

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Sent: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
To: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Cc: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PERRY, CHRISTOPHER M; (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Subject: Situational Awareness EAC Bullets Detroit MI: Chinese National Refused Entry – in Possession of (b)(7)(E) – (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Bullets for the Executive Assistant Commissioner
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Situational Awareness

Detroit MI: Chinese National Refused Entry – in Possession of (b)(7)(E) – (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)

Summary:

On (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to the Detroit Metropolitan Airport (DMA) in Detroit Michigan, POE encountered a (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Chinese citizen that arrived on Delta Airlines (DL) flight 188 from Beijing, China. Subject was admitted as an F1 returning student and was referred to secondary as an enforcement referral by CBP officers conducting post primary operations. During the secondary inspection, CBP officers discovered several tactical items, maps, clothing, backpacks, two ballistic plates, and various types of medications. (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E) The subject was processed as a Withdrawal (WD) in lieu of Expedited Removal and was returned to Beijing, China on DL flight 189 on (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Details:

On (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) DMA in Detroit Michigan, POE encountered (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) COC: China) that arrived on Delta flight 188 from Beijing, China.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was admitted as an F1 returning student and was referred to secondary as an enforcement referral by CBP officers conducting post primary operations.

During the secondary inspection, CBP officers discovered (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) and several bottles of medications. (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) were detained pending appraisal, and will be seized for failure to declare.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated during the inspection that he owned an AK 47, a Swiss K11, and a KSG, which are in his house in (b)(6)(b)(7)(C).

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the weapons were for hunting, and was possession of an expired Michigan hunting license and hunter Safety certificate.

Paperwork in (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) possession that stated (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) is being treated for (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). When asked about the medication, he stated that he had been hospitalized for (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) twice.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

Homeland Security Investigations responded.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was processed as a WD in lieu of ER pursuant to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, Sec. 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), on suspicion that he may be involved in illegal activity.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) departed on (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) on Delta Airlines flight 188.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

No weapons were registered under the (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) address.

(b)(7)(E)

Updates to follow.

(b)(7)(E)

Subject Information:

Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DOB: [REDACTED]

Gender: Male

COC: China

COR: China

COB: China

Submitted by: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

Date / Time: (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Sent: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
To: OFO AC BULLETS; FLD Houston Field Office
Cc: OFO FIELD LIAISON
Subject: EAC Bullets Houston, TX: (b)(7)(E) Refusal of Saudi Arabian F-1 Student in Possession of (b)(7)(E) – Federal / State Prosecution Declined

**U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Bullets for the Executive Assistant Commissioner
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)**

Houston, TX: (b)(7)(E) – Refusal of Saudi Arabian F-1 Student in Possession of (b)(7)(E) Federal / State Prosecution Declined

Summary:

On (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) in Houston, TX refused admission to a (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) male Saudi Arabian citizen, who arrived as an F-1 student aboard a KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KL) flight from Amsterdam and was in possession (b)(7)(E) (b) (1) (A)

(b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) The subject was refused admission and processed as a Withdrawal (WD) of application in lieu of a formal hearing before an immigration judge. The subject will remain in CBP custody pending his departure.

Details:

On (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CBP officers assigned to IAH encountered (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Saudi Arabia), who arrived to IAH KL flight 661 from Amsterdam, and applied for admission as an F-1.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E) focused on verifying travel documents for admissibility of returning F-1 students. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was referred to Passport Control Secondary (PCS) for further inspection.

While in PCS, and during a preliminary interview, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that he was traveling to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) to continue his mechanical engineering studies at the (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Secondary queries revealed that (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was active in SEVIS, and has been an F-1 student in the U.S. since (b)(6)(b)(7)(C).

Subsequent to his interview, a (b)(7)(E) exam of (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) electronic devices was conducted. (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

When questioned about the image (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he believed he received (b)(7)(E) through a WhatsApp chat group.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was processed as a WD and is scheduled to depart on the next KLM flight back to Amsterdam. He will remain in CBP custody pending his departure.

Subject of Interest:

Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DOB:

Gender: Male

COC: Saudi Arabia

POB: Saudi Arabia

PPN: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Visa #:

FIN:

(b)(7)(E) Record:

(b)(7)(E)

A#:

Crossings: No prior crossings in the last six months

Submitted by: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Field Liaison Division

Date / Time: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
To: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Cc: DELAO, JENNIFER B; (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Subject: Situational Awareness EAC Bullets Boston Logan International Airport, MA: CBP Officers Refuse Admission to Iranian F 1 Student Previously Employed by (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E)

**U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Bullets for the Executive Assistant Commissioner
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)**

Situational Awareness

Boston Logan International Airport, MA: CBP Officers Refuse Admission to Iranian F-1 Student Previously Employed by OFAC Sanctioned Entity (b)(7)(E)

Summary:

On (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) at the Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) refused admission to a (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) female Iranian F-1 student, who arrived on a Qatar Airways (QR) flight from Tehran, Iran, based on her previous employment (b)(7)(E). The subject was referred to secondary inspection due to a (b)(7)(E) record for possible affiliations with (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E). In secondary, the subject later refused to answer further questions without consulting a (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) attorney. The CBP (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) officers determined that the subject was inadmissible into the U.S. and was processed for an Expedited Removal. The subject returned foreign on board a QR flight. (b)(7)(E)

Details:

On (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CBP officers assigned to BOS encountered (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Iran), who arrived on board QR flight 743 from Doha, Qatar, originating in Tehran, Iran.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) presented a valid F-1 visa and was referred to secondary inspection (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) record for previous employment with companies (b)(7)(E)

In secondary (b)(7)(E) officers conducted an interview and revealed (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was employed by (b)(7)(E).

(b)(7)(E) officers determined (b)(7)(E) is affiliated with the (b)(7)(E) who supports the (b)(7)(E) sanctioned entities involved in Iran's oil, gas, and nuclear industries.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) officers determined (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) period of employment with (b)(7)(E) was subjected to (b)(7)(E) sanctions.

(b)(7)(E) refused to answer further questions prior to completing inspection without consulting with a (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was found to be inadmissible into the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and was processed for an Expedited Removal.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was returned foreign on QR flight 744 on the same day of arrival.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) has no previous US travel.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

Subjects' Information:

Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Gender: Female

DOB: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

COC: Iran

COR: Iran

POB: Tehran, Iran

FIN: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

PPN: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Visa: Negative

(b)(7)(E)
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

Trusted Traveler: No

Travel History: No prior US nexus.

Submitted by: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

Date / Time: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

HOFFMAN, TODD A

From: HOFFMAN, TODD A
Sent: Friday, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
To: Owen, Todd C (AC OFO)
Subject: RE: Boston, MA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F 1 Student Who Refused to Answer Questions about Previous Sanctioned Employment (b)(7)(E)

thx

Todd A. Hoffman
Executive Director, Admissibility and Passenger Programs
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

From: Owen, Todd C (AC OFO) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Sent: Friday, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
To: HOFFMAN, TODD A (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: Boston, MA (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F 1 Student Who Refused to Answer Questions about Previous Sanctioned Employment in the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

As mentioned.

Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs & Border Protection

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From: HOWE, RANDY J (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
To: WAGNER, JOHN P (b)(6)(b)(7)(C); Owen, Todd C (AC OFO) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F-1 Student Who Refused to Answer Questions about Previous Sanctioned Employment in the (b)(7)(E)

Info

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b)(7)(E) (Office)
(b)(7)(E) (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:

From: "DELAO, JENNIFER B" (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Date: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) EDT
To: "HOWE, RANDY J" (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Cc: "FORET, VERNON T" (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F-1 Student Who Refused to Answer Questions about Previous Sanctioned Employment in the (b)(7)(E)

XD,
FYSA - (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) has already inquired with Tim Quinn on this one. I am sure it will generate attention. We have a call scheduled with (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) on Monday.
Thx

Jennifer De La O
Director, Field Operations (A)
Boston Field Office

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b)(7)(E)
Date: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) EDT
To: (b)(7)(E)
Cc: "DELAO, JENNIFER B" (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), "MANNING, MICHAEL P" (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Subject: Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F-1 Student Who Refused to Answer Questions about Previous Sanctioned Employment in the (b)(7)(E)

Field Liaison/Sitroom,

The bullets below document the (b)(7)(E) refusal of a citizen of Iran based on previous employment with (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E). At the conclusion of the secondary exam, the subject was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Sections 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA and was processed as an expedited removal. Subject was returned foreign on the same day of arrival. Subject departed on QR on (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Area Port of Boston Bullets
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Boston, MA (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F-1 Student with Previous Employment (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)

Summary:

On (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers assigned to the (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered a (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) female citizen of Iran who embarked in Tehran, Iran. The subject was a (b)(7)(E) based on previous employment with Iranian companies linked to (b)(7)(E) in the (b)(7)(E) industry. At the conclusion of the secondary exam, the subject was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Sections 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA and was processed as an expedited removal. The subject refused to answer questions without consulting a (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) attorney. Subject was returned foreign on QR 744 on (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Details:

On (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CBP Officers assigned to the (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport encountered (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) COC: IR), who arrived on board Qatar Airways (QR) flight 743 from Doha, Qatar (DOH) with travel originating in Tehran, Iran (IKA).

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) presented Iranian passport (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) along with an unexpired F1 visa with foil (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was referred to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

During (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) secondary examination, the information the subject provided was in conflict with open source information about the companies the subject worked for. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated during the secondary inspection that she previously worked for two companies; (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she worked for (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was explained the inspection process by two (b)(7)(E). The subject stated she wished to consult (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) before answering any questions while under oath. No further information about the employment history or ties to sanctioned entities could be explained by the subject and she was notified she would be expeditiously removed as her true intentions in the United States could not be verified as she could not properly be inspected.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was offered food, water and access to restrooms. Third Party notification was made to a friend in the United States.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA and was processed as an expedited removal. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was returned foreign on the same day of arrival.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) has no previous US travel

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Name (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DOB (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Gender: Female

POB: Tehran, Iran

COC: Iran

COR: Iran

FIN: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

PPN (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

NIV: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

PNR (b)(7)(E)

SEVIS: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

SIGMA Event: (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(A) Border Security Coordinator
U.S. Customs & Border Protection
Boston Field Office

(b)(7)(E) (office)
(b)(7)(E) (cell)

(b)(7)(E) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)