

**Customs and Border Protection  
After Action Report (AAR)  
Mass Migration Event (MME)  
Del Rio, Texas  
September 8, 2021 – September 24, 2021  
Report Date: October 7, 2021**



**United States Border Patrol  
Del Rio Sector**

**Op Order Name:** Del Rio, TX Mass Migration Event (MME)  
**Report Date:** October 5, 2021  
**Authors:** PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
PAIC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**DATES**


A. Mass Migration Event Operational Dates: September 8, 2021 – September 24, 2021

**LOCATION**

Del Rio, Texas, Del Rio Sector (DRT) Zone 007  
Lat. 29.33100 Long. -100.92329

**COMMAND**

**A. Mass Migration Event Chain of Command:**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  


Del Rio Sector (Interim) Chief Patrol Agent  
Laredo Sector Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (Incident Commander)  
Del Rio Station Patrol Agent in Charge (Deputy IC)  
Eagle Pass Station Patrol Agent in Charge (Deputy IC)  
Special Operations Detachment Patrol Agent in Charge (Deputy IC)

**DESCRIPTION:**

**A. Executive Summary**

From September 8, 2021 to September 24, 2021, Del Rio Sector (DRT) experienced an unprecedented Mass Migration Event (MME) of primarily Haitian nationals illegally crossing into the United States that created a humanitarian crisis which overwhelmed U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), CBP and greater DHS resources. This was the largest mass migration event in recorded history of the USBP. A gap in intelligence dissemination and inadequate resourcing and response capabilities resulted in DRT being unprepared to initially manage the volume and speed of which migrants illegally crossed into the United States in a short period of time. An Incident Command Post (ICP) stood up by USBP and supported by numerous federal, state, local law enforcement components, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), led efforts to manage the MME. During the 17-day MME, DRT, supported by internal and external partners encountered 19,752 migrants making illegal entry seeking passage into the United States.

DRT faced significant challenges when thousands of primarily Haitian nationals illegally crossed into the United States in Zone 7 at the weir dam and accumulated underneath the Del Rio Port of Entry (DRL POE) International Bridge. At one point, the mass of subjects underneath the bridge reached approximately 15,000 migrants from 58 different

countries. USBP, along with internal and external partners, faced conditions consistent with those of a mass casualty type event, public health and humanitarian crisis. Already faced with overcrowded temporary holding facilities and limited ground and air transport capabilities, DRT could not relocate subjects to safer facilities/environments from the bridge in an expeditious manner commensurate with the need. Many of the subjects suffering from heat exhaustion or other conditions necessitated immediate medical attention. Additionally, migrants required water and nourishment while waiting for days in areas that became increasingly unsanitary.

Supported by multiple sectors, internal and external partners, the Incident Commander (IC) employed over 2,266 law enforcement and support personnel to feed, provide general and medical care, transport and process the migrants over the 17-day span. On September 24, 2021, DRT transported the last remaining migrants from underneath the bridge and formally returned command of operations back to Del Rio Station. During the MME, DRT fortunately did not experience any migrant deaths, violent events, or use of force incidents.

## **B. Mission Statement**

CBP will protect our nation's borders, personnel, infrastructure, and ensure the health and safety of the traveling public, while managing the effects of a land mass migration surge. CBP will provide additional manpower and resources to Del Rio Sector and Field Office to ensure border security in coordination with State and Local law enforcement partners.

## **C. Intelligence/ Events Leading to Event**

- a. Since June of 2021, in the Del Rio Station (DRS) area of responsibility, large numbers of migrants began congregating at the boundary fence near the "40 Main Crossing" waiting to turn themselves in to law enforcement and Border Patrol agents. There was no shelter at this location for migrants, especially families with vulnerable persons, small children and pregnant females, were consistently experiencing medical issues due to the heat and exposure to the elements.
- b. On July 30, 2021, DRT implemented a temporary staging area under the DRL POE International Bridge to allow the freely congregating migrants shelter from the elements while they waited to surrender to Border Patrol agents. Due to the number of migrants congregating at this location DRT provided security, 900 feet of temporary fencing, water, four light plants, twelve port-a-potties, hand washing stations, and dumpsters to maintain sanitation and to prevent the spread of disease as much as possible with limited resources.
- c. On average, between 200 to 1,000 migrants were staged under the bridge while DRT arranged for transportation to various stations and other Sectors for processing. A large portion these migrants were Haitian. The identified catalyst

that caused a rapid increase in migrants staged under the International Bridge was the short notice cancelation of Title 42 expulsion flights from September 8, 2021, until September 19, 2021, to Haiti. Throughput was interrupted as 900 migrants that were processed for expulsion flights had to be re-processed through other available dispositional pathways. DRT was already holding approximately 3,200 migrants in temporary holding facilities, 688% over its capacity, when the mass migration event began. The number of staged migrants rapidly increased from 2,456 on September 13, 2021, to a high of 14,921 on September 18, 2021.

#### **D. Timeline of Events**

Day 1: Wednesday September 8, 2021

- DRT holding 2,159 in custody / 648 unprocessed
- Title 42 Flights to Haiti Cancelled
- Total DRT POE (Bridge) Encounters 345

Day 2: Thursday September 9, 2021

- Total DRT POE Encounters 454

Day 3: Friday September 10, 2021

- Total DRT POE Encounters 486

Day 4: Saturday September 11, 2021

- Current state of DRT POE is 907 subjects under the bridge. Most are identified as Haitian migrants.
- Numbers of illegal crossings begin to rapidly increase

Day 5: Sunday September 12, 2021

- DRT holding 2,274 in custody / 1,015 unprocessed
- Additional 499 DRT POE Encounters
- A total of 1,500 migrants are reported to be staged under the DRT POE Bridge

Day 6: Monday September 13, 2021

- Additional 738 DRT POE Encounters
- A total of 2,456 migrants are staged under the DRT POE Bridge

Day 7: Tuesday September 14, 2021

- Additional 848 DRT POE Encounters
- A total of 3,171 migrants are staged under the DRT POE Bridge
- Intelligence reports 8 full charter buses arrive in Ciudad Acuna with more on the way

Day 8: Wednesday September 15, 2021

- 7,007 migrants staged under the DRT POE Bridge
- Del Rio Sector requests additional manpower and OA assistance
- Overtime guidance is updated for all USBP manpower

## Day 9: Thursday September 16, 2021

- Encounters increase to over 1,000 per day and rapidly increase
- A total of 10,503 migrants are staged under the DRT POE Bridge
- Initial request to close the Del Rio POE is submitted
- ICE Aviation Operations is directed to resume Haitian flights beginning next week
- OA assistance begins to arrive in mass

## Day 10: Friday September 17, 2021

- DRT holding 2,286 in custody / 1,255 unprocessed
- A total of 13,965 migrants are staged under the DRT POE Bridge
- EOC expands for additional OA tracking and transportation coordination
- Del Rio Sector begins transporting migrants to other Sectors for processing assistance
- DHS Volunteer Force reaches high water mark of 66 personnel
- Bureau of Prisons reaches high water mark of 80 personnel
- Texas DPS begins relocating up to 1,000 troopers to assist in securing the border
- Texas National Guard is activated and begins to arrive in Del Rio
- DRT POE closes at 1600 hours and reroutes traffic to the Eagle Pass POE.
- Eagle Pass POE entry lanes are reduced to one lane of entry for all cross-border traffic
- All Del Rio Sector Checkpoints closed
- SOG Mobile Command Center (MCC) arrives and becomes operational as ICP

## Day 11: Saturday September 18, 2021

- A high-water mark of 14,921 migrants staged under the DRT POE bridge
- Outside temperature reaching 106° Fahrenheit.
- Government of Mexico (GOM) increases efforts to deter migrants in Ciudad Acuna
- GOM established 5 active checkpoints on highways leading into the State of Coahuila, Mexico. All buses with migrants are being turned around.
- ICE ERO increases manpower support to Del Rio Sector

## Day 12: Sunday September 19, 2021

- DRT holding 2,789 in custody / 1,986 unprocessed
- A total of 11,941 migrants are staged under the DRT POE bridge
- Texas DPS hits a high-water mark of 1,000 personnel
- First 3 Title 42 Expulsion Flights to Haiti begin
- Del Rio Police Department deployed to assist
- Kinney County Sheriff's Office deployed to assist
- Val Verde County Sheriff's Office deployed to assist

## Day 13: Monday September 20, 2021

- A total of 10,413 migrants are staged under the DRT POE bridge
- HHS DMAT reaches high water mark of 81 personnel for medical assistance
- San Antonio Fire Department personnel arrive for medical assistance

- HSI reaches high water mark of 81 personnel
- OFO begins processing migrants at the Export Lot and Passport Control Area.
- Prosecution accepted for migrant bus event in Sarita, Texas (escape)

Day 14: Tuesday September 21, 2021

- A total of 8,556 migrants are staged under the DRT POE bridge
- ICE ERO reaches high water mark of 151 personnel
- Expulsion flights continue to Haiti

Day 15: Wednesday September 22, 2021


- DRT holding in custody 2,745 / 1,103 unprocessed
- A total of 4,994 migrants are staged under the DRT POE bridge
- OFO manpower reaches a high-water mark of 454 officers
- USBP manpower reaches a high-water mark of 605 agents

Day 16: Thursday September 23, 2021

- DRT holding 3,216 in custody / 1,059 unprocessed
- A total of 3,447 migrants are staged under the DRT POE bridge

Day 17: Friday September 24, 2021

- DRT holding 2,959 in custody / 743 unprocessed
- All migrants moved to processing facilities. Zero (0) remain under the DRT POE bridge
- Demobilization begins and OA support begins to reduce
- Operational control of DRT POE is transferred back to Del Rio Station PAIC
- Del Rio POE issues a press release for the re-opening of the port at 1600 hours



**E. Statistics/ Outcomes based on the information from e3 (All statistics are preliminary, subject to change, and should be considered unofficial)**

- a. Total Encounters (T8 and T42): 19,752
  - No Entry Zone Confirmed: 107
  - Del Rio Zone 7: 19,538
  - 5 Encounters (Mexican Nationals) are amenable to Title 42 immediate and therefore do not have an assigned Zone in e3
- b. Disposition Breakdown:
  - Deportable Apprehensions (T8): 13,926
  - Title 42 Delayed (T42): 5,821
  - Title 42 Immediate (T42): 5
- c. Demographics:
  - Family Unit (FMUA): 10,646
  - Single Adults (SAs and FMGs): 9,047
  - Unaccompanied Children (UACs): 59
- d. Peak Holding at POE Bridge was 14,921 on 9/18/2021
- e. Peak Day: 09/21/2021 had a total of 2,958 encounters
- f. Highest in custody number 3,216 on 9/23/2021 (DRT only)
- g. Citizenship:
  - A total of 58 unique Countries of Citizenship were encountered.
  - Top 5 Countries (95% of all encounters):
    1. Haiti: 13,893 (70%)
    2. Chile: 2,146 (11%)
    3. Cuba: 1,210 (6%)
    4. Venezuela: 1,077 (5%)
    5. Brazil: 489 (2%)
  - Haitian subjects traveled through multiple countries prior to entering the United States. Some subjects from Chile, Brazil, or other countries may belong to Haitian Family Units but have citizenship in the country in which they were born.
  - See Country Breakdown (Annex A) for a full list of the 58 countries and encounters.
- h. Total number processed for Title 42 expulsion to Haiti was 4,435 with 3,440 expelled during the reporting period.
  - As of September 30, 2021, 6,085 Haitians have been expelled by aircraft (additional flights are expected)
- i. There were 2,266 Law Enforcement and support personnel who responded to the MME (Refer to Annex B for agency breakdown)
- j. Contracts for 139 porta potties, 28 hand washing stations, and 8 bulk trash bins were used to support the migrants (this was wholly insufficient but also exhausted total regional supplies)

- k. Red Cross provided 17,000 hygiene kits (each kit contained a razor blade that had to be removed prior to issuance)
- l. World Central Kitchen and local contracted vendors provided 14,000 meals daily to migrants on average.
- m. CBP medical personnel responded to 672 calls for assistance to evaluate and treat migrants. A total of 425 migrants required advanced care and were referred to HHS DMAT medical personnel. Migrants were treated for a variety of issues ranging from seizures to respiratory distress. Medical teams delivered one baby at the POE bridge and 10 others were born at local hospitals. A total of 16 migrants were transported to local hospitals after being evaluated by DMAT medical personnel. **There were zero (0) deaths during the MME.**
- n. Border Patrol Search and Rescue teams successfully performed 56 water rescues in the Rio Grande River. Most water rescues occurred on September 23, 2021 (53 rescues)
- o. 63 transport buses and 57 transport vans were surged into Del Rio for assistance. (There actual requirement was 100 busses, but the requirement could not be met from current government/private sector supplies)
  - 11 USBP buses
  - 12 Contract Services buses
  - 5 United States Marshal Service buses
  - 25 Bureau of Prison buses
  - 10 leases buses
  - 51 Vans
  - 6 contracted vans

#### **F. Law Enforcement and Support Partners**

- a. Air and Marine Operations
- b. Office of Field Operations
- c. Department of Homeland Security Volunteer Force
- d. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations Special Response Team (ERO/SRT)
- e. Homeland Security Investigations Special Response Team (HSI/SRT)
- f. Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
- g. Health and Human Services (HHS)
- h. Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS)
- i. Texas Military Department (Texas National Guard)
- j. Val Verde County Sheriff's Office (VVS0)
- k. City of Del Rio, Mayor's Office
- l. Del Rio Police Department (DRPD)
- m. Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD)
- n. San Antonio Fire Department (FDSA)
- o. Texas Intrastate Fire Mutual Aid System (TIFMAS)
- p. National Institute of Migration of Mexico (INM)



- q. Mission Border Hope (NGO, Eagle Pass, TX)
- r. Val Verde Border Humanitarian Coalition (NGO, Del Rio, TX)
- s. World Central Kitchen (NGO)

**G. Roles and Responsibilities**

The U.S. Border Patrol was the lead Component charged with managing the MME due to statutory authority. The Incident Command Post (ICP) was stood up on September 16, 2021, and the Incident Commander (IC) was responsible for coordination with supporting federal, state, local partners, and non-governmental organizations. The IC conducted daily operational briefs with supporting partners for situational awareness as well as task assignments. Responsibilities were broken down into the support categories of Administrative Support, Intelligence Support, Operational Support, Logistical Support and Medical Support. The DRT Sector Chief maintained responsibility of controlling the outer perimeter and security patrols within the crowds in the containment zone, which afforded the ability to provide security and immediate medical assistance when necessary



**H. Technical Performance**

The current processing pathways in place are adequate for normal migrant and seasonal flow. However, the sheer volume of the mass migration overwhelmed throughput within CBP, ICE, and HHS. Personnel, CBP facility holding/detention capacities, and transportation (ground and air) are wholly insufficient to safely manage this type of Mass Migration event. Synchronization between USBP and ERO manifests continues to evolve to decrease processing and transfer of custody time.

**I. Equipment Performance**

All equipment performed as expected. Del Rio Sector and CBP Facilities, Maintenance, and Equipment (FM&E) facilitated many contracts in support of life sustaining functions

for migrants and personnel assisting with operations, security, and support. Equipment not readily available to CBP was contracted through local vendors.

## J. Finance and Resources

- a. Del Rio Sector Finance Office continues to work through pending acquisitions and reconciliation processes. Actual figures are expected to fluctuate as reimbursements and fiscal year closeouts continue.  
Estimates are current as of October 7, 2021.
- b. DRT Sector Expenses: \$1,280,580
- c. OFAM / FM&E Expenses: \$1,277,600
- d. PMOD Expenses: \$1,231,000
- e. SPAD Expenses: \$79,500
- f. Border Patrol TDY estimate per day \$135,000 / 17-day total: \$2,295,000.00
- g. Overtime cost estimate \$2,600,000
- h. HHS DMAT cost estimate: \$5,500,000
- i. Loyal Source Contract for 13 days: \$43,000
- j. Sanitation Expenses: \$2,000,000
- k. Del Rio Sector weekly fuel cost: \$350,000
- l. Ground Transportation: \$6,324,000
- m. ICE flight cost \$728,000
- n. Department of Defense flight support cost estimate - \$804,000
- o. DHS Volunteer Force \$500,000
- p. Total DRT / Border Patrol Cost Estimate: \$25,012,680**
- q. Additionally, Office of Field Operations (OFO) reported a loss of an average of **\$22,500** daily in estimated duties and fees collected as well as an estimated **\$42.5M to \$45.0M** lost in import value.

## K. Safety Concerns

Ensuring the safety of migrants, law enforcement, and support personnel was the first line of effort for the IC.

- a. The Del Rio POE closure mitigated potential risk to all personnel below the bridge.
- b. A Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) was put in place for the safety and security of the migrants and the numerous law enforcement aviation assets supporting operations. Media and privately owned drones caused a concern and the TFR provided an effective way to mitigate safety issues while allowing operations to continue uninterrupted.
- c. AMO was able to synchronize aviation support and leverage local organic resources to provide ISR capabilities to maintain situational awareness and enhance officer safety on a 24 hour cycle.
- d. Local and national media requests for drone coverage were coordinated through the DRT Strategic Communications Office.

- e. CBP EMTs were immediately requested and redirected to support medical needs.
- f. COVID exposure and other contagious disease spread in a mass migration event continues to be a safety issue for law enforcement and the general public. Multiple CBP employees deployed to Del Rio reported testing positive for COVID either during or immediately after their deployment as well as one agent contracting SCABIES infection.
- g. FBI continually monitored information from both anti-law enforcement and anti-immigrant threat groups. Many National Security issues were mitigated during the mass migration event to include two special interest migrants with national security concerns being apprehended and the interception of a possible violent actor at the Del Rio Port of Entry.

#### **L. Communication of Directions, Events and Changes to Plans**

Incident command conducted daily scheduled and hasty meetings with all executive leaders throughout the MME. Communication was adequate to ensure operational expectations and requirements were clear for supporting law enforcement personnel. On-site visits by Headquarters personnel and White House officials ensured the full scope of the event was understood for maximum support of resources and planned actions.

#### **M. Strategic Communications**

Strategic Communications (StratCom) and CBP Public Affairs (PA) are a critical role to ensure leadership at all levels as well as the media and the general public have the perspective of the agents on the ground managing the MME. Both DRT StratCom and CBP PA are co-located in Del Rio and synchronizes the messaging. Del Rio Sector StratCom had been messaging the use of the bridge as a staging location for large groups of migrants arriving since July 31, 2021. This created an advantage with the Del Rio Mayor and local law enforcement officials as they were already aware of the situation before the mass migration event occurred. Del Rio Sector had previously posted the use of the bridge and current situation on social media, new articles, distributed photos, and even had Congressional visits at the location before the mass migration event.

On September 13, 2021, numbers staged at the bridge began to rapidly increase. Due to the previous engagements with the City of Del Rio, resources began to arrive in support of the efforts. Messaging was put on hold until press conferences could be held that were approved by the Office of Public Affairs (OPA). The only messaging that StratCom released was the POE closure to the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) on September 17, 2021. Media and community members were the only entities distributing information which caused the Border Patrol to lose control of the messaging.

Chief Ortiz provided a short interview with local KENS 5 on September 17, 2021 and held a formal press conference on September 19, 2021. The DHS Secretary also held a press conference on September 20, 2021. Headquarters approval was required for all social media posts. The early and consistent release of unconstrained accurate messaging

from the Border Patrol would have provided a more holistic view to the public and other law enforcement agencies.

Detailing media support and additional StratCom personnel early in the crisis was needed to manage multiple site visits which overwhelmed the small Del Rio StratCom team.

#### **N. Environmental Concerns**

Summer temperatures reached as high as 106° and weather threatened the safety of the migrants that illegally crossed the border and the law enforcement personnel managing on scene issues. Additionally, migrants had no water, food, or shelter to protect themselves from the environmental hazards. Medical support was needed for on-site assistance for minor and advanced medical care. CBP EMTs were the first to surge to the area followed by HHS DMAT personnel for an increased capability and capacity. Zero fatalities occurred during the MME.

#### **O. Physiological Impacts (Stress and Fatigue Impact)**

The chaotic scene and high level of coordination required long hours of work in a very stressful environment. Leadership and personnel performing tasks to care for the migrants endured physical and mental exhaustion to ensure solutions were carried through to manage the MME. Mandated overtime further reduced rest cycles. The arrival of additional high-level leadership and detailers was needed early in the mass migration event to reduce physical and physiological impacts. CBP, State and Local law enforcement as well as all support personnel rose to the challenges of the crisis that produced a highly successful resolution of the MME.

### **Lessons Learned (issues/ recommendations)**

#### **A. Title 42 Flights Cancelled**

- a. On September 8, 2021, DRT Staff was informed by ICE/ERO that Title 42 flights supporting the expulsion of migrants from the United States would be cancelled. USBP was required to reprocess hundreds of migrants under Parole ATD, which created an immediate backlog of nearly over 1000 migrants. Additionally, it is believed the halt in expulsions was communicated immediately within the Haitian population creating an added pull factor and a rush to cross illegally into the U.S.
- b. In lieu of Title 42 expulsion and expected termination of CDC Title 42 authority, USBP and DHS partners should seek alternative options to immediately remove amenable migrants from custody upon completion of processing.
- c. Advanced warning needs to be given when expulsion flights are cancelled in order to avoid a disruption in throughput due to re-processing requirements.

#### **B. Del Rio POE Closure**

- a. DRT Staff coordinated with DRL Staff for several days prior to the closure of the DRL POE. On September 16, 2021, USBP formally made the request to close the Del Rio POE due to increasing number of migrants under the bridge and for

security and safety concerns. On the evening of September 17, 2021, the Del Rio Field Office closed the Del Rio POE. Additionally, the Eagle Pass POE, the nearest POE (approximately 50 miles away) was reduced to one lane due to OFO manpower supporting the MME. The closures resulted in significant delays for all essential and commercial cross border travel from Ciudad Acuna to Piedras Negras.

- b. In future MMEs, POE closures should be considered, discussed, and planned with OFO to be engaged swiftly to address security concerns. The POE closure mitigated risks to the migrants directly below the bridge, POE footprint security, and allowed Mexican authorities an opportunity to disperse migrants staged along the Rio Grande River, thus reducing cross border activity at the Weir Dam and the Boat Ramp crossings.

### **C. Migrant Transportation Coordination (Busses)**

- a. DHS lacked sufficient transportation and there was no mass transportation coordination mechanism within the Department to relocate the mass of migrants in Del Rio. CBP and ERO transportation capabilities were also limited. DOJ Bureau of Prisons assisted CBP by providing busses and drivers that could drive beyond the time restrictions set forth in current CBP transportation contracts. The Commissioner's Action Group (CAG) assisted with the reallocation of CBP contracted buses and communicated directly with the IC to coordinate additional transportation throughout the Southern United States and to Haiti as well.
- b. Establish a scalable, high capacity CBP transportation contract. A scalable contract will allow CBP to increase or redirect contracted transportation assets throughout the nation or throughout established regions to better support sectors when migrant flows develop and or evolve.
- c. Establish inter and intra agency MOUs to expand transportation capacity immediately within hours, not days.
- d. As the MME emerged, DRT expanded their sector transportation cell from a minimally staffed coordination element that mostly coordinated movement within sector to a fully staffed unit comprised of subject matter experts who coordinated detainee movement from the incident site to CPCs and stations in and outside of DRT.

### **D. ERO Manifest Issues**

- a. USBP does not have access to ERO systems of record utilized for passenger manifests, nor does ERO have access to USBP's detention module in e3. This lack of access forces USBP agents to manually enter names and dates of birth to generate manifest rosters for ERO. This process is not efficient – the process to generate a manifest for an expulsion flight of 130 passengers requires 8-man hours to produce from DRT personnel alone.
- b. USBP and ERO systems must be linked to generate passenger manifests more efficiently, or DHS should have a singular processing system that accommodates



all Departmental requirements from intake/processing, care and custody, and finally book-out/manifesting. It is also recommended USBP maintain ERO teams imbedded onsite at USBP sectors or temporary holding facilities to expedite manifest coordination.

- c. CBP and ERO functions in a mass migration event are intertwined with what CBP interdicts. Greater volumes of people need to be swiftly and effectively moved by ERO to expanded ERO holding capacities across the nation.

#### **E. Lead Field Command Construct**

- a. The Lead CBP Field Coordinator (LFC) construct provides an identified CBP leader directed to develop and maintain a regional based preparedness plan that incorporates coordinated planning and leverages the resources and capabilities of all CBP Components within a region. Although the Del Rio MME warranted unified emergency and humanitarian responses from CBP, DHS, and local law enforcement resources, the LFC construct was not activated.
- b. It is recommended for CBP leadership to consider at what point during a crisis, such as the Del Rio MME, a LFC activation is warranted. Trigger points may need to be identified that would assist with LFC activation requirements.

#### **F. Detention Capacity**

- a. Del Rio Sector's (DRT) total detention capacity is 1,360 and has been averaging 500 percent over capacity at any given time which results in excessive time-in-custody and overcrowding at every station, including the soft side processing facility in Eagle Pass. DRT, along with USBP Sectors along the Southwest Border (SWB), continue to experience overcrowding at levels not seen before. There is no indication that ICE/ERO detention capacity will ever increase to meet the flow of migrants illegally entering the United States through Del Rio Sector or any SWB sector. ICE/ERO needs to immediately address their shortfall in holding capacity across the nation.
- b. It is recommended that USBP HQ in collaboration with ICE ERO take ownership of the detention space problem and, with the support of all pertinent DHS partners, embark on a Regional Processing and Detention Centers (RPDC) initiative that will alleviate overcrowding in DRT, LRT, and RGV (specifically) as well as the rest of the SWB. Multiple RPDC facilities centrally located in the southwest or south-central area of Texas and supported by DHS ICE partners would be responsible for Housing, Processing, and the proper disposition of migrants. The centers would also serve as the central transportation coordination hub. Initial holding capacities 16K – 22K should be scalable and gauged by current in custody numbers, projections for evolving large migration volume headed to our southwest border, and processing times.

### **G. Designated Areas at IC for Supporting Agencies**

- a. Law Enforcement command and supporting elements should be considered when establishing the location of the Incident Command Post (ICP). The ICP in Del Rio was comprised of a Mobile Command Center (MCC) provided by USBP SOG. The MCC was located approximately 100 yards away from the migrant staging area. Although AMO, ERO and Texas DPS had representation in the ICP, no other supporting components or agencies were staged nearby.
- b. When establishing the ICP, the IC, Deputy ICs and planners should allocate adjacent or nearby footprints for support federal, state, and local LE partners to situate their command elements. Consider climate-controlled shelters for cooperating agency meetings and government or non-government delegation visits.

### **H. Regional Mobile Command Centers**

- a. DRT does not possess its own MCC and therefore requested SOG's MCC which arrived on September 17, twenty-four hours after it was requested. Prior to establishing a location for the ICP, the IC staff maintained a mobile posture on foot or in vehicles.
- b. The IC recommends the procurement of sector MCCs to support future incidents. At a minimum, one MCC could support multiple sectors using a regional concept. For example, one centrally located MCC could support incidents from Rio Grande Valley to Del Rio Sector. This should evolve to every sector having an MCC with further ability to create expanded climate-controlled IC tent structures to supplement for multiple LE partner collaboration.

### **I. Personnel Lodging**

- a. There were 2,266 law enforcement, first responder, and support personnel (internal and external to DHS) supporting the Del Rio MME. Del Rio, TX has an approximate population of 36,000 and limited lodging options throughout the local and regional economies. Many deployed personnel could not secure lodging within a 55-mile radius and traveled over 100 miles from their lodging sites to the Del Rio POE daily. DRT coordinated with the City of Del Rio to secure 500 retrofitted lodging spaces at the local convention center through contractual services made available to DHS employees.
- b. At the onset of an imminent MME, sectors should immediately examine lodging availability and begin communicating with contractual service representatives to secure available lodging accommodations and other associated resources to support deployed personnel.

### **J. Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF)**

- a. The dissemination of relevant information for MMEs is critical for Sectors when preparing for mass migration management, and all other law enforcement operations. Most USBP Sectors do not have the ability to communicate high-

level law enforcement and sensitive information from the Intelligence Community (IC) without Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF).

- b. All USBP Sectors must have access to SCIFs located at designated sites within a sector or within reasonable commuting distances to receive pertinent IC information or other sensitive law-enforcement information. (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) DHS needs to invest in SCIF buildouts for all USBP Sectors.

#### **K. Department of Defense (DoD) Crisis Response Force (CRF) Support**

- a. Even with the combined resources from DHS and DOJ, DRT experienced significant challenges at the onset of the mass migration event (MME). The most significant challenges were the transportation, housing, feeding, security, and welfare of migrants.
- b. Sectors planning for an MME should consider Department of Defense (DoD) Requests for Assistance (RFA) for Crisis Response Force (CRF) elements. The CRF was an approved duty description for RFA FY21 however, DoD did not approve the CRF for RFA FY22. A separate or updated RFA is required for this function to be available to CBP during a mass migration event. A CRF would provide DHS with assistance to enhance force protection, medical, aviation, and engineering capabilities. More specifically, the CRF should include additional support functions to include CDL Drivers, high-capacity Transportation Vehicles, high-capacity Field Holding Structures, security functions associated with the stand up of high-capacity field holding structures, medical, and high-capacity fixed wing support for moving both CBP personnel and migrants. DoD RFAs are submitted through the CBP Executive Agent as requirements are identified by CBP. This RFA needs to be approved yearly, all associated actions executable with preset timelines when CBP identifies emerging incidents and continues to evolve with the expanding MME problem sets impacting the country.
- c. The speed, number, and frequency of MMEs require DoD pre-coordinated assistance that is immediately responsive and agile. DHS always looks internally before seeking assistance outside the department. CBP currently does not have the organic resources to fill the various capability gaps identified during large mass migration events.

#### **SUMMARY**

The seventeen (17) day Mass Migration Event (MME) required a whole of government response to ensure the safety, rapid transport, and efficient processing of migrants from 58 different countries that illegally crossed into the United States and congregated under the Del Rio Port of Entry International Bridge. The MME was unlike anything that CBP had encountered in its history and at its peak, 14,921 migrants were staged under the bridge. CBP temporary holding facilities were already over capacity and local resources were inadequate to manage the speed and volume of migrants flowing into the United States. State, Local, and Community partners



responded to CBP's support request and exhausted all available resources to assist in managing the event. All Southwest Border Patrol Sectors assisted by sending personnel and resources to Del Rio and hundreds of Border Patrol agents and CBP officers from across the country arrived to assist.

A massive effort to care for the migrant's safety and basic needs was underway as ground and air transportation relocated thousands of migrants to facilities across the Southwest Border for processing. This unprecedented historical response to the MME successfully prevented any loss of life and treated hundreds of migrants in need of medical assistance. The Office of Field Operations played a key role in assisting the Border Patrol and in the closure of the Port of Entry was the turning point that increased safety and gained a greater response from the Government of Mexico and officials in the National Capital Region. The response by the State of Texas and the surge of Department of Public Safety Troopers was monumental.

Intelligence and open-source reporting have indicated that tens of thousands more migrants are traveling to the southern border of the United States that intend to make illegal entry. Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) elements have exploited policy changes and are facilitating the movement of migrants through the Western Hemisphere to the U.S. Southern Border with profit being the primary driving factor. National Security continues to be at greater risk as CBP collapses resources and personnel to manage large groups of migrants. TOC will continue to exploit our border in areas left vulnerable while CBP attends to MME as they occur. Policy changes and increased capacity and capabilities of all components and agencies that have a role in Border Security and thereby National Security, the immigration process, and the detention/adjudication continuum are needed for the humane and efficient management of mass migration.

**ANNEXES:**

- Annex A: Country Breakdown of Encounters
- Annex B: Supporting Personnel and Asset List
- Annex C: Photos


End of Report

## ANNEX A: Country Encounter Breakdown (September 8, 2021 to September 24, 2021)

	Deportable Aprehensions	T42 Delayed	T42 Immediate	Total	% of Encounters
ANDORRA	1	0	0	1	0%
ANGOLA	49	0	0	49	0%
ARGENTINA	3	0	0	3	0%
BAHAMAS	2	0	0	2	0%
BANGLADESH	1	0	0	1	0%
BENIN	1	0	0	1	0%
BOLIVIA	6	0	0	6	0%
BRAZIL	375	114	0	489	2%
BURKINA FASO	18	1	0	19	0%
CAMEROON	14	1	0	15	0%
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	2	0	0	2	0%
CHAD	3	0	0	3	0%
CHILE	1,626	520	0	2,146	11%
COLOMBIA	62	0	0	62	0%
CONGO	11	0	0	11	0%
COSTARICA	6	0	0	6	0%
CUBA	1,204	6	0	1,210	6%
CZECH REPUBLIC	2	0	0	2	0%
DEM REP OF THE CONGO	12	0	0	12	0%
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	54	1	0	55	0%
ECUADOR	35	12	0	47	0%
EL SALVADOR	4	8	3	15	0%
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2	0	0	2	0%
ERITREA	5	0	0	5	0%
ETHIOPIA	1	0	0	1	0%
FRANCE	2	1	0	3	0%
FRENCH GUIANA	5	0	0	5	0%
GAMBIA	2	0	0	2	0%
GHANA	50	0	0	50	0%
GUATEMALA	4	9	0	13	0%
GUINEA	23	0	0	23	0%
GUYANA	9	0	0	9	0%
HAITI	8,878	5,015	0	13,893	70%
HONDURAS	22	54	2	78	0%
MALI	3	0	0	3	0%
MAURITANIA	5	0	0	5	0%
MEXICO	31	69	0	100	1%
NICARAGUA	169	1	0	170	1%
NIGER	3	0	0	3	0%
NIGERIA	9	0	0	9	0%
PAKISTAN	5	0	0	5	0%
PANAMA	12	1	0	13	0%
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	1	0	0	1	0%
PERU	19	0	0	19	0%
PHILIPPINES	1	0	0	1	0%
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	1	0	0	1	0%
SENEGAL	48	2	0	50	0%
SIERRA LEONE	5	0	0	5	0%
SOMALIA	4	0	0	4	0%
SOUTH AFRICA	4	0	0	4	0%
SURINAME	1	0	0	1	0%
TAJIKISTAN	2	0	0	2	0%
TOGO	4	0	0	4	0%
TURKEY	1	0	0	1	0%
URUGUAY	23	0	0	23	0%
UZBEKISTAN	9	0	0	9	0%
VANUATU	1	0	0	1	0%
VENEZUELA	1,071	6	0	1,077	5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>13926</b>	<b>5821</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>19752</b>	

	FMJA	Sng e Adu t	UAC	Total	% of Encounters
ANDORRA	0	1	0	1	0%
ANGOLA	35	12	2	49	0%
ARGENTINA	2	1	0	3	0%
BAHAMAS	1	1	0	2	0%
BANGLADESH	0	1	0	1	0%
BENIN	0	1	0	1	0%
BOLIVIA	2	4	0	6	0%
BRAZIL	485	4	0	489	2%
BURKINA FASO	9	10	0	19	0%
CAMEROON	0	15	0	15	0%
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	0	2	0	2	0%
CHAD	3	0	0	3	0%
CHILE	2,144	1	1	2,146	11%
COLOMBIA	35	27	0	62	0%
CONGO	8	3	0	11	0%
COSTARICA	5	1	0	6	0%
CUBA	219	988	3	1,210	6%
CZECH REPUBLIC	2	0	0	2	0%
DEM REP OF THE CONGO	10	1	1	12	0%
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	25	29	1	55	0%
ECUADOR	32	15	0	47	0%
EL SALVADOR	8	6	1	15	0%
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	0	2	0	2	0%
ERITREA	0	5	0	5	0%
ETHIOPIA	0	1	0	1	0%
FRANCE	3	0	0	3	0%
FRENCH GUIANA	4	1	0	5	0%
GAMBIA	0	2	0	2	0%
GHANA	16	34	0	50	0%
GUATEMALA	10	3	0	13	0%
GUINEA	3	17	3	23	0%
GUYANA	9	0	0	9	0%
HAITI	6,805	7,063	25	13,893	70%
HONDURAS	45	25	8	78	0%
MALI	1	2	0	3	0%
MAURITANIA	0	5	0	5	0%
MEXICO	27	71	2	100	1%
NICARAGUA	69	98	3	170	1%
NIGER	3	0	0	3	0%
NIGERIA	4	5	0	9	0%
PAKISTAN	0	5	0	5	0%
PANAMA	12	1	0	13	0%
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	0	1	0	1	0%
PERU	12	7	0	19	0%
PHILIPPINES	1	0	0	1	0%
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	0	1	0	1	0%
SENEGAL	3	47	0	50	0%
SIERRA LEONE	4	1	0	5	0%
SOMALIA	0	4	0	4	0%
SOUTH AFRICA	0	4	0	4	0%
SURINAME	1	0	0	1	0%
TAJIKISTAN	0	2	0	2	0%
TOGO	0	4	0	4	0%
TURKEY	0	1	0	1	0%
URUGUAY	20	2	1	23	0%
UZBEKISTAN	0	9	0	9	0%
VANUATU	0	1	0	1	0%
VENEZUELA	569	500	8	1,077	5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,646</b>	<b>9,047</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>19,752</b>	

POE SUPPORT	9/17/21	9/18/21	9/19/21	9/20/21	9/21/21	9/22/21	9/23/21	9/24/21	9/25/21
	1327	1390	1954	2124	2266	2254	2150	1804	1585
USBP	154	218	381	405	465	605	501	473	356
OFO	90	83	212	298	270	368	368	368	368
ICE ERO	50	56	62	66	151	151	151	151	141
DHS VF	66	66	66	66	66	65	65	65	65
USMS	18	18	18	18	18	17	17	17	16
BOP	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	69	57
HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (HSI)	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
HSI SPECIAL RESPONSE TEAM / RAPID RESPONSE TEAM	54	54	54	55	54	54	54	54	0
TEXAS DPS	745	745	1000	1000	1000	745	745	439	451
TEXAS NATIONAL GUARD	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	40
SAN ANTONIO FIRE DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	15	0
DEL RIO POLICE DEPARTMENT	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0
KINNEY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE	0	0	5	5	5	0	0	0	0
VAL VERDE SHERIFF'S OFFICE	0	0	3	3	3	11	11	2	0
HHS/ASPR	0	0	0	55	81	81	81	81	81



Annex C  
Photo Annex  
Del Rio Mass Migration Event

LAYDOWN at ONSET



BUILDUP





Annex C  
Photo Annex  
Del Rio Mass Migration Event


FINAL LAYDOWN




(b) (7) (E)

Annex C  
Photo Annex  
Del Rio Mass Migration Event

September 16, 2021



September 17, 2021






Annex C  
Photo Annex  
Del Rio Mass Migration Event

September 18, 2021




September 19, 2021




Annex C  
Photo Annex  
Del Rio Mass Migration Event

September 22, 2021



September 22, 2021





Annex C  
Photo Annex  
Del Rio Mass Migration Event

September 23, 2021



September 24, 2021



Annex C  
Photo Annex  
Del Rio Mass Migration Event





Del Rio Mass Migration 09/2021  
Known Costs

Del Rio Surge Requirements	Projected O&S Costs	O&S Obligations
HHS Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) & Caregiver Services	\$5,500	\$5,500
Transportation Costs	\$6,324	\$6,324
Operational Costs	\$5,000	\$5,000
TDY	\$2,000	\$2,000
Overtime	\$2,600	\$2,600
Volunteer Force	\$500	\$500
AMO Flight Hours	\$728	\$728
Soft-Sided Facilities (SSF) and Medical Service Contract (MSC)**	-	-
<b>Del Rio Surge Requirements Total</b>	<b>\$22,652</b>	<b>\$22,652</b>

\* FY22 Q1 Projected Costs are not provided specific to Del Rio given they are embedded in the overall SWB costs.

\*\* Soft-Sided Facilities and Medical Service Contract costs are not specific to Del Rio; they are embedded in the overall SWB contracts.

Transportation Costs include ICE Air Flights: \$900K, DoD Flights: \$804K, Additional buses: \$800K, Additional bus service: \$3.7M

Operational Costs include water, food, Del Rio Civic Center, porta-johns, sanitary products, bridge trash clean-up, consumables for safety and sustainment.

TDY, OT, and Volunteer Force are estimates for Del Rio based on latest obligations; Del Rio Sector costs are embedded within overall SWB costs.

## **Surge Planning Considerations – Emerging Actions from Del Rio Mass Migration Event**

**September 8, 2021, to September 24, 2021**

Del Rio Sector (DRT) experienced an unprecedented number of migrant apprehensions that placed DRT in a critical state by overwhelming transportation, processing, and detention capacities. A complex issue quickly became chaotic as Emergency Operations increased and multiple components and outside agencies surged manpower and resources to the area. The unique situation did not allow for best practices to be implemented and emerging practices became the path forward for a crisis event the Border Patrol had not encountered in its history.

### **Emerging Practices and Response Considerations:**

- **Activate the Region VI or Region IX LFCs**
  - The Lead CBP Field Coordinator (LFC) is directed to develop and maintain a CBP Region Preparedness Plan that incorporates the coordinated plans and leverages the resources and capabilities of each OBP, OFO, and AMO component within the region.
  - The CBP Region Preparedness Plan will establish a CBP Region Mass Migration Task Force (MMTF). The MMTF provides the organizational framework to facilitate the assignment of roles to participating agencies, define processes for intra-departmental collaboration, and detect a mass migration event or other contingency operation.
  - Operation Vigilant Sentry Southwest describes the basic organization and structure by which the MMTF will deploy resources and direct multi-agency operations to address a potential or full-scale mass migration event.
- **Plan according to a Mass Casualty Type Event:**
  - Increase capacity and capability for feeding, medical, transportation, and holding.
  - Contracts were established with local restaurants to prepare meals. World Central Kitchen brought in for meal prep and distribution. They also consolidated local meal contracts into one CBP contract.
  - Sector MSS personnel were used to receive and distribute food and water while uniformed agents continued security and transport operations.
  - HHS DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Team) was activated for increased medical support. DMAT can provide advanced level care on site.
  - Bureau of Prison (BOP) bus drivers required deputization to provide support to CBP. Local CBP OCC was able to conduct the deputization. Approximately 48-hour lead time was needed to ensure compliance. The Commissioner's Action Group (CAG) coordinated BOP support.
  - All SWB Sectors assisted with holding processed and unprocessed migrants to reduce the total numbers in DRT staged at the POE bridge.
  - Consider all available operational and operational support resources to support MME (ex. MRT, Task Forces, & Checkpoints).
  - Calls for other federal, state, and local assistance should take place as early as possible.

- Sector Transportation Coordination Cell:
  - Consider limitations of local ICE/ERO office and contracted transportation services.
  - Transportation Coordination Cell consists of subject matter experts in flight operations and transportation coordination between sectors and contractual services.
  - Coordinate detainee transportation with receiving sectors and identify transporting components (CBP Contracted, USBP, DOJ).
  - Coordinate flight manifest requirements between transporting station/s and ICE/ERO
  - Coordinate transportation to flight lines
- Personnel Lodging Considerations:
  - At the onset of an imminent MME, sectors should immediately examine lodging availability and begin communicating with contractual service representatives to secure available lodging accommodations and other associated resources to support deployed personnel.
  - In instances where lodging through the local economy is not available, communicate with local officials for potential options, such as retrofitting city office space or convention centers.
- Designated Areas at IC for Supporting Agencies
  - Law Enforcement command and supporting elements should be considered when establishing the location of the Incident Command Post (ICP). The ICP should be comprised of a Mobile Command Center (MCC) located appropriately distanced from the incident site.
  - When establishing the ICP, the IC, Deputy ICs and planners should allocate adjacent or nearby footprints for support federal, state, and local LE partners to situate their command elements. Consider climate-controlled shelters for cooperating agency meetings and government or non-government delegation visits.
- Accountability
  - Identify an expedient process to account for migrants entering an established containment area. DRT utilized a ticket system to track the number of migrants making entry into the US. The same ticket system was also used to prioritize the order of movement of migrants during transport.
- Designated Areas for Medical and NGOs
  - Identify location/s for Medical sites such as mobile hospitals and decontamination sites.
  - Consider the location/s for feeding services that affords a practical distance from containment areas.
- Additional Hygiene and Sanitation Assistance
  - Medical recommendation as per CBP Office of Chief Medical Officer is 1 porta-johns per 32 persons.
  - Handwashing Stations 1 per 100 persons is recommended.

- Coordinate for additional bulk water delivery and water buffalo stations for drinking water and personal hygiene.
- Collapsible plastic water containers passed out upon arrival for individual use will support the CDC recommended amount of water for adequate life sustainment.
- Decontamination stations for agents: power washers for boots and water/bleach buckets for dunking.
- Ensure an early site visit by CBP HQ Personnel, White House Officials, or Commissioner Action Group
  - Firsthand visual assessment led to greater support. News and other official reporting do not provide the same impact as being on site.
  - Ensured financial assistance at a more rapid approval rate
  - Once the HQ visit was done, expect +72 hours for funding to start flowing.
- Establish a Regional Communication Representative to assist local PAO
  - Local PAO was overwhelmed with coordinating congressional and dignitary site visits.
  - Talking points and briefing memos were generated from the Regional Representative that assisted the Chief and IC
  - Ensured better coordination with Media and NGOs
  - Allowed IC personnel to focus on the operational requirements
- New Requests for Assistance (RFA) need to be established with DoD
  - The Crisis Response Force (CRF) activation would have provided a MP Company, Medical, Close Air Rotary Support, and Engineering Support. A phone call to the J3 at NORTHCOM is the requirement to activate the CRF. Note: The CRF was not approved by DoD for RFA FY22
  - RFAs should include: CDL Drivers, High-Capacity Transportation Vehicles, High-Capacity Field Holding Structures, High-Capacity Fixed Wing Support for moving both CBP personnel and migrants.
- Closure of POEs
  - Full closure of POE directly affected. Justification is for the safety of the migrants and the LE officials managing the scene.
  - Partial closure / lane reduction of adjacent POEs (ex. Eagle Pass POE closed all but one lane for all vehicles entering the US)
  - Closing the POE was the turning point to gains support from both the GOM as well as the NCR.
  - Implement a TFR (temporary flight restriction) for security and uninterrupted ISR assistance.
- MOU with the United States Coast Guard for fixed wing air support (National Level)
  - CONUS flights only. USBP personnel provided security
- Imbed ERO for assistance requirements / pre-coordination planning
  - Processing support and expedited file completion
  - Transportation surge
- Request for additional overtime funding
  - 6th day was mandated

- Option of 2-4 additional hours of OT per shift should be considered instead of a mandated 6<sup>th</sup> day to avoid burnout.
- Consider requests for bi-weekly overtime cap waivers for personnel expected to work beyond Congressionally mandated bi-weekly limits.