travelled in his assigned USBP GOV with the emergency lights and sirens activated and travelled via east highway U.S. 90. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) listened to radio communications and said the radio communications were bad, but recalled the following radio broadcasts: barricaded shooter, shooter was on the roof, and shooter was down (timestamp 00:31:28). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated it took approximately one hour to get to Uvalde.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said law enforcement vehicles could not access the road into the school and had to park about a couple hundred yards from Robb Elementary School. A resident of a nearby home gave BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) permission to park his GOV in his yard (timestamp 00:14:31). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the status of the situation, so he gathered his gas mask, M4 rifle, two (b) (7)(E) mags, three pistol mags, and ballistic plates (timestamp 00:34:29). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) collected his tactical medical bag consisting of trauma supplies, tourniquets, airway adjuncts, gauze, chest seals, needles, hot and cold packs, Intravenous (IV) supplies, Intraosseous Infusion (IO), and soft litter (timestamp 00:33:45). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was getting all his necessary items, he heard a radio transmission requesting Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) at the school (timestamp 00:15:09).

As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the school, he noticed a heavy presence of law enforcement officers to include Texas Department of Public Safety troopers, USBP, Uvalde Police Department officers, and plainclothes officers (timestamp 00:37:28). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the scene as very chaotic, with officers and agents walking towards and away from the school (timestamp 00:36:40).

As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the west entrance door, he saw a BORSTAR agent dressed in multi-camouflage pulling out an adult female who was later identified as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a medic bag was needed and saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, starting to work on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had two wounds, one in her abdomen and on her right arm near her armpit. One of the BPAs treating the woman attempted to put on a tourniquet, but the wound was too high on her arm, so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) packed the wound with gauze and wrapped an ACE bandage around her to create a pressure dressing on the wound. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was conscious, breathing, and made eye contact with him when he began to treat her. As (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was being treated, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she lost her pulse, so they initiated CPR and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pulse was regained. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that an ambulance pulled up to the front of the school and a gurney was brought out and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was placed on the gurney and taken to the ambulance for transport to a hospital, as she needed the standard of care available at a hospital (timestamp 00:15:59). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the last person to be treated.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the exact time he arrived at Robb Elementary School; however, believed he arrived after the shooter was killed because he never heard gunfire.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not enter the school, once (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was transferred to the ambulance, he walked to the side yard of the school where BORSTAR agents were congregating with Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the following BORSTAR team members present at Robb Elementary School: SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT (timestamp 00:47:05).

Following the meeting, BORSTAR agents were directed to report to Uvalde Station to be addressed by CPA Owens (timestamp 00:18:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) along with the rest of BORSTAR members walked away with bloody uniforms (timestamp 50:19:00).

SOD received a message that the girlfriend of the shooter had made a threat saying she was going to finish what the shooter had started at another school (timestamp 00:18:57). BORTAC immediately deployed to different schools in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to Uvalde High School. At the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Tucson Sector, Arizona, who informed him that a student from the high school needed medical care. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked the male student's vitals, placed a cold pack on his head, and determined the boy was not injured, but emotionally upset. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spoke with the student and the student's father to calm the student. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed at the school for a couple of hours assisting the school principal with the release of the students (timestamp 00:19:00).

According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP's role in the incident was to respond and address the shooter (timestamp 00:51:57). It is common for local law enforcement agencies to request assistance from USBP in a support role (timestamp 00:54:18). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP is trained to respond to active shooter situations. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he is not aware of a statutory authority that allowed USBP to respond; however, he believed he could as a law enforcement officer (timestamp 00:52:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned he had taken the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) (timestamp 00:53:07). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained in ALERRT, he learned that in active shooter situations, the priority was to stop the killing and stop the dying (timestamp 00:53:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing over the radio that someone was trying to talk to the shooter but did not know who broadcasted that transmission (timestamp 00:56:43). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also heard on another radio broadcast something related to keys and a door being locked (timestamp 00:57:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in command of the scene and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if anyone from USBP was in command and control of USBP personnel at the scene.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was not wearing a Body Worn Camera (BWC) and he did not draft any reports or emails concerning the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:02:31). Other than providing patient care to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not exercise authority impacting any individual's movement during the incident of May 24, 2022.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is a certified Emergency Medical Technician (EMT). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) highest level of medical training is EMT basic. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was first certified as an EMT for USBP in 2018 at DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) underwent the Individual First Aid Kit and the Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) training (timestamp 00:28:14). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is registered with the National Registry Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMT). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is not licensed with the State of Texas; however, he is affiliated with the Department of Homeland Security. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the medical director that oversees the medical protocols for USBP and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, the DRT medical coordinator (timestamp 00:26:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was certified to instruct USBP personnel in TCCC training.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described his knowledge of how to handle a mass casualty incident as the following: deal with the threat first; triage by prioritizing injured victims, assess the level of stability, and refer the individuals that need to go to a hospital.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is designated as the USBP BWC coordinator for DRT; therefore, he reviewed the BWC footage related to the Robb Elementary School incident that was turned over as evidence to OPR (timestamp 00:1:21:30).

During the interview, OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). These maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he travelled East 90 to Uvalde from Del Rio, TX. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he travelled through Geraldine St. to Robb Elementary. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he parked on Geraldine St. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 8.a Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he was by the west entrance and treated patient (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in west doorway. On the map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 196**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 14, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned as a field supervisor with the DRT USBP Search, Trauma and Rescue unit (BORSTAR). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working near Eagle Pass, Texas, when he heard radio transmissions of a school shooting or active shooter at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:16:12). He immediately called SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and informed him of the situation occurring at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and agreed to deploy BORSTAR personnel to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:17:39).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly after, a CBP air unit informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they were heading towards Uvalde due to a school shooting (timestamp 00:17:56).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he instructed, via radio, DRT BORSTAR personnel to deploy. The BORSTAR personnel he deployed included SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Agent (BPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing a BPA say he recovered a bag with magazines and a rifle (timestamp 00:20:12).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to contact SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Tucson Sector, Arizona, who was assigned to the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC), DRT, at that time, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT, to inform them of the shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:22:04).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while en route, he activated his lights and sirens on his unmarked government vehicle. As he arrived, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed vehicles blocking the streets leading to Robb Elementary School and decided to park on the southeast side of the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing someone say via radio, "They've got him in a classroom, in an office, and he's a barricaded subject" (timestamp 02:24:19).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he exited his vehicle, he began to grab his gear and was approached by an unknown male civilian. The unknown male civilian wanted to know what was going on; SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him he did not know. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked the civilian if he could help clear the roads to allow emergency vehicles in. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard someone ask via radio where incident command was located; another unknown person replied there was no incident command (timestamp 00:25:13).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he grabbed his tactical medical bag, which was equipped to treat approximately three patients and included an intravenous preparation kit, gauze, and occlusive dressing (timestamp 00:27:20). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also had two smaller medical kits on his chest rig. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed his M-4 rifle and two fully loaded magazines and began running towards the west side of the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not wearing a body-worn camera (BWC) (timestamp 02:51:04).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he approached the west side of the school where the incident occurred, he entered the building through the west entrance. As soon as he walked in, he recognized SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT, who was the acting BORTAC commander. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) where the shooter was and why had he not been killed (timestamp 00:30:15). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him the shooter was in a classroom with a metal door, a metal frame, and the door opened outward. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled asking SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if someone was attempting to negotiate with the shooter (timestamp 00:31:10).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an unknown Uvalde Police Department officer informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that Chief Pete Arredondo, Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD), was trying to negotiate with the shooter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed no one was in



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command on scene. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the most experienced, tactically trained person on scene but did not feel as if SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in charge. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed UCISDPD would be in command of the scene since he was informed Chief Arredondo was trying to negotiate with the shooter (timestamp 02:18:50).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked him if he had any tools to break and rake windows so they could deploy gas inside the classroom. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) why they would deploy gas if Chief Arredondo was trying to negotiate. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt if they deployed gas, it would startle the shooter and possibly make him start shooting children (timestamp 00:32:24).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempting to set up a triage point for mass casualties with the emergency medical technicians (EMTs) from Uvalde. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the goal was to get all the medical equipment in one area (timestamp 00:34:13).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while standing in the hallway, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORTAC, DRT, approach the T-intersection. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he needed help setting up his sniper rifle and tripod outside the building (timestamp 00:33:53). Once outside, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with set up near a tree on the eastside of the building. As they set up, Texas Department of Public Safety troopers informed them the shooter was at the third window. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed they were referring to the third window from the corner of the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it was of no use because he could not see inside the windows of the classroom (timestamp 00:38:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not hear any radio traffic. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised him they were getting ready to breach inside the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and quickly went back into the school through the east entrance. While still assisting BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an unknown Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent approached SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and asked how he could assist, to which SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested a layout of the school. The DEA agent promptly returned with a layout of the school and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed him to take it inside the building to assist with the situation (timestamp 00:37:24).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered previously trying to get UCISDPD and the Uvalde County Sheriff's Office (UCSO) to go through tourniquet and individual first aid kit training, but UCISDPD withdrew (timestamp 00:39:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once he reentered the school, he heard the shooter might be in the ceiling (timestamp 00:40:32). Soon after, he heard SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicate they were getting ready to breach the classroom. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who authorized BORTAC to breach but recalled hearing SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) say they wanted to get in, but the doors were locked (timestamp 02:26:47). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he needed medics. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) formed in a stack in the hallway near the classroom along with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other law enforcement officers (LEOs) (timestamp 00:40:42).



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[Agent Note: stack is a term for a formation used in law enforcement when a team forms up single file along the entrance or doorway to a room where they believe a threat is located.]

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard and saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicate he had a key to the classroom (timestamp 00:42:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that when the classroom was breached and the door was opened, he heard gunshots (timestamp 00:43:07). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing shrapnel and debris once he heard the gunshots. Immediately after the breach, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put his rifle down in the hallway, so he could provide medical treatment. Right after setting his rifle down, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told by an unknown heavy set, Hispanic BPA not to enter, as they were about to exit the classroom (timestamp 00:44:17).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he waited in the hallway as children were being taken out, he noticed the first child taken out was a little girl who was wearing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described her as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he wanted to close his eyes but told himself he could not be of any help if he melted down, and he pushed himself to help (timestamp 00:45:57).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw another girl taken out in the same condition. The third girl, whose name he later learned was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not work on the first three children taken out of the classroom because he believed they were deceased. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after the breach, no one was in charge of triage areas, as there were too many EMTs (timestamp 02:33:21).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw a boy exit the classroom and could tell he was in pain, but he was not crying. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked the boy if he was okay, to which he replied he had been shot. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) determined the boy had been shot (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but did not have an arterial wound and felt he could survive, so SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed the boy to continue up the hallway (timestamp 00:47:57).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the next child to exit the classroom as a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) girl who was wearing white and was covered in blood. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said she was crying and he asked her if she was okay. She said yes, so she continued running up the hallway. Another girl, with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the classroom and was crying hysterically. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked her if she was okay, and she said she was fine, so he instructed her to continue up the hallway. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled each child that exited the classroom went north up the hallway (timestamp 00:49:29).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw an unknown LEO dragging a boy who was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) out by one arm. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) helped pick the boy up, and he and the unknown LEO took him north up the hallway. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the LEO trying to take the boy out of the school through the west entrance. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to stop the LEO from taking the boy outside of the school but was unsuccessful (timestamp 00:49:40).



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as they took the boy outside of the school, he noticed parents near the outer fence of the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed an ambulance nearby, and as they approached, a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) medic told them (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would not help. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked her if she would allow them to put the boy inside the ambulance because they could not leave a child thrown outside. The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) medic agreed and allowed them to stage the boy inside the ambulance (timestamp 00:51:10).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he ran back inside Robb Elementary School through the west entrance. He saw an unknown BPA carrying a boy, and the BPA claimed the boy had a pulse (timestamp 00:51:56). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the boy's name was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed the BPA to put (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) down so he could begin medical treatment (timestamp 00:55:37).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he attempted to find a pulse but could not because his own heart rate was elevated. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived and began helping SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Both SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not find a pulse and noticed an exit wound from a gunshot on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:53:26). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the wound was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retrieved an occlusive dressing to seal the wound, placed the dressing on the wound, but noticed it was not large enough to cover the entire wound. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sat (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) up so he could find the entry wound. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) determined the entry wound was on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and commented the bullet went through (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed there was nothing else they could do, as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had no signs of life. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also believed the BPA who claimed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a pulse possibly felt his own pulse. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked an unknown LEO wearing gray pants to make sure they put (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) inside one of the classrooms (timestamp 00:54:56).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he got up, he heard SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) behind him requesting assistance. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned around and saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and an unknown person carrying an adult female. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned the adult (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted by grabbing her by the legs and explained she was looking at him and grinding her teeth (timestamp 00:56:46). They carried (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) outside and set her down with plenty of room for people to get in and out of the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked the medics, "Why are we working on her here? Let's get her to the hospital" (timestamp 03:04:04).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from his position, he could only see one ambulance in the area and a child on a gurney heading in the direction of the ambulance (timestamp 00:57:32). With what he could gather, the only ambulance he could see was occupied. Paramedic (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Emergency Medical Services (EMS), instructed them to lay (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) down. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then asked Instructor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Southwest Texas Junior College (SWTJC), to get them an ambulance (timestamp 03:06:18). As they laid (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) down, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the entrance wound to be about the size of a pencil and it had very little blood. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wiped the blood off and put an occlusive dressing on the wound. Paramedic (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they needed to start cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). At the same time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked for



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a tourniquet, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided one. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a wound at the joint of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he could not apply a tourniquet there. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he could pack the wound (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sustained near her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to start packing the wound with gauze.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as the BPAs began conducting CPR on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was going to assist by providing rescue breaths. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not get (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mouth open to provide rescue breaths since she was clenching her teeth. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided a small pocket mask, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to pry it in between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) teeth to provide an airway (timestamp 01:00:18). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began giving rescue breaths, once every five seconds while others were administering CPR. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard Paramedic (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) call for Paramedic (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde EMS, who had a bag valve mask. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stood up as Paramedic (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took over rescue breaths. Once he stood up, he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) preparing a cardiac monitor. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted by placing automated external defibrillator (AED) pads on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) top (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:02:54). Once the AED pads were placed, everyone cleared, and a pulse was detected.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized four or five people were medically assisting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) so he assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was struggling with his M-4 rifle. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took possession of the rifle and realized he left his own rifle inside Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the school and noticed there were no longer children being evacuated or movement inside the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retrieved his and other rifles and exited the school. Once he exited, he went to a tree in front of the school and did not want to leave the rifles unattended. The rest of the BORSTAR personnel slowly began making their way to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) location. After about twenty minutes, Chief Patrol Agent Jesse Owens, DRT, went and spoke with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the BORSTAR personnel. They were instructed to go to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) (timestamp 01:06:08).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once at UVA, he heard rumors of a second threat, so SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) deployed to Dalton Elementary School. When SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Dalton Elementary School, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who was off duty. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lent BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) one of his rifles and instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to secure the front of the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) secured the back of the school. Shortly after, the school principal allowed both SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to enter the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed school personnel they would have security in the front and the back of the school. Within an hour or two, they had agents from DEA, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and a variety of officers from different agencies on scene to assist with security. The school began releasing children. Once Dalton Elementary School was completely evacuated, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed that as law enforcement officers, BPAs had a responsibility to respond to an active shooter situation and help (timestamp 02:07:00).

CBP OPR interviewers showed video from the BWC of Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UCSO, from May 24, 2022 to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 2). The run time shown to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began at the



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00:01:47 mark. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself at the 00:01:52 mark on the video. At the 00:02:16 mark, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified an officer as the one who informed him that Chief Arredondo was trying to negotiate with the shooter. However, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the officer's name (timestamp 02:08:55).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in 2016, he went through the CBP Firearms Instructor Training Program (FITP). During FITP, he was also certified as an active shooter instructor. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during an active shooter situation, the first and main objective was to "take out" the threat (timestamp 02:20:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the active shooter training covered team movements down hallways, and entering and clearing rooms. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the training did not cover setting up incident command. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that if USBP was called to assist state and local law enforcement agencies, USBP would be in a support role (timestamp 02:22:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know of any policy or memorandum of understanding that addressed assisting state and local law enforcement agencies. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who within USBP authorized BORSTAR to assist state and local law enforcement agencies, nor did he know what authorization was required. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated that on May 24, 2022, he confirmed with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he and BORSTAR personnel would deploy to Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORSTAR typically got notified by DRT of incidents to which they should respond. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further explained he personally has contacted BORSTAR management regarding incidents in the field to keep them informed or to have more assets deployed.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he has been certified as an EMT by the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians since August 2012. In addition, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was trained in Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC), Advanced TCCC, Lead TCCC Instructor, Cadaver Lab, and Live Tissue training (timestamp 02:27:40).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had oversight of the BORSTAR EMT program but explained BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in charge of ordering equipment and EMT training. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they received their medical direction nationally through CBP physicians (timestamp 02:42:32).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during a mass casualty incident, there should be a triage point where medics would determine who was deceased and who could be saved. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further explained tags would be placed on victims to rate their medical condition but stated they did not have tags the day of the incident (timestamp 02:38:54).

During the interview, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw video which showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who is an EMT, and another unknown EMT triaging inside the classroom and determining who would remain and who would be assisted medically (timestamp 02:40:30).



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SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that due to the active shooter, he considered the BORSTAR deployment as a law enforcement deployment (timestamp 02:58:36).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further explained that BORSTAR did not breach rooms and did not have tools to breach. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in 2015, he attended a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) training with BORTAC at SWTJC in Del Rio. During the training, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned dynamic entry movements.

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde, south of Uvalde, the city of Uvalde, Uvalde schools, and Robb Elementary School. The maps were labeled one through ten, respectively (Attachment 3) (timestamp 02:34:17).

On map two of south Uvalde, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled to Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled on Farm to Market 1481 into Uvalde. On map seven of Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled around Robb Elementary School and the area where he parked. On map eight(a) of Robb Elementary School layout, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the triage area, the location where he medically assisted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the location where he medically assisted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the location of the ambulance where he staged the first boy, and the location where he assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) On map eight(b) of the Robb Elementary School layout, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the location where he saw an ambulance staged and where he saw a boy on a gurney. All other maps were not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	Video from the BWC of Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UCSO, from May 24, 2022.
2	Maps reviewed by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 20, 2023, SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. Prior to the interview, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with an Administrative Warning Acknowledgement for Non-Bargaining Unit Employees, which he signed acknowledging he understood his right and obligations (Attachment 1). On March 20, 2023, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with the form titled Your Required Appearance and Sworn Testimony. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 2).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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On May 24, 2022, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working with BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, transporting equipment around the Del Rio area of operations. As BPA-Ps (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were entering Uvalde on US-90 from the west to pick up an order from the local John Deere, they noticed two Uvalde Police Department (UPD) vehicles passing them with their lights and sirens activated and headed towards Robb Elementary School. As they made their way further into Uvalde, they saw three law enforcement vehicles, one being a USBP vehicle, passing them with their lights and sirens activated. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned on the vehicle's service radio and heard radio traffic about a shooter making entry into Robb Elementary School. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that given the nature of the incident, he figured he could assist with perimeter security. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he was not in a standard uniform, was driving an unmarked vehicle, and was without his ballistic vest and emergency medical technician (EMT) equipment. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked along Geraldine Street and walked to the school.

Upon arriving at the school, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered UPD officer who informed him the priority was to keep the parents out of the school. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled many parents were present and armed with pistols and rifles. While assisting with perimeter security, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard the UPD officer inform the parents that their children were out of the school and the shooter was in a classroom with the Police Chief. Based on the UPD officer's description of the situation, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the situation at the school was not active. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed parents to the nearby funeral home, where he was told parents were reuniting with their children. BPA-P stated that he did not have any physical altercations with parents.

While at a nearby gate, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Special Operations Detachment (SOD), and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SOD. Recognizing both SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue unit paramedics, he approached them and asked them about the situation. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) motioned towards BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and said, "Come with me, you're with me" (timestamp 42:59). When they entered the school, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) personnel and law enforcement officers (LEOs) with their guns pointed down a hallway, and recognized the situation was still active. Understanding that he did not have his ballistic vest, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist BORTAC, while he established a triage area.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assumed the role of coordinating the triage area, not because he was the highest medically trained person, but because it was where he could be most useful. As civilian medical personnel arrived, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with them and explained the triage plan, which included sending the critically wounded to the medics waiting outside and the walking wounded to Classrooms 131 and 132. Prior to BORTAC making entry into Classroom 112, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) placed chest seals, tourniquets, and pressure dressings in their ballistic vests in preparation for encountering any victims.

As BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was preparing for BORTAC to make entry, he heard someone yell, "BORTAC is here and they're coming in" (timestamp 50:02). BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned the person yelling was Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Chief Pete Arredondo.



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Just prior to BORTAC entering Classroom 112, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled someone saying the shooter may be in the ceiling. After BORTAC entered the classroom, he heard the team yell the situation was all clear. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that his access to Classrooms 131 and 132, which was to be used as a triage area, was blocked due to the number of LEOs in the hallway.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled two deceased victims brought out of Classroom 112. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed the victims be placed in the hallway and covered with blankets. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered Classroom 111 and observed bodies and blood throughout the classroom. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assessed vital signs on the closest victim by checking for a carotid pulse, but felt a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wound instead. The next victim BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered was shot in the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) multiple times. As BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued assessing victims, he noticed people moving bodies and yelled "If I pass them, you pass them, just follow me" (timestamp 55:49). BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a teacher on top of a pile of children, and initially believed the teacher may have saved some of the children. However, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized, after assessing all the victims, that they were deceased. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told everyone in the room, "They're all black," and explained that meant they were all deceased (timestamp 57:31). BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he checked each victim four or five times and recalled seeing multiple gunshot wounds on each victim. At that point, a Texas Ranger told everyone the classroom was a crime scene and instructed everyone to leave.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the classroom and south entrance and observed medics providing cardiopulmonary resuscitation to a girl with a gunshot wound (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recalled medics attempting to revive another child on a gurney near the South entrance. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to reenter the school to provide aid but was denied entry. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pushed his way into the school and waited in the hallway in case he discovered any signs of life; however, no signs of life were found.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the school and met up with other BPAs at a tree on the north side. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, instructing everyone to return to UVA. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) located BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and returned to their vehicle. Once they arrived at UVA, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing about a second threat but was discouraged to respond because he was covered in blood. When BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed UVA, they drove to the local John Deere to pick up their order and returned to Del Rio area.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that became an EMT in 2016 through a Border Patrol training course in the DRT. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the course was four weeks long and included clinical and practical experiences. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he became a nationally registered EMT by passing the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians exam and received additional training in Tactical Combat Casualty Care, Individual First Aid Kits, and Air Evacuations.

BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he understood the authority to respond to a situation, like the Robb Elementary School incident, rested with the state and local authorities. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed USBP's role is to provide support to the state and local authorities.



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BPA-P <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> was provided a collection of maps (Attachment 3). On the maps, BPA-P <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> traced his route and approach to Robb Elementary School and indicated his actions while at Robb Elementary School.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Administrative Warning Acknowledgement for Non-Bargaining Unit Employees.
2	StarWitness interview of BPA-P <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
3	Maps reviewed by BPA-P <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 20, 2023, SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness. The Authentication Code was (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was assigned to the unaccompanied minor processing group for UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first learned of the unfolding event at Robb Elementary School by listening to the Uvalde Police Department (UPD) radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing the UPD dispatch state there is an active shooter at the Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:13:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the incident was probably going to be another bailout near a school. Moments later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed several BPAs grabbing M4 rifles from the UVA armory and headed out of the station. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall who was issuing the weapons nor could he recall the agents that were taking the M4 rifles from the armory.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if he should respond to the school or if he should wait at the station. Shortly thereafter, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was instructed to bring bottled water to the site. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) last name unknown, UVA, loaded several cases of water into a marked USBP Chevrolet Tahoe. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to the Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:33:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the radio traffic was about an active shooter that was barricaded within a school classroom.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked on the east side of Robb Elementary School near Cargo Street. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the vehicle, he witnessed several children and teachers leaving the school and headed towards his location. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed the children and teachers to run towards waiting school buses. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing teacher (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described her as being very afraid, and instructed her and her children to get into the waiting buses.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being instructed to bring the water to the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got back into the USBP vehicle and drove towards the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the dispatcher announced over the radio that she was in contact with a female in the classroom with the shooter who said there were many victims in the classroom (timestamp 00:42:01).

Upon arriving at the funeral home, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed several parents and children near the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that there were many law enforcement officers (LEO) near the funeral home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any interaction with anyone but did say he saw upset parents.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then walked to the school's west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7) UVA, performing chest compression on an adult female. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered to help BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not respond (timestamp 00:54:03). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to enter the school at the west entrance but was turned away by an unknown LEO. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the unknown LEO stated, "there is no one left in the school to help" (timestamp 00:56:14).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was instructed to gather with other USBP personnel at the front of the school for a briefing from USBP management. After a short gathering near a tree, all USBP personnel were instructed to report to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rode back to the station with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. At the station, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of a potential second threat of a shooter at the Uvalde High School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traveled to his children's school to take them home. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then went to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) work at Dalton Elementary School to provide security until the end of the day.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the Robb Elementary School was killed by the shooter on May 24th, 2022.





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Robb Elementary School and Robb Elementary School layout (Attachment 2). The maps are labeled 5 and 8. On the map labeled 5, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the locations of where he parked the government vehicle and the route he walked to the school from the adjacent funeral home.

On the map labeled 8, Robb Elementary School layout, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the location where he witnessed the adult female receiving care outside the west entrance and the tree where the BPAs met.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have a body worn camera. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not have any text messages or emails concerning the CBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting nor did BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) produce any reports concerning the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded to the scene in order to help the local LEOs in a secondary capacity.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 199**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 20, 2023, SSAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty, armed, wearing his issued USBP BORTAC uniform with USBP, DHS, and BORTAC logos and nameplate.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at DRT, he noticed BPAs running in the parking lot. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rolled his window down and spoke with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC, who told him there was an active shooter in Uvalde (timestamp 00:09:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly after speaking with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he saw Acting Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who told him to get the BearCat and to respond to Uvalde (timestamp 00:09:45).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he transferred his issued gear, M-4 rifle, plate carrier, ballistic helmet, gloves, eye protection, extra magazines, and his handheld radio, into the BearCat and headed to Robb Elementary School via US Hwy 90 (timestamp 00:16:42).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the BearCat was an unmarked, green assault vehicle used for warrant service. The vehicle had bullet proof windows and rifle ports on its side and was equipped with a radio, lights, and sirens. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he utilized the lights and sirens enroute to Uvalde (timestamp 00:18:32).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not utilize the radio in the BearCat, and he did not hear any radio traffic while enroute to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:20:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while enroute to Uvalde, he was obtaining information from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC (timestamp 00:11:06). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not familiar with Uvalde and told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was going to follow him to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:31:58).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he parked in the vicinity of Geraldine Street and Farm to Market 1435, exited the BearCat, met with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the two ran to Robb Elementary School.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were running to the school, he telephonically contacted Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC, and asked how they could help. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the door had been breached and there was not anything for them to do (timestamp 00:35:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that although he was told by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was nothing he could do to help, they continued running to the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he joined USBP personnel standing under a tree. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed Patrol Agent in Charge (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment (SOD), BORTAC, was present and informed him of a secondary threat and directed him to respond to the high school (timestamp 00:37:02).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he departed Robb Elementary School and drove the BearCat to the high school where he met BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR), BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked the BearCat at the student pickup point to provide enhanced security for students dismissed and returned to the care of their parents or family (timestamp 00:41:23).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unsure who was in charge of the scene at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:37:43).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not give direction or guidance to anyone while at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:40:21).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have contact with members of the public, to include parents, during the Robb Elementary School shooting incident (timestamp 00:40:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP had a responsibility to respond to incidents like the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 00:47:37).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP’s role in the Robb Elementary School shooting incident was to provide support to local law enforcement agencies (timestamp 00:47:38).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware of USBP’s statutory authority to respond to or become involved in an incident like the one at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:48:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not write any reports related to the Robb Elementary School shooting incident (timestamp 01:03:13).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the only telephonic communication he had regarding the Robb Elementary School shooting incident was with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the communication was most likely via his personal cell phone, which he no longer possessed (timestamp 01:01:54).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not exchange any text messages related to the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 01:00:51).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to provide accurate times for his departure from DRT, his arrival and departure at Robb Elementary School, and his arrival and departure at the high school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after departing the high school, he returned to Del Rio.

CBP OPR interviewers provided a map package to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with which he labeled his movements and locations during the Robb Elementary School shooting incident. SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed the notes section in the map package (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 200**



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

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**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 20, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned as a firearms instructor at UVA. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when he returned to UVA from the range, Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, saw him and asked, “Hey, are you going?” When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked what he was referring to, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there was a person with a gun at a school. Still unclear as to what the situation was about, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the adjacent armory where BPAs were obtaining long arms and obtained a weapon as well. Amongst the BPAs, including SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, there was talk that the incident was related to a “bail-out” or pursuit.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, rode with him in his unmarked USBP firearms truck to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 0:38:02). Within ten minutes, they arrived at the school and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked his vehicle near the intersection of Old Carrizo Road and Geraldine Street, where they met with other BPAs who had also arrived from UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described that there were civilian onlookers in the area with an unidentified law enforcement officer (LEO) performing crowd control. In the nearby vicinity, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw two Uvalde Police Department (UPD) officers in plain clothes, whom he recognized from prior interactions. Initially the officers were engaged in conversation but then they started running towards the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) followed the two officers towards the west entrance of building 100, where he encountered Trooper (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS). From the doorway of the west entrance, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see into the hallway and observed a stack of LEOs, and asked Trooper (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he could enter to speak with the LEOs inside.

Upon receiving permission to enter the building, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed the LEOs in the stack were facing down the south hallway (timestamp 00:40:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the stack of LEOs and asked about the situation. One of the LEOs explained the threat was in one of the two classrooms down the hallway. Upon further inquiry, Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UPD, informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that the shooter ran into one of the classrooms, shot at them, and then hid. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had blood on his ear from a shrapnel injury.

While BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was speaking with Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he heard someone in the south hallway call out, "Barricaded suspect, barricaded suspect" (timestamp 02:10:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then explained that he believed they would be there for a while and offered to relieve the LEOs, because he knew their shoulders would be fatigued from holding their rifles.

According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the school was quiet, and the parking lot was empty, and he believed it was a teacher workday. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that aside from one classroom with the lights on, the other classrooms were dark. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked if classroom 131 had been cleared (timestamp 00:43:00). When he did not receive a response, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and an unidentified BPA, entered the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the classroom was adjoined to classroom 132, where he found a teacher hiding under a table in the corner. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) escorted the teacher from the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then started to inquire about the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) classroom adjacent to their location (timestamp 00:44:00). The STEM classroom was locked with the lights off and one of the LEOs in the hallway started knocking and calling for someone to open the classroom door; eventually a teacher opened the door.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then relieved the LEOs in the stack facing the south hallway (timestamp 00:47:30) and saw another stack of LEOs on the south end of the hallway. At one point, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed children outside, running past the south entrance door, and realized it was not a teacher workday.





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were waiting for the master key; it was being used to evacuate the other classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained a key to unlock the classroom doors was brought to them, However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the key was not the correct one (timestamp 02:17:30). While waiting in the stack, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UPD, brought in cannisters and gas masks. As they were discussing the cannisters and distributing gas masks, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard three gunshots (timestamp 0:50:00). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the sound of the gunshots “changed the narrative really quick”. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Zavala County Sheriff’s Office, and the other BPAs subsequently made their way down the hallway towards the classroom, where they believed the gunshots had come from. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed his anger regarding the fact that the other LEOs in the hallway did not react to the sound of the gun shots (timestamp 02:54:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as they neared the classroom door, he observed that the classroom door was closed, the door window shot out, and the classroom was pitch dark inside (timestamp 00:51:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a sinking feeling, because the shooter could likely see him, but he could not see anything inside. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was no instruction given to stop, however, they did not have a way into the locked classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the doors to the classrooms opened outward, so they were unable to kick them in.

According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he heard discussions about using a drone to see if the shooter was on the roof, which did not make sense to him. At one point, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought there was another shooter on site and recalled an unidentified LEO in his stack pointing out bullet holes in the walls (timestamp 01:04:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that eventually another master key arrived, and someone suggested they test the key on another door and confirmed the key worked. At that time, Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) arrived and joined BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his stack in the hallway (timestamp 00:54:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that when BORTAC and BORSTAR arrived, he observed the sparse number of non-USBP LEOs disperse (timestamp 05:26:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the only other non-USBP personnel left in the hallway was Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Texas Parks and Wildlife, and an unidentified Deputy U.S. Marshal. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled conversations related to using a Halligan to breach the door, however, after studying the doors, it was determined the Halligan would be of no use (timestamp 02:40:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the stack in the hallway formed two entry teams on either side of the two doors leading into classrooms 111 and 112. One team was positioned south side of the doors and another team on the north side of the doors. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), obtained the key to the classroom and assumed the number two position of the south side entry team. At the same time, a ballistic shield arrived which BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, handed off to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, who assumed the number one position of the team on the south side entry team. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who had a light on his rifle, was asked to assume the number one position of the north side entry team. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, joined the south side entry team as a last-minute addition. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing someone spreading the message that the shooter called his aunt and informed her it was going to



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be “suicide by cop,” to which SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) announced to them, “You hear that guys, he wants a gunfight” (timestamp 01:04:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then leaned out with the shield, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used the key to open the door to classroom 111, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shined his light into the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could only see chairs and desks (timestamp 00:55:45). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) glanced into the room and reported there were two classrooms which shared an open partition, and the entry teams would need to treat the two classrooms as one large room (timestamp 02:22:00). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) planned for the north side entry team to file in behind the south side entry team instead of entering classroom 112, as originally planned. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they did not make any announcement at the time of the breach.

As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his team were preparing to enter the room behind the south side entry team, the shooter began firing (timestamp 00:56:45). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rounds were coming through the door and the walls, and they were hit by shrapnel; one of the rounds grazed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) head (timestamp 03:08:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered classroom 111, recalled seeing an older male on top of students in the southwest corner. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he slung his rifle over his shoulder and immediately began taking victims to the triage area located at the north end of the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he initially assisted with carrying a boy to triage and someone took the boy from him, while he was in the hallway, before he could reach the triage area (timestamp 03:21:30). When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the classroom, he grabbed another boy and, with the assistance of another unidentified BPA, brought him to triage. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the floors being slippery. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recalled seeing BORSTAR providing medical care to a child who was on top of a table in room 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not an emergency medical technician (EMT), and he did not provide medical care to anyone.

When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the classroom, he checked on the shooter who was laying on the floor, just outside the closet in the northeast corner of the classroom (timestamp 03:25:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the shooter as small and skinny, and wearing a tactical vest. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a rifle and two magazines on the floor near him. While BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was still in the classroom, an unidentified LEO came into the room, declared the area as a crime scene, and instructed everyone to leave. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the other LEOs exited the classroom, Chief Pete Arredondo, Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District (UCISD), requested them to clear the other classrooms in the area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained, that at that time he realized Chief Arredondo had been on the south end of the hallway attempting to negotiate with the shooter, prior to the breach.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and an unidentified BPA cleared classrooms 105 and 106. After clearing the classrooms, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the building via the south entrance. At the south entrance, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a victim on a stretcher near the parking lot and paramedics administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (timestamp 03:36:00). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made his way north towards the front of the school, he observed several paramedics providing medical care to victims on gurneys, in the parking lot near the west entrance.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with some of the other BPAs who were onsite, before gathering at the tree near the front of the school, where Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, addressed the group and instructed them to report to UVA for a muster. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that, while back at UVA, some of the BPAs were tasked with deploying to other schools, due to a threat from the shooter's girlfriend, however he remained at UVA (timestamp 01:08:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he changed out of his tan pants and red firearms shirt, as instructed by an unidentified supervisor from the DRT. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was provided with a change of clothing and his soiled uniform was placed in a bag for storage (timestamp 03:50:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he departed for the day at approximately 4:00 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have knowledge of anyone who was in charge of the scene at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that while he saw Chief Johnny Field, Southwest Texas Jr. College Police Department, providing instructions from the north side of the building, he believed Chief Arredondo may have been in charge, as he was providing instructions from his position on the south end of the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that Chief Arredondo was the person who initiated negotiations with the shooter and was the most vocal (timestamp 02:34:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in command and control of USBP (timestamp 02:35:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he did not see any other USBP personnel, aside from those he originally entered the building with, until BORSTAR and BORTAC arrived. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the group of BPAs he arrived on the scene with were BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were no instructions from the other LEOs to BORTAC and BORSTAR when they arrived (timestamp 02:46:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP's role at Robb Elementary School was to supplement where needed (timestamp 03:42:30). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) local law enforcement agencies had authority over the situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained USBP's authority to respond to this type of incident was their sworn duty to safeguard lives.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was an active shooter instructor and explained the situation changed from barricaded subject to active shooter when shots was heard. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained, they had to halt their movement down the hallway toward the classroom because, at the time, they did not have a way to access the classroom (timestamp 02:48:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that as he looked back on the situation, he should have asked more questions instead of assuming the LEOs on site had awareness of all the information related to the incident.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided information related to his training (timestamp 04:01:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was originally certified as a firearms instructor in 2010 and obtained his active shooter certification in either 2013 or 2015. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he had not received training for scenarios related to barricaded subjects. According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he only participated in two or three active shooter trainings in the DRT and stated he has never participated in or conducted



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an active shooter training at UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained USBP had previously attempted to coordinate active shooter training with UCISD, however, UCISD was disinterested. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not aware of any agreements between USBP and any of the local law enforcement agencies.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not wearing a body worn camera on the date of the incident and did not produce any written statement or memorandum related to his involvement at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he did not communicate with anyone through phone or text message during the incident.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a Map Package which was utilized to mark his routes of travel and significant areas where he was throughout the day (Attachment 2):

- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 5 – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate where he parked upon arrival and his walking path to the school.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 5a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate where he parked upon arrival.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 7 – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, to indicate his route of travel from the UVA to the school.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8a – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the location of where he observed bystanders and law enforcement officers as he approached the school.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8b – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the location where he discovered a teacher while clearing classrooms 131 and 132.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8c – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the triage location, classrooms he assisted clearing post-breach, location of where he saw a student receiving medical treatment, and the USBP meeting location.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8f – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate his location and the formation of law enforcement officers while in building 100.
- BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) utilized Map 8g – Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX to indicate the formation of law enforcement officers prior to the breach and the layout of the classroom he observed post-breach.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown video footage from the camera at the intersection of the north hallway of building 100 at Robb Elementary School from May 24, 2022. The video footage began at 00:31:27 and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself in the video at 00:31:39.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 201**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 20, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On the day of the Robb Elementary School shooting, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was scheduled to work the (b) (7)(E) shift. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that prior to reporting to work, he was having lunch with his dad in Leakey, Texas, when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called him at 11:47a.m. on his cell phone to notify him of a shooting at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:47:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he immediately concluded his lunch with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and, while preparing to leave, he received a group text from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Division (SOD), BORTAC, DRT, who asked for all BORTAC members to report to Robb Elementary School due to a possible barricaded shooter (timestamp 00:41:56).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he departed Leakey, Texas, and drove to his residence to obtain his Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card, which he would need to access the parking lot at the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed his residence, drove approximately 45 minutes to UVA, and obtained his government owned vehicle (GOV) and issued gear (timestamp 00:42:16).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall the time, but stated that while enroute to Uvalde, he received text updates from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, stating he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were on scene at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:43:04). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received texts while enroute to Robb Elementary School from his BORTAC group, but no longer has those texts on his government cell phone (timestamp 01:51:17).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled one of the text messages from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the local Police Department had the shooter confined in a particular area inside the school and one of the text messages from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided directions to the location of the other BORTAC members.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he departed UVA in his GOV and, at approximately 12:40 p.m., he parked approximately 50 yards from Robb Elementary School in a resident's yard on Geraldine Street. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there were vehicles parked everywhere, which prohibited him from driving to the school grounds. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled a lady pulled up to him and was frantic due to her being unable to find her child. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the lady he was unsure exactly what was going on and departed toward the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled having his radio and explained he was hearing radio traffic, but it was unintelligible (timestamp 00:50:10). Other than this contact, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have contact with members of the public, to include parents, during the Robb Elementary School shooting incident (timestamp 03:11:13).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he most likely utilized lights and sirens when crossing intersections while enroute to Robb Elementary School from UVA (timestamp 03:08:52). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in command or control of the scene at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 03:10:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that before he arrived at Robb Elementary School, he understood the situation to be that of a barricaded subject and his perception of the situation did not change. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that a barricaded subject is someone who has positioned themselves behind something, is waiting for police or agents to go to him and is not currently firing his weapon. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an active shooter is actively shooting people (timestamp 01:32:52).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) issued plates and carrier with clearly visible Police insignia. He also had extra rifle magazines. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was carrying his duty belt, which included his radio, pistol, extra pistol magazines, handcuffs, a collapsible baton, and a medical kit. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also had his USBP issued M-4 rifle (timestamp 01:31:22).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing conflicting radio transmissions while jogging toward Robb Elementary School, to include the shooter had shot himself; was possibly in the ceiling; was on the roof; and lastly, to standby because someone was bringing drones to put inside the school (timestamp 00:52:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that it took him two minutes from the time he parked his vehicle until he arrived inside Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:34:35).

As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the school, he encountered Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was inside the school and pointed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the correct direction. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered Robb Elementary School through the west door and immediately noticed many law enforcement personnel in a dark, quiet hallway. He noted that several of the officers had their guns pointed towards a classroom door (timestamp 00:54:22).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown photos of CBP personnel, which were included in the interview packet. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, as he was walking toward Robb Elementary School (timestamp 03:02:05). He also recognized SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORSTAR, DRT, in the hallway inside the school (timestamp 03:05:10) (Attachment 2).

Shortly after his arrival into the hallway, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who appeared to be planning to enter a classroom due to the presence of a stack of agents near a classroom doorway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw him and motioned him to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) location. As he ran toward SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) crossed an open doorway to a classroom where officers were pointing their weapons (timestamp 00:55:57). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him they were going in the classroom and that it was big (timestamp 00:57:21).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to positively identify the BORTAC members in the stack other than SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:22:06). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he later learned BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, was in the stack and was in possession of the ballistic shield. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, was also in the stack (timestamp 01:41:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later explained he subconsciously knew BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had the shield at the front of the stack but did not have a clear recollection that he was the BPA with the shield at the time of the incident (timestamp 03:00:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at the stack, he noticed the classroom door was being held open by the shield held by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained unsure about what was going on in the classroom since the door was open, and rounds were not being fired at the agents outside (timestamp 01:27:02).





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall his position in the stack but remembered that he observed law enforcement officers in front of him and heard an exchange of gunfire at about the time he crossed the threshold entering Classroom 111. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately spun hard to his left behind drywall and felt an impact to his head. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the impact felt like his head exploded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the specific details were difficult to recall but remembered that he ended up in the hallway outside of the classroom, where he leaned against the wall. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed it was at that time he heard someone say the subject was down. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he took a moment to gather himself, saw daylight shining through a window in the exterior door at the end of the hallway, and walked in that direction to exit the building (timestamp 00:59:16).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to recall hearing the first five- or six-gun shots and believed he was hit possibly by the first round. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was unable to recall any details about the interior of the classroom (timestamp 01:22:58).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that prior to joining the stack, he was unaware whether children were present in the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that once he joined the stack, he processed the entire situation and concluded it was likely there were children present in the room (timestamp 01:17:15).

Once outside of Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled talking to a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) State Trooper, who assured BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was okay. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran to him and checked on him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he took his hat off to see SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reaction to determine how badly he was injured. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he didn't get a reaction from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which comforted him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go back into the school and assist (timestamp 01:01:07).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that after he learned he was not severely injured, he immediately noticed pain (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a TXDPS Trooper offered to transport him to the hospital but couldn't find the keys to that TXDPS patrol car. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to sit down to check the wounds (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and only noticed small entry wounds. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled medical personnel approached him to provide aid, but he rerouted them to the school to support the need inside the classrooms (timestamp 01:02:51).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he walked toward his GOV through the same gate he used earlier to get to Robb Elementary School. While enroute to his GOV, an unidentified BPA walked with him to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the unidentified BPA gave him a ride to the hospital (timestamp 01:03:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that it appeared he was the first injured person from the Robb Elementary School shooting to arrive at the hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the unidentified BPA to leave and take his GOV and gear to UVA, where BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would get it later (timestamp 01:04:48).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he explained the extent of his injuries to hospital staff and was set aside just prior to the arrival of children. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after waiting an unknown amount of time, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) revealing shrapnel. The shrapnel was removed from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) but the doctors elected to leave the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because removing it would cause more damage than leaving it (timestamp 01:10:53).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, arrived at the hospital to check on him and began to drive BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was nearby, so he exited PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vehicle and joined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who transported (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he got into his personal truck and drove home, where he ended his day (timestamp 01:10:53).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unsure who was in charge of the scene at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 02:56:21).

Other than what he received from SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not receive instructions while at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 03:10:14)

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not witness orders being given to any law enforcement officers (timestamp 03:10:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not give direction or guidance to anyone while at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 03:10:38).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated did not witness anyone from the USBP in charge of the scene at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 03:10:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after he parked his GOV in the yard of a homeowner on Geraldine Street, an unidentified female pulled her vehicle near him and expressed concern about her child. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recalled that when he sat down to see where in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was hit, an unidentified individual began asking him multiple questions. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he told the person that now was not the time.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not exercise any authority that impeded the movements of any member of the public and did not use force or restrain anyone while at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 03:12:06).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not render medical care or medically assess anyone while at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 03:12:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believes USBP played a huge role in the evacuation of classrooms during the Robb Elementary School shooting incident. They also provided perimeter security in support of local law enforcement agencies. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORTAC's actions were what ended the



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threat when no one else did. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was apparent that if BORTAC didn't handle the situation, they didn't know who was going to (timestamp 03:12:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked what his assessment of the situation was when he entered Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that when he entered the hallway, he was shocked at the demeanor of the law enforcement personnel in the hall. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained there was a very relaxed posture. It seemed like the law enforcement personnel were waiting for instruction from someone. He stated when he rounded the corner at the T-intersection, he remained extremely confused due to the amount of law enforcement personnel present for what he believed was a contained subject (timestamp 03:13:54).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is unaware of USBP's statutory authority to respond to or become involved in an incident like the one at Robb Elementary School, but he believes there is a moral responsibility to respond (timestamp 03:18:41).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believes USBP has a responsibility to respond to incidents like the Robb Elementary School shooting to lend assistance (timestamp 03:18:59).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not write any reports related to the Robb Elementary School shooting incident (timestamp 03:23:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the only gunshots he heard were the ones fired at the entry team immediately after the breach. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed the subject had previously fired rounds because in the BORTAC text string, the subject was called a barricaded shooter (timestamp 03:20:14).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he replied to an email from his chain of command, which asked him to provide him a narrative regarding his role related to the Robb Elementary School shooting incident (timestamp 03:23:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had not participated in any discussion regarding his response to Robb Elementary School that was not discussed during the interview (timestamp 03:24:23).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not participate in active shooter training but explained BORTAC trains for incidents related barricaded subjects (timestamp 03:25:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown a video captured from a ceiling mounted camera in the hallway inside Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself entering Robb Elementary School, taking a right-hand turn, and making his way south toward the location of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 04:05:27).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown a video captured from a body worn camera from a law enforcement officer at the scene that captured BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exit the classroom, hesitate in the hallway, and make his way to the south door at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the video



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captured him after he was hit with shrapnel and exited Robb Elementary School (timestamp 04:13:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown a video captured from the body worn camera of a BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT, at the west door of Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated at the time he walked by the west door; he was unsure which BORTAC members were present. After reviewing the video, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SOD, BORTAC, DRT (timestamp 04:19:12).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not take any pictures or videos at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 04:30:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with a map package, and he labeled his movements and location during the Robb Elementary School shooting incident (Attachment 3).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Photos of CBP personnel.
3	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 202**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 21, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the day shift and was performing line operations on U.S. Highway 57 (US 57) and Farm to Market Road 481 (FM 481) with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had engaged in the apprehension of a group of undocumented noncitizens. After the group was secured and transferred to a transport vehicle, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back to his government owned vehicle which he left at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7) ranch. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the gate of the ranch on US 57 and FM 481 and parked at the gate while he had something to eat. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard a CBP air pilot transmitting over the radio there had been an active shooter in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked at the BORSTAR message thread on his government cellphone and saw a text stating there was an active shooter at an elementary school in Uvalde. Immediately, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the ranch and started to drive towards Uvalde. Moments later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message from Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, telling the group, "Let's start rolling" (timestamp 00:24:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know which school he was responding to and followed a location pin on his government cellphone's Android Team Awareness Kit, a secure map-based application, and also followed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, who was driving in front of him (timestamp 00:35:24).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was a BORSTAR paramedic, and while en route to Uvalde, his thought process was on setting up a triage area as soon as he arrived. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the shooter was "going to be down" by the time he arrived at the school, as he was 40 to 50 miles away when he heard about the incident (timestamp 00:36:26).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at Robb Elementary School at the same time as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). They parked on Geraldine and Nicolas Street, grabbed their gear, and ran towards the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had his medical bag, cardiac monitor, rifle, vest, and was dressed in his standard SOD multi-camouflage uniform and BORSTAR cap.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he was running towards the school, there did not appear to be a sense of urgency outside. At the entrance of the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed an officer he was a paramedic and was directed towards the west entrance. At the west entrance, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized Detective (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department, who guided him inside the building. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the tempo inside the building as "more tense" than outside (timestamp 00:44:56).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, and approached him to try to obtain the status on the situation. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were unable to access the door to the classroom and needed gas and a Halligan tool (a tool used for prying, twisting, punching, or striking) to pry the door open. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he would set up a medical triage area (timestamp 00:46:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he set up the medical triage area by the bathrooms and water fountain just east of the T-intersection. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) prepared his heart monitor, medical equipment, and supplies, and guided other emergency medical technicians (EMT) who arrived and reported to the triage area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he asked officers in the hallway to prepare their tourniquets and any



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other medical equipment they had available (timestamp 00:50:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested at least two medics be staged on the south end of the hallway and coordinated with emergency medical services (EMS) waiting outside the school (timestamp 00:52:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once the medical plan was established, he positioned himself in the front of the stack next to classroom 112 and saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by the door to classroom 111. While lined up, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed bullet holes in the door to classroom 111 and in the wall. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were also in the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing someone ask for a ballistic shield and saw an officer run out of the building and return with a shield. The shield was given to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who lined up in front of the stack by classroom 111 (timestamp 00:58:00).

[Agent Note: A stack is a term for a formation used in law enforcement when a team forms up single file along the entrance or doorway to a room where they believe a threat is located.]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opened the door to classroom 111 and a small chair was placed in front of the door to keep it open; however, the chair was too small so someone in the stack held the door open. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ordered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORTAC, to join the stack as they made entry into classroom 111 (timestamp 01:01:00). Immediately following entry, the door closed behind the group and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw gunfire penetrating the door. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated everyone in the hallway either ducked or went to the ground upon hearing the gunfire (timestamp 01:01:49).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing someone yell, "Clear," and he proceeded to enter classroom 111. Inside the classroom, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to see because the room was dark and filled with smoke, however, he recalled the smell of lead, and his ears were ringing. Eventually, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began to see children on the floor including a pile of children on one side of the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) removed a boy from the pile. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he broke down mentally, but knew he needed to remove the children from the area where they had been shot (timestamp 01:06:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he observed the deceased children in the classroom, he realized he was dealing with "a mass casualty of kids." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he felt emotionally broken and his only thoughts were, "No, no, no, no... I don't want them to die" (timestamp 01:10:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the boy he removed from the pile to the triage area in the T-intersection. As soon as he began his assessment, he felt a hole (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the child's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and realized he was deceased (timestamp 01:12:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then saw a second boy and began to assess him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exposed the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and observed multiple gunshot wounds to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Lastly, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked the boy's pulse but did not find one (timestamp 01:13:04). Someone brought a third boy with a gaping wound in the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) area to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) placed his gloved hand over the wound as SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) applied an occlusive dressing to the child's wound. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instructed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to check the child's airway, breathing, and circulation (ABC), and carotid pulse. The child had a pulse and was transferred to EMS.





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then stood up and yelled, “Make sure you are checking for ABC...make sure you are checking for a carotid pulse” (timestamp 01:14:37).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was still in the triage area, someone brought a fourth boy with a pulse to him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cut open the child’s shirt to expose his chest and determined the child did not have any visible gunshot wounds. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) placed the child on a gurney, and with the help of another officer, headed out of the building towards EMS. Once outside, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see any air or ground ambulances and began working on the child. An officer got on the gurney and started performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) established an airway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized he did not have any of his medical equipment and ran back inside the building to grab an oral pharyngeal airway (OPA) and a bag valve mask. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the child and inserted the OPA to maintain an open airway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then started palpating the neck to feel for deformities and felt a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which he explained was indicative of a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) injury. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then observed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, “I lapsed... it kind of took the wind out of my sail... well... it did take it.” The officer working with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him, “Let’s keep working on the child.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regained his thoughts and continued to work on the child until the child was transferred to a ground ambulance (timestamp 01:18:58).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went back inside the building and was stopped by a Texas Department of Public Safety Ranger who informed him the building was a crime scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the Ranger he was a medic and needed to go back in the building. The Ranger informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he needed someone to confirm whether casualties left inside were deceased. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the Ranger he could do it and went inside to check for a carotid pulse on those without obvious signs of death. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he counted 17 deceased inside the building (timestamp 01:23:53).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that afterwards, Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, instructed all BPAs to rally by a tree where he later spoke to them. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he shook and broke down emotionally as he stood listening. CPA Owens instructed everyone to report to USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he could not find his keys and rode with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to UVA. Upon arrival, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of a second threat and informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD BORSTAR, he was going to respond to Dalton Elementary School because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended school there. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Dalton Elementary School with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and aided at the pickup location ensuring a safe handoff of the children to their parents. Later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA and headed to his residence at approximately 8:00 p.m. (timestamp 01:35:11).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed he was responding to an active shooter event and his role as a trained law enforcement officer and paramedic was to act. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what USBP’s legal authority was to respond, however, he stated he had a moral responsibility and as a BPA, he took an oath to serve and protect. At Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed no one was in command and people were taking action. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not feel USBP was in



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charge of the incident and only reported to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because he was an SOD supervisor (timestamp 03:20:33).

CBP OPR interviewers provided BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a photo taken from the body worn camera video from Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department, on the date of the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself on the photo and affirmed the photo captured the moment he first entered the building (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided the text message thread from his government cell phone containing conversations with BORSTAR personnel from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 3) to SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) video recorded the text message thread during the interview.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he became an EMT in 2015 and in 2020 he obtained his paramedic certification through DRT. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he was also certified through the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians.

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 4). These maps were labeled 1-8, respectively. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled throughout May 24, 2022, using the maps labeled 2-South of Uvalde, TX, 4-Uvalde, Texas Schools, 5-Robb Elementary School, Uvalde TX, and 8.a./8.f-Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde TX. On map 2, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route from the ranch. On map 4, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the Uvalde schools he responded to provide assistance. On map 5.a., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his parking location at Robb Elementary School. On map 8.a./8.f., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his location at Robb Elementary School. All other maps were not applicable.

## ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Photo from Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body worn camera.
3	Video recorded text message thread.
4	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**EXHIBIT 203**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 21, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he worked the day shift which started at (b) (7)(E) and was assigned to the USBP Uvalde checkpoint near Uvalde when he heard Border Patrol Agent- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) UVA, relay via service radio the Uvalde Police Department (UPD) was responding to an individual with a gun near Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:13:49). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) self-deployed to Robb Elementary School from the checkpoint along with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never received any guidance from USBP management on his way to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:16:37). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also assumed USBP would be on scene in a support role and help UPD with perimeter security.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived on scene, he noticed quite a bit of vehicles already in front of the school, so he began driving around the area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he arrived on scene at approximately 11:55 a.m. (timestamp 01:25:55). While driving in the area, he noticed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) near a truck in the culvert (timestamp 00:18:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited his vehicle, approached the truck, and noticed a rifle and duffle bag with magazines. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then took some pictures with his cell phone for documentation and evidence purposes (timestamp 00:19:27). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to stay with the truck and secure the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed UPD would be in charge on scene since it was within Uvalde city limits (timestamp 01:17:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing via his service radio that UPD said they were going to check the building and around the school (timestamp 00:20:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) still did not know what or who UPD was looking for.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at approximately 12:00 p.m., he saw children exiting Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was still on the west side of the fence dividing the culvert from the school area (timestamp 00:21:21). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the children exiting, so BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) jumped the fence and ran towards the school while BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed to secure the truck. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see a lot of different law enforcement officers (LEO) evacuating children, some of which were being taken to Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while at his position, a civilian male who said he witnessed the initial vehicle wreck approached him (timestamp 00:23:45). The civilian male also said he witnessed the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home personnel who were shot at and claimed he was shot at as well. The civilian described the shooter as a young male, skinny, and dressed in black. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relayed the information via radio and requested a detective to his location, but no one responded. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obtained the individual's information and gave it to Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Rangers.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing a "hot mic" on the radio and someone yell about blood and ask if "she had blood" (timestamp 00:27:19). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed one of the children being evacuated was hurt. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a large amount of people gathering and approaching the west gate entrances to the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested additional help to close the gates or tape off the area.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the culvert area and informed him children were shot and killed at Robb Elementary and placed piled up in a corner (timestamp 01:36:00). Civilians continued to ask BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what the situation was, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told them LEOs were evacuating children. Shortly after, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard children would be taken to the Uvalde Civic Center. Buses were unable to get through due to vehicles blocking the streets to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed an unknown individual that vehicles needed to be moved to allow ambulances and buses in and out. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP began transporting children in USBP transport vans (timestamp 00:35:26).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was relieved by TXDPS at the culvert area and believed he was the last person to be relieved (timestamp 00:38:37). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) never heard any gunshots while on scene



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(timestamp 01:20:39). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received instruction to go to UVA (timestamp 00:44:02). Once BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at UVA, USBP Del Rio Sector Chief Jason Owens was conducting a briefing with all personnel who were present. While at UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard of a possible second threat at the Uvalde High School (timestamp 00:45:18).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he informed BPAs at UVA of the second threat near Uvalde High School and subsequently self-deployed to the area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained Uvalde High School and Uvalde Middle School shared a big field and were within close proximity of each other. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio traffic from different law enforcement agencies deploying to schools across the district including private schools. While at the Uvalde Middle School area, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted with setting up a perimeter and had conversations with parents and instructed them to stay back until the school district figured out how to release their children (timestamp 00:48:16). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio traffic regarding a suspicious subject near the soccer field, so he and an unknown LEO cleared the entire area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to Uvalde Middle School with the rest of the LEOs and focused on evacuating kids and reuniting them with their families. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at no point did he have or see any BPAs have any physical interactions with civilians (timestamp 01:33:40).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2) (timestamp 01:39:35). These maps were labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled from the USBP Uvalde Checkpoint to Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled east on Highway 90 into Uvalde. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled around Robb Elementary School and the area he parked. All other maps were not applicable.

CBP OPR interviewers showed approximately seven pictures (Attachment 3) to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) taken of the vehicle in the culvert area (timestamp 01:29:30). The pictures consisted of a truck and an AR-15 rifle sitting on top of a black duffle bag with AR-15 magazines inside. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged the pictures as the photos he captured on his personal cell phone and provided to the TXDPS Ranger Division.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Pictures taken on scene by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 204**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 21, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he worked the day shift which started at (b) (7)(E) and was assigned to canine training in Del Rio, Texas. After the training ended at approximately 10:00 a.m., he got lunch and heard of an active shooter at Robb Elementary School via his service radio (timestamp 00:22:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) self-deployed to Robb Elementary School in an unmarked USBP canine truck with the lights activated. When CBP OPR interviewers asked what authority USBP had to respond, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that as first responders, USBP assisted state and local law enforcement agencies often (timestamp 01:11:20).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived on scene, he met with an unknown BPA who did not know what was going on. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) briefly spoke with an unknown female Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) trooper. The trooper told him to stay near the road because they were waiting for a special weapons and tactic unit (SWAT) (timestamp 00:23:07). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not remember the approximate time when he arrived at Robb Elementary School but thought it took him approximately one hour to arrive after deploying from Del Rio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw other USBP personnel and asked where he could help. Watch Commanders (WCs) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, informed him that Uvalde Police Department (UPD) was conducting crowd control. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was not involved with keeping parents away from the school (timestamp 00:46:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to stay on the perimeter with WCs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled asking for information on the situation and if anyone was injured; the WCs replied they did not know. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in charge at the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:10:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after a short time on scene, he saw several USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) personnel arrive and heard they were waiting on ballistic shields (timestamp 00:24:43). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall if he heard that information on the radio or if he heard WCs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mention it. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the BPAs as BORTAC or BORSTAR due to their multi-camouflage uniforms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that he still did not know if there were any BPAs or law enforcement officers (LEOs) inside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also did not know if there were any injured children inside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the radio was chaotic because they had all LEO agencies on one channel. After being on scene for approximately 20-30 minutes, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard gunshots (timestamp 00:55:42). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed LEOs near the entrance of the school react as if they were being shot at. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered seeing LEOs and paramedics near the west entrance of Robb Elementary School and explained it seemed as if they wanted to enter the school (timestamp 00:47:34). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought it was possible they were not entering the school due to the shooter's location.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that approximately 2-3 minutes later, he saw people being evacuated (timestamp 00:25:46). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered seeing a child on a gurney (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also witnessed an adult female brought out who was covered in blood and was being treated medically. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BORSTAR bring out a female child who was shot but alive and taken to an ambulance (timestamp 00:26:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), walking out of the school who seemed "mentally out of it" (timestamp 00:27:26). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached him and asked if he was all right. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he could check his head. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed a gash on BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) head; BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also complained of pain in his feet. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he would take him to the hospital (timestamp 00:28:08). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to his vehicle, they ran into BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who volunteered to take BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then walked back to his previous location outside of Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he never medically assisted anyone.



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw USBP personnel begin to gather under a tree and decided to join (timestamp 00:29:19). DRT Chief Jason Owens arrived and instructed everyone to return to UVA for a debrief.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once at UVA, he heard of a possible second threat and subsequently deployed to Uvalde Classical Academy to provide security (timestamp 00:30:58). Once he, other BPAs, and LEOs secured the school, they began releasing children to their parents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then deployed to Flores Elementary School and assisted by providing security. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any physical interaction or confrontation with civilians at any moment (timestamp 01:19:13). After leaving Flores Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA and then went home.

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2) (timestamp 00:35:21). These maps were labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled from Del Rio to Uvalde on May 24, 2022, and indicated he traveled east on Highway 90 into Uvalde. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, TX Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked which schools he deployed to after hearing of the second threat. On map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his route to Robb Elementary School and where he parked his vehicle. On map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his route of travel after he arrived on scene. On map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where he saw an ambulance, LEOs, and paramedics at Robb Elementary School. On map labeled 8.f. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked locations of victims, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and an ambulance. All other maps were not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 23, 2023, SAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the day shift on field duties near Texas Highway 57. BPA (b) (7)(C) was a paramedic assigned to USBP Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), Special Operations Detachment (SOD), near a ranch located near Eagle Pass, Texas. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall how he first learned of the possible active shooter in Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he either received a text message or heard the information over the radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not immediately respond to the school because he was not ordered to do so and was awaiting additional information and instruction. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled receiving a text message stating there was an active shooter inside Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to respond to the scene. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing several Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) troopers speeding towards Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled radio communications being patched while driving to the school.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove straight to Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at the scene at approximately 12:00 p.m. and was forced to park several blocks from the school on the front yard of a nearby residence. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled getting out of his vehicle, donning his ballistic vest and helmet, and grabbing his M-4 rifle and medical bag. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked to the school. Upon approaching the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard parents screaming near the funeral home area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not respond to any of the parents and continued walking to the school. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the school's west entrance, he approached Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) and asked if he was doing OK. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stating, "I am not doing OK because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the school."

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he entered the school through the west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described speaking with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with setting up a triage area near the bathrooms just inside the west entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was expecting numerous patients. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he decided BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would stay at the triage area and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would assist with breaching the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw several members of the USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) getting into formation in preparation to breach the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall anyone talking nor did he see anyone use a key or breaching tool to enter the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw the classroom door open and members of BORTAC entering the classroom (Timestamp 01:07:16). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled agents being in the classroom approximately 15 seconds before hearing approximately 20–30 gunshots. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard someone yell, "Shooter down!" When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approached the classroom door, he saw a male teacher being dragged from the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered thinking the male teacher could be a potential patient. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled someone dragging a little boy from the classroom with a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wound and thinking that he was not a potential patient (Timestamp 01:10:25).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he entered classroom 111, he saw BPAs pulling bodies from under a cabinet area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing someone in classroom 112 calling for a medic before he entered classroom 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing a female teacher moving her arms in the air (Timestamp 01:15:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then turned his attention to a large pile of kids located in classroom 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled another unknown BPA assisting him with looking for signs of life in the pile of children in classroom 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began checking the children for signs of life by checking for pulses. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described most of the children (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Timestamp 01:17:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked approximately four or five children and determined none had signs of life (Timestamp 01:18:11). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the unknown BPA determined all the children in classroom 112 were deceased.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated someone told him BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed assistance at the south entrance of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performing life saving techniques on a small boy. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled approximately five unknown BPAs assisting BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to take over performing life saving techniques. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) examined the young boy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the



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other BPAs took the boy to a nearby ambulance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the boy did not show signs of life prior to taking him to the ambulance (Timestamp 01:26:53).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after taking the young boy to the ambulance, he attempted to re-enter the school through the west entrance but was denied entry by a TXDPS trooper.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was a meeting around a tree near the front of the school where Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, spoke briefly. Chief Owens instructed all BPAs to report back to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked alone back to his vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall anything that may have occurred during his walk back to his vehicle.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at UVA and was there approximately 15 minutes prior to being informed of the possibility of another school shooter. He was instructed to report to any local Uvalde school to assist with security. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Dalton Middle School and provided security on the backside of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained in his vehicle for several hours before receiving instructions to report back to UVA.

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting South of Uvalde and Robb Elementary School and Robb Elementary School Layout (Attachment 2). The maps were labeled 2, 5 and 8c, respectively. On the map labeled two (2). South of Uvalde, TX, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the location where he was working on the morning of May 24, 2022. On the map labeled as five (5). Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted the location he parked his vehicle upon arriving at Robb Elementary School and the route he walked to the school. On the map labeled 8c, Robb Elementary School Layout, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted the door location he used to enter classroom 111.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he did not have a body worn camera nor any text and emails concerning the USBP response to the Robb Elementary School shooting. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not produce any reports concerning the incident.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 206**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 21, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code was (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1). Branch Chief (BC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR Threat Mitigation and Analysis Division (TMAD) was present for a portion of the interview.

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to the dayshift and working on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) near Eagle Pass, Texas. At approximately 11:39 a.m., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT Special Operations Detachment, on his government issued phone notifying him of a shooting in Uvalde (timestamp 00:28:50). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, directed the BORSTAR agents on the text string to respond to Uvalde if they were not waiting for a detainee transport. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, shared the location of Robb Elementary School, using the Android Team Awareness Kit (AKAT) mapping application on his government issued phone, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently responded.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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While enroute to Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a text message from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) updating the group that the shooter had shot two police officers and went inside the school. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then texted the group to bring gas canisters and described the situation as an active shooter. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he was with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC), and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, inside the school and instructed the group to use their ATAK enabled government issued phones to locate them and to bring their medical bags.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Robb Elementary School around 12:40 p.m. and parked two blocks from the school (timestamp 00:36:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled parking under a large tree to provide shade for his K9. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that an unknown officer assisted him in loading his rifle magazines, while he put on his body armor. In addition to his body armor, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) grabbed his rifle, gas mask and medical bag, but could not recall if he had his gas canister with him (timestamp 00:37:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that did not bring his K9, since he is a search and rescue K9 and not a patrol K9 (timestamp 00:40:43).

While BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made his way towards the school, he recalled SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or another BORSTAR agent direct him to go inside the school to meet up with the other BORSTAR agents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the school through the open double doors (timestamp 00:41:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he expected to encounter an active shooter situation based on the information he had previously received, however, it was very quiet. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he did not know who was in charge at the scene (timestamp 00:46:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the school through the west door entrance and saw unidentified BPAs and BORSTAR agents in the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) setting up a triage area and directing the emergency medical technicians (EMT) were to put their medical bags and where to bring the victims for treatment. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then walked towards the classrooms and joined agents that were lined up in a stack (timestamp 00:48:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his stack initially planned to enter a small room on the left side of the hallway, which was not a classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he was not sure why they were going into the small room but thought the room may have led to a classroom (timestamp 00:52:05). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he was not directed to join the stack or given any other instructions. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing an unknown law enforcement officer (LEO) run into the hallway and provide a ballistic shield to an unknown BORTAC agent, at the front of a second stack that planned to enter classroom 111 (timestamp 00:52:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that before he joined his stack, he saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the hallway looking for keys to open the door to the classroom where the shooter was located. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was uncertain as to whether SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) opened the classroom door with the keys, but heard him say, "let's go in." BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORTAC, enter the hallway in civilian clothes, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directing him to join his stack (timestamp 00:54:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing bullet holes in the walls and realized that there was no cover from gunfire. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he believed they would be shot



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if the shooter opened fire (timestamp 00:56:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that it was quiet, and he did not recall anyone communicating with the shooter (timestamp 01:00:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he did not recall hearing anyone say not to breach into the classroom (timestamp 01:12:55).

Moments later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw the second stack of agents enter classroom 111, heard multiple gunshots, and observed drywall and glass flying through the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he dropped to the floor for a moment and then rejoined his stack. Once the gunshots stopped, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard someone say, "all clear," and his stack entered classroom 111. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT BORSTAR, handing him a child to take to the triage area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he did not check for signs of life on any of the children he took to the triage area (timestamp 02:30:15).

When asked how triage works, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that triage uses a color-coded system to classify victims. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that black is for individuals who are dead or cannot be helped, red is for individuals who are close to black and need help right away, yellow is for individuals who need medical care, and green is for individuals who are injured but do not require immediate medical care. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated no one in the classroom used the colored-coded system to direct the LEOs evacuating the victims (timestamp 02:35:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled a few children running past them in the hallway but did not know which classroom the children came out, as he did not see any children that were alive in classroom 111 (timestamp 02:31:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed LEOs standing over the shooter's body, in case the shooter made any further movements (timestamp 02:33:05).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled entering classroom 112 through a door that connects to classroom 111 and was about to take a child to the triage area, when an unknown LEO told him to stop removing bodies as they had been declared dead and the room was now considered a crime scene (timestamp 02:22:55). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the classroom and assisted unidentified BORTAC agents clear two classrooms across from classrooms 111 and 112. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not recall the names of the agents.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then exited the school through the south door entrance and observed unidentified BORSTAR agents and other EMTs giving medical aid to a female teacher. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) does not recall the names of the agents. While outside, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned that all BPAs were directed to rally up by a tree in front of the school to meet with Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT. At the rally point, CPA Owens instructed all BPAs to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for a debrief (timestamp 02:24:30).

At UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of another threat against area schools was made on social media. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BORSTAR and BORTAC agents were redeployed to the schools and believed he responded to Dalton Elementary School, where he assisted with reuniting students with their parents (timestamp 02:26:4). Once all the students had been released, BPA



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA for another debrief and then returned his residence in Eagle Pass, Texas.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown a printout of a text string involving BORSTAR members, obtained by CBP OPR during the interview of another BORSTAR member, to compare to the text string that was on his government issued phone (timestamp 01:54:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed the printout was the same text string stored on his phone and initialed the printout (Attachment 2).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was served with a notice of litigation hold regarding the preservation of the text messages on his government issued phone, related to the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 04:23:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) read and initialed the notice (Attachment 3).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 4). The maps are labeled 1-8, respectively. On the maps labeled 2 and 4, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where he parked his vehicle and how he approached Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, marked his route to Robb Elementary School and where he entered the building. On the map labeled 8.b., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified where he saw members of BORSTAR and the location of the triage area. On the map labeled 8.c., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his post breach actions and where he exited the building. On the map labeled 8.g., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described how the two stacks were lined up prior to the breach and the location of the shooter in the classroom. On another map labeled 8.g., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described what he saw inside of classrooms 111 and 112.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided the opportunity to view video footage from of the hallway camera inside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked to identify himself in the video to confirm the time he entered the building. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) presented the video footage to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and explained the actual time on the footage was not accurate and therefore, the elapsed time would be used when referencing timestamps. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started the video at timestamp 01:18:16 elapsed time and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself at timestamp 01:18:18.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in command of the school hallway, as SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got the keys to open the classroom door and directed the stacks when to breach (timestamp 03:57:12). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in command of the triage area (04:15:45).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any interaction with members of the public, nor did he impede the movement of a member of the public while at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 04:00:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know what authority USBP had to respond to the shooting at Robb Elementary School, but believed USBP had the responsibility to respond and assist (timestamp 04:01:26).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he was interviewed by the Texas Department of Public Safety but had not spoken to any other agency (timestamp 04:10:26).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his highest level of medical training is EMT-Basic, which he received in 2013 or 2014. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he is registered with the National Registry of EMTs, however, he was unsure if he is licensed with the state of Texas. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall the name of the medical director who oversees BORSTAR medical protocols (timestamp 04:12:30).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Printout of text string shown to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Notice of Litigation Hold.
4	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**EXHIBIT 207**



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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 21, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty working on the Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR) unit with fellow BORSTAR Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, tracking a group of migrants near (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) which is located approximately 45 minutes south of Uvalde. He explained he was scanning USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) channel (b) (7)(E) on the radio when he heard (b) (7)(E) broadcast that someone was shot at Robb Elementary School. He estimated this radio traffic transmission was broadcast at approximately 11:40 a.m. (timestamp 00:31:30).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after hearing the radio traffic regarding someone being shot at Robb Elementary School, he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to deploy to the school. He explained he dropped off SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at his vehicle parked at a nearby ranch and began driving north on Farm to Market Road 481 to U.S. Highway 90 to Uvalde. He said that while he was driving to Uvalde, he heard information on the radio that somebody was in the classroom with the shooter talking to him and kids were being evacuated from the school. He stated that at this time, no one had said anything about an active shooter (timestamp 00:36:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained someone dropped a location pin on the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) application (an Android smartphone geospatial infrastructure and situational awareness application) showing the location of Robb Elementary School, and he used ATAK to find his way to the school. He stated he parked approximately 150 to 200 yards from the entrance of the school and retrieved his Kevlar helmet, rifle, CamelBak, and two individual first aid kits. He added that he inserted a magazine in his rifle and loaded a round into the chamber. He explained that he did not keep breaching tools in his government vehicle because his specialty was medical, and the Border Patrol Tactical Team's (BORTAC) specialty was breaching (timestamp 00:41:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as he was running towards the school, he saw a young girl run across the road in front of him. He said the girl had blood on her face, and as soon as he recognized the blood, he asked her if she was hurt and told her that he was a medic. She ran away from him in the direction of the funeral home where there were other law enforcement officers (LEOs) and medical personnel. Seeing the girl with blood on her face raised his level of concern (timestamp 01:11:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know for a fact there were wounded people inside of the school but assumed there could be wounded people after seeing the girl with blood on her face, and he knew LEOs had to get in there fast (timestamp 01:22:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at the west side of the school, he had no idea who was in charge of the incident. He explained he saw BORSTAR BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, at the west entrance of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to retrieve all his medical equipment because they were setting up a triage. He described his two medical bags as having intravenous injection (IV), intraosseous infusion (IO), tourniquets, and bandages for massive bleeds. After speaking with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he returned to his vehicle, retrieved both his medical bags, ran back to the school, and entered the building. He estimated he arrived at the school at 12:30 p.m. (timestamp 00:45:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after entering the school, he left his two medical bags with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and witnessed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BORSTAR SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, set up a triage area near the bathrooms on the east side of the hallway T-intersection. He believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) oversaw the medical triage pre-breach. He explained that after leaving his medical bags, he saw personnel from Uvalde County Sheriff's Office and Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS), and BPAs down the hallway of the T-intersection. He stated that after seeing



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LEOs in the hallway, it was apparent to him the incident was still going on because numerous LEOs had their rifles aimed at a door in the hallway (timestamp 00:49:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he saw BORTAC SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, walk by him in the hallway, and he was carrying a breaching tool. He stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asking other unknown LEOs for keys to make entry into the classroom where the shooter was located. He said he made his way to the stack of LEOs outside of rooms 111 and 112 and added he remembered someone in the hallway on the south end saying, "Please don't do this," (timestamp 00:49:30).

[Agent Note: stack is a term for a formation used in law enforcement when a team forms up single file along the entrance or doorway to a room where they believe a threat is located.]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he later learned through statements made from individuals after the incident that the individual who said, "Please don't do this," was Chief Pete Arredondo, Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while in the hallway, he saw BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, arrive in the hallway and added that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a sniper rifle and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had an M-4. He stated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the hallway, and shortly after he left, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obtained keys for the classroom. He said he understood the doors were locked and keys were needed to unlock the doors. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told by an unknown person to test the keys on the janitor's closet door that was located in the hallway. He said that after the keys were tested on the janitor's closet, he noticed the closet was full of bullet holes (timestamp 00:53:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he entered the stack in the hallway, he did not remember having conversations with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) specifically, and described the stack formed with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) second, Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Zavala County Sheriff's Office third, and himself fourth. The stack he was in was positioned on classroom door 111. While in the stack, an unknown LEO showed up with a rifle-rated shield, and he ran back and grabbed the shield from him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later learned the shield belonged to the U.S. Marshals Service through conversation with other LEOs. He continued to explain that after he retrieved the shield, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took the shield from him and went back into the stack at the front. BORTAC BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, showed up right before they breached the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he heard SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) say, "Hey (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) over here," for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to fall into the stack (timestamp 00:56:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that prior to entering the classroom, an unknown LEO in the hallway relayed the subject wanted "suicide by cop," and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned to the LEOs in both stacks and told them, "You guys understand that? The guy wants suicide by cop, ok?" He added that at this point, he (BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) had still not heard any noise coming from the classroom (timestamp 00:58:45).





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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised everyone in the stacks to go in as “one big stack.” He saw SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put a key in the door, turn it, and open the door. He stated he could not remember specifics but remembered SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saying, “Okay, let’s go in,” prior to breaching the room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered first and went straight into the classroom, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered second and went straight in, Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered third and went straight in, and he entered and went to the “hard corner” to the right side of the classroom. After entering the classroom, he heard a loud bang that sounded like a metal door slamming, so he turned towards that noise. The next thing he heard was gunfire and he saw muzzle flashes. He remembered seeing a silhouette and hair of the subject and added there were muzzle flashes coming from the subject (timestamp 02:14:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he fired his rifle “point shoot” because he did not have time to use his sight as a reference. He said he did not remember what part of the body he was aiming at, but it would have been center mass based on his training. However, at the time, he was unable to make out center mass because the classroom was dark. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shot back at the muzzle flashes from shots in his direction because it was so dark (timestamp 03:44:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he fired his M-4, he felt like he fired five to six rounds, but he explained that when he performed a round count after the shooting, his round count indicated he fired 12 rounds. After the subject and his rifle fell to the ground and was no longer a threat, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) slung his rifle. After he slung his rifle, he turned around in the classroom and saw a pile of kids entangled under tables. The kids were pale and covered in blood. After seeing the children in the classroom, he went to the child closest to him and tried to get him out from under the table by grabbing his leg. Due to the blood on the child’s leg, he slipped and fell on the ground. After he fell on the ground, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entering classroom 112 and felt the need to help him clear that classroom. Other LEOs were entering the classroom, so he let them help with the children under the desk (timestamp 01:53:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) go into classroom 112, he followed him. As he entered the classroom, he saw a little girl, so he bent down to pick her up. She stood on her own as he put her over his shoulder. As he took her out of the classroom, he yelled, “She is alive,” and proceeded to take her to the triage center and laid her next to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:58:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he noticed a bullet hole through the girl’s (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the blood already appeared to be clotted. He put a trauma bandage on the girl’s (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the girl’s (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) due to other gunshots in her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) area. He said he checked the girl’s pulse, it was strong and rapid, and she was breathing. PA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to put her on the cloth litter (a litter is a stretcher, carried by two or four bearers, for evacuation of sick and wounded), and they transported her to an ambulance and advised the ambulance medical personnel she had a pulse (timestamp 03:53:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after taking the girl to the ambulance, he went back to the school and saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) working on a little boy and asked him to check for a pulse. The boy had a



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“huge hole” in his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) area that appeared to be an exit wound. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after checking the male child’s pulse, it was weak and “thready.” He said he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put the boy on a cloth litter and transported him outside the school to an ambulance (timestamp 03:55:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that after he took the boy to the ambulance, he went back into the school and looked for other victims to help. He saw a casualty collection point (CCP) and explained this was where they placed the confirmed deceased people. After seeing the CCP, someone advised him they were locking down the school, so he exited through the west side door and saw a female teacher on a gurney. BORSTAR BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BORSTAR SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, were providing medical treatment to the teacher. He carried the bottle of oxygen while other LEOs moved her to the ambulance (timestamp 03:58:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in charge of the medical triage post-breach (timestamp 04:45:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after exiting the school, he saw BORSTAR BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he had fired five to six rounds. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked him out to make sure he did not get shot or have any injuries. He could not remember what time he exited the school for the final time. After being checked for injuries, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with other BPAs by a tree and then was told to go to UVA to meet. He remembered Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, being at the meeting by the tree at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 04:00:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went to UVA and had a muster with CPA Owens, but he did not remember what was said. He explained that while at UVA, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised him there was another threat at the high school because a girl made a threat she was going to “finish the job.” BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he went to Uvalde High School with BORSTAR BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and provided security near the entrance at the high school. He could not remember what time he arrived or left the high school but estimated being there approximately one hour. He stated he did not use force and did not restrain anyone while at the high school (timestamp 04:26:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he left the high school and met with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to provide his name, “star number” (USBP call sign), and round count to him on a piece of paper. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not specify who SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was providing his (BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) name, star number, and round count to (timestamp 04:30:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his highest-level medical certification was EMT Basic and added he had advanced skills such as IV and IO certifications. He received his EMT training at DRT in 2019. He was registered with the National Registry of EMTs and was licensed and credentialed as an EMT with the Department of Homeland Security and possibly with the State of Texas. He explained that to maintain his EMT license, he was required to complete 40 hours of medical training a year. He stated the EMT coordinator for DRT was BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and



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he did not know who the Medical Director overseeing protocols was but had the Medical Director's phone number (timestamp 04:40:00).

Investigative Analyst (IA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, Threat Mitigation and Analysis Division, assisted CBP OPR interviewers and presented BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with video obtained from the T-intersection camera of Robb Elementary School from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 2).

The video started at 01:10:54. During review of the video, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself and confirmed he was on the T-intersection video at the overlay time reflected on the video at 01:11:11. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was presented with body-worn camera (BWC) video obtained from Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department (UPD), from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 3).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself and confirmed he was taking the battery out of his radio at elapsed time 00:29:22.

IA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) played radio transmissions from the incident for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to attempt to identify his voice on the radio (Attachment 4). The first audio played was USBP radio transmissions from the incident at Robb Elementary School. At 00:47:56 of the audio, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged it was his voice on the radio asking if a girl was injured. He stated this occurred when he was running to the west entrance door prior to entering the school when he witnessed a girl running towards the funeral home (timestamp 06:50:40).

IA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) played the patched radio communications from the incident at Robb Elementary School (Attachment 5). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) acknowledged it was his voice on the radio during the initial encounter with the girl as previously acknowledged in the USBP standalone radio traffic. He stated he could not recognize whether it was his voice on the entire transmission and stated the second part of the audio could be a bystander overheard on the radio and believed the girl or someone was heard on the radio saying, "Oh my god." He could not distinguish whether the second part of the patched audio was him or someone else (timestamp 06:57:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he did not recall the girl stopping for him or saying anything to him and she continued running to the funeral home in the direction of other LEOs. He said she did not tell him she was injured or shot (timestamp 07:00:00).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 6).

These maps were labeled one through ten, respectively. Map one of north of Uvalde was not applicable. On map two of south of Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his route from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) to Uvalde. Map three of Uvalde was not applicable. On map four of Uvalde schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the schools he responded to, Robb Elementary School, and Uvalde High School. On map five of Robb Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled his initial parking spot upon arriving at the school. Map five(a) of Robb Elementary School was not applicable. Map six of Robb Elementary School and the Uvalde Civic Center were not applicable. On map seven of Robb



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Elementary School, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified traveling to UVA twice, once for muster and the second time to meet with TXDPS Rangers. On map eight(a) of Robb Elementary School layout, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the location of the three civilians he provided medical treatment to. On map eight(b) of Robb Elementary School layout, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled the location of the triage area. Maps eight(c), (d), (e), and (f) of Robb Elementary School layout were not applicable. On map eight(g) of Robb Elementary School layout, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) labeled locations of personnel in the stack, movements of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) post-breach, movements of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) post-breach, movements of Deputy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) post-breach, his movements post-breach, the locations of where he fired shots, and movements inside classrooms 111 and 112 to include locations of the people he moved or provided medical care to. Map nine of Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home was not applicable. Map ten of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) Area (BORTAC only) was not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Video from the T-intersection at Robb Elementary School, dated May 24, 2022.
3	BWC footage from UPD Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated May 24, 2022.
4	Audio of radio transmissions, dated May 24, 2022.
5	Audio of patched radio transmissions, dated May 24, 2022.
6	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 208**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 22, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was working at BRA assigned to detention and care. While in the breakroom on his lunch break, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned about a shooting in Uvalde. Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, directed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to Uvalde because he was an emergency medical technician (EMT). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was departing BRA, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and BPA trainees (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the shooting in Uvalde because BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also an EMT. While driving to Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, to obtain information on the situation as BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also an EMT responding to the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also called SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get details about the specific location of the incident. While en route to Uvalde, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing over the radio there were kids in the classroom, multiple victims, and that a kid was calling from the classroom (timestamp 00:56:57).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stated he arrived near Robb Elementary School and parked on Nicolas Street. As he exited his vehicle, he saw parents gathered near the school. One parent suggested that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drive around to the other side of the school. After a few attempts at getting closer to the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) parked on Old Carrizo Road. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) grabbed his medical equipment and ran towards the school. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) arrived, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, who was also an EMT. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) arrived at the west entrance, he recognized BPA-Programs (BPA-P) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Special Operations Detachment (SOD). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) added that BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was an EMT and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a paramedic. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) to the south entrance to assist with any victims on that side of the school and informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) the scene was still active.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) arrived at the south entrance and saw two Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) troopers, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the south entrance, he was informed by an unknown law enforcement officer (LEO) the shooter may be in the ceiling rafters or the roof. After hearing a call that a group was going to breach the door, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) heard gunfire and observed several people move through the south entrance up the hallway. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) moved up the hallway, he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT SOD. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) observed that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was injured and stopped to evaluate him. When evaluating BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) observed a blood coming down his face and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) complained of leg pain. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) classified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a “walking wounded” since he was able to breathe, talk and walk. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) insisted that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stop treating him and assist the victims.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) stated that as he approached classroom 111, he saw a child being carried by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) towards the south entrance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) later learned the child was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) entered classroom 111 and noticed classrooms 111 and 112 were connected and the lights were off in classroom 111. In classroom 112, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) saw BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checking victims for signs of life. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) observed an adult female that seemed to be breathing and asked two nearby LEOs for assistance carrying the woman. As he reached the threshold of classroom 112, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) handed off the woman to others who carried her to medical personnel for assistance. BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) that all the remaining victims were “black,” meaning they were deceased (timestamp 01:18:00). BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to inform everyone in classroom 112 of the status of the remaining victims, however the room was loud. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) yelled at the occupants in classroom 112 to leave the room if they were not an EMT (timestamp 01:18:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) exited classroom 112 to help with medical treatment in the hallway. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) moved towards a young boy who was injured sitting up against a wall. However, by the time BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made his way to the boy, others were taking care of him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) heard someone yell for assistance treating and transporting an adult male teacher, so he made his way towards the teacher. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) helped to move the teacher onto a backboard that did not have straps, and with the assistance of three unknown LEOs, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) carried the teacher out of the east entrance towards the driveway in front of the school’s entrance on Old Carrizo Road. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7) noticed



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an unoccupied ambulance and decided to load the teacher into it. The ambulance did not have a gurney or any other transport device, so he loaded the teacher into the back of the ambulance on the backboard.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he climbed into the back of the ambulance and held the teacher to secure him. The ambulance was driven by an unknown firefighter while BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cared for the teacher. While driving to the hospital, the teacher informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the shooter had placed a cell phone on the teacher's back and sat next to him. The shooter then stood up, walked around classrooms 111 and 112, and shot everyone a second time. The teacher said the shooter then shot him a second time in the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

When the ambulance arrived at Uvalde Memorial Hospital, hospital staff assumed the teacher's care. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walking into the hospital.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the school to look for his vehicle keys inside the building but was denied entry into the school. After calling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw a group of BPAs congregating near a tree on the north side of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw BPA P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and spoke with him about the situation. Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, spoke to the group and instructed them to return to UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also spoke to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) near the tree and learned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at UVA around 2:00 p.m., changed his clothes, and was driven to his vehicle. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he did not feel he was able to drive, and that BPA trainee (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove his vehicle back to BRA.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that prior to the breach, he believed the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) oversaw USBP personnel, however it appeared the other agencies did not seem to care who was in charge. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at the scene, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him that "BORTAC is getting ready with shields" (timestamp 02:50:48). After the breach, CPA Owens oversaw USBP personnel. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not observe an incident nor medical command during the incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) oversaw the medical response, however, BPA-P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took over the medical response to allow BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to focus on tactical matters. Given the perceived absence of a medical command, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) oversaw the transport of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) teacher to the hospital.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unsure as to what his authority was to respond to a situation like the one at Robb Elementary School, but believed he had a duty to act and assist local law enforcement in the area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood he did not have peace officer status in the State of Texas.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he became a certified EMT in 2019 through a USBP training course in the DRT. At the conclusion of the incident, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BRA, who served as the BRA medical coordinator, told the BRA EMTs not to worry about submitting any patient care reports.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided by CBP OPR interviewers (Attachment 2). In the collection, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traced his route to Robb Elementary School and his approach to the





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school. Additionally, BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> drew on a map to explain his actions while at Robb Elementary School.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
2	Maps reviewed by BPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 209**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 22, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended training at USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) and, during a training break, heard radio communications concerning an active shooter and a request that available law enforcement officers respond. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated he heard this radio communication at approximately 11:00 a.m. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other BPAs retrieved rifles from the UVA armory. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rode with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, in a marked USBP vehicle, with emergency lights and sirens activated, to Robb Elementary School.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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When BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the school, they parked approximately one block away and walked toward the northeast side of the building where the shooting occurred. When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the vehicle with a rifle, handgun, baton, two spare pistol magazines, one spare rifle magazine and a flashlight. However, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have body armor, a radio, or any breaching tools. At the northeast entrance to the building, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered a Uvalde Police Department (UPD) officer with a rifle, who informed them the shooter was contained, two bags of ammunition were found, and that the shooter had shot someone (timestamp 00:34:33). Based upon the UPD officer's location, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the shooter was contained within the school library.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed several law enforcement officers (LEOs) inside the building, so he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) positioned themselves near the classrooms located east of the building, where the shooting occurred. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and relayed to WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the information he received from the UPD officer. BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then evacuated children from the classrooms east of the building where the shooter was located (timestamp 00:57:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not remember if these classroom doors were locked, but he remembered that after knocking on the doors announcing his presence, they did not have difficulty evacuating children (timestamp 01:30:14). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not use keys to unlock any doors at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:31:10).

As the children were evacuated from these classrooms, they were directed east towards other LEOs. Later, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed children being loaded onto buses on the east side of the school. BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) evacuated children from classrooms 7 to 12 and later observed the evacuations of classrooms 13 to 23 and 31 to 33. However, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not evacuate children from the middle classroom building because it was near the location of the shooter, and they were concerned the children could be injured. The children in these classrooms were later evacuated when additional LEOs arrived to assist.

Since neither BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) nor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a radio, one would periodically meet with the LEOs outside the building where the shooter was located to obtain situational updates. As BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued evacuating children, two other LEOs arrived and assisted. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed one was a constable and the other was wearing a cowboy hat and a blue shirt.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved to the cafeteria where they found staff, as well as a child, hidden behind a stage curtain. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there were staff that did not want to evacuate and remained in the cafeteria. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explain that the staff were later evacuated by a Texas Department of Public Safety trooper. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attempted to clear the school office, but the door was locked. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knocked on the door and used his flashlight to illuminate the office. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered people in the school office, but BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not explain what was done after the encountered people in the office (timestamp 02:37:37).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, who instructed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go to the funeral home to assist with loading children onto buses (timestamp 00:45:17). Neither BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) nor BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew where the funeral home was located, and



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they believed it was a distance from Robb Elementary School. BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to their vehicle and attempted to drive to the funeral home, but the roads were blocked with vehicles.

While in their vehicle, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard radio communications on the vehicle radio that law enforcement officers were preparing to breach the classroom. Since the roads were blocked, BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to return to Robb Elementary School to assist. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then heard radio communication that a man was injured, and assistance was needed to evacuate injured children.

As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was running towards the school, he encountered WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), Del Rio Sector (DRT). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) limping and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed to be taken to the hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) walked back to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vehicle and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove him to Uvalde Memorial Hospital. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was shot in the head and possibly the foot (timestamp 01:14:25).

When they arrived at the hospital, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the emergency room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was given a tag and they waited outside. As the ambulances began to arrive at the hospital, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized the severity of the situation. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he could leave, and asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to take his vehicle with his firearms and equipment back to UVA to secure them (timestamp 01:15:44). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that when he arrived at UVA, BPAs scheduled for the (b) (7)(E) shift were arriving for muster. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned in the vehicle keys to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and returned home, as he was scheduled for work later that night (timestamp 01:17:50).

During the interview, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; and Uvalde schools, including Robb Elementary School and Uvalde High School (timestamp 02:01:40). These maps are labeled 1-9, respectively (Attachment 2). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the maps labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas; 2. South of Uvalde, Texas; and 3. Uvalde, Texas, were not applicable. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated that on May 24, 2022, he was at UVA, Robb Elementary School, and Uvalde Memorial Hospital. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated where BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) parked near Robb Elementary School and where he encountered the Uvalde Police Officer. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the maps labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, and 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center, Uvalde, Texas, were not applicable. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his route of travel when he drove BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the hospital.

On the map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where he spoke with the Uvalde Police Officer, the classrooms and other school facilities he evacuated with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other LEOs, and where he walked when he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the school for Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home. On the map labeled 8.b. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked approximately where he encountered BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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after he was injured. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the maps labeled 8.c., 8.d., 8.e., 8.f, and 8.g., Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, as well as the maps labeled 9. Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home, Uvalde, Texas, and 10. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) were not applicable.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed photos of LEOs who responded to the Robb Elementary School shooting from the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department, UPD, Texas Department of Public Safety, as well as other agencies (timestamp 02:51:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to identify the UPD officer he spoke with when he initially arrived at the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also reviewed photos of BPAs who responded to the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 02:53:53). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, as having assisted with evacuating classrooms 13 to 18 and 19 to 23 (timestamp 02:55:44).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in charge of the law enforcement response to the shooting at Robb Elementary School. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not use force or restrain anyone at the school, and he did not provide medical aid to anyone (timestamp 03:02:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that USBP responded to the shooting at Robb Elementary School to support other law enforcement officers. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said USBP was responsible as a law enforcement organization to respond (timestamp 03:03:15).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received active shooter training approximately two or three years ago during a quarterly firearms qualification.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 22, 2023, ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was performing tracking work with “Brush Crew” BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and Supervisory BPA (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School via radio communication while working at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) located approximately (b) (7)(E) of Uvalde (timestamp 00:20:30).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when the Brush Crew learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School, they decided to respond (timestamp 00:27:22).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he utilized Texas Farm to Market 481 to Highway 90 to get to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he activated his USBP vehicle’s lights and sirens during his drive to Uvalde. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while enroute, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told the Brush Crew to respond to the civic center (timestamp 00:22:05).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked in an alley at the back of the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was wearing body armor and his duty belt, which included his pistol, extra magazines, a multi tool, handcuffs, flashlight, gloves, and a knife.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was instructed by an unknown BPA to enter the civic center and provide security. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he entered the civic center, he noticed students were present and were accompanied by their teachers. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) established an interior post near an exterior door at the rear of the civic center. Students continued to enter the civic center after they were dropped off. The students remained with their teachers until their parents arrived. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when parents and students were united, they would exit the rear door where he was assigned.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he remained at the rear door of the interior of the civic center until he learned about a potential second threat. The shooter's girlfriend had allegedly made a comment, something to the effect that she was going to finish the job (timestamp 00:36:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was not sure, but believed that after hearing about the second threat, he was relocated to the exterior rear of the civic center where BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other local law enforcement officers conducted perimeter security.

When CBP OPR interviewers showed a photo of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station, to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he stated that he believed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the other BPA working inside of the civic center (timestamp 01:26:34). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, was also on scene at the civic center (timestamp 00:46:58).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unclear about the timeframe but recalled being notified it was time to discontinue providing perimeter security at the civic center. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he drove to UVA and turned in his USBP vehicle and keys. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he departed UVA and drove his personal vehicle to Dalton Elementary School, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) place of employment. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he united with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and remained with her until she was cleared to leave the school.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) searched his phone for text messages he sent to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to assist CBP OPR interviewers with establishing a timeline but was unable to locate any messages.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after learning about the shooter at Robb Elementary School, he was unclear if the situation was regarding an active shooter or a barricaded subject (timestamp 01:15:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not receive updates or additional directions while enroute to Uvalde (timestamp 01:16:20).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to identify the person in charge at the civic center and did not see anyone giving orders to law enforcement officers arriving at the civic center (timestamp 01:18:34).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not provide direction or guidance to anyone while at the civic center (timestamp 01:19:04).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not identify anyone from USBP that was in charge at the civic center (timestamp 01:19:10).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not restrict, use force, or restrained anyone while at the civic center and did not render medical aid on the day of the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 01:19:22).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP's authority to respond to an incident like the Robb Elementary School shooting was to stop the threat and render aid as soon as possible. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that authority was granted because of the status of being a first responder and a law enforcement officer (timestamp 01:20:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed there was a responsibility by USBP to back up other law enforcement agencies and there was a responsibility for law enforcement personnel to respond (timestamp 01:20:42).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not send or receive any official text messages related to the Robb Elementary School shooting but did send text messages to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was on lockdown at Dalton Elementary School, and to his father (timestamp 01:21:16).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not believe he sent or received any emails related to the Robb Elementary School shooting but agreed to conduct a search and to share the results of his search with ASAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:23:55).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not write any reports related to the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 01:24:31).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he did not have discussions with BPAs or USBP officials after the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:25:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in 2020, he participated in active shooter training while at the USBP academy in Artesia, New Mexico (timestamp 01:25:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he only responded to the civic center on May 24, 2022 and did not respond to Robb Elementary School or any other school.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION  
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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 211**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 22, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is currently an administrative supervisor at USBP Falfurrias Station (FLF). On the date of the incident at Robb Elementary School, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled Watch Commander (WC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, had just departed his office when he heard a transmission on the radio from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was an armed subject running towards Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) repeat the transmission to confirm what he heard. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was an armed subject running towards the school and the subject shot back at police officers; it was an active shooter situation (timestamp 00:29:00).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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After receiving the information, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested the radio channel be cleared of all other traffic and requested that BPAs respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:30:25). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he then spent the majority his time at UVA fielding telephone calls, maintaining accountability of assets, and coordinating various requests. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was the only person left at UVA, per the instruction of WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he already put on his vest and was staging to depart when he was told he needed to stay behind to man the station.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he requested a radio patch via sector communications (timestamp 01:06:00). According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was aware it was common practice to initiate a radio patch for certain types of situations, but he made the request himself to ensure it was done instead of assuming it would automatically be initiated. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he was unsure as to whether the radio patch on the date of the incident was completed based upon his request or if it had already been initiated prior to his request.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was charged with handing out rifles from the armory as BPAs were deploying into the field (timestamp 00:55:50). Additionally, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maintained a list of personnel who were in the field, to include those who were at Robb Elementary School, those who deployed to the Uvalde Civic Center, and any BPAs who responded to other school sites. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) coordinated the availability of uniforms for BPAs who needed a change of clothes, water to be taken out to the field, and food for the influx of BPAs who were reporting to the station after responding to the incident (timestamp 00:31:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he stayed in constant communication with the Border Intelligence Center (BIC) at USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested the BIC contact other USBP stations to request assistance. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also requested, via the BIC, to have the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) deployed to Robb Elementary School but soon after his request he learned BORTAC was already on scene (timestamp 01:17:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled one item he specifically assisted with was his participation in sorting out the information related to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) involvement with the initial stages of the incident. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) preliminary information from an unknown source indicated BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was involved in a failure to yield (FTY) incident involving the shooter. USBP Command Staff from DRT was demanding information as to why BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was involved with the FTY incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made direct contact with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who explained he was not involved in an FTY incident. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was in Uvalde conducting (b) (7)(E) when he noticed another unspecified law enforcement agency pass him by, heading in the opposite direction of where pursuits in Uvalde typically occurred. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subsequently followed to see what assistance he could provide. At no time was BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the lead agent related to an FTY (timestamp 00:33:25).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled some of the radio communications he heard while he was coordinating from his office at UVA. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he heard talk about looking for keys to unlock



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a door (timestamp 01:19:40). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled at one point during the incident there was a “hot mic” (an open microphone that is transmitting), during which he could hear someone yell “Is she shot? Is she bleeding?” SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear any shots fired over the radio.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he initiated the Evolving Situation Report (ESR), as per protocol when it came to certain critical incidents. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was presented with a copy of the ESR created for the incident at Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he generated the information contained within it based upon information he received via radio communication and/or telephone calls. Although SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have a clear sense of time when it came to recalling the events from the date of the incident, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed the times indicated in the ESR were correct as he entered the information (timestamp 00:48:00).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not receive any specific instructions from sector regarding information he needed to put out into the field for the BPAs who were responding to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:04:40). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained, after he clarified the information related to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he did not have any specific communication with sector except to provide them regular updates regarding the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) maintained communication with WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who were providing him information from their location at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed many of the decisions he made on the date of the incident were decisions he made on his own and there were no specific instructions he received from anyone (timestamp 01:28:45).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in command and control at Robb Elementary School on the date of the incident. When asked who was in charge on behalf of USBP, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the highest-ranking official on site was Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) although PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on site, he was unsure if he was in charge because he was aware PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a personal connection to the incident. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was redirecting telephone calls via WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and WC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:13:30). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained USBP did not have peace officer status in the state of Texas. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP’s response and presence at the scene was in a support capacity to the local or state law enforcement entities who did have peace officer status (timestamp 01:15:30).

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not produce any written statements or memorandums related to the incident at Robb Elementary School. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he took notes while he was fielding calls but no longer had the notes available.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he came upon information, via a conversation with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, that a non-USBP investigative agency conducted a reenactment of the incident at Robb Elementary School. According to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as part of the investigation of the incident, USBP personnel who were not involved were requested to assist with the recreation of the incident, which included a heavy emphasis on testing the radio patch between USBP and other agencies. According to the tests, it was found that USBP and the other agencies could not communicate via radio while inside the school with the doors closed. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed



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he did not participate in the recreation of the event nor any of the tests related to the radio patch (timestamp 01:22:30).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Copy of ESR presented to SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 22, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The Authentication Code was (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to the USBP Del Rio Station (DRS) and was conducting firearms qualifications at the USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) range near Amistad Dam, west of Del Rio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of the incident at Robb Elementary School from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Law Enforcement Safety and Compliance Directorate. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) being on the phone as someone informed him about a shooting in Uvalde (Timestamp 00:28:50). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRS, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Comstock Station, and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, responded to Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled radio communication was spotty and they used handheld radios because the vehicle's radio was not working properly. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that while en route, he heard a radio transmission that the shooter was "down" (Timestamp 00:22:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated they arrived at Robb Elementary School around 12:50 p.m.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing on the radio or from an occupant in his vehicle that a hostage negotiator had been contacted (Timestamp 00:53:25). Based on the information BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had received, he believed he was responding to a barricaded subject.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he parked his vehicle in a nearby neighborhood and walked towards school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed a truck that had crashed in a concrete ditch west of the school (Timestamp 00:23:40). At the truck, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered an unknown trooper with the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) and observed a rifle laying next to the truck. The trooper informed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the truck was driven by the shooter (Timestamp 00:49:50).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he assisted with perimeter security and did not enter school grounds. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, based on the earlier radio transmission, he believed the shooter was down. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he was not an emergency medical technician and did not believe further enforcement action was necessary (Timestamp 00:47:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not have any encounters with the public nor did he provide medical aid.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was at Robb Elementary School for approximately one hour when he overheard Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, request all agents to report to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) for a debriefing. At UVA, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of a second threat made on social media. He responded to the Uvalde High School to assist with perimeter security (Timestamp 00:26:00). When BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned the threat was not real, he responded to a middle school to assist with the release of students to their parents. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall the name of the middle school.

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Timestamp 00:33:40) (Attachment 2). The maps were labeled 1-5, respectively. On the map labeled 1., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled into Uvalde on May 24, 2022. On the map labeled 4., BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked Uvalde High School, but could not recall the name of the middle school where he assisted with the student release. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where he parked his vehicle and where he performed perimeter security. On the map labeled 8.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked his location and observations.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed TXDPS had control of the scene and recalled an unspecific conversation that TXDPS would investigate the incident. He did not know of anyone from USBP who was in charge (Timestamp 00:57:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unsure of USBP's authority to respond to active shooter situations but believed USBP had an obligation to respond as a law enforcement agency.



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 22, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified with Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was dressed in his rough duty USBP uniform and assigned to the UVA processing area (Timestamp 00:17:16). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing a call over the radio regarding a possible school shooting at Robb Elementary School (Timestamp 00:36:59). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately left the processing area, went to the armory, and checked out an M-4 rifle. As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exited the armory, he met BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and rode with him to Robb Elementary School. As they travelled to Robb Elementary School, they saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and followed him to the school (Timestamp 00:19:13).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that upon arriving at Robb Elementary School, he exited the vehicle and walked towards the school with BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Timestamp 00:19:37). As they approached the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noticed most of the people present were on the right side of the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) entered the school through the west entrance and observed a mixture of law enforcement personnel from the Uvalde Police Department (UPD), Uvalde County Sheriff's Office, and possibly, the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) (Timestamp 00:20:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing law enforcement officers (LEOs) in a stack in the hallway with their M-4s pointed down the hallway (Timestamp 00:20:20). At the time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were trying to get an idea of what was going on and where the shooter was located (Timestamp 00:20:36).

[Agent Note: stack is a term for a formation used in law enforcement when a team forms up single file along the entrance or doorway to a room where they believe a threat is located.]

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to clear the classrooms behind the LEOs (Timestamp 00:20:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled they cleared one classroom and found a teacher hidden under a desk. The BPAs identified themselves and asked her to get up and they got her out of the building (Timestamp 00:21:03). As they stood in the hallway, the LEOs told them they had an idea of where the shooter was located and believed the shooter was inside the set of classrooms on the left side of the hallway (Timestamp 00:21:40). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know the extent of everything that had happened up until that point. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) looked down the hallway and noticed bullet holes and speculated the shooter had shot out of the classroom (Timestamp 00:22:06). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the LEOs told him the shooter had locked himself in the classroom (Timestamp 00:22:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to specify who told him. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the LEOs were trying to find a way to get the shooter to come out and were also looking for a key to get inside the classroom (Timestamp 00:22:25). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that at one point, an unknown law enforcement officer brought a set of keys, and they tested them to identify the master key (Timestamp 00:22:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the situation as chaotic with LEOs going in and out of the school (Timestamp 00:23:07). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know how they knew the shooter's name but recalled a uniformed police officer calling the shooter by name, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and telling him to give himself up (Timestamp 00:40:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there was no response from the shooter. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the person talking to the shooter was on the south side of the building (Timestamp 02:29:30). During this interaction, USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and USBP Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR) team members arrived in the school hallway and were trying to get an idea of what was going on and trying to put a plan together. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing discussions on possibly throwing gas into the classroom and said someone started handing out gas masks (Timestamp 00:23:31).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled he heard gunshots from the classroom (Timestamp 00:24:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that following the gunshots, they pressed up against the hallway, approached the classroom, and tried finding an entry way into the classroom (Timestamp 00:55:47). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing approximately three to four shots fired (Timestamp 00:55:28). At



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some point, someone produced a key and the LEOs continued to approach the classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a team of LEOs were stacked on the left side of the hallway with BORTAC and BORSTAR team members stacked on the right side, including BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he saw BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), testing keys on the doors and said BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) found a key that worked on the door (Timestamp 02:28:30). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to describe the key, nor did he know where the key went (Timestamp 00:59:15). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it was relayed to them that a child called 9-1-1 from inside the classroom (Timestamp 02:30:46). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who relayed that information. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while they were stacked, he was able to peer into a window on the classroom door and did his best to get an idea of the layout. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that BORTAC SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, had received information stating the shooter wanted a fight (Timestamp 00:59:31). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing someone say the shooter could be in the ceiling (Timestamp 01:00:00). Shortly thereafter, either a BORTAC or BORSTAR member, approached the classroom door, opened it, and placed a chair to keep the door open (Timestamp 01:00:09).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled observing someone with a shield enter the classroom followed by the rest of the stack (Timestamp 00:26:45). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the guy with the shield entered the classroom and went to the right side because that was the side BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not able to see (Timestamp 01:02:48). As BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was about to enter the classroom, he heard a noise coming from a cabinet located at the back of the classroom (Timestamp 00:27:08). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard the door swing open followed by gunfire and saw the shooter come out of the cabinet firing (Timestamp 00:27:20). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the shooter had long hair, wore a plate carrier, and shot with a rifle (Timestamp 01:04:09) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know how many shots were fired and said he did not shoot because he did not have a clear shot (Timestamp 03:04:54). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw the LEOs in front of him shot the shooter but was not able to identify the LEOs. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was able to tell the shooter was getting shot because his body was flailing as he went down to the ground (Timestamp 03:26:59). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said once he saw the shooter on the ground, he fully realized what had happened (Timestamp 01:05:02).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that following the exchange of gunfire, he looked to the right side of the classroom and saw children in a pile and said the floor was a mess (Timestamp 00:29:34). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) realized there was an adjacent classroom connected by a door and knew they needed to clear that classroom. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) proceeded to clear the adjacent classroom and described the classroom as looking like the first classroom, with a group of children in a pile on the far side. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said his first reaction after realizing there was no other shooter in the adjacent classroom, was to go back to the first classroom to see if there were any survivors (Timestamp 00:30:48).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he went to the pile of deceased children and found a boy with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hair covered in blood who stood up from the pile and asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to help him (Timestamp 01:07:00). The boy was frantic but was able to talk, walk, and did not appear injured (Timestamp 00:31:02). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he escorted the boy to the classroom door





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and another LEO took over. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the pile in search of more survivors but did not find any (Timestamp 00:31:44). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being told they needed to get the children out to the triage medical area in the hallway but could not remember who gave the order (Timestamp 00:32:00). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) followed the instruction and carried children out of the classroom, however, he could not recall how many children he carried (Timestamp 00:32:34). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he saw a lifeless little girl with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hair covered in blood (Timestamp 02:58:24). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he and another LEO carried the girl out to the triage area. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he held her arms and the other LEO held her legs (Timestamp 03:00:20).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and other LEOs cleared the classrooms across the hall from where the shooter was and did not find anyone. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said there were a lot of LEOs in the classroom and observed other LEOs carrying out victims (Timestamp 03:01:00). Because there were a lot of LEOs in the classroom and hallway, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went outside to see if there was anything they could do to help (Timestamp 03:01:46). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled observing someone performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on a child outside the south door (Timestamp 03:02:00). While they were outside, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if he was okay and noticed their arms were covered in blood. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he obtained a bottle of water and poured water on their arms to wash the blood off (Timestamp 03:19:40). Following the incident, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met with Chief Patrol Agent Jason Owens, DRT, and other BPAs for a briefing (Timestamp 03:20:08).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing a lot of radio traffic and described the radio traffic as sounding chaotic. At the time, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed the USBP and UPD patched their radio communications together creating a lot of radio traffic. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered that at one point, there was a hot mic that prevented anyone else from transmitting over the radio. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it was difficult to understand what was being broadcast (Timestamp 00:37:32). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he listened to the radio communication on frequency (b) (7)(E) (Timestamp 02:39:42).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while he was on his way to Robb Elementary School, he believed he was responding to a school shooter situation. However, upon arriving at the school, he heard an unidentified LEO say the shooter had locked himself in a classroom. At that point, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) changed his mind set and looked at the situation as a barricaded subject (Timestamp 00:38:35).

[Agent Note: barricaded subject is a term generally meaning a person, believed to be armed, who has taken a position in a physical location that does not allow police access and is refusing police orders to exit].

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA were present with him in the school (Timestamp 00:44:35). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recalled a BPA known as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was present and confirmed his name as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA (Timestamp 00:49:30).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) specifically recalled BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yelling at BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for not having a vest and instructed him to get a vest (Timestamp 00:44:57). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also remembered swapping out positions with other LEOs who were stacked at the T-intersection of the hallway when they felt fatigued (Timestamp 00:43:57). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) one of the LEOs said the classroom door was locked causing a delay to attempting entry. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed that one of the UPD officers sustained an injury to his ear apparently from a gunshot (Timestamp 00:46:10). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a discussion while they were in the hallway and agreed if they heard gunfire, they had to go in, but the issue they encountered was getting in (Timestamp 00:47:19). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained they had no way of getting into the classroom at the time (Timestamp 00:53:54). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also explained there were other LEOs located at the south end of the hallway (Timestamp 00:47:49).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled children entering the hallway at the south end and evacuating out the south door (Timestamp 02:30:00). He believed LEOs were trying to get the children out of the surrounding classrooms before they made entry (Timestamp 00:52:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified that when he first heard the three or four gunshots, he, BORTAC and BORSTAR members, a UPD officer, a LEO who was wearing shorts, and BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pressed forward towards the gunshots (Timestamp 00:56:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he observed LEOs from Texas Rangers, TXDPS troopers, UPD, U.S. Marshals Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Texas Parks and Wildlife Game Warden, USBP, and other agencies he could not name, at the scene (Timestamp 02:38:28).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have any interactions with the public outside of the school (Timestamp 02:40:020).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that from his perspective, his role at the incident was to provide backup to UPD. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained it had been past practice to assist other law enforcement agencies when they requested assistance. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of a specific policy or a written standard operation procedure that allowed USBP to assist (Timestamp 02:40:08). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware if a specific authority existed that allowed USBP to respond to the incident (Timestamp 02:41:35).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived, it did not appear there was any command and control outside the school (Timestamp 02:43:46). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware if an incident command was established. Upon entering the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed UPD was in charge (Timestamp 02:41:49). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on the USBP side, it did not seem that anyone specifically was in command and control. However, when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived on scene, he felt like SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took control of the situation and got his team together to move down the hallway (Timestamp 02:42:20). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was making decisions and communicated with someone after the three or four initial gunshots were fired (Timestamp 02:31:44).



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BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA, gave him a ride back to the station and took his M-4 rifle back to the armory (Timestamp 03:20:30). CPA Owens held a briefing in the UVA muster room. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard about a second threat, but he was not in a state of mind to respond (Timestamp 03:22:00).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that BORSTAR and BORTAC wore the same uniform and the only distinction to tell the teams apart was the patch that identified them as either BORSTAR or BORTAC (Timestamp 02:32:18).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not wear a body camera on May 24, 2022. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not send any e-mails, text cellular messages, or draft a report regarding the incident at Robb Elementary School (Timestamp 03:23:06).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed he was interviewed by FBI and TXDPS Rangers regarding the Robb Elementary School incident (Timestamp 03:23:40).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled seeing “LOL” rubbed in blood on the classroom board (Timestamp 03:47:24).

CBP OPR interviewers showed maps to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the City of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; Robb Elementary School, Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) rea (Attachment 2). These maps were labeled 1-10, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 2. South Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 3. Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 4. Uvalde, Texas, Schools, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 5. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 5.a. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 6. Robb Elementary School and Civic Center Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated they parked near Geraldine Street. On the map labeled 7. Robb Elementary School, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated the travel path from UVA to Robb Elementary School. On the map labeled 8.a Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated the classrooms that he cleared and the location where he saw LEOs providing CPR to a child outside near the south entrance. On the map labeled 8.f. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated how he entered and after the three – four shots were heard how they pressed forward toward classrooms 112-111. On the map labeled 8.g. Robb Elementary School Layout, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated how they breached and where he saw the shooter come out from. On the map labeled 9. Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home, Uvalde, Texas, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings. On the map labeled 10. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) Area, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not make any markings.



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CBP OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) photos depicting LEOs in various stages of the May 24, 2022, incident (Attachment 3). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISDPD) Chief Pete Arredondo, but only recalled that he saw him, but did not communicate with him, UPD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the UPD officer that got the call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was inside the classroom, UPD Acting Police Chief Mariano Pargas as a person going in and out of the school, Game Warden (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Zavala County Sheriff's Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as two LEOs who were present inside (Timestamp 02:46:37).

CBP OPR interviewers showed BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a schematic of the T-intersection which also included the layout of the classrooms (Timestamp 03:14:54). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked where they were stacked prior to the breach. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also marked in the schematic how everything looked and where the decedents were after the breach (Attachment 4).

Investigative Analyst (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, assisted CBP OPR interviewers and presented BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with two segments of video from the hallway camera of Robb Elementary School from May 24, 2022 (Attachment 5). The first segment started at lapse time 00:31:32 and ended at 01:01:13. The second segment started at 01:01:40 and ended at 01:09:45 (Timestamp 01:43:37).

During review of the video, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified himself at lapse time of 00:31:41, and identified BPAs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also identified UCISDPD Police Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who did not appear to be in a right state of mind and was taken out of the school because he had said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was either injured or shot (Timestamp 01:50:38). BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA (Timestamp 01:48:07) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the video (Timestamp 02:09:33).

During the review of video, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled there was a discussion about getting a tool to open the door but did not know the name of the tool (Timestamp 02:19:33).

BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that prior to the breach, he was somewhere behind SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he was following his direction (Timestamp 02:21:28). According to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he saw and heard when SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told BORSTAR (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, to hand over the shield because he was going to need him for his medical skills (Timestamp 02:26:18).

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Photos of LEOs at Robb Elementary School reviewed by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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4	Map labeled Robb Elementary School reviewed and labeled by BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
5	Robb Elementary School hallway videos from May 24, 2022.

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 214**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 23, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was dressed in his full rough duty USBP uniform and was assigned as the PAIC to the USBP DRT, Border Intelligence Center (BIC). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had oversight of the BIC and Radio Room (b) (7)(E). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described that during a critical incident, the BIC and Radio Room become the focal point of the incident command area where command leadership is centralized in one location (timestamp 00:18:24). When necessary, the Radio Room could patch USBP radio communications with outside law enforcement agencies to receive live radio transmissions.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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On said date, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was out having lunch with Acting Division Chief (ADC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Operations Division, Executive Officer (XO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Laredo Station (timestamp 00:11:12). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that the lunch occurred between 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:48:34). During their lunch, someone in the group received a call and informed them of a possible shooting at Uvalde.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not respond to the scene because he knew there would be enough resources deployed. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the BIC and reported to the radio room to validate the information, assist with any reporting, and allocate resources. Deputy PAIC (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operation Detachment (SOD), Comstock (COM) Station, TX, Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Border Patrol Agent Intelligence (BPA-I), DRT, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, Watch Commander (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Eagle Pass (EGT) Station, TX, were working between the BIC and Radio Room performing various tasks when PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived (00:13:50). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that Val Verde High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Analyst (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also assisted but could not confirm if he was onsite at the BIC or assisted remotely.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ensured that his staff assigned a scribe, created an accurate timeline, conducted research to identify the shooter, and identified the area of the incident to provide a map to the personnel responding to the scene. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also ensured that radio communications were monitored, and that information was disseminated to the field. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not assign specific tasks to individual employees and said everyone worked together in validating the information that was being received. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained the BIC was essentially the incident command for reporting and communication flow (timestamp 00:45:15). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked on gathering the information for the Significant Incident Report (timestamp 01:02:15).

According to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the highest ranking and in command of the BIC while all the command staff ensured they provided (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with accurate information. The BIC disseminated all the critical information to the field.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not communicate directly with Headquarters (HQ) leadership; however, he did review the critical incident information his staff put together for (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the incident unfolded (timestamp 00:14:55). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed (A)DC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and XO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) communicated directly with HQ leadership.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified Law Enforcement Information System Specialist (LEISS) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, as the radio dispatcher who handled the Uvalde Station (UVA) on May 24, 2022, but was physically present at the BIC (Timestamp 00:15:18). Although PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not hear the live radio communications, he was informed that there was a radio broadcast or discussion regarding individuals at the scene asking for keys and having difficulty getting through the doors (timestamp 00:15:45). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not recall any other significant radio





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communications because he was not listening to the radio communications. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned (A)PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in direct communication with lead SOD personnel on scene at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:30:30).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that at one point, the BIC received a message regarding the girlfriend of the shooter. Upon receiving this information, the BIC staff worked on identifying the girlfriend and the shooter based on the names that were provided to the BIC (timestamp 0:19:03). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to provide where the BIC obtained the initial biographical information regarding the shooter. The BIC also received information regarding a threat at another location stating something to the effect of finishing what the shooter had started (timestamp 0:19:20). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and HIDTA Analyst (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conducted open-source research on the shooter to get useful information for a law enforcement response (timestamp 00:19:55).

Regarding the USBP protocol in responding to assisting other law enforcement agencies, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know if there is a written established protocol or a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to assist state and local law enforcement agencies. According to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if there is an MOU, it is possible that SOD would have it. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated, in a critical incident situation, USBP would respond (timestamp 00:20:50). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) commented that partnerships with the state and locals is important and critical. It is common for local law enforcement agencies to request assistance from USBP mainly because of the manpower and the skills that USBP holds in comparison to small municipal, county, and school police (timestamp 00:27:50). The role that USBP would assume would be determined based on the situation.

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's authority and responsibility to respond to the active shooter incident at Robb Elementary School was that USBP is a law enforcement agency and are protectors of the people with the understanding that its' authority is mainly immigration and Title United States Code 21 authority (timestamp 00:27:20).

According to PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Carrizo Springs (CAR) station, TX, was initially the (A)PAIC in charge at the scene; however, when USBP leadership was made aware that DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a child at Robb Elementary School, the decision was made to have PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relieve DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:52:10). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to provide the timeframe of when PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relieved DPAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:58:25).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) understood that Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens, DRT, was enroute to the scene and PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed that upon CPA Owens' arrival to the scene, he would assume the command of all USBP personnel. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know what agency was in command over the overall law enforcement response to Robb Elementary, but if he had to speculate it was the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District (UCISD), Police Chief Pete Arredondo and the Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) (timestamp 00:29:00).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had five subordinate employees that responded to Robb Elementary; however, he did not know the names of the employees until after the incident. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the subordinate employees as former BPA-I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)



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Brackettville (BRA) station, TX, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) CAR, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT (timestamp 00:32:00). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not communicate with the employees on the day of the incident.

Although PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not confirm whether the U.S. Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) was specifically requested to respond to Robb Elementary, he explained that generally in a critical situation such as the one that occurred, BORTAC is typically requested. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did recall that Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) were requested to respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:53:40).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was informed that BORTAC members were trying to gain access to the shooter's location and after a span of time that had passed, he heard the shooter had been killed (timestamp 00:54:40). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified BORTAC members, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, as being involved in the incident, however, mentioned he became aware of their names after the incident had occurred (timestamp 00:55:20). PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not communicate directly with anyone at the scene and did not provide orders or guidance to USBP personnel at the scene (timestamp 00:56:53).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP's role in the Robb Elementary School shooting incident was to provide support and assist local law enforcement agencies (timestamp 00:57:05).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he learned, after the fact, that the situation changed from an active shooter to a barricaded subject. PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he either heard this from a news broadcast or from Chief Arredondo's television interview, where Chief Arredondo said he believed the shooter was contained (timestamp 00:50:50).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was possible he spoke with Supervisory SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Antonio, TX regarding the shooter, but he is not certain because he might be confusing two separate incidents (timestamp 01:02:55).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) COM, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, BPA Programs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DRT, as personnel that responded to Robb Elementary; however, PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to provide details regarding what they did, what role they assumed, or what time they arrive at Robb Elementary (timestamp 00:55:55).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being made aware of a second threat and heard law enforcement personnel were responding to the Uvalde high school, however, he did not know whether USBP personnel were deployed or directed to respond (timestamp 01:06:32).

PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not believe he wrote any reports, sent cellular text messages or emails related to the Robb Elementary School shooting incident and agreed to follow-up with CBP OPR to confirm if he wrote a report, sent e-mails, or had cellular text messages regarding the incident (timestamp 01:09:31).



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Following the incident, the incident command leadership had an after-action discussion and CPA Owens assigned all USBP DRT stations to generate an action plan for active shooter response to schools in the area (timestamp 01:10:32).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 215**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On March 22, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on duty at the Border Intelligence Center (BIC), USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT), where he oversees the (b) (7)(E) at DRT. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that between 10:45 a.m. and 11:15 a.m., he heard radio chatter regarding an active shooter at a school in Uvalde, Texas (timestamp 00:44:34). Shortly after, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Eagle Pass Station (EGT), Texas, who advised there was an active shooter at an elementary school in Uvalde (timestamp 00:17:40).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked permission for he and Acting (A) SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) EGT, to respond to support local law enforcement. He also wanted to locate BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Uvalde Station (UVA). SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he approved a leave request for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to attend his son's award ceremony at Robb Elementary School that day and wasn't able to contact him.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he granted permission for SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (A)SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to Robb Elementary School. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that he told SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (A)SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to wear their body armor so they would be easily identified and to keep him updated (timestamp 00:46:45). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he did not direct SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (A)SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to deploy to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:48:43).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he tasked his team to contact (b) (7)(E) to obtain information regarding the shooter at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:36:25). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later explained that (b) (7)(E) did not provide any usable intelligence.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (A)SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) UVA; and BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Carrizo Springs Station, as the only personnel in his direct chain of command who responded to Robb Elementary School. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, to his knowledge, none of his personnel entered Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:14:20).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called him upon arriving at Robb Elementary School and described the scene as chaotic, with several law enforcement personnel from different agencies present. SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was safe and remained on scene, located a backpack containing magazines and ammunition (timestamp 01:18:46).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that, while he was at the BIC, he heard about a second threat and believed it was related to the high school in Uvalde, Texas. However, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was unable to recall who provided this information. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he did not direct SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (A)SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to the high school and he was unsure if any of them responded (timestamp 01:33:11).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he briefed his supervisor, Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BIC, DRT, regarding the report that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at Robb Elementary School around the time the active shooter was first reported (timestamp 00:53:35). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that his role on the day of the shooting at Robb Elementary School was to provide oversight of SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and to ensure the safety of BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 01:05:45).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was unaware that the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) breached a classroom door (timestamp 01:36:09). He explained that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (A)SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided perimeter security and did not enter Robb Elementary School. SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BIC, DRT, monitored the radio traffic related to the incident (timestamp 01:38:22).

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated USBP's role in an incident like the shooting at Robb Elementary School was to respond and assist the other law enforcement agencies (timestamp 01:42:50). When asked what statutory authority allows USBP to respond and act to an incident like the Robb Elementary School shooting, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled from his training at the USBP Academy that, as federal agents, USBP is allowed to make arrests for crimes that take place in their presence (timestamp 01:49:33).



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SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he did not recall sending or receiving any emails related to the Robb Elementary School shooting (timestamp 01:53:09). However, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he wrote a “Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Nomination for Extraordinary Valor Above and Beyond the Call of Duty” for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 2). SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) communicated via email regarding the drafting of the award nomination.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a copy of email messages between he and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 3). In the email, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) requested that SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) obtain information related to BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Trooper’s involvement with clearing classrooms and evacuating students at Robb Elementary School. Further, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked for clarification regarding the backpack that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) located.

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded by providing screenshots of text messages he received from BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) which addressed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) request and provided additional details. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted that he saw a TXDPS Trooper running code (driving a vehicle with emergency lights and sirens activated) and followed him to Robb Elementary School. Upon entering the school, BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) encountered two officers who were hit with shrapnel and heard the shooter fire two to four more rounds. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he helped TXDPS establish an exterior perimeter and helped evacuate approximately 80 students from 10 classrooms. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after BORTAC breached the classroom, he assisted with moving deceased children to a different classroom. He also assisted with reviving a teacher, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by taking turns performing chest compressions with a Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit (BORSTAR) BPA and other Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs). In the additional email sent by SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he informed SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the backpack was on the ground in the grass. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it appeared as if the shooter shot out a window and threw the backpack on the ground outside the school. BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated an officer opened the backpack and noticed it contained several fully loaded assault rifle magazines.

SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he did not know who from the USBP was in charge at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:57:37); however, SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he initially learned of the incident, he heard that the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team from San Antonio, Texas was en route (timestamp 02:19:45).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Nomination for BPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Emails between SOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dated, May 25, 2022.

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On May 23, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was assigned to work the day shift on May 24, 2022, and was assigned routine patrol duties in a helicopter. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled working alongside Air Interdiction Agent (AIA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the Carrizo Springs area assisting USBP agents (timestamp 00:12:05).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) landed the aircraft and he assisted USBP agents on foot. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised him over the service radio that he had received a call for assistance regarding “shots fired” (timestamp 00:13:09). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) landed the aircraft and after he boarded, they realized they were out of fuel. They traveled to the USBP Carrizo Springs Station to refuel. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled coordinating with CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) in Del Rio to get an AMO Air Crew Rifle (ACR) program rifleman (trained to fire a rifle from the helicopter) to their aircraft (timestamp 00:15:23). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a certified AMO ACR pilot (trained to pilot the helicopter with an onboard ACR rifleman firing a rifle).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they traveled to a big open field in Uvalde while they waited for a second aircraft to bring the certified ACR rifleman to their location. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they waited at least 5 minutes before ACR rifleman AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Air Unit Del Rio, arrived. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled they coordinated with a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) aircraft to ensure aircraft deconfliction (timestamp 00:16:30).

[Agent Note: Aircraft deconfliction ensures nearby aircraft do not fly in the same range of altitude for safety purposes.]

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they were hearing a lot of different things on the radio while en route from Carrizo Springs to Uvalde. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was mostly small bits of information or “chatter” (timestamp 00:18:15). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the time when the ACR rifleman boarded their aircraft, an AMO aircraft that had been operating in Uvalde left the area to refuel as they entered the Uvalde area (timestamp 00:19:50).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once they arrived at Robb Elementary School, they started an orbit pattern around the school and started discussing a plan (timestamp 00:21:15). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the three agents on the aircraft began discussing a plan on how to best position the ACR rifleman in case he needed to take a shot. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added they also numbered the buildings around the school for their own reference in case they needed to call out something they saw; however, he did not recall which building was assigned which number (timestamp 00:21:48).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled transmissions on the radio regarding looking for keys (timestamp 00:23:09). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it seemed like it “drug on forever.” AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed a large police presence, a lot of TXDPS personnel. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the county or state and local law enforcement was in charge and USBP was there helping (timestamp 00:24:00).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the aircraft was equipped with a (b) (7)(E). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he utilized the (b) (7)(E) briefly, but then realized it was limiting his field of vision and recalled the TXDPS aircraft had a (b) (7)(E) as well. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he decided the (b) (7)(E) was not the best option for them to utilize (timestamp 00:25:00).



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AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled observing officers and agents performing a lot of perimeter control, a lot of first aid, and a lot of “running around” (timestamp 00:26:14). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall any specific law enforcement agency giving orders on the radio, but he did recall someone saying over the radio, “DPS SWAT is here...stand down” (timestamp 00:28:30). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed USBP’s role in this incident was to respond as a support agency (timestamp 00:30:28). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear any shots fired at any point. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled someone saying over the radio, “subject is shot” or “subject is down” (timestamp 00:31:04).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recognize any specific individual from the aircraft at Robb Elementary School. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) believed he observed a USBP Border Patrol Tactical Unit outside the south entrance of the building where the shooter was believed to be inside (timestamp 00:34:45).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed state and local law enforcement would maintain command of a school shooting incident (timestamp 00:38:00). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not observe any sort of medical triage or command center for medical aid at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:39:30). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the AMO aircraft can be utilized to transport injured civilians, however a request to do so was never made or received to his knowledge. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the pilot in command has the final authority to authorize AMO to utilize the aircraft for medical purposes (timestamp 00:40:05).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added weight and balance is a consideration in taking additional personnel and equipment. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated at certain point, the AMO aircraft might not be able to fly or get off the ground, if overloaded (timestamp 00:41:45).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the weather, heat, humidity, can affect the type of performance the aircraft operates at (timestamp 00:42:30). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the type of AMO aircraft they utilized that day was an (b) (7)(E). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added they probably could have fit one or two more individuals on that aircraft under the conditions for that day (timestamp 00:43:20). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall if there was ever any discussion or consideration given to transporting any sort of specialty team, BORTAC or otherwise, to Robb Elementary School by AMO aircraft (timestamp 00:44:09). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that during their response from Carrizo Springs to Uvalde, the only discussion involving transporting additional CBP personnel to Uvalde revolved around pairing up AMO ACR personnel in Uvalde to respond to the call for shots fired (timestamp 00:44:15).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated equipment would load down the AMO aircraft quickly and clarified that is not to say equipment cannot be transported but the weight would cause complications (timestamp 00:45:00). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated length of time to fly from Uvalde to Del Rio, pick up additional personnel, and fly back would take approximately an hour in flight time under ideal conditions (timestamp 00:46:50).



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CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:49:08). These maps were labeled 1-10, respectively. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated his route of travel and patrol routes in Uvalde on the applicable maps (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 217**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On May 23, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

On May 24, 2022, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked the day shift, which started at (b) (7)(E). He stated he was not scheduled to fly and worked in the office most of the day. At approximately 12:00 p.m., AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his supervisor, Supervisory Air Enforcement Agent (SAEA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (retired), advised him of a subject who may have shot a police officer and was possibly barricaded in a house (timestamp 00:08:45).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SAEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was attempting to pair AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Aviation Enforcement Agent (AEA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the same aircraft. Both AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) are assigned to the Del Rio, Texas, Office of Air and Marine (AMO) air branch and both trained in the Air Crew Rifleman (ACR) program. The ACR program is a training program which trains pilots and riflemen in shooting from an aircraft. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a certified ACR pilot and AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a certified ACR. At the time, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assisting USBP near Carrizo Springs, Texas, and AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working in Del Rio, Texas. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SAEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they could save time if AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) flew AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Uvalde, Texas, to link up with AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:10:35). SAEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed, so AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began prepping an AMO marked (b) (7)(E) helicopter and launched within two minutes.

Approximately five minutes into the flight to Uvalde AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard, via his service radio, that there was an active shooter at a school (timestamp 00:12:10). He also heard, via his service radio, that children were being evacuated and there were reports of a 911 call from a little girl in the school who was surrounded by victims. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued flying as fast as he could safely fly to Uvalde. Later into the flight, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard an unknown dispatch operator advise that three more shots were fired (timestamp 00:13:49). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not remember the sequence of events but recalled hearing a stuck microphone on the radio that transmitted the sound of a little girl crying. [Agent's Note: A "stuck" microphone is a phrase commonly used to describe a microphone that is transmitting continuously, commonly due to the operator not being aware the transmission button is being held down by another object pressing up against it. This continuous transmission prevents other users from using the radio channel to communicate with others.]

At approximately 12:35 p.m., AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the Uvalde Fairgrounds and met up with AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shut his A-Star helicopter down and remained on stand-by while AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) joined AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained he remained on stand-by in case AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ran out of fuel, in which case AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would take over. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained on stand-by for approximately forty-five minutes and monitored his service radio during that time. Within that time, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing information indicating the shooter may be in the ceiling and then later heard the shooter was down (timestamp 00:21:55).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know who was in charge at Robb Elementary School and the only directions he heard on the radio were people instructing where to take children once they were evacuated. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not identify who was speaking on the radio (timestamp 00:23:00).

When asked what CBP's role is during active shooter situations, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated every five years he participates in active shooter training (timestamp 00:24:30). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) elaborated by saying the scenarios are in schools and he has been trained to address the shooter as quickly as possible. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated local law enforcement would have command and control in a multi-agency situation such as the incident at Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:27:42).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he is required to give a safety brief any time he allows extra passengers on his AMO aircraft. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated civilians are required to sign a hold harmless agreement,



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which must be pre-approved unless it is an emergency. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the A-star helicopter he was flying has six seats, but explained they typically could not hold six passengers because AMO heavily equips them and there are weight restrictions. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also advised the A-star can't board passengers who are on a stretcher because the board is too large and won't fit.

During the interview, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2) (timestamp 00:36:35). These maps are labeled 1-10, respectively. On the map labeled 1. North of Uvalde, Texas, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled from Del Rio, Texas, to Uvalde, Texas, on May 24, 2022. He indicated he flew from Del Rio, Texas, to Uvalde, Texas, and landed at the Uvalde Fairgrounds. All other maps were not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On June 1, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed Air Interdiction Agent (AIA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he worked the day shift assigned to patrol and started at (b) (7)(E) and Aviation Enforcement Agent (AEA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was working with him. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled operating in the Carrizo Springs area assisting USBP in tracking a group of suspected migrants (timestamp 00:09:30). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was piloting a CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) helicopter which he had landed so that AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could deboard and assist USBP agents on the ground.

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard the dispatch operator state over the service radio there was a shootout near a school in Uvalde and requested assistance from agents (timestamp 00:10:14). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not have enough fuel to fly to Uvalde and remain on station operating the helicopter. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) over the radio he was landing the aircraft for AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to reboard and then respond to Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he decided to refuel at the USBP Carrizo Springs Station (CAR) rather than refueling in Uvalde. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that in his experience, the time it would take to refuel at CAR was significantly shorter than refueling at the CBP Uvalde Air Branch (timestamp 00:11:45). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after refueling at CAR, he advised his supervisor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Supervisory AIA, CBP Uvalde Air Branch, they were responding to Uvalde. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that shortly thereafter, he was advised to head to Del Rio to pick up AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) because he was a certified Air Crew Rifle (ACR) program certified agent (trained to fire a rifle from a helicopter). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was a certified ACR program pilot (trained to pilot a helicopter while a ACR rifleman fires a rifle from the helicopter) (timestamp 00:12:30). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he told his supervisor it would take too long to fly to Del Rio and was responding straight to Robb Elementary School. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was notified that another pilot, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Air Unit Del Rio, would fly AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Uvalde to have both an ACR certified pilot and rifleman respond to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:13:25). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated both helicopters landed near Uvalde County Fairplex and AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) boarded his aircraft. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the first AMO aircraft on scene was piloted by AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:14:20).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he first heard about the incident, he believed the incident was at or near but outside a school. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that as he started flying closer to Uvalde, he heard radio transmissions which led him to believe the incident was taking place in the school; the shooter was somewhere in the school and officers were trying to pinpoint his location (timestamp 00:18:40). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall hearing that the incident was classified as an active shooter or a barricaded subject over the radio (timestamp 00:20:15). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised agents he could not see inside the windows of the school (timestamp 00:21:05). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that agents transmitted for AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get altitude or distance because they were having trouble communicating (timestamp 00:21:30). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he recalled AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left Robb Elementary School and returned to the CBP Uvalde Air Branch.

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when they left the Uvalde County Fairplex, he and AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) discussed a plan of action regarding what to expect; AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would make the decision to shoot if necessary. The length of the discussion was approximately two minutes (timestamp 00:22:10). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the final authority in the aircraft was the pilot in command, which AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated ultimately rested with him. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they orbited Robb Elementary School at approximately 300 feet but advised AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to let him know if they needed to fly lower if they observed anything requiring them to respond.

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he communicated with a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) air unit on an air-to-air frequency to coordinate each aircraft's orbiting altitude (timestamp 00:25:35). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the USBP radio frequency had been patched with the Uvalde Police Department and Uvalde County Sheriff's Office. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated radio communications were a mess (timestamp 00:27:20).



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AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall transmitting on the patched radio frequency. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard transmissions from officers and agents in the building regarding the shooter's possible location. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it "sounded chaos" on the patched radio frequency (timestamp 00:28:15).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived at the school, he observed numerous officers and agents stacked at the south door of the west wing building at Robb Elementary School. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated other officers and agents were also stacked at the west door entrance. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said numerous civilians and parents were all over the place. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observed numerous TXDPS officers attempting to keep them back (timestamp 00:29:15).

[Agent Note: A stack is a term for a formation used in law enforcement when a team forms up single file along the entrance or doorway to a room where they believe a threat is located.]

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he heard transmissions on the radio regarding trying to get a SWAT (special weapons and tactics) team from the San Antonio Police Department or TXDPS (timestamp 00:31:15). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled transmissions about clogged streets, moving vehicles, and other directions.

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a transmission on the radio stated the scene was safe and then observed officers and agents evacuating some of the injured children from the classrooms (timestamp 00:33:40). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he decided to head to the CBP Uvalde Air Branch to free the airspace for any emergency medical service air units that were headed to Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:34:00).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed AMO's role in response to the incident was to assist to any lawful request for assistance. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said AMO can provide information, conduct overwatch for officers and agents, or to assist in locating individuals (timestamp 00:35:15). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed whichever law enforcement agency was the first on scene was in charge of the incident (timestamp 00:38:07). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that it did not appear any law enforcement agency had "a good take" on the incident or was in charge.

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated AMO is not set up to transport civilians for medical treatment, but it can be done. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated a consideration would be remaining under the care of medical personnel in an ambulance versus simply transporting someone quickly in an aircraft not equipped with medical equipment (timestamp 00:39:16).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated CBP personnel can board and utilize AMO aircrafts. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added weight, weather, available power, flying with the door open for the ACR personnel, all affect the operation of the aircraft and are things to consider (timestamp 00:41:00). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised they were operating an (b) (7)(E) on that date and clarified you could fit a maximum of six normal sized individuals under perfect conditions. AMO stated the maximum amount of personnel he's ever flown with was five individuals (timestamp 00:43:20).



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AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated there was never a request made for AMO to pick up any additional assets or personnel (timestamp 00:43:09). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed officers and agents rendering aid to individuals outside the west wing building at Robb Elementary School but could not see or make out a specific agency or the type of aid being administered to individuals due to his altitude and angle (timestamp 00:47:09).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled there was some social media discussion surrounding an individual who claimed they were going to finish what the shooter at Robb Elementary School had started (timestamp 00:49:45). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they refueled and began orbiting schools throughout Uvalde to provide overwatch for agents and officers who had been deployed to schools (timestamp 00:51:15).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 00:52:00). These maps were labeled 1-10, respectively. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated his route of travel and patrol routes in Uvalde on the applicable maps (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Additional Information Received from AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On June 1, 2023, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed a photograph of the CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) aircraft flight log from May 24, 2022, to SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 1). The flight log listed the following personnel and flight hours: AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approximately 4.1 hours, Aviation Enforcement Agent (AEA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approximately 4.1 hours, and AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approximately 1.5 hours.

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) additionally provided screenshots of a text string between himself and Supervisory Aviation Interdiction Agent (SAIA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Attachment 2). The text string revealed that AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified SAIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at 11:45 a.m. that he needed to fuel the aircraft and was headed to a call for shots fired at a school in Uvalde. The remainder of the text string was coordination to have AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) board the aircraft with AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as they were both trained in the Air Crew Rifle program (firing a rifle from a CBP helicopter).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Photograph of AMO Aircraft Flight Log.
2	Screenshots of AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Text String.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On June 2, 2023, SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was working on May 24, 2022, in full uniform and on temporary duty in Del Rio at the time. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Air Unit Del Rio, took and relayed a call from USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) communications dispatch regarding a “barricaded subject by a school” (timestamp 00:11:52). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had just been recently assigned to the CBP Air Unit Del Rio and was not familiar with the area. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was a certified instructor through both the Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events and Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training programs (timestamp 00:13:30). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he had approximately 10 years of experience in those training programs and was also a primary firearms instructor with CBP (timestamp 00:13:50).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took it upon himself to let the DRT communications dispatch know there was a CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) aircraft in the Uvalde area, but that CBP Air Unit Del Rio did not have anything available (00:16:00). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not communicate with the first line supervisor at the time, Supervisory Aviation Enforcement Agent (SAEA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Air Unit Del Rio, regarding the call from DRT communications. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he advised SAEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of the call. SAEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately started making calls on his cell phone, and AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SAEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was going to don his gear (timestamp 00:17:50).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was an aircrew rifleman and was trained to shoot out of helicopters. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he has performed those duties since around 2012 (timestamp 00:18:02). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he grabbed his Kevlar helmet, ballistic plates, and his Air Crew Rifleman (ACR) program rifle. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled hearing AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relay something from the phone call stating, “all hands respond.” AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at that point, he knew it was going to become an active shooter situation (timestamp 00:19:35).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated SAEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said an aircraft was en route from the Eagle Pass, Texas area to the CBP Air Unit Del Rio location for AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to board the aircraft and pair up with pilot CBP Air Interdiction Agent (AIA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Air Unit Del Rio. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the reason for the pair up was because AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a certified ACR pilot (timestamp 00:19:50). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that ever year, trained ACR pilots fly the helicopter while ACR riflemen shoot out of the aircraft.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that pilot AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP Air Unit Del Rio, stepped up and offered to fly AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Uvalde to cut down on the time it would take to pair up with AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then fly to Uvalde (timestamp 00:21:04). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the aircraft operating near Eagle Pass and the aircraft leaving from Del Rio both coordinated to meet outside of Uvalde near the Uvalde County Fairplex so AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could board the aircraft with AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:21:20).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that while en route to Uvalde, he heard a radio transmission involving a “hot mic” that lasted awhile and he could hear kids in the background. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall anything other than the last 10 minutes of the flight “took forever” (timestamp 00:21:55).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that once both aircraft landed near the Uvalde Fairplex, it did not take long to join AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in his aircraft and get to Robb Elementary School. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said a state police helicopter was in the area. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the pilots coordinated, and the state police helicopter flew high and the AMO aircraft flew low (timestamp 00:23:00).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that when he was initially boarding the aircraft in Del Rio, SAEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised him to remember the CBP Use of Force Policy, to be prepared and “take care of business” if he needed to take a shot (timestamp 00:25:13).



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AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed that by both aircraft meeting in Uvalde instead of Del Rio first and then flying to Uvalde, a minimum of 45 minutes to one hour of flight time was saved in the AMO response to Uvalde (timestamp 00:26:05).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his understanding of the situation was that law enforcement was dealing with an active shooter as soon as he heard there was a school involved (timestamp 00:27:45).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) additionally recalled he may have heard a little girl on the radio saying, "I'm hit" (timestamp 00:29:30).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when the aircraft first arrived at Robb Elementary School, he observed seeing people everywhere, agents and officers, "a lot of green" [Border Patrol agents] stacked up near the south end of a building. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled agents taking a perimeter toward a window, and he concentrated on an open window with a tree next to it (timestamp 00:30:31).

[Agent Note: A stack is a term for a tactical formation used in law enforcement when officers form a single file along the entrance or doorway to a room where they believe a threat is located.]

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his rifle was equipped with a 6x scope, and he was trying his hardest to look in the window but he could not see because it was dark in the classroom (timestamp 00:31:00). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said a radio transmission advised that the shooter might be on the roof. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled he did not observe any manholes or access to the roof from inside the building (timestamp 00:31:45).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as they continued scanning the area, he was thinking, "something is not right." AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that based on his training and the training he provides officers and agents, if stimulus such as gunshots, gunfire, screaming, etc. occurs, then officers head in the direction of the stimulus (timestamp 00:33:35). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that without stimulus but with knowledge there was an active shooter in a certain location, then officers "plug the rooms" meaning they move into every room and search until officers find the threat (timestamp 00:33:55).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled telling the pilot and the other crewmember in the aircraft that something was not right with the situation. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clarified he was not on the ground and stated only the people on the ground knew the situation. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled considering asking the aircraft to land to assist the agents on the ground in any way he could. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that sometimes someone needs to push and to encourage officers to move in (timestamp 00:35:22). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that at the time he was considering this, he observed the stacks of agents moving in the building.

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he observed two officers escorting an individual out quickly and realized it was an officer or agent they were escorting out. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued scanning and not long after, he observed officers and agents pulling children out. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated multiple officers



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and agents were providing aid to children, administering bandages and other types of aid (timestamp 00:37:15).

CBP OPR interviewers provided AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with a map of the west wing building of Robb Elementary School (Attachment 2). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) identified the west entrance of the building and stated he observed officers providing aid to a child outside the west entrance (timestamp 00:39:00).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not know who was in command and control of the scene (timestamp 00:41:05). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that based on his training, if a supervisor shows up on scene and realizes the person in charge is not performing their duties adequately, then one can help the supervisor or even possibly take over the mission, especially if one had certain training (timestamp 00:41:15).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added it was hard to determine command and control because there were so many agencies and that communication between agencies had always been an issue (timestamp 00:42:45).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not recall any orders being provided over the radio (timestamp 00:43:22). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not hear anyone from USBP give any orders (timestamp 00:43:55). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he never heard any shots fired during the time he was on scene (timestamp 00:44:15).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated CBP's role was to respond to help. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that CBP was sometimes the closest agency to respond and might be the first agency there (timestamp 00:45:30).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after they observed children exiting the building, he heard a second threat called out (timestamp 00:47:50). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the AMO aircraft started running patterns on multiple schools throughout Uvalde. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing there were not enough officers to cover all the schools. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated they flew patterns over schools throughout Uvalde for a while. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled one central location where children were being shuttled and recalled scanning the area looking for suspicious activity (timestamp 00:49:00). AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not recall how long they performed those duties, but they performed them until the office notified them to return (timestamp 00:50:05).

AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed the first person who arrives at an active shooter scene is in command and control (timestamp 00:55:55).

CBP OPR interviewers provided maps to AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (timestamp 01:02:00). The maps were labeled 1-10, respectively. AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) annotated his route of travel and patrol routes in Uvalde on the applicable maps (Attachment 3).



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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Map of the west wing building of Robb Elementary School.
3	Maps reviewed by AEA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 220**



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O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On July 19, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment. The recording was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was teleworking from home in Del Rio when he received a call at approximately 12:00 p.m. from his supervisor, Acting Supervisory SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Del Rio, telling him to grab his equipment and respond to Uvalde. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told there was an incident involving a mass shooting and USBP was involved. After grabbing his equipment, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove to Uvalde in his government-owned vehicle. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that since it was not equipped with emergency equipment, he drove at the speed limit and obeyed all traffic laws.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he arrived in Uvalde at approximately 1:45 p.m., he parked near the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home and spoke with an unknown Texas Department of Public Safety sergeant while trying to find the incident command center. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the area surrounding the school as “chaos” (timestamp 00:13:25). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that while near the funeral home, he saw SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Del Rio, and they both started walking around looking for the command center. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that at this time, the school was secured, and no one was allowed in or out.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) found an incident command center located in a trailer at the northeast side of Robb Elementary School. At the trailer, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Del Rio, who was the OPR Del Rio duty agent that day. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about a possible secondary threat at another Uvalde school. The potential threat was that the girlfriend of the shooter at Robb Elementary School was allegedly going to “finish the job.” SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at the trailer for less than five minutes before leaving for Uvalde High School as instructed by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (timestamp 00:15:01).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at Uvalde High School at approximately 2:00 p.m. and was there for a few hours providing security until all the children were released to their parents. While at the high school, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked alongside an unknown Border Patrol agent (BPA) and had no interaction with parents or the public. Once finished at the high school, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA) and awaited further instruction (timestamp 00:24:18)

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he arrived at UVA between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. At approximately 7:00 p.m., Group Supervisor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Del Rio, who was the Acting Resident Agent in Charge at that time, directed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go to the Uvalde airport and pick up SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, El Paso, Texas, and two unknown OPR task force agents (TFA) who traveled on a CBP Air and Marine Operations flight from El Paso to Uvalde. After taking SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the two TFAs back to UVA, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at UVA until he was dismissed around midnight, but he could not recall who dismissed him.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was not sure what his authority to respond to a situation like the one at Robb Elementary School was, but he believed he had a duty to act as a law enforcement officer to provide security and safety to the public (timestamp 00:42:31).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided by CBP OPR interviewers (Attachment 2). In the collection, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traced his route to Robb Elementary School and his approach to the school. Additionally, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map to explain his actions while at Robb Elementary School and other locations in Uvalde.

**ATTACHMENTS**

ATTACHMENTS	DESCRIPTION
1	StarWitness interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On July 19, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty working when he received a call at approximately 12:00 p.m. from Acting Supervisory SA (A)(SSA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office, telling him there was an active shooter situation in Uvalde. (A)SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to be ready and on standby, and later called back to tell SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove his government owned vehicle to Uvalde. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drove at the speed limit and obeyed all traffic laws since his vehicle was not equipped with emergency equipment.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived in Uvalde at approximately 1:30 p.m., found SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office, and was told everything at the school was secure. However, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office, who was also present, about the possibility of a second shooter at another school (timestamp 00:14:56). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) each went to a school to provide security. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the Uvalde Dual Language Academy, Uvalde, Texas.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the Uvalde Dual Language Academy around 2:00 p.m. He worked alongside unidentified Border Patrol Agents from the USBP Eagle Pass Station, Texas, and other unidentified law enforcement officers, to provide security at the school, which was on lockdown. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the school's principal and administrators, along with Texas Department of Public Safety Troopers, were responsible for organizing the dismissal of the students and interacting with the parents. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the Uvalde Dual Language Academy at approximately 4:00 p.m., after the students were dismissed. He went to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), Texas, which was designated as the meet-up location by the OPR SAs.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was at UVA for a few minutes before he was sent to Uvalde Memorial Hospital to act as a liaison between CBP and the hospital staff, since it was known that an unidentified Border Patrol Agent (BPA) was shot and was taken to the Emergency Room. While at the hospital, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned from other unidentified BPAs that the injured BPA was grazed in the head. Once the injured BPA was released from the hospital, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to UVA at approximately 8:00 p.m. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained in the muster room at UVA until he was released at approximately midnight.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he believed that as a federal law enforcement officer he had a responsibility and the authority to respond to a threat of this magnitude to provide security and protect the public (timestamp 00:56:18).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided (Attachment 2). In the collection, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traced his route to Robb Elementary School and his approach to the school. Additionally, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map to explain his actions while at Robb Elementary School.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On July 19, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty serving as the OPR Duty Agent at the Del Rio DSAC Office. While driving towards Eagle Pass, Texas, with SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office, to respond to another matter, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Del Rio Sector, Texas. During the call, SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him about radio communications he heard regarding a possible shooting near a school in Uvalde. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were in a government owned vehicle without a two-way radio installed. After his call with SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called Acting Resident Agent in Charge (A)(RAC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office, to tell him about the situation. Although (A)(RAC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initially told SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to proceed with his planned assignment, once he learned the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) was responding he told SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to respond to Uvalde. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated their vehicle's lights and sirens and drove towards Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Robb Elementary School shortly after 1:00 p.m. and encountered SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) USBP Brackettville Station, Texas. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the incident and was advised that shots were fired, children were deceased, and to not go inside the school. Instead, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the incident command center at the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home, where he learned of a possible secondary threat against other Uvalde schools. (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Acting Supervisory SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office, directed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Del Rio DSAC Office; SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office; and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to each respond to a different school (timestamp 00:12:24). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was directed to respond to Morales Junior High School.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sent a group text message to other OPR SAs at 2:18 p.m. stating he was responding to the junior high school. When SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Morales Junior High School, there were Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) members already at the school, including SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Special Operations Detachment, USBP Del Rio Sector, Texas. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the perimeter of the school and provided security. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believed an unidentified local police officer was coordinating the activity at the school. At one point, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked by a local police officer to accompany her to see the parents and explain the process for student dismissal (timestamp 00:14:30).

After approximately two hours at the school, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) returned to the incident command center near Robb Elementary School to discuss with (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) how to approach the OPR investigation into the incident. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed the school prior to all the students being dismissed, but first ensured that enough law enforcement officers were present to handle the location before leaving.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he believed CBP does not have any authority to respond to incidents like the one at Robb Elementary School except at the request of state or local law enforcement, who have primary jurisdiction over those types of matters.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided (Attachment 2). In the collection, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traced his route to Robb Elementary School and his approach to the school. Additionally, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map to explain his actions while at Robb Elementary School. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also provided SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with copies of the text messages sent and received between OPR SAs on May 24, 2022 (Attachment 3).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Images of text messages sent and received between OPR agents.

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 223**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On July 19, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and uniquely identified by Authentication Code: (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on leave and in San Antonio, Texas, with his children for medical appointments. While at an appointment, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled seeing news on the television at the doctor’s office about the incident. After finishing the medical appointment and driving back from San Antonio to his home in Del Rio, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called Acting (A) Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Del Rio, around 5:30 p.m. and asked if (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted his assistance in Uvalde. (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said yes, so SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retrieved his gear and drove his government owned vehicle to Uvalde and arrived at the “incident command” center around 8:00 p.m. (timestamp 11:08:08).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that when he reported to Robb Elementary School, he went straight to the incident command center. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said Federal Bureau of Investigation and Texas Rangers were in the building. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was only there for five to ten minutes. (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to go to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), Texas, to await further instructions. At UVA, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Del Rio, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Del Rio, and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OPR Del Rio, in the muster room. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed UVA at 12:30 a.m. (timestamp 11:09:05).

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided by CBP OPR interviewers (Attachment 2). In the collection, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traced his route to Robb Elementary School and his approach to the school.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 224**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On July 24, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was assigned to CBP OPR, Del Rio Deputy Special Agent in Charge (DSAC) Office, Del Rio, TX, but was on approved annual leave out of state. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) approved leave ran from May 18, 2022, through May 30, 2022. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of the incident at Robb Elementary School the following day on the news. Since he was on approved leave, his government-issued phone was turned off. Once he learned of the incident, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned on his phone but was not included on any emails or text messages related to the incident. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he did not make any calls to inquire about the incident.

During the interview, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided printed copies of his leave requests, which were approved by Group Supervisor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office, who was Acting Resident Agent in Charge at the time of the incident (Attachment B).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Copies of WebTA Leave Requests for SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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**UF2022586**  
**EXHIBIT 225**



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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On July 25, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) Attachment 1).

This investigative activity report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he was on duty assigned to the CBP OPR Del Rio Deputy Special Agent in Charge (DSAC) Office, Del Rio, Texas. On that date he was driving with SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office, toward Eagle Pass, Texas, with two unidentified Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) following behind in a separate vehicle. One of the BPAs in the vehicle behind them called SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and told him there was a shooting at a school in Uvalde. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called Acting Resident Agent in Charge (A)(RAC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Del Rio DSAC Office, and informed him of the situation. (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to proceed to Eagle Pass while he made some calls. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) received a call from (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shortly after they arrived in Eagle Pass, and he told them to respond to Uvalde as fast as they could. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated the lights and sirens in their government owned vehicle and drove towards Uvalde.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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When SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at Robb Elementary School, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw at least 80-100 law enforcement officers around the school. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that he was not aware whether the situation at Robb Elementary School was still active when he arrived. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) met (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home and described the scene as chaotic (timestamp 00:12:32). While talking with (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Uvalde Police Department, told the group about a possible secondary threat against other Uvalde schools. (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what equipment he had with him, and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) indicated he did not have his ballistic vest or rifle with him. (A)RAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him to take his vehicle to the USBP Uvalde Station (UVA), Texas, to gather information from the Texas Department of Public Safety Rangers, who were going to question the BPAs involved in the incident at Robb Elementary School. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) activated the lights and sirens in the vehicle and drove to UVA. At UVA, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted the USBP Patrol Agent in Charge and an unidentified USBP Tactical Unit Commander. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not leave UVA for the rest of the evening.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he believes he is required to respond to a situation like the one at Robb Elementary School because he is a federal agent (timestamp 00:35:28). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that a request from state or local law enforcement would necessitate a response from him. SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knows he does not have peace officer status in the state of Texas.

SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reviewed the collection of maps provided (Attachment 2). In the collection, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) traced his route to Robb Elementary School and his approach to the school. Additionally, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drew on a map to explain his actions while at Robb Elementary School.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Maps reviewed by SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y

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OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE**



**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On August 2, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his involvement in the CBP response to the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on May 24, 2022, he worked the day shift which started at (b) (7)(E) AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was flying alone in the Eagle Pass, Texas area near (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) in Maverick County, Texas in support of U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Tactical Unit (BORTAC) agents apprehending a group of suspected migrants. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had just refueled his aircraft and was flying over the BORTAC agents at approximately 11:40 a.m. when he received a call over the USBP Del Rio Sector radio regarding a possible shooting in Uvalde (timestamp 00:29:30).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the exact location and severity of the incident was unknown to him. Since his helicopter was the closest and the only one flying at the time, he was directed over the radio by dispatch to leave the BORTAC agents and fly towards Uvalde (timestamp 00:16:32).

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he communicated to the BORTAC agents on the ground that he had been requested to respond to a shooting in Uvalde and was departing the area. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not aware of the details and scope of the situation when he was asked to respond to Uvalde; however, had he known the severity of the incident, he would have immediately landed, picked up two or three BORTAC agents, and brought them with him to Uvalde. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being informed over the radio of a “guy with a gun near a school;” however, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not know he would be responding to a shooting at a school (timestamp 00:27:40).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his flight time from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) to Uvalde was approximately 20 minutes. At approximately 12:00 p.m., upon entering the Uvalde area, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was directed into the vicinity of Robb Elementary School by an unidentified Border Patrol agent (BPA) over the radio. As AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) flew closer to Robb Elementary School, he began to understand the severity of the incident as an active shooter situation. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided not to fly back to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) to pick up BORTAC agents, since doing so would take approximately 40 minutes round trip, and his was the only helicopter on scene when he arrived (timestamp 00:29:03).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he flew over the school at an altitude of approximately 150 feet, providing aerial observation of the scene. During this time, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw children being evacuated by law enforcement officers through classroom windows. He also recalled seeing various uniformed law enforcement officers gathering around the outside of the south entrance of the building where the shooter was located (timestamp 00:41:05).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that after flying on scene for approximately 20 minutes, he was contacted by a Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) helicopter flown with two crewmembers and equipped with a camera (timestamp 00:31:25). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began to communicate the location of the shooter to the TXDPS helicopter crew through a non-recorded very high frequency radio channel, attempting to get the TXDPS crew to relocate their helicopter. However, the TXDPS crew decided not to hover over the area because it was unknown to them if the shooter had a rifle (timestamp 00:33:09).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that because two helicopters operating in the same airspace was dangerous, and the TXDPS helicopter was more capable, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yielded the scene to TXDPS to operate at a safe distance and took his helicopter to the CBP Air Branch at the Uvalde airport (timestamp 00:47:12). By this time, AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was aware from radio traffic that a certified Air Crew Rifleman (ACR) (trained to fire a rifle from a helicopter) and ACR pilot (trained to pilot a helicopter while a ACR rifleman fires a rifle from the helicopter) were headed to Uvalde via helicopter. He remained at the airport for a few hours awaiting instruction before returning to Del Rio at approximately 4:00 p.m. (timestamp 00:30:24).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was flying an (b) (7)(E) Helicopter with a (b) (7)(E) AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated multiple factors affect the aircraft’s performance, such as winds, payload, and the age of the aircraft. Typically, a crew consisting of one or two people operate the aircraft with room for no more than four passengers. However, given the additional



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sensors and equipment on these aircraft, CBP variants of the (b) (7)(E) helicopter typically only have room for no more than three passengers. As a matter of practice, chemicals such as oleoresin capsicum spray and explosives are not flown on CBP aircraft (timestamp 00:48:20).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had no medical equipment in the helicopter and the helicopter was not equipped with litter (stretcher) or evacuation capacities (timestamp 00:58:08).

AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that state and local law enforcement officers on scene should have had command and control over the incident at Robb Elementary School. CBP's role was to provide them with assistance, backup, and resources. AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he responded to Uvalde because it was a violent felony in progress (timestamp 00:37:15).

During the interview, CBP OPR interviewers provided AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with an aviation sectional chart (Attachment 2). AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) marked the route he traveled from Del Rio to Uvalde on May 24, 2022 (timestamp 00:19:12). In addition, he was shown maps depicting the area north of Uvalde; south of Uvalde; the city of Uvalde; Uvalde schools; and Robb Elementary School (Attachment 3) (timestamp 00:32:40). These maps were labeled 1 through 10. On the map labeled 8(A) Robb Elementary School Layout, he indicated he hovered over the school. All other maps were not applicable.

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	Aviation Sectional Chart reviewed and labeled by AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Maps reviewed by AIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On August 7, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) interviewed BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) concerning his knowledge of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) related to CBP and the May 24, 2022, shooting at Robb Elementary School. The interview was audio and video recorded using StarWitness equipment and was uniquely identified by Authentication Code: (b) (7)(E) (Attachment 1).

This Investigative Activity Report does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that since 2008, he has worked in the emergency management field at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services from 2008 to 2012, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) from 2012 to 2016, and the CBP Watch’s Incident Management Branch since July 2016. Before becoming the Branch Chief, BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a senior preparedness planner. In his roles at the Incident Management Branch, BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) participated in preparedness planning for hurricanes, fires, floods, the COVID-19 pandemic, State of the Union addresses, presidential inaugurations, and other major events.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described NIMS as a doctrinal standard or baseline that allows different federal, state, and local agencies responding to incidents to operate in a common, consistent way. NIMS was developed to ensure all agencies respond, communicate, and share information better. ICS, which is a part of NIMS, was developed to allow the sharing of resources and information with all responding agencies at all levels. The main principle of ICS is that incidents start and end locally.

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that under ICS protocols, the first person on scene is the incident commander, and others who respond are to assimilate based on their experience (timestamp 00:10:24). However, as others who are more capable arrive on scene, the role of incident commander can be turned over as the situation dictates. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that ICS protocols work best when all partners are trained at a similar level. Based on BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) experience, the level of training law enforcement officers receive in using ICS during events, varies. Learning ICS protocols before an incident helps to establish who is in charge and who has what authorities, which can be complicated in a law enforcement setting (timestamp 00:38:04).

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that benefits to using ICS in an incident include the following: all participating parties having a common understanding of their roles, functions, and expectations; state and local agencies receive federal grant funds for NIMS and ICS training with the understanding they will all abide by the same principles and baseline understanding of the national doctrine; and NIMS and ICS protocols can be scaled larger or smaller as the situation necessitates. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that for example, CBP has been using ICS protocols to manage issues at the southwest border through the Department of Homeland Security Southwest Border Coordination Center (SBCC), since it provides a systemic way of managing issues larger than any single entity can handle (timestamp 00:14:00).

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that if someone does not have any experience with ICS, there is still a chance the person can understand it intuitively, particularly if the person has a military background. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained ICS protocols are based on command and control, so someone with the right aptitude may be able to understand what someone is instructing others to do without ever being trained in ICS protocols (timestamp 00:28:25).

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that to ensure unity, CBP partners with FEMA regionally and integrates personnel with state and local agencies at regional incident management officers. At the headquarters level, CBP has a liaison at FEMA's National Response Center. Integration varies across the country depending on how frequently the region experiences incidents, how the state and location emergency management agencies are set up, and other variables. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that partnering with state and local stakeholders is important to operate consistently and the Incident Management Branch encourages building relationships and discussing organizational capabilities with partner organizations before an incident. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated meeting partners for the first time at an incident is too late (timestamp 00:33:57).

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that in a situation where no one is taking charge or following ICS protocols, chaos will result (timestamp 00:41:28). The purpose of the training in ICS protocols is to avoid



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that specific situation. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further explained that ICS protocols teach responders to not self-deploy, but instead take charge of the situation until that authority is ceded to someone else (timestamp 00:49:57). Communicating what is seen, what is being done, what is being planned, as well as expectations, roles, and responsibilities during an incident is vital. Effective communication and its importance are covered in each ICS class.

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that training in NIMS and ICS protocols varies at CBP. The following classes are offered online in CBP's online learning portal (Acadis): DHS Web-Based Training - IS-100.c: Introduction to the Incident Command System, ICS 100 (Online, 1h 0m); DHS Web-Based Training - IS-0200.c Basic Incident Command System for Initial Response, ICS 200 (Online, 4h 0m); DHS Web-Based Training - IS-0700.b An Introduction to the National Incident Management System (Online, 3h 30m); and DHS Web-Based Training - IS-0800.d: National Response Framework, An Introduction (Online, 3h 0m).

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that CBP's Office of Training and Development offers the following advanced training courses in NIMS and ICS at the Advanced Training Center (ATC), for which IS-100, IS-200, IS-700, and IS-700 are prerequisites: AOTB Incident Command System Training Program-300 – ICS-300-2310 (Advanced Training Center (ATC), 24h 40m) and AOTB Incident Command System Training Program-400 – ICS-400-2310 (Advanced Training Center (ATC), 24h 0m). The ICS-300 and ICS-400 courses provide students with an awareness of how they fit into the larger emergency response apparatus.

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that each of the in-person classes at the ATC typically has 30-35 participants from the CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO), U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), and Air and Marine Operations (AMO), and are offered less than 10 times per year. CBP employees can also attend the advanced trainings when they are offered by state or local agencies across the country. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that selection in the advanced training courses is based on employee interest, office mandate, management direction, etc.

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that another course offered at CBP is the Lead Field Coordinator course, and explained that the course is designed for OFO Directors of Field Operations, USBP Sector Chiefs, and AMO Directors of Air Operations and Marine Operations. The course teaches Lead Field Coordinators how to interact with Actions Officers, who oversee critical elements of an incident such as operations, support staff, administration, and finance. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added that each component maintains a list of senior officials who have been trained and who are nominated to attend the training. However, attending this course is not mandatory for GS-15 or Senior Executive Service employees (timestamp 01:07:57).

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that attendance is tracked either through the Acadis platform or through certificates provided by students who attend training courses outside of CBP. The Incident Management Branch is responsible for providing subject matter experts to deliver the advanced training courses in NIMS and ICS and Lead Field Coordinator training courses, but is not involved in selection of the students. BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not believe NIMS or ICS protocols are taught in CBP's Supervisory Leadership Training, CBP's mandatory three-week training class for new



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supervisory personnel (timestamp 00:26:48), nor was he aware of NIMS or ICS coordination with training classes falling under the purview of CBP's Law Enforcement Safety and Compliance Directorate (timestamp 00:35:29).

BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated more training is needed across CBP in both the NIMS and ICS protocols (timestamp 00:48:02). Pointing to the successes of the SBCC's use of ICS protocols, BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated ICS works and there is increased interest in using ICS, however the ability to provide training opportunities on a consistent basis is a challenge, especially since there are not enough certified instructors to teach the classes. However, since CBP is not a pure emergency management agency, but instead a law enforcement agency, CBP lacks the same standards for mandatory training as found elsewhere.

Following up on a request from SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during the interview, on August 8, 2023, BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) emailed a copy of the PowerPoint Presentation for the Lead Field Coordinator course (Attachment 2).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	StarWitness interview of BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
2	PowerPoint Presentation for Lead Field Coordinator provided by BC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) via email on August 8, 2023.

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**INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY REPORT**

<b>CASE NUMBER:</b>	UF2022586	<b>FIELD OFFICE:</b>	Del Rio DSAC Office
<b>CASE AGENT:</b>	SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		
<b>CASE TITLE:</b>	Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities		
<b>ACTIVITY CONDUCTED:</b>	Interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

**DETAILS OF ACTIVITY**

On August 10, 2023, SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, and SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CBP OPR, interviewed ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Director of the National Firearms and Tactics Branch, LESC, who was also the former Director of the Pre-Deployment Branch, as it relates to CBP and the May 24, 2022, shooting at the Uvalde Robb Elementary School.

Prior to the interview, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with an Administrative Warning Acknowledgement for Non-Bargaining Unit Employees, which he signed acknowledging he understood his right and obligations (Exhibit 1). On August 11, 2023, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was provided with the form titled Your Required Appearance and Sworn Testimony. The interview was audio and video recorded using the StarWitness and the Authentication Code (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (Exhibit 2).

This Report of Investigation does not detail every statement made during the interview but provides a summary. The video recording of the interview should be reviewed for additional details.

I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Prepared by:		Date:	
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Approved by:		Date:	
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In 2012, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started working full-time out of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Advanced Training Center (ATC), in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. Beginning in 2012, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was assigned to the Tactics Branch and was certified in the ASITP. In 2017, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the Acting Assistant Director over the Firearms Branch at ATC, and in 2018, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) absorbed the Tactics Branch into the Firearms Branch. In 2021, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) developed the Pre-Deployment Program for CBP personnel working and living overseas. Since July 2023, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has been assigned to the Tactics and Firearms Branch.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further explained that in 2009, the ASITP was developed at the U.S. Border Patrol Academy and was taught by the Advanced Training Department. In 2013, the Advanced training portion was moved to ATC as part of the Tactics Branch. In approximately 2015, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other ATC cadre taught ASITP export classes at United States Border Patrol (USBP) sectors in Grand Forks, North Dakota and Detroit, Michigan. In 2018, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) combined the Tactics Branch into the Firearms Branch, which included the ASITP. While this occurred, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and ATC cadre conducted approximately nine other ASITP export classes across the country to other USBP sectors. In approximately 2019, the ASITP was added to the basic Firearms Instructor Training Program (FITP) at the request of multiple USBP sectors. Previously, to be certified and attend ASITP, each student had to be a member of a CBP special operations group; USBP Tactical Unit (BORTAC), Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR), or Office of Field Operations (OFO) Special Response Team (SRT). However, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and other members of LESC decided that just because someone was in a special operations group, did not guarantee they were a skilled instructor. The ASITP attendees were required, however, to be a firearms instructor, which is why it was included in the FITP basic courses.

During the overview of the program, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that the ASITP is a principle-based and scenario-based program. It emphasizes the use of cover, positioning, team movements, clearing rooms, etc. The ASITP is focused on tactics. The concepts and principles can be applied to any law enforcement situation, not solely active shooter (Timestamp 14:05).

The ASITP worked well within the FITP, however, after a year, LESC removed the ASITP from the FITP and included tactics within the program instead, based on the same principles.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not provide an exact date, but mentioned that after some time, LESC received requests from various USBP sectors asking for active shooter certification training (Timestamp 15:54).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that they conducted several ASITP export classes due to the field's numerous requests. He estimated that from 2018 to 2020, LESC certified approximately 1,200 CBP personnel as active shooter instructors before the training was discontinued (Timestamp 16:28). He believed that ASITP was stopped due to a lack of class requests, as well as LESC not being aware if active shooter was taught by the instructors in the field after they received certification at the ATC.



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In 2021, while working at the Pre-Deployment Branch, and after a few active shooter events within the U.S., ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended a call with CBP component leadership to gauge interest in restarting ASITP (Timestamp (17:33)).

The component leadership requested ASITP classes restart and in 2021, ASITP classes were held at Summit Point, West Virginia.

In 2021, LESC certified approximately 180 CBP personnel in the ASITP. In 2022, they certified approximately 240, and in 2023, they are scheduled to certify approximately 360 additional personnel (Timestamp 18:13).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that since 2009, ASITP program has been based loosely on the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) (Timestamp 21:40).

He further explained that the ALERRT program has been used as LESC's guiding document, as ALERRT and its creators were the subject matter experts on active shooter situations (Timestamp 22:07).

Since approximately 2021, approximately four of LESC's ASITP instructors have attended ALERRT (Timestamp 22:26).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that LESC made some changes to the curriculum and added some techniques to increase the efficiency of delivering the program, as well as the safety of CBP personnel when responding to active shooter events (Timestamp 23:14). The changes specifically included clearing "L" and "T" intersections and a few unspecified techniques that BORTAC personnel thought would be beneficial to the training (Timestamp 27:00).

In approximately 2015, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and LESC updated the ASITP Instructor Guidebook (IGB), and the training material, but still loosely based its content on ALERRT (Timestamp 27:45).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that CBP's ASITP encompasses approximately 90% of ALERRT's training (Timestamp 24:45).

Since 2021, the ASITP was updated to include more instructor-led scenarios, which included shoot or no-shoot situations, as well as incorporating safe weapon handling skills because of observed safety violations by students (Timestamp 28:15).

During the interview, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned the legal authority to respond to active shooter situations was very convoluted and that they have been working with OCC and Congress regarding legislation to provide CBP specific authority to respond to active shooter situations (Timestamp 35:25). He further explained that the majority of CBP's authority to respond to active shooter incidents was based on the past practice of CBP supporting local and state law enforcement agencies. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) discussed that CBP's authority to respond was the biggest



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concern regarding the ASITP. He mentioned an email from CBP's Office of Chief Council (OCC), which addressed CBPs authority to respond to active shooter situations, and said that since July 2023, that information was provided verbally to the ASITP students on the first day of training (Timestamp 44:30).

During the interview, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned that the ASITP has undergone various changes, which included requiring all students be a certified CBP firearms or less lethal/use of force instructor, as well as allowing other law enforcement agencies to audit and attend the course.

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) discussed that the process for CBP personnel to teach active shooter courses requires the attendance of the ASITP. All students must meet the minimum standards and be able to teach back the material and demonstrate the techniques (Timestamp 49:00). SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if it was possible someone attended the ASITP, but the student did not meet the standard and was not certified by the end of the course, yet remained a certified firearms instructor, whether the individual has the authority and certification to teach the ASITP curriculum under their firearms or less lethal certification. ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said if the student did not receive the ASITP certification, then they should not teach anything regarding active shooter, but knew LESC did not have a method to enforce such a policy (Timestamp 51:00). He agreed that if a firearms or less lethal instructor received training and certification on team movements, tactics, room clearing, etc., from a previous CBP firearms or less lethal course, then they would be able to teach that to CBP personnel (Timestamp 53:33).

During the interview, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was familiar with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the Incident Command System (ICS), but said there was a very small mention of them during the first day of training (Timestamp 54:15). He said the students are told that the first person on scene must pick up incident command, and that someone must take control until someone with more rank or experience arrives on scene and takes that part over. He said the ASITP students are told that someone must take on the roll, but they do not teach how that is to be accomplished (Timestamp 56:10).

The ASITP focuses on CBP personnel arriving to the active shooting scene first and does not discuss state or local law enforcement agencies arriving first with CBP personnel showing up in a support role. Additionally, the training does not discuss CBP personnel arriving on scene and observing a lack of response from state and local law enforcement agencies, requiring them to take charge and act (Timestamp 1:21:50).

ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that the ASITP focuses on CBP personnel responding to a scene, shots are fired, getting to the building, getting inside the building, clearing the rooms, manipulating corners and intersections, and eliminating the threat as safely as possible (Timestamp 56:45).

He discussed that the main difference between active shooter and barricaded subject situations, which is addressed in the IGB and during the ASITP course, is that in active shooter situations, people are being murdered, and in barricaded subject situations, people are not being murdered, and CBP personnel can take their time (Timestamp 1:00:15). ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said three slides



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during the first day of training discuss the differences between active shooter and barricaded subjects but there are no practical applications or scenarios within the ASITP. He further explained that the ASITP does not teach hostage negotiation tactics or what to do in hostage situations.

When discussing closed and locked doors, ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> mentioned that it is a very complex subject matter, which includes location of doors, door hinge location, breaching tools, safety of the breacher, keys, etc. and that the ASITP <sup>(b) (7)(E)</sup>  
<sup>(b) (7)(E)</sup> (Timestamp 1:03:28).

He explained that the IGB and ASITP curriculum discussed active shooter versus a barricaded subject over approximately three slides during the first day of training and differentiated the situation based on stability and someone actively dying or not (Timestamp 1:08:03).

He discussed the curriculum's prioritization of people, open doors, and then closed doors. On the first day of training, students were told verbally that if they encountered locked doors, they should try and kick the door open or find a tool to open it. <sup>(b) (7)(E)</sup>  
<sup>(b) (7)(E)</sup> (Timestamp 1:13:03).

When discussing medical triage during the ASITP, ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated that the course operates under a contact team and rescue team. Contact teams move towards the threat, and rescue teams deal with the victims. Students are instructed to bypass injuries, make quick assessments, tell mobile victims to move, and communicate to the incident commander, but to keep moving towards the threat. Students are taught medical is not the primary mission in a response, but it is, instead, to stop the threat (Timestamp 1:14:04). He said that Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) training was originally incorporated into the ASITP course but was ultimately removed to provide students with additional repetitions in scenario-based training situations.

ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said the ASITP curriculum did not cover anything regarding CBP personnel's response to an active shooter event where people may be actively dying, and where CBP personnel may not have heard any shots fired (Timestamp 1:10:30).

ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> mentioned that the ASITP does not teach students what to do post-shooting, once the active shooter is neutralized, or what CBP personnel should do regarding medical triage (Timestamp 1:16:00).

During the interview, ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> mentioned that several items discussed during the training were not listed in the IGB, which included CBP's authority to respond, crime scene preservation, or what to do post-shooting incident.

Towards the end of the interview, SA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> inquired as to why CBP's ASITP was not 100% ALERRT training. ACPA <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> said that in 2009, when the ASITP started, ALERRT was not initially messaged as the gold standard, but was used as a baseline. CBP could not hire



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ALERRT trainers to certify and teach LESC cadre, as it was a federally funded program for state and local law enforcement agencies. He said although ALERRT contained good information, some of the training was adjusted to include tactical movements and lessons learned from CBP's special operations groups, and other CBP personnel's experience.

At the conclusion of the interview, ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided SA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with a printed copy of the email from CBP's OCC, regarding CBPs authority to respond to active shooter situations (Exhibit 3).

**ATTACHMENTS**

<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>
1	Administrative Warning Acknowledgement for Non-Bargaining Unit
2	StarWitness interview of ACPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
3	Printed Email of CBP's authority to respond to active shooter