WEBVTT 00:00:11.410 --> 00:00:13.098 >> Assistant Commissioner Alles, 00:00:13.098 --> 00:00:14.475 thank you for taking the time to talk about 00:00:14.475 --> 00:00:17.330 CBP's unmanned aircraft program. 00:00:17.330 --> 00:00:19.762 As you know, a recent Inspector General's report 00:00:19.762 --> 00:00:24.011 concluded that the program has not achieved expected results 00:00:24.011 --> 00:00:25.938 and I quote from the report: 00:00:25.938 --> 00:00:31.682 "CBP cannot demonstrate how much the program has improved border security." 00:00:31.682 --> 00:00:33.850 Is that a reasonable conclusion? 00:00:33.850 --> 00:00:36.913 >> No, I don't think it's a reasonable conclusion. 00:00:36.913 --> 00:00:39.754 The report, in our estimation, 00:00:39.754 --> 00:00:43.249 fundamentally misses what we use the platforms for. 00:00:43.249 --> 00:00:46.410 So the platform provides us domain awareness. 00:00:46.410 --> 00:00:48.393 And from that standpoint it's part of 00:00:48.393 --> 00:00:52.434 a larger CBP system of technology to help secure our borders. 00:00:52.434 --> 00:00:54.874 So it's not a stand-alone system by itself. 00:00:54.874 --> 00:00:57.897 The report also, as we looked at it, 00:00:57.897 --> 00:01:00.818 did not consider key parts of what the system actually did. 00:01:00.818 --> 00:01:05.098 So a for instance is, in the year that the report was actually written, 00:01:05.098 --> 00:01:08.185 they omitted the fact, at least in their stats, 00:01:08.185 --> 00:01:10.377 that the report actually, the platform actually 00:01:10.377 --> 00:01:14.881 was responsible for seizures in the amount of 341 million dollars. 00:01:14.881 --> 00:01:17.649 That's a pretty substantial amount for any particular platform. 00:01:17.649 --> 00:01:19.546 We had a very high return on the investment. 00:01:19.546 --> 00:01:22.626 So I think they miss key parts of what the platform does, 00:01:22.626 --> 00:01:25.402 particularly in the area of domain awareness. 00:01:25.402 --> 00:01:26.969 >> What is the return on investment? 00:01:26.969 --> 00:01:29.298 How much have taxpayers invested in this 00:01:29.298 --> 00:01:33.010 and how do you determine what return on investment is? 00:01:33.010 --> 00:01:36.122 >> So the way, the way we have done that, 00:01:36.122 --> 00:01:41.730 is we looked at the numbers that the OIG came up to $12,000 per hour flight, 00:01:41.730 --> 00:01:44.531 cost per hour that they estimated. 00:01:44.531 --> 00:01:49.041 And we calculated that against return of the platform itself. 00:01:49.041 --> 00:01:51.602 So for instance, in the life of the program, 00:01:51.602 --> 00:01:55.306 its returned 1.2 billion dollars of contraband, 00:01:55.306 --> 00:01:57.898 which is a return on investment of $41,000, 00:01:57.898 --> 00:02:00.922 almost $42,000 per flight hour 00:02:00.922 --> 00:02:04.185 and that is a 242 percent return on investment. 00:02:04.185 --> 00:02:06.369 So that's across the life of the program. 00:02:06.369 --> 00:02:08.065 In the year the IG did the report, 00:02:08.065 --> 00:02:11.714 it had a 444 percent return on investment, so pretty substantial, I'd say. 00:02:11.714 --> 00:02:13.290 Better than, you know, better than, 00:02:13.290 --> 00:02:16.154 you know, most other platforms, I think. 00:02:16.154 --> 00:02:18.091 >> Speaking of statistics then, 00:02:18.091 --> 00:02:22.753 the IG report claims the program isn't meeting its flight hour goals, 00:02:22.753 --> 00:02:28.506 specifically claims that CBP anticipated four 16-hour flights a day, 00:02:28.506 --> 00:02:33.297 for a total of 23,296 flight hours. 00:02:33.297 --> 00:02:38.897 It reported that instead the aircraft has logged 5,102 flight hours, 00:02:38.897 --> 00:02:41.601 80 percent less than anticipated. 00:02:41.601 --> 00:02:43.537 First, are these numbers accurate? 00:02:43.537 --> 00:02:45.497 And if so, how do you explain the difference? 00:02:45.497 --> 00:02:48.834 >> So the 23,000 hours is the calculation they performed, 00:02:48.834 --> 00:02:52.049 which assumed the airplane would be airborne almost all the time, 00:02:52.049 --> 00:02:54.265 which was never our intent. 00:02:54.265 --> 00:02:57.698 The 5100 hour figure is correct; that's the amount we flew it 00:02:57.698 --> 00:03:02.130 in fiscal year '13, roughly I think, 5,112, something like that. 00:03:02.130 --> 00:03:05.761 So what they assumed from looking at our con ops 00:03:05.761 --> 00:03:09.050 is that we were going to fly the airplane 16 hours a day, 00:03:09.050 --> 00:03:11.097 you know, seven days a week 00:03:11.097 --> 00:03:15.154 and they multiplied that times my platforms to get the 22,000, 23,000 hours. 00:03:15.154 --> 00:03:17.017 That's not our intent. 00:03:17.017 --> 00:03:18.361 What we want is to have the capability 00:03:18.361 --> 00:03:21.281 to operate the platform in those time windows. 00:03:21.281 --> 00:03:24.266 We operate the platform when it needs to fly. 00:03:24.266 --> 00:03:27.418 To use it more than we need it is simply a waste of taxpayers' dollars. 00:03:27.418 --> 00:03:31.457 So in this case, we had money to operate it 5100 hours, which is what we did. 00:03:31.457 --> 00:03:35.114 To operate it, I would say, at 23,000 hours per year would be irresponsible. 00:03:35.114 --> 00:03:37.961 That would be almost 2500 hours per platform 00:03:37.961 --> 00:03:41.210 and the aircraft would literally wear out in four or five years. 00:03:41.210 --> 00:03:43.507 It wouldn't have any more UASs. 00:03:43.507 --> 00:03:45.401 I'd be completely out of them. 00:03:45.401 --> 00:03:47.867 And that would be, in the end, not serve the taxpayer well, 00:03:47.867 --> 00:03:50.626 because I would have a critical element of our border security apparatus 00:03:50.626 --> 00:03:52.513 that was no longer available. 00:03:52.513 --> 00:03:54.434 >> Now one of the things the report says is that 00:03:54.434 --> 00:03:59.186 the unmanned aircraft don't operate along the entire southwest border. 00:03:59.186 --> 00:04:01.401 Is that true? 00:04:01.401 --> 00:04:04.113 And if so, how can the aircraft achieve its mission 00:04:04.113 --> 00:04:07.169 if it's not operating along the entire border? 00:04:07.169 --> 00:04:09.337 >> So a couple of things there. 00:04:09.337 --> 00:04:13.049 First off, the aircraft can operate along our entire border. 00:04:13.049 --> 00:04:15.098 It has permission to do that. 00:04:15.098 --> 00:04:17.490 It has done that in some capacity. 00:04:17.490 --> 00:04:21.073 However, we employ the aircraft in the majority of its time 00:04:21.073 --> 00:04:23.417 in the areas it needs to be utilized. 00:04:23.417 --> 00:04:25.457 In the year that this report was written, 00:04:25.457 --> 00:04:29.354 most of our activity was in the Tucson area of sector of operations 00:04:29.354 --> 00:04:31.889 where our joint field command is 00:04:31.889 --> 00:04:34.761 and that's where we put a lot of our effort in those years. 00:04:34.761 --> 00:04:37.266 After that, it's in the Rio Grande Valley area. 00:04:37.266 --> 00:04:40.866 We know through using technology such as coherent change detection, 00:04:40.866 --> 00:04:43.561 areas of the border that have very low activity levels. 00:04:43.561 --> 00:04:46.665 And there's no reason to put technology or agents or aircraft 00:04:46.665 --> 00:04:49.081 over those areas with any degree of frequency, 00:04:49.081 --> 00:04:51.138 because there's not anything occurring. 00:04:51.138 --> 00:04:53.602 So in those areas, we just need to validate occasionally 00:04:53.602 --> 00:04:55.505 that we have low activity levels 00:04:55.505 --> 00:04:57.443 and you need to devote your resources to those areas 00:04:57.443 --> 00:04:59.337 that have your high activity levels. 00:04:59.337 --> 00:05:01.106 And this year it was the Tucson area 00:05:01.106 --> 00:05:03.457 and then after that the Rio Grande Valley areas. 00:05:03.457 --> 00:05:05.810 And that's where the bulk of the hours went in those years. 00:05:05.810 --> 00:05:08.570 And in fact, even this year, fiscal year '15, 00:05:08.570 --> 00:05:11.481 the bulk of our hours will go in those two particular areas 00:05:11.481 --> 00:05:13.577 in terms of border security. 00:05:13.577 --> 00:05:17.281 That doesn't mean the rest of the border is not patrolled; it certainly is. 00:05:17.281 --> 00:05:22.401 But we devote again the majority of our hours to the high-risk areas 00:05:22.401 --> 00:05:26.113 and we monitor the low-risk areas by other means. 00:05:26.113 --> 00:05:28.841 >> Since we're on the topic of operations, 00:05:28.841 --> 00:05:33.697 the Inspector General reported that CBP could attribute only quote, unquote, 00:05:33.697 --> 00:05:37.081 "relatively few number of apprehensions, 00:05:37.081 --> 00:05:44.441 2,272, in Arizona and Texas in fiscal 2013 00:05:44.441 --> 00:05:47.617 to the unmanned aircraft program." 00:05:47.617 --> 00:05:54.321 Is that an accurate appraisal of how this system operates? 00:05:54.321 --> 00:05:56.691 >> So the apprehension numbers are roughly correct, 00:05:56.691 --> 00:06:00.697 mine are slightly higher, but not, you know, they're in the noise level. 00:06:00.697 --> 00:06:03.640 So we'll accept that level as the apprehension numbers. 00:06:03.640 --> 00:06:06.401 But again, it misses what the platform does overall. 00:06:06.401 --> 00:06:08.921 It doesn't just participate in apprehensions. 00:06:08.921 --> 00:06:11.129 In fact, it's used for domain awareness. 00:06:11.129 --> 00:06:12.858 The VADER radar system is a system 00:06:12.858 --> 00:06:15.337 that sees people walking across the border. 00:06:15.337 --> 00:06:18.867 We fly the aircraft down the border to strip the border with that system 00:06:18.867 --> 00:06:20.969 and see what kind of movement we have 00:06:20.969 --> 00:06:23.257 and pass that information to border patrol agents 00:06:23.257 --> 00:06:25.657 so that can actually affect an apprehension. 00:06:25.657 --> 00:06:28.417 We don't stay on site until the apprehension occurs, 00:06:28.417 --> 00:06:31.017 because again it's a broad area of surveillance device. 00:06:31.017 --> 00:06:33.074 It's providing domain awareness. 00:06:33.074 --> 00:06:36.602 It's directing a multitude of agents, not just a couple, 00:06:36.602 --> 00:06:42.546 a multitude of agents onto immigrants that are crossing our U.S. border. 00:06:42.546 --> 00:06:45.185 >> Now you do agree in some parts of the report 00:06:45.185 --> 00:06:47.129 with Inspector General's findings. 00:06:47.129 --> 00:06:50.714 For example, on the need to create performance measures. 00:06:50.714 --> 00:06:52.537 What's the status of that? 00:06:52.537 --> 00:06:55.249 >> So I would, I would agree that we need to have 00:06:55.249 --> 00:06:57.642 better metrics on the employment of the system. 00:06:57.642 --> 00:07:00.506 And some of these are actually very difficult to develop. 00:07:00.506 --> 00:07:03.834 I mean, how do you rate the value of a platform that, 00:07:03.834 --> 00:07:06.881 for instance, provides presence for an officer 00:07:06.881 --> 00:07:12.162 that's in a dangerous situation and helps protect the safety of an officer? 00:07:12.162 --> 00:07:14.858 Well, you can't actually establish a monetary value on that. 00:07:14.858 --> 00:07:16.993 So those are some of our difficulties. 00:07:16.993 --> 00:07:19.898 But I think overall, I think the IG has a valid criticism 00:07:19.898 --> 00:07:22.146 that we need to develop better metrics for the system 00:07:22.146 --> 00:07:23.707 and we're working on that currently. 00:07:23.707 --> 00:07:26.649 So we're going to go out to private industry and see what they have, 00:07:26.649 --> 00:07:30.249 potentially is best practices and use those, 00:07:30.249 --> 00:07:32.162 basically engage a private contractor 00:07:32.162 --> 00:07:35.146 to develop those best practices into metrics 00:07:35.146 --> 00:07:39.091 that we can use on the platform and evaluate its utility more effectively. 00:07:39.091 --> 00:07:41.426 I think we see its utility in other areas. 00:07:41.426 --> 00:07:43.761 I've described that in terms of contraband seizures, 00:07:43.761 --> 00:07:45.658 in terms of domain awareness. 00:07:45.658 --> 00:07:48.330 I think those are all valid measures of performance. 00:07:48.330 --> 00:07:50.643 But there are other things that I think we can do 00:07:50.643 --> 00:07:52.698 to assess the utility of the platform, 00:07:52.698 --> 00:07:56.345 overall to the border security structure that we have in the United States. 00:07:56.345 --> 00:07:58.762 >> Now one thing that you disagreed with the Inspector General, 00:07:58.762 --> 00:08:05.458 was there contention that CBP has plans to spend 443 million dollars 00:08:05.458 --> 00:08:08.978 to expand the fleet by 14 more aircraft? 00:08:08.978 --> 00:08:11.714 What are CBP's plans for the fleet? 00:08:11.714 --> 00:08:13.762 >> So a couple of things on that. 00:08:13.762 --> 00:08:17.505 Currently our plan for the fleet is to keep the nine aircraft that we have. 00:08:17.505 --> 00:08:20.945 We'd like to replace the tenth aircraft that we ditched last year 00:08:20.945 --> 00:08:23.969 in the Pacific Ocean due to a, due to a generator failure. 00:08:23.969 --> 00:08:25.554 We'd like to do that. 00:08:25.554 --> 00:08:28.138 Beyond that, I want to get higher levels of operation utility 00:08:28.138 --> 00:08:31.730 out of the aircraft before I think about any kind of expansion. 00:08:31.730 --> 00:08:34.137 Now we sent a letter to the Assistant General, 00:08:34.137 --> 00:08:36.890 Assistant Inspector General for audits in October, 00:08:36.890 --> 00:08:40.258 before the report was issued and told them we had no plans, 00:08:40.258 --> 00:08:43.482 no immediate plans to buy any more platforms. 00:08:43.482 --> 00:08:45.890 And for some reason the IG did not, 00:08:45.890 --> 00:08:49.138 was not willing to accept that as our position. 00:08:49.138 --> 00:08:52.370 We currently have no money in the budget to purchase additional platforms 00:08:52.370 --> 00:08:55.417 and I currently am committed to not buying any more platforms 00:08:55.417 --> 00:08:58.241 until we fully operationalize what we, 00:08:58.241 --> 00:09:01.755 fully operationalize the platforms that we have. 00:09:01.755 --> 00:09:03.682 And just as an example, 00:09:03.682 --> 00:09:07.801 last year when the Senate wanted to up our numbers of UAVs to 24. 00:09:07.801 --> 00:09:09.769 And we basically told the Senate and the House 00:09:09.769 --> 00:09:11.898 we would prefer that you not do that, 00:09:11.898 --> 00:09:15.026 that you not give us more platforms in your border bills, 00:09:15.026 --> 00:09:18.626 that we work on operationalizing and getting better utility 00:09:18.626 --> 00:09:20.970 out of the platforms that we currently have. 00:09:20.970 --> 00:09:24.370 So we're not interested in purchasing more at the current time. 00:09:24.370 --> 00:09:28.385 >> How do these aircraft differ from unmanned military aircraft? 00:09:28.385 --> 00:09:30.449 >> So a couple of significant differences. 00:09:30.449 --> 00:09:32.402 First off, our aircraft are not armed. 00:09:32.402 --> 00:09:34.674 In the military, a variance of these aircraft are armed 00:09:34.674 --> 00:09:37.458 and these are aircraft that can't be armed. 00:09:37.458 --> 00:09:41.026 Secondly, these aircraft are operated by trained law enforcement officers. 00:09:41.026 --> 00:09:44.426 So these law enforcement officers are trained on the U.S. Constitution, 00:09:44.426 --> 00:09:48.226 what they are allowed to and not allowed to do as a law enforcement officer. 00:09:48.226 --> 00:09:51.817 They are trained to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of American citizens. 00:09:51.817 --> 00:09:54.618 That means against unreasonable search and seizure. 00:09:54.618 --> 00:09:56.266 They are trained to know where they can 00:09:56.266 --> 00:09:59.794 and can't utilize this platform to collect information. 00:09:59.794 --> 00:10:03.378 So there are substantial protections given by the fact 00:10:03.378 --> 00:10:06.258 it's run by a trained law enforcement officer. 00:10:06.258 --> 00:10:08.018 >> You mentioned the U.S. Constitution. 00:10:08.018 --> 00:10:11.370 Does CBP have any rules or policies in addition to 00:10:11.370 --> 00:10:15.021 that designed to protect the privacy of American citizens? 00:10:15.021 --> 00:10:17.174 >> So a couple of things that we do have in place. 00:10:17.174 --> 00:10:20.333 There is a privacy impact assessment on the UAS program 00:10:20.333 --> 00:10:22.774 that was produced by CBP last year. 00:10:22.774 --> 00:10:26.356 There is a UAS unmanned air systems best practices 00:10:26.356 --> 00:10:28.878 put out by the Department of Homeland Security 00:10:28.878 --> 00:10:33.117 and there is also a policy put out by my office, Air and Marine, 00:10:33.117 --> 00:10:37.093 that dictates how we'll use the aircraft and how we'll protect privacy. 00:10:37.093 --> 00:10:39.478 Now a couple of things about our platform. 00:10:39.478 --> 00:10:41.205 It flies very high. 00:10:41.205 --> 00:10:43.269 It's typically flying at 20,000 feet. 00:10:43.269 --> 00:10:46.205 So it actually does not collect, it can't recognize a face. 00:10:46.205 --> 00:10:49.678 It can't recognize, identify a person at those kinds of altitudes. 00:10:49.678 --> 00:10:53.549 The best we are doing is to determine if the person is carrying a backpack 00:10:53.549 --> 00:10:56.077 or maybe they have a long arm that they're carrying. 00:10:56.077 --> 00:10:59.342 But beyond that we can't really identify any features about 00:10:59.342 --> 00:11:02.437 the person that we would call personally identifiable information. 00:11:02.437 --> 00:11:04.262 So that's one aspect of it. 00:11:04.262 --> 00:11:08.117 So the second aspect is the drones operate predominantly on the borders. 00:11:08.117 --> 00:11:10.645 That's where the vast majority of our flight hours go. 00:11:10.645 --> 00:11:13.157 It's supporting the border patrol and their border patrol mission 00:11:13.157 --> 00:11:16.214 or potentially doing operations in the transit zone, 00:11:16.214 --> 00:11:19.133 interdicting drug runners outside of the United States. 00:11:19.133 --> 00:11:20.501 So it's not like we're, 00:11:20.501 --> 00:11:24.285 we're doing a lot of interior operations in the United States. 00:11:24.285 --> 00:11:26.349 Predominantly again we go on the borders and again, 00:11:26.349 --> 00:11:27.629 due to the altitude of the aircraft, 00:11:27.629 --> 00:11:29.277 we're not seeing a lot of this information. 00:11:29.277 --> 00:11:31.326 We don't retain the information. 00:11:31.326 --> 00:11:34.973 We have a limited amount of storage for the video that we collect. 00:11:34.973 --> 00:11:38.869 And about every 30 days that information is over written on those tapes. 00:11:38.869 --> 00:11:40.973 So it's not something we're keeping long-term, 00:11:40.973 --> 00:11:43.821 unless it's evidence for a case that's underway. 00:11:43.821 --> 00:11:45.821 So if we collect criminal evidence, 00:11:45.821 --> 00:11:48.741 then we are going to secure that through our evidentiary chain, 00:11:48.741 --> 00:11:52.093 our chain of custody and take it as evidence into court. 00:11:52.093 --> 00:11:53.909 And that we'd retain, you know, 00:11:53.909 --> 00:11:58.509 as long as the case is active, you know, however long that takes. 00:11:58.509 --> 00:12:00.933 >> Assistant Commissioner Alles, thank you so much for taking the time. 00:12:00.933 --> 00:12:02.966 >> You're welcome. 00:12:02.966 --> 00:12:05.589 >> For more information about CBP's response to the IG report, 00:12:05.589 --> 00:12:10.414 visit our webpage at www.cbp.gov. 00:12:10.414 --> 00:12:13.909 And click on the tab "Speeches and Statements". 00:12:13.909 --> 00:12:15.789 To view UAS achievements, 00:12:15.789 --> 00:12:20.709 please click on the tab "Milestones and Achievements".