

Boston Logan Airport <u>Pas</u>senger Analysis Unit

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

Boston Logan Airport: R Practical Training (OPT)	efusal of F1 Student attending a fra Program	udulent Optional
	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	

On (b)(6), (b)(7)(Boston CBP Office	rs encountered a	citizen of China	a traveling on
an F1 visa who was	s attending a fraudulent (OPT program. T	he subject was r	eferred to
Admissibility secon	ndary. During the inspect	ion, the subject	was attending (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) as a Mas	sters candidate and had p	reviously compl	leted 3 years of	OPT. In 2018
the subject "transfe	rred" t((b)(6), (b)(7)(C)		and was
immediately accept	ted into and OPT program	n. (b)(7)(E) revea	aled the subject'	S
employment author	rization ended in July 20	18. The subject i	s currently empl	loyed as a
software engineer for Google in Cambridge, MA and Google previously sponsored at				
least two H1B visa	applications which were	denied. The su	bject admitted u	nder oath that
his manager at Goo	gle suggested he attend	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to keep	working at Google and	maintain status.	Subject was ref	fused under
	(b)(7)(E)		v	
	, ,, ,, ,			

NOT FOR FUBLIC DISCLOSURE - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE	
PREPARED BY: Boston (b)(7)(E)	



Boston Logan Airport Passenger Analysis Unit

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

F1 Student refused admission for attending a fraudulent school and engaging in unauthorized employment.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Boston CBP Officers encountered a citizen of India traveling on a F1 visa to attend a fraudulent school, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The subject stated that he studies Customer Service and attends courses twice a week for a total of ten (10) hours. The subject also admitted under oath to working at a pizza shop. The subject was refused admission for violating the terms of the F1 visa by not engaging in a full time course of study and engaging in unauthorized employment. Subject was refused under 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (b)(7)(E)

NOT FOR PURILIC DISCLOSURE - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PREPARED BY: Boston



Boston Logan Airport Passenger Analysis Unit (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PREPARED BY: Boston



Boston Logan Airport Passenger Analysis Unit (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

Citizen of Serbia traveling on an F-1 Visa refused admission for attending fraudulent school to obtain OPT and continue working in the United States.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Ot (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Boston CBP Officers encountered a subject traveling on an F1 visa. The subject was referred to Admissibility secondary for an inspection. During the inspection the subject admitted under oath that she had previously graduated from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and completed OPT. The subject later applied and enrolled at the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The subject stated she was looking for a school that allowed fulltime OPT and more importantly OPT from day one. The subject did not have a valid I-765 on December 2, 2019. The subject was processed as an Expedited Removal under Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). (b)(7)(E)

PREPARED BY: Bosto (b)(7)(E)



Boston Logan Airport Passenger Analysis Unit

Brief Brief

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PREPARED BY: Boston



Boston Logan Airport Passenger Analysis Unit

December 6, 2019



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PREPARED BY: Boston (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)



Boston Logan Airport Passenger Analysis Unit (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(7)(E)

PREPARED BY: Boston



Boston Logan Airport (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PREPARED BY: Boston



Boston Logan Airport (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PREPARED BY: Boston



Boston Logan Airport

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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PREPARED BY: Boston



Boston Logan Airport (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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PREPARED BY: Boston (b)(7)(E)



Boston Logan Airport

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PREPARED BY: Boston



Boston Logan Airport (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PREPARED BY: Boston



Boston Logan Airport
(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

Boston Logan: Refusal of a Citizen of India and F1 Visa Holder for Attending a Fraudulent School and Obtaining Employment Outside the Scope of the Degree of Study on Optional Practical Training (OPT).

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Other (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CBP Officers encountered a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) year ollows. Citizen of India applying for admission into the United States on a valid F1 visa. The subject was referred to Admissibility Secondary for inspection. It was determined that the subject was attending (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a known fraud school with an alleged "pay to stay" OPT program. The subject stated under oath that she obtained a masters degree in Electrical Engineering but could not answer basic questions about the principles of electricity or electrical engineering. The subject stated that she was working as an I.T. Specialist at a company called (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) The subject stated that she was qualified to work in this field after taking three (3) credit courses. The subject was allowed to withdraw her application for admission in lieu of expedited removal and after being found inadmissible und INA Sec 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Reference (b)(7)(E) for more information.

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
PREPARED BY: Boston (b)(7)(E)



Boston Logan Airport

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection vigilance integrity service

Boston Logan: Refusal of a Citizen of India and F1 Visa Holder for Attending a Fraudulent School and Obtaining Employment Without Authorization.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

One (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CBP Officers encountered a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) year old was nearest itizen of
India applying for admission into the United States on a valid F1 visa. The subject was
referred to Admissibility Secondary for inspection. It was determined that the subject was
attending (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a known fraud school with an alleged "pay to stay"
OPT program. The subject previously completed a Master's degree program at the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The employment
authorization for that OPT program ended in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The subject then applied to
the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to obtain a certificate as a Customer Service
Specialist. The subject began OPT training with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at the same time as
enrolling at The subject was deemed inadmissible to the United States under
212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and was processed for an expedited removal. (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)


NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PREPARED BY: Boston

Message From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)Sent: To: CC: Subject: Re: : Boston, MA [ালাগাচ] Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian Citizen Applying for Admission as a Returning Student Thank (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Sent from my iPhone (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)O (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) , at 5:48 AM @cbp.dhs.gov> wrote: I Will find out if they stamped it cancelled at the POE yet, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)Sen. warrens Office was involved with this guy before. I'm still adding and cleaning up the bullets. Sent from my iPhone On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at 5:32 AM (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)DCBP.DHS.GOV> wrote: Excellent work here. Was his VISA cancelled? Sent from my iPhone (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Or (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at 5:13 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) cbp.dhs.gov> wrote: Sir/Ma'am, Please see the case below, this is good one The subject claimed (b)(7)(E)Will need to push bullets, additionally Northeastern may be calling about his location.

> Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian Citizen Applying for Admission as a Returning Student

Summary:



During interview subject indicated in 2010, he previously worked under the rank of Lieutenant at an Air Force facility on a special project for 3-4 months. Subject indicated he was selected through the Air Force to model and reverse engineer a welding machine that had military applications; he would not elaborate on its use. The subject was very evasive throughout secondary interview, when probed further he provided geo-coordinates of the location in which he worked on the project and googled (b)(6),(b)(7)(c) indicating that was the name of where he worked on the project, subject inadvertently went onto the website

(b)(7)(E) "which showed (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

Subject's work for (b)(7)(E) was not listed on his 2012, 2013 or 2016 visa application, nor was it on the resumes he provided to DOS. Subject's true intent for entry to the U.S. could not be determined and he was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA. Subject was processed as an expedited removal, subject expressed (b)(7)(E) during processing and will remain at Logan Airport until (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in which time he will be transferred to ERO custody pending his hearing.

(b)(7)(E)

Traveler Information:

(b)(7)(E)

Name

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

DOB: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Gender: Male COB: Iran COC: Iran COR: Iran FIN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)(b)(7)(E) PNR: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NIV: F-1 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) **SEVIS:** (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E) **Travel History:** IKA-FCO-BOS (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) BOS-FRA-IKA KEF-ORD Alien Number: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Media Attention: Possible In 2013, after refusing subject's visa U.S. Embassy in Ankara received a congressional inquiry from Senator Warren's office Submitted by: SCBPO (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Date / Time: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) / 0300 hours Respectfully, SCBPO ((b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Customs and Border Protection Boston Logan Int'l Airport (b)(7)(E)(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Message

From:

Sent:

To:

CC:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(PTDIBOHTZ53PDET)/CN=RECIPIENT3/CN=CARE.5:CANIPBELL)

Subject:

RE: (b)(7)(E) : California Constituent

Sir,

As discussed. I spoke with DepAPD (10)(10)(10)(10)(10) and was able to fill in the blanks.

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

Thank you,


(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Branch Chief U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations Field Liaison Division





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Subject: FW (b)(7)(E) California Constituent

Importance: High

Sir,

Based on our quick review of (b)(7)(E) ertaining to this case, this subject was with our admissibility enforcement unit on January 11, 2017 through

January 13, 2017 when he was turned over to ICE ERO for further processing. Then again on **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)** the subject was brought back to AEU for additional questioning relating to his original claim.

The timeline looks like this:

-Subject in custody for ER proceedings

-ER Case Completed (last day with OFO)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Transferred to Barracks 5 Detention Facility

-Transferred to ICE ERO custody

Returned to San Ysidro AEU to amend his statement. Subject was offered a withdrawal in lieu of Temovar, but refused so the ER was continued.

(b)(6).(b)(7)(c) Transferred to ICE ERO custody. (last day with OFO)

Deputy Assistant Port Director (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is available to answer any other questions you might have. He can be reached at (b)(7)(E) . He is included on the email as well.

Best regards,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Border Community Liaison San Diego Field Office Customs and Border Protection Dept. of Homeland Security

(b)(7)(E)

From (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

o (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) PCBP.DHS.GOV>

Subject: RE: (b)(7)(E) | California Constituent

So the delay in any action between apprehension (January) and today was on the ERO side, not us?



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

We called ERO. They indicated that the paperwork was filed for asylum on the 30th. He was scheduled for his interview today, but that interview was stopped because his attorney was not present.

We were told that the interview is being re-scheduled and could potentially be within the next week.

I hope this helps.

Best regards,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Border Community Liaison San Diego Field Office Customs and Border Protection Dept. of Homeland Security

(b)(7)(E)

Fron Sent	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	
То:	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	
Subject	FW: (b)(7)(E) California Constituent	-

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)		
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	
Cc:	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	
Cubiant DE! (b)(7)(E) ! California Constituent		

Subject: RE (b)(7)(E) California Constituent

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

As discussed, need some clarification on the timeline of this case. He was encountered in January and the last update is that he claimed fear on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and is pending an asylum interview.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Executive Director, Operations (Acting)
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

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From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) On Behalf Of OFO-FIELD LIAISON

Sent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Tc (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ; OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)(E) : California Constituent

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CBP Officer, Field Liaison Division Office of Field Operations U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



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From (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: FW: (b)(7)(E) California Constituent

Liaison,

Please pull the Q&A on this case

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)


Executive Director, Operations (Acting)

Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(7)(E)

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Subject: RE: (b)(7)(E) California Constituent

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

My staff provided the following:

(b)(7)(E) . This was a good ER, the subject's F-1 status was terminated because he failed to maintain his attendance at school and he also admitted under oath that he was employed in the U.S.

The subject is still in ICE custody at Otay Detention Facility. The last update is that he claimed fear on (b)(7)(E) and is pending a (b)(7)(E) interview.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Executive Director, Operations (Acting)
Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(7)(E)

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From Sent: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

To CCC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: FW (b)(7)(E) California Constituent

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Can you take a look at this and see what you can get from the systems. Reach out to the Field Office if you need to.

Thank you,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Director, Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-3
Washington, DC 20229

(b)(7)(E) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



From (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

To (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: FW: (b)(7)(E) California Constituent

Please review

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Executive Director, Operations (Acting)
Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(7)(E)

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From (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Ta (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)


Subject: FW: (b)(7)(E): California Constituent

Good morning XD,

OCA is working the below case and we're a bit stumped information mentioned you'd be able to assist providing a bit more background of the constituent. The case is from Rep. Kalama Harris' office on for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Our office received a call from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who informed us about a college student who has been detained for over two months. His name is (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and he is a Tunisian national who has been living and studying in the U.S. for the past three years on a F-1 visa.

Over the winter break (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) vacationed in Baja, Mexico and upon returning to the United States on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was detained and taken to secondary processing. We were informed that his attorney, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); has been having difficulties getting information about her client's case and the reason he is being detained. She has been told by both CBP and ICE officials to speak with the other agency about her client's status.

CBP officials did inform (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) lawyer that he would be receiving expedited removal. When pressed, officials said that someone from CBP had spoken with West LA College's International Student Office and was told that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I leave to speak about a student's I-20 status, and he confirmed to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) that he had not spoken to any officials and in fact was out of the office of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Also, on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was allegedly taken to the San Ysidro Port of Entry and asked to sign voluntary removal order without notifying his attorney.

Our office understands CBP is doing their best to ensure an effective and efficient border-crossing process. But we respectfully request an update on the status of [(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)] the reason for his on-going detention, and a time certain that he can meet with his lawyer to determine the best course of action that may permit him to return to his studies at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Attached is the Privacy Release Form for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Thank you and we look forward to your response.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

State Director U.S. Senator Kamala D. Harris 312 N Spring St., Ste. 1748 Los Angeles, CA 90012 213.894.5000 (Office)

<u>www.harris.senate.gov</u> Twitter: @SenKamalaHarris

Facebook: @SenatorKamalaHarris

Message				
From:	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)			
Sent: To:	OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)			
CC:				
CC.	(1-)(0) (1-)(7)(0)			
	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)			
	()(-), ()(-)			
Subject:	Boston, MA (ID)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F-1 Student that Misrepresented Military Service with an (b)(7)(E)			
Field Liais	on,			
The bullets below document the Boston (b)(7)(E) refusal of first time Iranian F1 student who was found to have misrepresented military service with an (b)(7)(E). The subject was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Sections 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the INA and was processed as an				
expedited	removal. Subject was returned foreign on the same day of arrival.			
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations Area Port of Boston Bullets				
	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)			
Boston, M Service wi	A: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F-1 Student that Misrepresented Military than (b)(7)(E)			
	10, 2019, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers assigned to the (b)(7)(E)			
	7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered a 30-year old male citizen of rrived from Doha, Qatar. (b)(7)(E)			
Tan who a	(b)(7)(E) At conclusion			
	ry exam, the subject was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Sections 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)			
and 212(a)	(6)(C)(i) of the INA and was processed as an expedited removal.			
Details:	(INC)			
	(b)(7)(C) , CBP Officers assigned to (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport encountered (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) COC: Iran), who arrived on board Qatar Airways (QR) flight 743 from Doha,			
	H) with travel originating in Tehran, Iran (IKA).			
	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)			
\				

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) plaimed to be coming to the United States for the first time to do complete a Masters degree in Data Analytics Engineering at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
During the secondary inspection, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he completed his compulsory military service in the Iranian Artesh (army) and assigned to an administrative role. (b)(7)(E) inspection of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) cell phone
revealed a photograph of him wearing a military uniform bearing the insignia of (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not articulate why he misrepresented material facts during his visa application process or during the exam to officers. Specifically (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated under oath that he never did military service with the Artesh Army, and that he
was at a military facility which only trained (b)(7)(E) This directly contradicts the information he provided to consular officers during his visa application process, as well as the information he provided to CBP officers throughout his secondary inspection.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not overcome the presumption of being an intending immigrant and was charged 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as an immigrant without an immigrant documents and for material misrepresentations during the visa application process, to officers during the baggage exam, and during the sworn statement.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was processed as an expedited removal.
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was returned foreign on the same day of arrival
(b)(7)(E)

Traveler Information:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has no previous travel to the United States.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Name DOB: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Gender: Male COB: Iran COC: Iran COR: Iran

FIN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

PNR{ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | NIV: F-1 | (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) | SEVIS: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(E)

Travel History: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) IKA-DOH-BOS-DTW

Alien Number: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Media Attention: Not anticipated

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(A) Border Security Coordinator

U.S. Customs & Border Protection Boston Field Office

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Message	
From:	
on behalf of	
Sent:	
To:	
	/! \/^\ /! \/¬\/^\
	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
CC:	

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: Attachments:

)(6), (b)(7)(C)


- EAC Daily Operations Report - EAC Daily Operations Report.docx



Executive Assistant Commissioner's
Daily Operations Report
Operations - Field Liaison Division
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



(b)(7)(E)



Incident Date: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Location of Incident: Boston, MA			
(b)(7)(E) Examination and Refusal of F-1 Student – Possession of Derogatory Material			
Summary: Or (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), CBP officers assigned to the (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) old male (minor) Palestinian refugee and resident of Lebanon who arrived from Doha, Qatar (DOH) via Qatar Airways (QR) flight 743. The subject stated to (b)(7)(E) that he was a student coming to study at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E)			
(b)(7)(E)			
(b)(7)(E) Officers determined the subject was inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A) (i)(I) of the INA and allowed him to withdraw his application for admission in lieu of an Expedited Removal. The subject returned foreign on the same day of arrival.			
Incident Date: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Location of Incident: Houston, TX			
(b)(7)(E) Expedited Removal of Angolan Citizens - Unauthorized Employment and Overstay on F-1 Visa			
Summary: On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CBP Officers assigned to George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) in Houston, TX encountered a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) old Angolan citizen and his (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) old Angolan citizen spouse, both whom are F-1 students and arrived on Emirates Airline (EK) flight 211 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Subjects were referred from primary due to possible student violator records (b)(7)(E) During the secondary interview, the male subject admitted working as an Uber and Lyft Driver to pay his tuition.			
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)			
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Both subjects were processed for Expedited Removals pursuant to INA Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (immigrant not in possession of a valid immigrant visa) and departed the U.S. on the next available flight.			
(b)(7)(E)			
None			

End of Report

Message (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)From: Sent: To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)FW: Boston. MA(២)ប្រេទ្ធ) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F-1 Student with Previous Employment Linked to Subject: (b)(7)(E)Would you all leave the students alone! lol (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)(A) Deputy Director, Field Liaison Division U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations (b)(7)(E)(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)On Behalf Of OFO-FIELD LIAISON From Sent: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)Cc: OFO-FIELD LIAISON Subject: FW: Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers Refuse Admission to an Iranian F-1 Student with Previous Employment (b)(7)(E)Request to file (b)(7)(E) inspection, (b)(7)(E) No (b)(7)(E) No media (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CBP Officer Commissioner's Situation Room Field Liaison Division - OFO U.S. Customs and Border Protection FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WARNING: This document is TON OFFICIAL VSL CHUP (FOUC). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5.U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy relating to FOUG information and is not to be released to the public or other personnel who do not have a need-to-know without the prior approval of an authorized DHS official.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From:

Sent:

REL0000003928

To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)			
Cc:	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	иминимими		
(b)(6)	, (b)(7)(C)			
Subject: Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Employment Linked to	Officers Refuse Admission to an Ira (b)(7)(E)	anian F-1 Student with Previous		
Field Liaison,				
linked to inadmissible to the U.S. pursuan	nt to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA of an expedited removal. Subject was re	The subject was found to be A and was allowed to withdraw his		
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations Area Port of Boston Bullets (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)				
Boston, MA: (b)(7)(E) Officers R (Family Business)	Refuse Admission to an Iranian F-1 Stu (b)(7)(E)	ident with Previous Employment		
	oms and Border Protection (CBP) Officer			
	(b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) encountered a 26-year old male citizen of an who arrived from Doha, Qatar (b)(7)(E)			
(b)(7)	(b)(7)(E)	sion of secondary exam, the subject was		
found to be inadmissible to the Uwithdraw their application in lie	U.S. pursuant to Sections 212(a)(7)(A)(i)	(I) of the INA and was allowed to		
Details: On (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), CBP Offic (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	ers assigned to (b)(7)(E) at Boston Logan In	nternational Airport encountered		
743 from Doha, Qatar (DOH) with travel originating in Tehran, Iran (IKA).				
(b)(6), (b)	(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)			
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was referred)(E) d		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(b)(7)(E)	· - Lo · Lo ·		
(b)(7)(E) Additionally, (b)(6), ((b)(7)(c) s supervisor at (b)(7)(E)	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)		
COC. Iran)	been revoked by the U.S. Department of	i		
~//·//-/				

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) s non-immigrant F1 visa was a single entry visa and was issued (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) D did not indicate the knowledge of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) affiliation to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was found to be inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA and was allowed to withdraw his application for admission in lieu of an expedited removal. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was returned foreign on the same day of arrival.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has no previous US travel

Traveler Information:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

 $_{\rm DOB}^{\rm Name}$ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Gender: Male COB: Iran COC: Iran COR: Iran

FIN: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E) PNR: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NIV: F- (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Travel History: [(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)] IKA-DOH-BOS Alien Number: [(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)]

Media Attention: Not anticipated

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(A) Border Security Coordinator U.S. Customs & Border Protection Boston Field Office

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)