

Message

From:

Sent:

To:

CC:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: RE: Admissibility Officers refuse admission to a Nigerian citizen applying for admission as a returning student using Fraudulent I-20

Great catch by **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

From: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Sent:

To: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Cc: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: RE: Admissibility Officers refuse admission to a Nigerian citizen applying for admission as a returning student using Fraudulent I-20

Nice work.

From: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Sent:

To: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Cc:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: Admissibility Officers refuse admission to a Nigerian citizen applying for admission as a returning student using Fraudulent I-20

Boston, MA: Admissibility Officers refuse admission to a Nigerian citizen applying for admission as a returning student using Fraudulent I-20

Summary:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to Admissibility processing at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male citizen of Nigeria that arrived from Doha, Qatar (DOH) via Qatar Airlines (QR) flight 743. The subject was processed by the Primary officer where (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) presented his passport, visa, and I-20. A review of SEVIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in (b)(7)(E) came back as cancelled and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was referred requesting his status as a student be reviewed and was escorted to Secondary. (b)(7)(E) revealed a terminated status in SEVIS. The subject was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and 212(a)(6)(c)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and expeditiously removed from the United States.

Details:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at 1428hours (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) used an APC machine and received an X on his receipt and presented himself to the Passport Control Primary officer for inspection with his Nigerian passport (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) F1 visa (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and I-20 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). SEVIS (b)(7)(E) returned results stating the SEVIS program was terminated and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was referred with the comments "sevis shows canceled SEVIS ID (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had been denied two previous F1 visa's first on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) second on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and a bit more than a month later was issued his current F1 on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) which he did use and entered on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) intending to attend (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and departed the same month on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

In secondary (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was found to be traveling with his original I-20, a comparison of the I-20 presented revealed they were nearly identical but for the program start date, earliest admission date, and the DSO's name and signature.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was placed under oath, a Sworn Statement was taken, he admitted that on his last trip he never attended University, and that he paid an agent in Nigeria \$1,200 to get his visa, SEVIS fee paid, and his I-20. After returning from his first trip to the US he paid the same agent another \$415 for the updated I-20 he presented on the trip.

Due to the discovery of fraud during processing (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was processed as an ER with charges of 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and 212(a)(6)(c)(i).

Fraudulent I-20 is attached to this report.

Subject to be escorted back to QR flight 744 departing the same day he arrived.

Attached is the fraudulent I-20.

Traveler Information:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Name: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
DOB: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Gender: Male
COB: Nigeria
COC: Nigeria
COR: Nigeria

FIN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
PPN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(E)

PNR: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
NIV: F-1 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SEVIS: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(E)

Travel History: Inbound DOH-JFK (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Outbound JFK-IST (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). Inbound DOH-BOS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Alien Number: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Submitted by: SCBPO (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Date / Time: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 1907 hours



Boston Field Office
Daily Operations Report



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

This report encompasses operational events involving the Field Operations of Boston over the past 24 hours as an awareness of anticipated daily events.

Admissibility Report

Withdrawals

Logan: Chinese citizen was allowed to withdraw his application due to his student status having been terminated when he decided to withdraw from school.

Logan: South African citizen was allowed to withdraw her application due to admitting to having worked in the U.S. with a cabinet refinisher on her previous trip and coming to resume that work.

Derby Line: Canadian was allowed to withdraw his application due to criminal history in Canada.

Highgate Springs: French citizen destined to St. Albans to get his biometrics for immigration purposes in Canada was allowed to withdraw his application.

Highgate Springs: Canadian applying for a TN as an engineer was allowed to withdraw his application due to the description of his duties not meeting the classification of TN he was applying for.

Refusals

Logan: Spanish citizen was refused entry under the VWP due to lack of ties to Spain and lack of sufficient funds to support himself while in the U.S.

Expedited Removals

Logan: Citizen of Pakistan apply as an F1 was expeditiously removed due to his student status having been terminated and presenting an I-120 with a fraudulent signature. (b)(7)(E)

Other Admissibility

Logan: Haitian citizen, LPR, was placed into removal proceedings due to convictions for larceny (b)(7)(E)

Seizure / Enforcement / (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

Incident Report Log

(b)(7)(E)

Trade / Agriculture / FWS

(b)(7)(E)



Boston Field Office
Daily Operations Report



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

This report encompasses operational events involving the Field Operations of Boston over the past 24 hours as an awareness of anticipated daily events.

Admissibility Report

Withdrawals

Logan: China citizen was allowed to withdraw his applications after exam revealed his F1 status had been terminated.

Jackman: French citizen was allowed to withdraw her applications after interview revealed her intention was to voluntarily abandon her US LPR status. Card abandoned and subject returned to Canada.

Houlton: Canadian citizen was allowed to withdraw his applications after exam revealed a criminal conviction for possession of drugs.

Jackman: Ivory Coast citizen was allowed to withdraw his application for admission when it was determined he did not have a visa for entry. French citizen who was travelling with subject was allowed to voluntarily withdraw their application at same time and both returned to Canada.

Highgate: Moroccan citizen was allowed to withdraw his applications after his fingerprints were unable to be taken due to technical difficulties and he decided he was unwilling to wait.

Highgate: Canadian citizen and German citizen were allowed to withdraw their applications when they could not be processed due to system outage. Subjects decided they were unwilling to wait and returned to Canada.

Refusals

Calais: Citizen of the UK arrived with his USC wife after entering Canada to obtain another 90 day stay and was refused entry under the VWP due to having an I-130 on file and having been in the U.S. since November 2017 and getting married on 8/14/18. (b)(7)(E)

Ferry Point: Citizen of Singapore arrived on foot and was refused entry under the VWP due to lack of ties to home country, unable to provide a clear itinerary for this travel and being unable to overcome the presumption of being an intending immigrant. (b)(7)(E)

Logan: Spanish citizen was refused admission after exam revealed he had not job, no hotel booked in US, had only \$1000 for his trip and that his father was living and working illegally in the US. Subject had also deleted all US contacts from his phone and was evasive about his US contacts.

Logan: Netherland citizen was refused admission after exam revealed he was coming to the US to perform research and earn college credits but he did not have the correct visa to do so.

Logan: Citizen of Nigeria was expeditiously removed with a 5 year bar after admitting to coming to the US to work after evidence of such was found on Subject's phone. Also found was potential evidence of identity theft/credit card/bank fraud such as bank account and credit card information being sent electronically that did not match either sending or receiving party.

Seizure / Enforcement /

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

Incident Report Log

(b)(7)(E)

Trade / Agriculture / FWS

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

Message

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Attachments:

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Port Director
Logan Airport
Area Port Of Boston

(b)(7)(E)

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Subject: RE: **(b)(7)(E)**

Just had to tweak a couple of things but it should be all set now. Please let me know if you would like anything changed or added.

Thanks,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Watch Commander
U.S. Customs & Border Protection
Boston Logan Airport

(b)(7)(E)

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Subject: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Did you send it to me?

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Port Director
Logan Airport
Area Port of Boston

(b)(7)(E)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection



Boston Logan

(b)(7)(E)

BACKGROUND

(b)(7)(E) by the Area Port of Boston at Boston Logan International Airport **(b)(7)(E)** attempting to enter to the United States as students (F1, M1), exchange visitors (J1), and their dependents (F2, J2, M2). **(b)(7)(E)**

(b)(7)(E)

The Area Port of Boston has over 200 hundred institutions of higher learning. In August of 2017, 23,974 students, exchange visitors and dependents made entry into the United States at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS). From August 1, 2017 to September 30, 2017 Boston Logan International Airport refused 22 individuals who arrived on F or J non-immigrant visas. The majority of the students were refused because they were using the F1 visa to circumvent U.S. Immigration law.

According to CBP HQ Counterterrorism Office “October 1, 2017 through March 31, 2018, CBP admitted 989,644 students (F1, M1), exchange visitors (J1), and their dependents (F2, M2, J2). During the same time, CBP denied admission to 743 students, exchange visitors, and their dependents.” **(b)(7)(E)**

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) CBP HQ Counterterrorism Office further stated that “because of the success of previous CBP operations, several foreign governments have advised their citizens traveling to the United States for school to delete all material from their electronic devices that could jeopardize their chances of admission.”

OPERATION PLAN

(b)(7)(E)

1. CBP Officers will review all passport pages of new and returning students and their dependents to determine if they are nationals of or have traveled to the following countries since their last entry into the US (Saudi Arabia, United Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Syria, Yemen, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Niger, Mali, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Libya, and Indonesia). **(b)(7)(E)**

(b)(7)(E)

2. CBP Officers will also ask all returning F1 students if they had successfully completed their courses last semester. All students who failed to successfully complete their courses will be referred to admissibility secondary for further inspection.

(b)(7)(E)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

(b)(7)(E)

Duration of Operation: August 5th through September 30th

Port Management:

- **(b)(7)(E)**
- No later than September 15, 2018, port management will provide the following information generated through **(b)(7)(E)** to Watch Commander **(b)(6)**
 - Total of referrals
 - Total of refusals
 - **(b)(7)(E)**

Message

From:

Sent:

To:

CC:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: RE: Boston, MA (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian Citizen Applying for Admission as a Returning Student

ALCON;

(b)(6) s lawyer, (b)(6) called this afternoon. He was provided all public contact information for ERO Burlington.

Respectfully,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Supervisor – (b)(7)(E)
Boston Logan Airport
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian Citizen Applying for Admission as a Returning Student

Boston, MA (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian Citizen Applying for Admission as a Returning Student

Summary:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered a 35-year old male citizen of Iran that arrived from Rome, Italy (FCO) via Alitalia (AZ) flight 614. (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) to determine subject's military history and to further research previous visa refusal under Section 212(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). At conclusion of secondary exam, subject was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA and was processed as an expedited removal, subject expressed credible fear during processing and will remain in custody pending his hearing.

Details:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) COC: Iran), who arrived aboard Alitalia (AZ) flight 614 from Rome, Italy with travel originating in Tehran, Iran.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) determine military history and possible involvement in specialized military branches, additionally, subject was previously refused a non-immigrant visa in 2013 under Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA and refused in 2012 per (b)(7)(E)

Subject is a PhD student at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) starting his second semester of his PhD program in Mechanical Engineering. Subject completed his first semester at the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

During interview subject indicated in 2010, he previously worked under the rank of Lieutenant at an Air Force facility on a special project for 3-4 months. Subject indicated he was selected through the Air Force to model and reverse engineer a welding machine that had military applications; he would not elaborate on its use. (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

the location in which he worked on the project and googled "Sasad Iran" indicating that was the name of where he worked on the project, subject inadvertently went onto the website "www.iranwatch.org" which showed Sasad Defense Industries is also known as Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Further research on Sasad/DIO indicated they are controlled by Iran's Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); according (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

Subject's work for Sasad/DIO was not listed on his 2012, 2013 or 2016 visa application, nor was it on the resumes he provided to (b)(7)(E). Subject's true intent for entry to the U.S. could not be determined and he was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA. Subject was processed as an expedited removal, subject expressed credible fear during processing and will remain at Logan Airport until (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in which time he will be transferred to ERO custody pending his hearing.

NTC and JTTF notified of subject's refusal.

Traveler Information:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Name: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
DOB: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Gender: Male

COB: Iran

COC: Iran

COR: Iran

FIN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
PPN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

PNR: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
NIV: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SEVIS: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

Travel History:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) IKA-FCO-BOS
BOS-FRA-IKA
KEF-ORD

Alien Number: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Media Attention: Possible

In 2013, after refusing subject's visa U.S. Embassy in Ankara received a congressional inquiry from Senator Warren's office

Submitted by: SCBPO (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date / Time: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) / 0300 hours

Respectfully,

SCBPO (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

*U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Boston Logan Int'l Airport*

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

عشقنا الموت خوفا من ان نعشقنا الحياة



قد علمنا من الامتحان ان الموت شهداء

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

is a citizen and resident of Libya. On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

subject (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) arrived on flight AF 338 at Boston Logan International Airport (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

presented Libyan passport (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to the CBP Passport Control Officer and was referred (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

CBP Passport Control to a CTR/PAU

(b)(7)(E)

Subject (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) claimed to be coming to the United States to study English as a second language

at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in Brighton, Massachusetts. He was to stay with a host

family he couldn't identify who resided in the Boston area:

(b)(7)(E)

After being refused an F1 visa in 2014 and 201 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) finally obtained an F1 NIV on

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as a scholarship recipient for aeronautical engineering at a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), an


occupation he noted his father held on his visa application. Subject (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) claimed the

scholarship money from Libya had stopped in 2015 and he then decided to study English in the United States through another scholarship that he again claimed Libya had cancelled. Due to the cancellation of this scholarship for his English school he decided to stay in Libya and work for his father in construction where he builds family residences, a job description highly contradictory from other initial information given during the visa application.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I20 form stated he intended to study English for about a month but he instead told officers he wanted to stay for a year. Although he wanted to stay for a year, he had no way of paying for these extended English courses and could only state his father would send him money to pay as he took the courses. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had 900 USD in his possession with no access to any other funds.

A routine CTR baggage exam revealed nothing derogatory. Due to the inconsistent facts surrounding (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)'s study and what appeared to be the lack of finances to support an extended English program, a (b)(7)(E) electronics review was requested and approved by SCBP (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for CTR purposes and to verify his intent.

During a manual review of his electronics which consisted of an Apple iPhone 5, multiple pictures were found showing:



When approached with the pictures (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he had obtained them from a friend. He claimed that his friend in Libya had some other pictures he liked of babies and animals but instead of giving him just the pictures he wanted, his friend transferred him all his pictures. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further explained he was from the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and although he is a practicing Muslim his beliefs are not aligned with Sunni or Shia Muslims. He added Sunni extremist groups do not like the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Due to the derogatory pictures Boston CTRT generated (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not overcome the presumption of being an intending immigrant and was charged 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as an immigrant without an immigrant documents.

(b)(7)(E)

Message

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To:

Subject:

RE: Boston, MA: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Kuwaiti Citizen Found to be in Possession of Child Porn Images-Federal Prosecution Declined

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Watch Commander
Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Area Port of Boston

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFO Proud!

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: RE: Boston, MA: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Kuwaiti Citizen Found to be in Possession of Child Porn Images-Federal Prosecution Declined

Who was the officer

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Boston DFO

Cc: CBP Boston AAPD;

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: Boston, MA: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Kuwaiti Citizen Found to be in Possession of Child Porn Images-Federal Prosecution Declined

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Port of Boston

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Boston, MA: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Kuwaiti Citizen Found to be in Possession of Child Porn Images-Federal Prosecution Declined

Summary:

On Saturday (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers assigned to the Port of Boston (b)(7)(E) encountered a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male Citizen of Kuwait that was

in possession of two (2) videos on his phone that depicted under age children engaging in sexual acts. The passenger applied for admission as an F1 Student to attend English school in San Diego. (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) was contacted and federal prosecution was declined. The subject was refused entry into the United States and will be returned to Kuwait via Dubai.

Details:

On Saturday (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at approximately 0745 hours (EST) CBP officers assigned to the Port of Boston (b)(7)(E) encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), COC: Kuwait) after he was referred from primary (b)(7)(E) CBP Boston requesting a full CTR exam.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) arrived at Boston Logan Airport aboard Emirates Airlines flight 239 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates and was in possession of a valid Kuwaiti passport and F1 Visa to attend english classes at the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for Integrative Studies.

During the course of the CTR secondary inspection a review of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)'s phone revealed two (2) videos that depicted underage children engaging in sex acts. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that the videos were sent to him via the "what's up" mobile application from a friend.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was refused admission into the United States and will depart on Saturday (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) aboard Emirates Airlines flight 237 (ETD 2230)

Submitted by: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Watch Commander
Date / Time: 300 hours

Message

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

on behalf of

Sent:

7/27/2018 4:18:51 PM

To:

OFO-AC

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AC:

AC:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CC:

OFO-FIELD LIAISON

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject:

EAC Bullets – Boston, MA (b)(7)(E) Encounter Pakistan Citizen Affiliated to Positive CAT-20 (b)(7)(E) Subject – Allowed to Withdraw

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Bullets for the Executive Assistant Commissioner
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Boston, MA (b)(7)(E) Encounter Pakistan Citizen Affiliated to Positive CAT-20 (b)(7)(E) Subject – Allowed to Withdraw

Summary:

On Jul (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male citizen of Pakistan that arrived from Doha, Qatar. The subject was referred to secondary (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E). The subject was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. and allowed to withdraw his application for admission.

Details:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), CBP officers at BOS encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) COC: Pakistan), who arrived aboard Qatar Airways (QR) flight # 743 from Doha, Qatar, originating in Islamabad, Pakistan.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as traveling on a Pakistani passport and presented himself to the primary CBP officer for admission as a F-1 visa holder. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was referred to secondary (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

During questioning, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he was coming to the U.S. to continue his studies at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for a master's degree in engineering management. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Form I-20 listed family fund contribution of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) toward his master's program. While the I-20 lists his uncle as the financial contributor, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated his father predominantly funds his education in addition to providing (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) each semester for living expenses.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) works as a tax officer for the Government of Pakistan (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) and his valid non-immigrant visa (NIV) was subsequently revoked. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) received his F-1 NIV on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) but omitted that his father would be funding his education in the U.S. on his NIV application or I-20.

(b)(7)(E) search of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)'s electronic devices revealed several images related to charity donations, courier receipts and Government of Pakistan documents. When questioned, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he knew little about the images on his phone and that they were all related to his father's finances and work.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

CBP officers determined (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) visa was cancelled and he was allowed to withdraw his application for admission in lieu of an expedited removal.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) departed the U.S. aboard QR flight # 744 on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject Information:

Name: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
DOB: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Gender: Male
COC: Pakistan
COR: Pakistan
Passport: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Visa: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

Travel History: No crossings in the last six months.
Trusted Traveler: No

Submitted By: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Commissioner's Situation Room
Date / Time: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 1130 hours

Message

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Fwd: Boston (b)(7)(E) Officers Refused Two Saudi Arabia F-1 Students With Beheading Video and Child Pornography

Attachments: image001.jpg; image002.jpg

Two more F-1 refusals

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Area Port Director

Area Port of Boston

(b)(7)(E)

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date:

To:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Cc:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: Boston (b)(7)(E) Officers Refused Two Saudi Arabia F-1 Students With Beheading Video and Child Pornography

Boston, MA: Boston TTRT Officers Refuse Two Saudi Arabia F-1 Students With Beheading Video and Child Pornography

Summary:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male citizens of Saudi Arabia that arrived from Dubai on Emirates Flight EK 237 . The subjects were referred to secondary (b)(7)(E) Fahad (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) The subjects were found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Details:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), U.S. CBP officers assigned (b)(7)(E) Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), who arrived aboard Emirates Flight EK 237 from Dubai.

Passenger (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) traveling on Saudi Arabia Passport Number (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Passenger (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) presented themselves to the primary CBP officer for admission as a F1 visa holder (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were referred to secondary (b)(7)(E)

During secondary inspection both (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were attending International Education Services (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Further inspection of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I-Phone X revealed a beheading video and Child Pornography photos/videos.

(b)(7)(E) secondary questioning indicated he is part of the group chat with videos and photos. Search of his phone was negative.

Boston (b)(7)(E) Officers reached out to (b)(7)(E) which were negative (b)(7)(E) : (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) visa was cancelled and was processed as a Withdrawal and will be departing the U.S. aboard EK 238 on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) visa was cancelled and was processed as a Expedited Removal and will be departing the U.S. aboard EK 238 on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject Information:

Name: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Gender: Male
DOB: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
COC: Saudi Arabia
COR: Saudi Arabia
POB: Najran
FIN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
PPN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Visa: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

Trusted Traveler: No
Travel History: No prior US nexus.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject Information:

Name:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Gender:

Male

DOB:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

COC:

Saudi Arabia

COR:

Saudi Arabia

POB:

Narjan

FIN:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

PPN:

Visa:

(b)(7)(E)

Trusted Traveler:

No

Travel History:

No prior US nexus.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Area Port of Boston

Passenger Operations Chief

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Message

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To:

Subject:

RE: Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Pakistan Citizen Affiliated to

(b)(7)(E)

Subject

Don't worry about it, im enjoying the abuse.

He wants heads up as soon as we know there is a refusal going on.

The flight arrived at 1406 so we should have told them as soon as we knew he was going back.

The report doesn't have to be done just a notification .

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Border Security Coordinator
Boston Field Office
Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: FW: Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Pakistan Citizen Affiliated to

(b)(7)(E)

Subject

I will apologize to him, I'm not up at 0500 on the weekends unless I am just getting ready to go to bed (like I was on Saturday morning)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Port Director
Logan Airport
Area Port Of Boston

(b)(7)(E)

From:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sent:

To:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Cc:

Subject: RE: Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Pakistan Citizen Affiliated to

(b)(7)(E)

Thanks for the delayed reporting.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Director, Field Operations
Boston Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

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From: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**
Sent:
To: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**
Cc:
Subject: Boston, MA **(b)(7)(E)** Officers Refuse Pakistan Citizen Affiliated to **(b)(7)(E)**

FYI,

(b)(7)(E) refusal of F1 student at Logan last night.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Border Security Coordinator
Boston Field Office
Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**
Sent:
To: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**
Cc:
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Subject: Boston, MA: **(b)(7)(E)** Officers Refuse Pakistan Citizen Affiliated to **(b)(7)(E)**

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Pakistan Citizen Affiliated to (b)(7)(E)

Summary:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) old male citizen of Pakistan that arrived from Doha. The subject was referred to secondary (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) The subject was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Details:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. CBP officers assigned to (b)(7)(E) Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Pakistan), who arrived aboard Qatar Airways (QR) flight # 743 from Doha, Qatar originating in Islamabad, Pakistan.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was traveling on Pakistan passport (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and presented himself to the primary CBP officer for admission as a F1 visa holder (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and was referred to secondary (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

During questioning, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he was coming to the United States to continue his studies at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for a masters in engineering management (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); Form I-20 listed family fund contribution of \$83,527 toward his masters program, while the I-20 lists his uncle as the financial contributor subject indicated his father predominantly funds his education in addition to providing \$8K USD each semester for living expenses.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) entered into the WLS on or about (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and valid NIV was subsequently revoked (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) received his F1 NIV on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) but it was not listed on his NIV application or I-20 that his father would be funding his education in the U.S.

During manual review of subject's electronics, several images were discovered related to charity donations, courier receipts and Government of Pakistan documents, when questioned the subject indicated he knew little about the images on his phone and they were all related to his father's finances and work (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

CBP officers determined (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Subject's visa was cancelled and he was allowed to withdraw his application for admission in lieu of an expedited removal. Subject departed the U.S. on QR 744 on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Traveler Information:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NAM: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
DOB: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Gender: Male

COC: Pakistan

COR: Pakistan

POB: Islamabad, Pakistan

PPN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Visa: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

Traveler Itinerary:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ISB-DXB-BOS
BOS-DOH-ISB
FRA-DFW

Media Attention:

None anticipated at present time

Submitted by: SCBPC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date / Time: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 2330 hours

Respectfully,

SCBPC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

*U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Boston Logan Int'l Airport*

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Message

From:

Sent:

To:

CC:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: Fwd: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: CBP Officers Refuse Admission to Saudi Arabian, F-1 Students in Possession of Terrorist and Child Pornography Material

Attachments: **(b)(7)(E)**

FYI your case was pushed out nationally by the EAC, excellent work. Thank you

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Area Port Director
Area Port of Boston

(b)(7)(E)

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**
Date: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**
To: "**(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**"
Subject: **FW: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: CBP Officers Refuse Admission to Saudi Arabian, F-1 Students in Possession of Terrorist and Child Pornography Material**

FYI,

The Logan case Friday night was pushed out nationally via EAC bullets.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Border Security Coordinator
Boston Field Office
Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)** **On Behalf Of:** **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Sent: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

To: **OFO-AC-BULLETS;** **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Cc: FLD Boston Field Office

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: CBP Officers Refuse Admission to Saudi Arabian, F-1 Students in Possession of Terrorist and Child Pornography Material

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Bullets for the Executive Assistant Commissioner

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Boston, MA: CBP Officers Refuse Admission to Saudi Arabian, F-1 Students in Possession of Terrorist and Child Pornography Material

Summary:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to the (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) refused admission to two F-1 students, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) old male citizens of Saudi Arabia who arrived on a Emirate Airlines flight from Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), after it was discovered the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) old subject was in possession of a graphic beheading video and child pornography on his cell phone. (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) Both subjects were refused admission and departed the U.S. aboard Emirates Airlines back to Dubai, UAE.

Details:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CBP officers assigned to BOS encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) COC: Saudi Arabia) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) : Saudi Arabia) who arrived at Boston Logan International Airport aboard Emirates Airlines flight 237 from Dubai, UAE.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) presented valid Saudi Arabian passports and F1 visas to attend an English Language school in San Diego, CA. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

During the course of the (b)(7)(E) secondary inspection (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that they were going to San Diego for two months to attend English Language School at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

A (b)(7)(E) search of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) phone was conducted and revealed a graphic be-heading video as well as what appeared to be child pornography. Further research revealed that the videos were part of a group chat that co-traveler (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was a part of as well, although no nefarious material was found during the search of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)'s cell phone.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was refused entry under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) and processed for an Expedited Removal. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was refused entry

under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA and allowed to withdraw his application for admission.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no previous travel to the United States

Subjects' Information:

Name: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Gender: Male

DOB: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

COC: Saudi Arabia

COR: Saudi Arabia

POB: Najran

FIN: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

PPN:

Visa:

NCIC: Negative

TECS: Augment

Trusted Traveler: No

Travel History: No prior US nexus.

Travel History: No prior US nexus.

Name: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Gender: Male

DOB: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

COC: Saudi Arabia

COR: Saudi Arabia

POB: Najran

FIN: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

PPN:

Visa:

NCIC: Negative

TECS: Augment

Trusted Traveler: No

Travel History: No prior US nexus.

Submitted by: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)** LD – Commissioners Situation Room

Date / Time: / 1300 hours

Respectfully,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CBP Officer/ Program Mgr

Field Liaison Division/ Commissioner's Situation Room

US Customs & Border Protection

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Message

From:

Sent:

To:

CC:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: RE: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: Citizen of Qatar in Possession of ISIS Propaganda – Expedited Removal

Ahh, the good old days.....

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Director, Field Operations
Boston Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

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From: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Sent: Wednesday, September 9, 2020 1:17 PM

To: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Cc: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Subject: RE: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: Citizen of Qatar in Possession of ISIS Propaganda – Expedited Removal

That's not how we used to do it. If we had an Operation, and didn't know what it was (local/national), we'd put in a short description. It comes down to knowing your audience and what's important.

From: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Sent: Wednesday, September 9, 2020 1:17 PM

To: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Cc: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Subject: RE: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: Citizen of Qatar in Possession of ISIS Propaganda – Expedited Removal

Glad they will be discussing. Interested in the feedback/thoughts.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Director, Border Security
Boston Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2018 11:18 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: Citizen of Qatar in Possession of ISIS Propaganda – Expedited Removal

It is disappointing that they don't see the value in sharing this information with other FOs. Early this morning I briefed both (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and their intentions are to discuss this case further with leadership.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Director, Field Operations
Boston Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

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From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2018 11:18 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: Citizen of Qatar in Possession of ISIS Propaganda – Expedited Removal

No. It should have been included. They pick and choose what they leave in or out.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Assistant Director, Border Security
Boston Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(7)(E)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2018 11:18 AM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: Citizen of Qatar in Possession of ISIS Propaganda – Expedited Removal

Is there a known reason why (b)(7)(E) would remove the description of Operation Early Dismissal be removed from the bullets? This is would have been useful to other FOs.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Director, Field Operations
Boston Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

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From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) **On Behalf Of** SITROOM

Sent: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Cc: OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b)(7)(E) <[redacted]@cbp.dhs.gov>; (b)(7)(E) <[redacted]@cbp.dhs.gov>

Subject: EAC Bullets - Boston, MA: Citizen of Qatar in Possession of ISIS Propaganda – Expedited Removal

**U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Bullets for the Executive Assistant Commissioner**

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Boston, MA: Citizen of Qatar in Possession of ISIS Propaganda – Expedited Removal

Summary:

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male citizen of Qatar who arrived on board Qatar Airways (QR) flight #743 from Doha, Qatar. Secondary inspection revealed derogatory information based on direct association with a subject of interest and ISIS propaganda material on his phone. (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) The subject was found inadmissible to the U.S. and processed for expedited removal.

Details:

On, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CBP officers assigned to BOS encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (DOB: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) COC: Qatar), who arrived as a returning F-1 student on board QR flight #743 from Doha, Qatar.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) applied for admission as an F-1 student returning to resume his studies at the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E) media search of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) two cell phones, laptop computer, and iPad revealed that most of the contents were deleted. One cell phone contained ISIS propaganda material (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was placed under oath and a sworn statement was obtained. During the interview, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that his brother was recently arrested by the Qatari government and was currently in a Qatari prison. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also indicated that he believes that his brother was associated and communicating with ISIS.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) media exam was completed and uploaded to the event. All electronics were detained for further forensic analysis.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was determined to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, with a drop charge of 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was processed for expedited removal and returned to Qatar on board QR flight #744.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

Subject Information:

Name: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
DOB: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Gender: Male
COC: Qatar
COR: Qatar
Passport: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Visa: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

Travel History: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) last departed the U.S. of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Trusted Traveler: No

(b)(7)(E)

Submitted By: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Commissioner's Situation Room

Date / Time: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) / 1030 hours